

***EU-Themen auf der Agenda:  
Chancen und Restriktionen politischer Kommunikation  
im Europawahlkampf 2014***

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vorgelegt von Andreas Severin Jansen (geb. Bathelt)

geboren am 28.05.1981 in Stuttgart

1. Berichterstatterin: Prof. Dr. Michaela Maier
2. Berichterstatter: JProf. Dr. Christian von Sikorski

Vorsitzende des Promotionsausschusses: Prof. Dr. Melanie Steffens

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## Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit den Chancen und Restriktionen, denen Parteien im Wahlkampf der supranationalen Ebene der EU begegnen. Mittels kommunikationswissenschaftlicher Konzepte des Agenda-Settings (Fokus: Medien) und Agenda-Buildings (Fokus: Parteien) wird anhand des Wahlkampfs zur Wahl des Europäischen Parlaments (EP) 2014 erstens analysiert, inwieweit es Parteien in Zeiten zunehmender Europäisierung bei gleichzeitig erstarkendem Euroskeptizismus im Wahlkampf gelingt, die EU als Thema auf die mediale Agenda zu setzen und ob sich etablierte Parteien diesem Trend und so zu einer Normalisierung des Wahlkampfs beitragen können. Zweitens wird untersucht, ob Parteien ihren strukturellen Vorteil, die mediale Agenda auch auf supranationaler Ebene im Wahlkampf beeinflussen zu können, im Rahmen des EP-Wahlkampfs genutzt haben. Drittens wird geprüft, ob sich Parteien durch die Ablehnung der EU-Integration und der damit verbundenen, konflikthaften Kommunikation einen Vorteil für die Sichtbarkeit ihrer Kampagnen verschaffen können. Viertens und abschließend wird erforscht, ob Agenda-Building die Rangfolge spezifischer politischer Themenfelder auf der medialen Agenda auch im europäischen Kontext beeinflussen kann.

Die Analysen zeigen *erstens*, dass ein europapolitischer Fokus der Wahlkampfkommunikation nicht mehr nur auf Seiten der kleinen (euroskeptischen) Parteien zu finden ist. Verfolgen die Parteien einen europapolitischen Fokus in ihrer Wahlkampfkommunikation, haben sie *zweitens* gute Chancen, in der Medienberichterstattung präsent zu sein. *Drittens* stellt sich ein negativer Tenor der Parteienkommunikation nicht als ausschlaggebend für die Sichtbarkeit der Parteien im Wahlkampf heraus. Eine klare Positionierung auf politischen Sachfragen bereitet Parteien *viertens* auch auf die Restriktionen der weiteren Ausbildung einer europäischen Themenagenda vor. Die Arbeit schließt nach einer Diskussion dieser Ergebnisse mit einer Einschätzung der Analyselimitationen und einem Ausblick auf weitere Forschungsansätze.

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## 1. Einleitung

In Zeiten supranationaler institutioneller Settings wird Regierungshandeln auf staatlicher Ebene zunehmend durch Entscheidungen in übergeordneten Institutionen beeinflusst. Besonders in der Europäischen Union (EU) werden staatliche Herrschaftsaufgaben übernommen, die somit auf die Lebenswirklichkeit ihrer Bürgerinnen und Bürger direkt Einfluss nimmt. Historisch gesehen ist die EU im Zuge der europäischen Integration zu einem Staatenverbund mit über 512,4 Millionen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern gewachsen (European Commission, 2019). Dennoch blieb sie lange Zeit ein Projekt der politischen Eliten (De Vreese, 2003; Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004; Gerhards, 2000), selbst im Zuge der Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (EP) zeigten Medien und Wähler geringes Interesse (Holtz-Bacha, 2005; für einen Ländervergleich zur EP-Wahl 1989 siehe Cayrol, 1991).

Eine europäische Öffentlichkeit und Identität ist ebenso wie ein breitangelegter politischer Diskurs in der Öffentlichkeit erst in den letzten Jahren zu beobachten (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2005). In der Wahrnehmung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger gewinnt die EU zunehmend an Relevanz, da sie allgemeingültige politische Entscheidungen trifft. Somit rücken Entscheidungen der EU auf ausdifferenzierten Themenbereichen (Boomgaarden et al., 2013) in den Mittelpunkt öffentlicher politischer Diskussionen (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). Die EU wird zunehmend politisiert (Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Kriesi, 2009), die Bürgerinnen und Bürger können Position beziehen (Wilde, 2007). Die Entstehung (auch kritischer) politischer Einstellungen im europäischen Kontext (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & De Vreese, 2011; Maier & Rittberger, 2008; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004) kann dabei als eine *Normalisierung demokratischer Willensbildung* oder im Falle euroskeptischer Einstellungen als *Gefahr für die Integration der EU* als Ganzes verstanden werden (Bijmans, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2018). Der gesellschaftliche Diskurs wird im Regelfall der Normalisierung über Medien und Parteien öffentlich geführt (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Kriesi, 2009), eine Repräsentation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger erfolgt klassisch über die Partizipation an Wahlen zum EP – als Organ der unmittelbaren Vertretung. Gerade in Wahlkampfzeiten lässt sich die Manifestation des politischen Diskurses beobachten. Medienberichterstattung beeinflusst die öffentliche Meinung (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010) und Parteien werben immer professionalisierter um Stimmen (Hopmann, Elmelund-Præstekær, Albæk, & De Vreese, 2009). Um also erfolgreich in Wahlkämpfen zu sein, benötigen Parteien

Berichterstattung in den Medien, um ihre Positionen den Wählerinnen und Wählern zu präsentieren. Aus kampagnenstrategischer Sicht stehen die Parteien also vor der Frage, inwieweit sie ihre europapolitische Wahlkampfkommunikation an die Nachfrage aus dem Elektorat anpassen und wie erfolgreich sie damit die EU als Thema oder spezifische europäische Politikfelder (Boomgaarden et al., 2013) in den Medien platzieren können.

Insofern kommt der Erforschung der Interaktion der Kommunikation von Parteien und Medien – in ihrer Funktion zur Unterstützung der Willensbildung im Elektorat (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010) – entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Forschung in nationalen Kontexten analysiert, inwieweit sich Parteien und Medien in der Darstellung des öffentlichen Diskurses wechselseitig beeinflussen (Bartels, 1996; Soroka, 2002b; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008) und geht bei kurzfristigen Effekten von einer Dominanz der Parteien in Wahlkampfzeiten aus (Brandenburg, 2002; Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; Dearing & Rogers, 2010; Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010; Hopmann, Elmelund-Præstekær, Albæk, Vliegenthart, & De Vreese, 2012; Soroka, 2003). Auch für vergangene Europawahlkämpfe deutet die bisherige Forschung darauf hin, dass aufgrund des geringen Nachrichtenwertes der EU politische Akteure wie Parteien die EU auf die Themenagenda bringen (Adam, 2007; De Vreese, 2003; Jalali & Silva, 2011; Machill, Beiler, & Fischer, 2006; Schuck & De Vreese, 2011). Dennoch haben gerade etablierte pro-europäische Parteien lange Zeit die EU als Themenfeld ignoriert. Analog zum Desinteresse der Bürger (Holtz-Bacha, 2005) haben sie Europa in ihren Kampagnen nicht ansprechen müssen (Blumler & Thoveron, 1983; Hoeglinger, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012; Mattila & Raunio, 2012; Petithomme, 2012; Weber, 2007). Mit der Veränderung des europäischen Diskurses und dem erfolgreichen Aufkommen neuer, euroskeptischer Parteien (Taggart, 1998; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2011) mehren sich die Anzeichen, dass auch etablierte Parteien auf EU-Themen abstellen (Adam & Maier, 2016; Jalali & Silva, 2011; Janda, Harmel, Edens, & Goff, 1995; Spoon, Hobolt, & De Vries, 2014), sich also eine Normalisierung des Europawahlkampfes hin zu europäischen Themen abzeichnet. Dies kann Interaktionseffekte zwischen Medienberichterstattung und Parteienkommunikation beeinflussen, da nun nicht mehr nur kleine, euroskeptische Parteien Wahlkampfkommunikation mit europäischem Fokus betreiben (Adam et al., 2017). Damit ergibt sich für auch für etablierte Parteien ein Gelegenheitsfenster, nicht nur national, sondern auch auf supranationaler, europäischer Ebene den medialen Diskurs stärker zu beeinflussen. Inwieweit dies der Fall ist, ist jedoch weitgehend unklar.

Betrachtet man darüber hinaus spezifische Themenfelder, so zeigen Ergebnisse aus nationalen Kontexten, dass Medienberichterstattung ihre Relevanz beeinflussen kann (Soroka, 2003; Walgrave et al., 2008). Für den Europawahlkampf haben Maier, Bacherle, Adam und Leidecker-Sandmann (2017) nachgewiesen, dass einzelne Medienberichte durchaus den Europafokus der Parteien beeinflussen können.

Die Struktur der Interaktion zwischen Parteienkommunikation und Medienberichterstattung ist also einem Wandel unterworfen, der möglicherweise zu stärkerer, wechselseitiger Beeinflussung zwischen Medien und Parteien führt. Unklar ist zudem, ob länderspezifische Charakteristika und Eigenschaften der nationalen Parteienspektren die Interaktionseffekte beeinflussen. Mit Blick auf den unterschiedlich stark ausgeprägten Euroskeptizismus in den Parteienspektren sowie den divergierenden Mediensystemen liegen potentielle Einflussgrößen vor, die die Wahlkampfkommunikation nur durch den Einbezug verschiedener Mitgliedsstaaten näher beleuchten kann (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011).

Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, diese Interaktion mithilfe einer umfassenden, international vergleichenden Inhaltsanalyse der Medienberichterstattung (Nachrichtenartikel) sowie der Parteienkommunikation (Pressemitteilungen) während des Wahlkampfes zur Europawahl 2014 zu erforschen. Es soll die Frage beantwortet werden, wie erfolgreich Parteien in ihrer europafokussierten Wahlkampfkommunikation auftreten und welchen Restriktionen sie dabei unterliegen. Um den Forschungsgegenstand theoriegeleitet zu analysieren, erfolgt zunächst eine kommunikationswissenschaftliche Einordnung der Konzepte *Agenda-Setting* und *Agenda-Building* in Bezug auf europäische Wahlkampfebene, um eine definitorische Abgrenzung der Wirkungsrichtungen zu erzielen, Implikationen vorhandener Forschung aufzuzeigen und dezidierte Forschungsfragen für die folgenden Analysen zu entwickeln (vgl. Kap. 2). Im Anschluss erfolgt in Kapitel 3 eine Darstellung der dieser Arbeit zugrundeliegenden vier Analysen, mithilfe derer die Beantwortung der Forschungsfrage vorgenommen wird, sowie der zugrundeliegenden Datenbasis. Kapitel 4, 5, 6 und 7 bilden das Kernstück der Arbeit und geben die Analysen wieder, die jeweils einleitend theoretisch verortet und deren Ergebnisse in einem abschließenden Zwischenfazit verdeutlicht werden. Kapitel 8 fasst die Analysen abschließend zusammen und bewertet die Ergebnisse unter Betrachtung ihrer Implikationen für die Parteienkommunikation in Europawahlkämpfen, bevor in Kapitel 9 auf Einschränkungen der Analysen und weitere Forschungsmöglichkeiten eingegangen wird.

## 2. Theoretische Grundannahmen

Klassische Ansätze der *Agenda-Setting-Forschung* betrachten Medien als Einflussfaktor dafür, welche Themen für Wählerinnen und Wähler Relevanz besitzen (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shaw & McCombs, 1977). *Agenda-Setting-Effekte* sind dabei abhängig von Eigenschaften des Rezipienten und der Mediennutzung (Maurer, 2010) sowie realen Ereignissen (Funkhouser, 1973). Effekte sind nur dann zu erwarten, wenn die jeweiligen Themen für die Empfängerinnen und Empfänger Relevanz besitzen (Erbring, Goldenberg, & Miller, 1980; Rössler, 1997). Im Zuge der Politisierung der EU ist dies gegeben, wenn diese Wahlentscheidungen bei der Wahl des Europäischen Parlaments treffen müssen. Folgerichtig erweisen sich *Agenda-Setting-Effekte* dann als besonders erfolgreich, wenn im Wahlkampf Wahlwerbung und Medienberichterstattung zusammenkommen (für nationale Forschung: Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; Damore, 2004; Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave et al., 2008) und auf erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit der Bevölkerung treffen (Sarcinelli & Schatz, 2002).

### 2.1. Agenda-Setting und Agenda-Building

In Abgrenzung zu klassischen Ansätzen – also der Messung von Interaktionseffekten zwischen Medien und Bevölkerung – ist es ebenso möglich, dass politische Akteure wie Parteien die Agenda der Medien beeinflussen (Maurer, 2010). Sarcinelli (2002, S. 22–26) verdeutlicht die Unterscheidung zwischen *Agenda-Setting* (Medien wirken auf → Bürgerinnen und Bürger), *Policy-Agenda-Setting* (Medien → Parteien) und *Agenda-Building* (Parteien → Medien). Zu beachten ist, dass die Trennung nach *Agenda-Setting* und *Policy-Agenda-Setting* darauf verweist, dass bei *Policy-Agenda-Setting* für die Bevölkerung wichtige Themenfelder zur Bearbeitung an Entscheidungsträger übermittelt werden sollen. Da im Folgenden keine Effekte der Medien auf die Bürgerinnen und Bürger untersucht werden, wird der Effekt von Medien auf Parteien verkürzt als *Agenda-Setting* bezeichnet, um im Weiteren der Verdeutlichung der Effektrichtungen dienlich zu sein. Im Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit steht somit das Verhältnis von *Agenda-Building* und *Agenda-Setting* auf Ebene der generellen, europafokussierten

Kommunikation sowie zu spezifischen EU-Themen und die Untersuchung von Einflussfaktoren für erfolgreiches *Agenda-Building* durch Parteien im EP-Wahlkampf.

## **2.2. Die EU auf der Agenda: EU-Agenda-Building durch Parteien?**

Im Kontext einer Politisierung europäischer Wahlkämpfe (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Van der Brug, Gattermann, & Vreese, 2016) steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Wahlentscheidungen aufgrund von Informationen zu Diskussionen über Sachfragenpositionen mit europäischem Fokus getroffen werden. Eine öffentliche Debatte über diese Positionen bedarf eines häufigen Auftretens eines Themas in der Öffentlichkeit, indem Medien oder Parteien es auf die Agenda setzen (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Kriesi, 2009; Wilde, 2007), unabhängig davon, ob die EU als Thema als relevant angesehen wird oder spezifische Politikfelder auf Ebene der EU im Fokus stehen.

Voraussetzung zur Beantwortung der Frage, inwiefern Parteien erfolgreiches *Agenda-Building* auf europäischer Ebene betreiben, ist aber der Versuch an sich, Themen auf die Agenda der Medien zu setzen. Trotz der strukturellen Vorteile wurde die EU als Thema lange Zeit nur durch einen Teil der Parteien thematisiert (Adam et al., 2013; Adam & Maier, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2011). Hemmnisse für eine erfolgreiche Thematisierung durch die Parteien stellen interne Parteeigenschaften (De Vreese, 2006; Edwards, 2009; Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004) wie Meinungsunterschiede und Schwierigkeiten in der direkten Positionierung (Thomassen, Noury, & Voeten, 2004; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004) gerade etablierter Parteien dar. In den letzten Jahren beginnen nun auch etablierte Parteien, auf die aufkommende (auch euroskeptische) Diskussion – möglicherweise auch durch erfolgreiches *Agenda-Setting* – zu reagieren und die EU als Thema auf die Agenda nehmen (Adam & Maier, 2016). Als erstes stellt sich daher die Frage, inwieweit sich die Wahlkampfkommunikation der Parteien in ihrem europapolitischen Fokus unterscheidet und insbesondere, ob auch etablierte Parteien diesen Fokus wählen. Sollte dies der Fall sein, ist eine Analyse der Interaktion zwischen Medienberichterstattung und Parteienkommunikation erst sinnvoll.

Die Forschungsliteratur aus nationalen Kontexten zum Verhältnis zwischen *Agenda-Building* und *Agenda-Setting* ist umfangreich. Während sowohl Befunde innerhalb der Legislaturperiode darauf hinweisen, dass eine wechselseitige Beziehung (Bartels, 1996;

Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2016) zwischen Parteien und Medien vorliegt und Medien im *Agenda-Setting* erfolgreich sind (Walgrave et al., 2008), deuten andere Studien darauf hin, dass Parteien in Wahlkampfzeiten erfolgreicher sind (Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Lassen sich diese Ergebnisse auf die europäische Ebene übertragen? Limitierend für die Sichtbarkeit der EU in den Medien stellt sich der ohnehin schon geringe Nachrichtenwert der EU als Thema dar. Bisherige Forschung geht davon aus, dass eine Aufbereitung in den Medien zumeist durch die Verknüpfung mit politischen Parteien oder Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten (De Vreese, 2003) erfolgt. Durch die geringe Salienz der EU (Machill et al., 2006) und europäischer Akteure bedarf es tendenziell nationaler politischer Akteure, die die EU auf die Agenda setzen (Adam, 2007; Jalali & Silva, 2011; Schuck, Xezonakis, Elenbaas, Banducci, & De Vreese, 2011). Die Parteien haben also strukturell einen Vorteil, wenn sie *Agenda-Building* mit europäischem Fokus betreiben wollen. Die Frage ist daher, ob diese Ergebnisse für den Europawahlkampf 2014 ebenso zutreffen. Sollte dies der Fall sein – Parteien also die EU als Thema auf die Agenda der Medien setzen – und sich die EP-Wahlkampfkommunikation der Parteien nicht nach dem Grad ihrer Etabliertheit unterscheiden, so kann analysiert werden, inwieweit der Tenor der Wahlkampfkommunikation erfolgreiches *Agenda-Building* beeinflusst.

Eine Untersuchung der Variation erfolgreichen *Agenda-Buildings* ist in nationalen Kontexten dabei abhängig vom Umfang der Kampagnenkommunikation (Hopmann et al., 2012), Parteieigenschaften, wie Regierungsbeteiligung auf nationaler Ebene (Brandenburg, 2002; Jandura & Leidecker, 2015), und textinherenten Eigenschaften, wie dem Inhalt der Nachricht (van der Pas & Vliegthart, 2016). Die Logik der Auswahl der Kommunikation bestimmter Parteien und damit eine erhöhte Sichtbarkeit im Wahlkampf ist also abhängig von Selektionsprozessen der Medien. Annahmen der Nachrichtenwerttheorie (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2016; Maier, Stengel, & Marschall, 2010) legen nahe, dass – neben den genannten Eigenschaften Häufigkeit und Regierungsbonus – mit Blick auf den Kommunikationsinhalt besonders konflikthafte und negative Inputs die Chancen erhöhen, in der Berichterstattung aufgegriffen zu werden (Harcup & O’Neill, 2016; 2001). Auch auf europäischer Ebene zeigt die Forschung, dass die Ablehnung der europäischen Integration, also die Fokussierung auf Konflikte in Bezug auf das supranationale Setting, die Sichtbarkeit in den Medien erhöht (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; De Vreese, Lauf, & Peter, 2007; Schuck et al., 2011). Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob sich politische Parteien durch die Ablehnung der EU-

Integration und damit verbundene konflikthafte Kommunikation einen Vorteil für die Sichtbarkeit ihrer Kampagne verschaffen können.

Die bisherigen Annahmen der Forschung weisen auf Parteien als primäre Quelle für die Sichtbarkeit Europas auf der Medienagenda hin. Jedoch hat sich die europäische Politikebene in den letzten Jahren gewandelt. Im europäischen Kontext haben sich europäische Politikfelder herausgebildet (Adam et al., 2017; Boomgaarden et al., 2013), die eigene Positionierungen der Parteien erfordern (Green-Pedersen, 2011; Hobolt & De Vries, 2015; Kriesi, Adam, & Jochum, 2006). Themen wie Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Finanzpolitik sowie Immigration werden verstärkt auf europäischer Ebene wahrgenommen (Boomgaarden et al., 2013, S. 609) – es konstituiert sich eine europäische Themenagenda. Gerade bei Themen wie der Außenpolitik und Wirtschaftspolitik weist aber Forschung aus nationalen Kontexten auf erfolgreiches *Agenda-Setting* durch die Medien hin (Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010; Soroka, 2002a; Walgrave et al., 2008). Somit ist die Betrachtung der Interaktion zwischen *Agenda-Building* und *Agenda-Setting* auch abhängig von der Salienz einzelner Themen auf der Agenda, die sich eher langsam und längerfristig (über mehrere Wochen) ändert (Roberts & McCombs, 1994). Anders als bei der Analyse der *Agenda-Building-Effekte* der Parteien und kurzfristiger Medienresonanz darauf (van der Pas & Vliegenthart, 2016) sind Veränderungen der Themensalienz gegeben, falls längerfristig stabil. Die Wahlkampagnen politischer Parteien sind hinsichtlich der Themen, denen eine Partei Relevanz zuweist, stringent geplant (Kleinnijenhuis & Nooy, 2013). Parteien weichen seltener von diesen Planungen ab (Seethaler & Melischek, 2012), wohingegen Medien schneller anhand von Nachrichtenfaktoren entscheiden, welche Themen für die mediale Agenda relevant sind (Seethaler & Melischek, 2012). Dabei folgen sie nicht nur der Themensalienz der Parteien – auch reale Ereignisse (Bytzek, 2011; De Vreese, 2003) finden etwa aufgrund der Nachrichtenwerte Aktualität, Überraschung und Krise (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2016; Maier et al., 2010) Eingang in die Berichterstattung und fördern die Salienz bestimmter Themen auf der Agenda – ein Vorgang, der sich durch nationale Kontexte zu „press-party-dealignment“ (Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scamell, & Semetko, 1999, 181f.; Seethaler & Melischek, 2012, S. 98) noch verstärkt. Mit der Normalisierung der Medienberichterstattung über die EU stellt sich hier die Frage, ob Medien die Rangfolge spezifischer politischer Themenfelder auch im europäischen Kontext durch *Agenda-Setting* beeinflussen können.

Die Analyse der Thematisierung der EU durch Parteien und der angesprochenen Effekte zur Interaktion der Thematisierung der EU zwischen Parteien und Medien sowie der Abhängigkeit der Sichtbarkeit einzelner Parteien vom Inhalt ihrer Kommunikation unterliegen in ländervergleichenden Studien auch immer unterschiedlichen Randbedingungen auf Ebene der untersuchten Länder. Mitgliederstaaten unterscheiden sich in Bezug auf den Grad der Polarisierung im Parteienspektrum hinsichtlich der europäischen Integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2013), der Ausgestaltung des Mediensystems (Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004) sowie der generellen Salienz des Europafokus‘ in der öffentlichen Debatte (Pfetsch, Adam, & Eschner, 2008). Hier stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit die festgestellten Einflüsse abhängig sind von länderinherenten strukturellen Unterschieden.



### 3. Untersuchungsschritte und Datenbasis

#### 3.1. Untersuchungsschritte

Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, eine mögliche *Normalisierung zwischen Parteien und Medien* in Bezug auf *Agenda-Setting-* und *Agenda-Building-Effekte* im Bereich der Kommunikation über europäische Themen zu untersuchen. Dies geschieht im Rahmen von vier Analysen:

*Analyse I: When Do European Elections Campaigns Become About Europe? An Analysis of Parties' Communications in the Run-up to the 2014 EP Elections*

- *Forschungsfrage:* Welche Parteien betreiben aufgrund welcher Faktoren Agenda-Building?
- *Methode:* Logistische Regression zur Unterscheidung von Pressemitteilungen von Parteien nach EU-Thema vs. nationalem Fokus.

*Analyse II: Who drives the agenda: Media or parties? A seven-country comparison in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections*

- *Forschungsfrage:* Wer bringt die EU auf die Agenda?
- *Methode:* Zeitreihenanalyse (Vector-Auto-Regression) der tagesaktuellen kausalen Interaktion von Pressemitteilungen und Nachrichtenartikeln.

*Analyse III: Does negativity about Europe propel parties' media visibility?*

- *Forschungsfrage:* Erhöht ein euroskeptischer Tenor in Pressemitteilungen die Sichtbarkeit einer Partei in der Medienberichterstattung?
- *Methode:* Panel-Negative-Binomial-Regression-Analyse des Einflusses EU-negativer Pressemitteilungen auf die Medienberichterstattung am darauffolgenden Tag

*Analyse IV: Agenda-Setting or Agenda-Building? Inferring knowledge from the 2014 EP election campaign via Bayesian cross-lagged-panel methods*

- *Forschungsfrage:* Wer beeinflusst die EU-Themenagenda?
- *Methode:* Bayesian modelling Cross-Lagged-Panel-Analyse der Rankings europäischer Themen auf der Agenda im EP-Wahlkampf

### 3.2. Datenbasis

Zur Untersuchung der aufgeworfenen Forschungsfragen werden Daten aus dem Projekt „*The role of national political parties in the politicization of EU integration*“ unter Leitung von Prof. Dr. Michaela Maier (Universität Koblenz-Landau) und Prof. Dr. Silke Adam (Universität Bern), gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (DFG Grant MA 2244/5-1) sowie die Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF Grant 10017E-144592/1) herangezogen. Im Zeitraum vor der Europawahl 2014 wurde eine zwölfwöchige Erhebung für sieben Mitgliedsländer (Deutschland, DE; Griechenland, GR; Niederlande, NL; Österreich, AT; Portugal, PR; Frankreich, FR und das Vereinigte Königreich, UK) durchgeführt. Die im Projekt erhobenen Daten beinhalten unter anderem eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse ausgewählter Nachrichtenartikel von zwei etablierten Tageszeitungen (jeweils links und rechts des politischen Spektrums) und aller Pressemitteilungen der Parteien (mit mind. drei Prozent Stimmenanteil bei der letzten nationalen Wahl) in jedem der Mitgliedsstaaten. Für den Fokus der vorliegenden Dissertation sind erstens die absoluten und relativen Häufigkeiten der EU-fokussierten Parteienkommunikation (Analyse I) relevant. Zweitens ist es für die Kausalanalyse der Effektrichtungen notwendig, die Anzahl der generellen EU-fokussierten Kommunikation der Parteien und der Medien pro Tag zu untersuchen (Analyse II). Drittens ist es durch die Erfassung des Tenors – nach Grad des Euroskeptizismus bzw. der Europakritik und der Nennungen der Parteien in der Medienberichterstattung des darauffolgenden Tages – möglich, die Sichtbarkeit von Parteien zu analysieren (Analyse III). Viertens können durch die inhaltliche Analyse der Parteienkommunikation und Berichterstattung pro Woche Themenrankings erstellt und somit die Salienz sowie ihre mögliche Verschiebung aufgrund von Interaktionseffekten über den Wahlkampfverlauf ermittelt werden (Analyse IV).

Zur Überprüfung der Reliabilität wurden von den Primärforscherinnen Master-Coder-Vergleiche vorgenommen und Werte für Holsti's *R* sowie Krippendorff's *Alpha* berechnet. Diese liegen für formale Variablen (z.B. EU-Fokus) zwischen .972 und 1.0, für Inhaltskodierungen (z.B. Euroskeptizismus) zwischen .597 und .997 über alle Länder (vgl. auch Maier et al., 2016).

Ein weiterer entscheidender Vorteil der vorliegenden Daten ist die Möglichkeit, Variation zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten zu untersuchen. Gerade die Interaktionseffekte zwischen Parteienkommunikation und Medienberichterstattung können durch unterschiedliche

Randbedingungen in verschiedenen Ländern beeinflusst werden. So kann die Polarisierung des Parteienspektrums anhand der vorliegenden Daten pro Land konstruiert werden (Analyse II). Eine weitere Dimension stellt der Grad an konflikthafter Positionierung zur europäischen Integration dar. In der Analyse der Sichtbarkeit einer Partei durch negative Kommunikation zur EU (Analyse III) wird die Konfliktdimension auf Parteebene aus einer Kombination der vorliegenden Daten sowie der Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2014) abgeleitet. Darüber hinaus werden den Analysen externe Daten zugespielt. So kann der Parallelismus im Mediensystem eines Landes (eine entscheidende Randbedingung) durch die Einordnung anhand vorliegender Forschung (Brüggemann et al., 2014) vorgenommen werden (Analyse II und IV). Mithilfe dieser Daten und Chronologie werden im Folgenden nun die Analysen präsentiert.

## 4. Determinanten europafokussierter Wahlkampfkommunikation der Parteien

### 4.1 Befunde bisheriger Forschung zu den Determinanten europafokussierter Wahlkampfkommunikation

Demokratische Wahlkämpfe können als System verstanden werden, in dem Parteien Positionen zu politischen Inhalten anbieten und im Gegenzug Stimmen der Wähler erhalten (Schmidt, 1996). Bei vergangenen EP-Wahlkämpfen haben vor allem etablierte Parteien in ihrer Wahlkampfkommunikation stark auf nationale Themen fokussiert (Blumler & Thoveron, 1983; Hoeglinger, 2016; Mattila & Raunio, 2012; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004), wodurch es zu einer Unterrepräsentation europapolitischer Positionen auf der Angebotsseite gekommen ist. Wählerinnen und Wähler trafen ihre Wahlentscheidung verstärkt aufgrund nationaler politischer Dimensionen, da auch die Medienberichterstattung geringen Europafokus aufgewiesen hat (De Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006; Machill et al., 2006; Maier & Maier, 2008; Schuck & De Vreese, 2011). Eine verstärkte Europäisierung vor allem auf der Nachfrageseite der Wählerinnen und Wähler (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) setzte Parteien unter Druck, Position in europapolitischen Themen zu beziehen (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015; Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Dieser Druck wurde im Wesentlichen durch das Aufkommen neuer, hauptsächlich euroskeptischer Parteien aufgefangen, die sich den neu aufkommenden europäischen Themen zuwenden (Adam et al., 2013; Adam & Maier, 2011; Hobolt & De Vries, 2015) und klar positionieren – hier ließe sich somit ein *Inter-Parteien-Agenda-Setting* formulieren. Im Zuge des EP-Wahlkampfes 2009 mehrten sich die Anzeichen, dass sich auch etablierte, große Parteien der Relevanz europäischer Themen auf der Nachfrageseite bewusstwerden (Adam & Maier, 2016; Jalali & Silva, 2011).

Im spezifischen Kontext der EU unterliegt die Positionierung gerade etablierter Parteien einigen Limitationen. Eine generelle Positionierung ist schwierig, da sich die EU in nur geringem Maße in klassische Links-Rechts-Bewertungen einordnen lässt (Thomassen et al., 2004; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Die EU-kritische oder -skeptische Positionierung kleiner national-konservativ gesinnter Parteien gestaltet sich hier einfacher (Adam et al., 2013;

Adam & Maier, 2011; Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Kriesi, 2009), da sie durch die Ablehnung supranationaler Institutionen einen Markenkern zeigen können. Etablierten Parteien, die die EU-Integration über jahrelange Unterstützung in der Umsetzung vorangetrieben haben (Carmines & Stimson, 1993; Weber, 2007), ist die Kommunikation von EU-Themen dahingehend auch durch das Aufkommen euroskeptischer Einstellungen prinzipiell erschwert. Dennoch können etablierte Parteien durch einen potenziellen Verlust an Stimmenanteilen in die Position gedrängt werden, zu europäischen Themen sowie der EU-Integration eindeutig Stellung zu beziehen (Spoon et al., 2014). Die Präsenz der EU in der Außenkommunikation ist dabei abhängig von der Bewertung des Themas EU innerhalb der Partei (De Vreese, 2006; Edwards, 2009; Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004). Gerade bei großen Parteien können parteiintern unterschiedliche Positionierungen in Bezug auf die EU koexistieren, die schwer zu einer stringenten Außenkommunikation zu bündeln sind. Darüber hinaus können der Erfolg in und Entfernung zu nationalen Wahlen (Parsons & Weber, 2011) eine Rolle spielen. Insofern unterliegt die Frage nach der Normalisierung der Wahlkampfkommunikation bezüglich ihres EU-Fokus‘ nicht nur der Unterscheidung nach etablierten Parteien versus neue, euroskeptische Parteien, sondern auch einer Analyse der parteiinternen Eigenschaften. Wichtigste Voraussetzung für einen kompetitiven europäischen Wahlkampf und damit für die Analysen der vorliegenden Untersuchung bleibt jedoch die Zuwendung aller Parteien hin zu einer europafokussierten Wahlkampfkommunikation, die in folgender Analyse durchgeführt wird.

## **4.2. When Do European Elections Campaigns Become About Europe? An Analysis of Parties' Communications in the Run-up to the 2014 EP Elections**

### **Abstract**

In this article, we examine which parties put Europe on the agenda during the 2014 European Parliament campaign and which factors help us understand whether they did so. To achieve this aim, we use an integrated model combining factors driving parties' communications derived from the selective emphasis and the co-orientation approaches, and differentiating among governing, established opposition and challenger parties. Based on a content analysis of 9,100 press releases from parties in seven countries, our analyses show that, in 2014, established and especially governing parties no longer silenced EU-issues but in fact referred to them as often as challenger parties. However, if established parties were successful on the national level, or if they were internally divided on European integration, they remained less likely to talk about the European Union – with the major exception of successful governing parties, which were especially prone to campaign using a specific EU outlook. Looking at the co-orientation between parties, established opposition parties showed the strongest orientation towards other opposition parties, while challenger parties were unresponsive to the communication strategies of governing parties. Also, unexpectedly, a pro-EU public opinion seemed to stimulate all parties' willingness to put EU issues on the agenda. In sum, it appears highly valuable to combine factors from selective emphasis and co-orientation approaches into a comprehensive model to analyse the future development of parties' strategic EU communications.

#### 4.2.1. Introduction

Competition lies at the heart of most conceptions of representative democracy. This competition is most saliently reflected in democratic elections. Normative conceptions of democracy tend to centre this electoral competition on rival substantive policy platforms presented by parties and/or candidates from which voters choose based on their positions on different issues. The genealogy of the notion of a *democratic political market* can be traced back to this view of democracy. Democracy is thus conceptualized as a market in which parties supply policies in exchange for votes reflecting political demand (Schmidt 1996).

At the heart of this conception lies the notion that, in a democracy, citizens 'decide issues', to borrow Schumpeter's (1942/2003:250) apposite expression. Yet, this notion of citizens deciding issues requires issues to be proffered to citizens. If an issue is not presented, then voters are unable to decide it, with considerable implications for political decision-making. As Ware (1996) notes, 'what is filtered out of politics because neither party chooses to represent that interest or opinion, is often as important as the issue that the parties are contesting fiercely over' (p.7). Placing this problem in the framework of the political market, parties' supply-side behaviour can constrain voters' choices by avoiding issues (or not providing a choice on them). However, the political market also allows for the correction of supply–demand mismatches. Parties can incorporate these neglected issues into their policy platforms, thus politicizing them, seeking to derive electoral gains from the hitherto pent-up demand.

In this paper, we examine the silencing (or filtering out) versus incorporation of European Union (EU) issues in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. This provides a doubly interesting context in which to explore issue politicization. The salience of EU issues has seemingly grown for voters. Yet, political parties – especially established parties – are perceived as lagging behind in politicizing these issues (Hoeglinger 2016; Mattila and Raunio 2012; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), thus generating a potential mismatch between political supply and demand in this area. In the past, European elections have been shown to be an extreme instance of this silencing. Despite the EP being the only directly elected EU institution, EP elections have invariably been described as second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980), with the few voters who turn out marking their ballots based on domestic issues (notably, government performance) rather than European issues. This voter behaviour is predicated by parties' failure to campaign on European issues (e.g. De Vreese 2009; Hoeglinger 2016; Petithomme 2012; Kriesi et al. 2012), as well as a media that focuses on the domestic

dimensions of the vote in the (little) coverage it provides of EP elections (e.g. De Vreese, Banducci, Semetko and Boomgaarden 2006; Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006; Maier and Maier 2008; Schuck and De Vreese 2011).

Yet, as previous research suggests, this pattern does not necessarily remain static. The mismatch between demand and supply can generate opportunities for the emergence of issue entrepreneurs that can potentially force parties to politicize issues they previously ignored. Our paper thus seeks to answer the following research question:

*Which parties campaign on European issues,  
and which factors help us understand whether they do so?*

The goal is to explain what leads parties' EP election campaigns to become *about Europe* – generating the not-insignificant possibility of voters deciding how they will vote based on European issues, thus contributing to the transparency of EP elections (Adam and Maier 2016; Boomgaarden and De Vreese 2016). With our analyses, which build on our work on the 2009 EP elections (Adam and Maier 2011:2016), we add to the existing literature in the field by a) comparing a comprehensive set of variables potentially driving party communications that are derived from the most prominent approaches in the field (i.e. the selective emphasis and co-orientation theses) and b) examining how parties referred to EU issues in their press releases, that is, whether they did so in a cursory and incidental manner or at length and in-depth. We carry out this analysis for all parties campaigning in seven selected countries.

#### **4.2.2. Party Campaigns in EP Elections**

Discussions of EP elections usually refer to Reif and Schmitt's (1980) second-order election model. In this model, one central implication is that such elections are fought on national issues (or 'main arena issues', as Reif and Schmitt [1980] put it), as opposed to European ones (or 'specific arena issues' [p.14]). When originally conceptualizing the EP elections as predominantly focusing on national issues, Reif and Schmitt identified party campaigns as one of the main explanatory factors for this outcome. As Marsh (1998) observes, 'parties themselves generally work to make European elections second-order national elections' by



focusing on domestic rather than European issues (p.607). The literature has identified both demand and supply-side factors behind this absence of EU issues. On the demand side, there has been a perception that the EU was a 'non-issue for the public' (Hooghe and Marks 2009:6), enabling a 'permissive consensus' that left party elites electorally unconstrained on EU issues (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:41). Aside from the apparent absence of demand for discussion of these issues, parties that have dominated electoral competition and government formation have had little interest in giving salience to EU issues. For the most part, these parties' views converged on EU issues, and the politicization of them risked generating internal divisions (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Thus, the supply-side also militated against the introduction of EU issues (e.g. Hoeglinger 2016) – an absence that, while general, became particularly stark during EP elections, when (normative) expectations are that such issues would be at the forefront of parties' campaigns and voters' minds.

However, this picture seems to be changing. EU issues appear to have had growing salience for voters beginning in the early 1990s (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The question that then emerges is whether parties would respond to this potential demand. Initial work – such as by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) on the 1999 EP elections – suggested a mismatch between parties' lack of politicization of EU issues and voters' changing attitudes, creating a 'sleeping giant' of political mobilization on EU issues (p.32). As a result, if the main parties remained silent vis-à-vis EU issues, they would potentially open the door to political entrepreneurs, who politicize hitherto silenced issues to obtain electoral gains (Hobolt and De Vries 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Additionally, the introduction of new issues could potentially force their wider politicization, even by parties that would prefer silence – especially on issues that have traction amongst voters, as appears to be increasingly the case with regard to EU issues.

Recent work tends to confirm these dynamics. Hobolt and De Vries (2015) find evidence of issue entrepreneurship on EU issues over a 23-year period, with parties that we call 'challenger parties' – parties that are typically excluded from access to government or fail to mobilize a relevant share of the vote – being more entrepreneurial. Additionally, Adam and Maier (2016) find evidence of mobilization on EU issues in the specific context of the 2009 EP elections, suggesting a transition away from the previous second-order party campaign model, even if the campaign was likewise not centred solely on EU issues. Interestingly, they find evidence of EU politicization not only in challenger parties' communications, but also those of 'established

parties' – that is, those that are in the main sphere of competition and are typically part of government – with little difference between the two (Adam and Maier, 2016; see also Jalali and Silva 2011). Adam et al. (2016) have confirmed this trend in their study of the 2014 EP elections; they find that large catch-all parties do not necessarily avoid European issues in their election campaigns unless they are struggling with internal dissent.

At the same time, while there is evidence of increased EU salience in parties' recent EP election campaigns, substantial differences remain among parties and across countries (Adam and Maier 2011; 2016, Adam et al. 2016). In this paper, we aim to analyse in detail which factors drove or hampered parties from raising EU-related discussions in their 2014 EP election campaigns. We do so by testing two alternative explanatory approaches: *the selective emphasis approach* (RQ1, H1a to H3b), derived from the pioneering work of Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1996), and *the co-orientation approach* (Steenbergen and Scott 2004; see H4a to H5b). Underlying both is the notion of party competition being based on rival policy platforms presented to voters.

#### *Assumptions of the Selective Emphasis Approach*

The basic idea of the selective emphasis approach is that parties tend to campaign on issues that are favourable to them, for example issues that they *own*, such as issues on which the party is better placed and perceived as more credible vis-à-vis competing parties (Petrocik 1996). Research on issue ownership suggests that parties have little incentive to explore different issues from those on which they have built their reputations (Hayes 2008). Experimental studies also confirm that parties have little to gain from campaigning on issues owned by their competitors (Tresch, Lefevere and Walgrave 2015) or eschewing their own issues for those with greater media salience (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). This is not to say that *issue takeovers* cannot occur (e.g. U.S. President Clinton on the issue of crime, as Holian [2004] demonstrates; see also Leidecker-Sandmann, Antl-Wittenberg, Adam and Maier 2016), but they are rare – and their scarcity reflects the high risk of such a strategy.

The notion of selective emphasis interacts strongly with the nature of political parties. The party reputations presupposed by issue ownership are 'long standing' (Damore 2004:392), built over time with the electorate. As such, issue ownership will tend to be stronger among established parties that typically compete for power. At the same time, this means that challenger parties – that is, those typically excluded from the main arena of competition (Mair

1997) – will have incentives to engage in issue entrepreneurship by politicizing issues (and conceivably gaining ownership of issues) in order to reframe political competition away from the established parties (Hobolt and De Vries 2015).

What are the implications of this for EU issues? As noted earlier, research before the 2009 EP elections has shown that established parties typically avoided EU issues, preferring to campaign on the issues they owned. Indeed, as Geys (2012) notes, giving salience to joint-ownership issues – which the EU tends to be for established parties – can be an electorally harmful strategy. However, challenger parties have incentives to politicize new issues in order to change the nature of political competition and, in this regard, are more likely to politicize the EU – typically through a Eurosceptic position, given the generally more Europhile stance of the established parties. Taking into account our own work, which shows that established parties have also increased EU salience in their recent EP election campaigns (Adam and Maier 2011; 2016; Adam et al. 2016), we frame the following research questions:

*RQ1: Do challenger parties give greater salience to EU issues on their campaign agendas than do governing parties and established opposition parties, which tend to downplay EU issues?*

So far, the argument has focused solely on the supply side. However, the demand side can also play a role here, as parties adapt their policy platforms to electoral outcomes. In this regard, poor electoral outcomes are more likely to produce changes to policy platforms (e.g. Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff 1995). This effect is likely to be stronger among losing established parties if challenger parties – which centre their appeal on non-mainstream or niche issues – are at the same time growing electorally. In such cases, the perceived electoral threat of the challenger party can force established parties to engage on issues raised by the challenger party (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014). Concomitantly, challenger parties that are having success exploiting a particular niche issue are more likely to maintain that policy platform (Meyer and Wagner 2013). As such, we posit:

*H1a: Established parties that have lost support in recent elections are more likely to include EU issues on their campaign agenda.*

*H1b: Challenger parties that have gained support in recent elections are more likely to focus on EU issues.*

Finally, the nature of a party's policy platform will also depend on the party's internal dynamics. On this topic we develop two dimensions: first, the degree of party cohesion on the issue and second, the nature of party leadership. With regard to the first, it should be noted that issue entrepreneurship carries risks. In particular, as a new issue is politicized, it risks exposing internal party divisions that had previously lain dormant. So, while politicizing a new issue seeks to upset the apple cart of inter-party competition, it also risks upsetting the apple cart of intra-party equilibria (for empirical evidence, see Adam et al. 2016). The more delicately balanced this intra-party balance, the more costly the adoption of issue entrepreneurship is and the less likely it becomes (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). As such, we formulate the following hypothesis:

*H2: Parties are less likely to include EU issues on their campaign agenda if they are internally divided on the issue.*

The other internal dimension refers to the strength of party leadership and how this interacts with party cohesion in established parties. Here, the point of departure is that parties generally have some degree of internal disunity and dissent on issues, especially on issues like the EU that are crosscutting for established parties. Within this context, a strong party leader – that is, one who has been electorally successful – can muffle internal disunity and avoid these divisions from emerging in a campaign (Parsons and Weber 2011). Conversely, a weak leadership – that is, one that remains in place after an electoral defeat – is unable to muffle these internal divisions and, in such circumstances, the crosscutting issues are more likely to emerge on the party's policy platform (Parsons and Weber 2011). Finally, the literature posits that these effects are likely to be amplified the closer the ensuing national (first-order) election occurs, as parties' 'organizational politics are structured foremost by national electoral cycles' (Parsons and Weber 2011:385). We thus hypothesize the following:

*H3a: Established parties with a weak leadership and internal divisions on EU issues are more likely to put EU issues on their campaign agendas.*

*H3b: The closer the date of the next national election, the more likely it is that established parties with a weak leadership will put EU issues on their campaign agendas.*

#### *Assumptions of the Co-Orientation Approach*

The selective emphasis approach suggests little interaction between different parties' campaigns, as each focuses on the issues it owns. Campaigns are thus a series of different monologues by each party. The *co-orientation approach*, however, suggests that parties' platforms are considerably more adaptable and responsive to the wider issue agenda because no party has monopolistic agenda control (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). In other words, even if parties want to engage in a monologue, they will find it difficult to avoid dialogue. Moreover, while parties react to the party-system agenda, they also shape it – and indeed seek to reshape it to further their electoral interests. In this regard, the expectation is that opposition and especially challenger parties have greater leeway than governing parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). The latter are bound by their policy records, which inevitably enter the party-system agenda and which they must defend; the former have no record to respond to and can choose which issues to criticize the government on; thus, they have more influence on the party-system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). We thus expect:

*H4a: Governing parties will be responsive to the emphasis opposition parties place on EU issues.*

*H4b: Challenger parties will not be responsive to the emphasis governing parties place on EU issues.*

Finally, authors have called for linking the co-orientation approach to the demand side (e.g. Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries 2014), in the sense that public opinion on European integration is understood to be a secondary context shaping parties' campaigns. The implications for our study seem clear: EU issues are more likely to be politicized by challenger parties in countries where citizens' attitudes towards the EU are more critical. At the same time, this demand-side pressure and polarization can also force established parties to engage more on the issue (Spoon et al. 2014; Spoon and Klüver 2015). We thus have the following hypotheses:

*H5a: The larger and more pronounced citizens' Euroscepticism in a country, the more likely it is that challenger parties will include EU issues on their campaign agendas.*

*H5b: The larger and more pronounced citizens' Euroscepticism in a country, the more likely it is that established (governing and opposition) parties will include EU issues on their campaign agendas.*

In the following sections, we will refer to the methodological aspects of our analysis before moving on to the results.

### **4.2.3. Methods**

To test our hypotheses, we analysed national political parties' public communications in the run-up to the 2014 EP elections in seven European countries – Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK) – to allow for international comparisons and to be able to generalize our findings.

#### *Material and Content Analysis*

To measure the salience parties attach to European issues in their public communications, we chose party press releases as our data source. Although other possible materials are available, for example campaign posters, TV spots, manifestos and political speeches, press releases are the most appropriate source of data for this research as they can also be published by smaller parties, which often cannot afford to produce several campaign spots (Hopmann, Elmelund-Præstekær, Albæk, Vliegenthart and De Vreese 2012), and they allow parties to put forward more complex and explicit arguments regarding the EU than would, for example, campaign posters.

Our analysis examines 9,100 press releases issued by 46 national parties (and party coalitions) in the 12 weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections in seven European countries. This includes all parties that won at least three per cent of the vote in the last European or national election before the 2014 EP elections and that participated in the 2014 EP elections (see Appendix 4). Press releases were subject to a partly automated, partly manual quantitative content analysis (see the discussion below on dependent variables). To ensure the reliability of manual coding (for the complete codebook, see Appendix 4), nine coders participated in a comprehensive

training program, followed by a (researcher–coder) reliability test of 25 press releases each. We tested for coding reliability using Holsti's *r* and Krippendorff's *alpha* coefficients. Reliability tests delivered satisfactory results with mean values of 0.98–1.00 for Holsti's *r* and 0.97–0.99 for Krippendorff's *alpha* for formal categories and mean values of Holsti's *r* = 0.86–0.87 and 0.82 for Krippendorff's *alpha* for content characteristics (*main issue* and *issue-scope*) across the seven countries.

#### *Dependent Variable – EU Issue Salience*

The salience of EU-related issues in press releases was operationalized in two steps. First, using an electronic search string that contained relevant keywords and word components,<sup>1</sup> we examined whether a press release referred to *European issues*, *European policies*, *European institutions*, *European politicians* or the *European Parliament elections* at least *twice*. This search identified 2,671 press releases that contained at least two references to European issues and 6,429 press releases with none or only one EU reference. Second, those press releases containing at least two EU references were subjected to a manual content analysis that, among other variables, determined the main issue of each press release and the *issue-scope* attached to it. The 'issue-scope' describes whether the main issue was discussed by referring to the EU or to another political level (e.g. the national political level or an international level other than the EU; Koopmans 2002). Of the 2,671 press releases with at least two EU references, 2,202 were coded as primarily having an EU scope. The information from both procedures (automated detection of EU references and manual coding of issue-scope) was used to define our dependent variable, which takes the values 0 (*none or only one EU reference*; 6,429 press releases), 1 (*at least two EU references, but no EU issue-scope*; 469 press releases) and 2 (*at least two EU references and an EU scope*; 2,202 press releases).

#### *Independent Variables*

The data used to assess the independent variables derive from several sources: the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; Bakker et al. 2015), public archives, Eurobarometer 81.4 (May

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<sup>1</sup> The (English-language) search string contained the following keywords and word components: Europ\*, europ\*, EU, EP, EC, ECB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, ECJ, EEAS, EESC, EIF, EDPS, EMU, Troika, troika, Frontex, FRONTEX.

2014) and 71.3 (June 2009), as well as our 2014 analysis of EP election media coverage (Maier et al. 2016).

First, our analysis is based on the distinction between three *groups of parties*: (a) 'established governing parties', defined as those political parties governing or being part of governing coalitions at the time of the 2014 EP elections (N = 12 parties; 2,845 press releases), (b) 'established opposition parties', defined as parties that were in opposition at the time of the 2014 EP elections but which had previous government responsibility (N = 11 parties; 2,002 press releases) and (c) 'challenger parties', defined as opposition parties that have never been involved in government (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012) for a full legislative period (N = 23; 4,253 press releases; source: Döring and Manow 2016).

In line with our theoretical expectations and hypotheses, the remaining independent variables are grouped into three blocks to account for (a) variables derived from the *selective emphasis thesis* (RQ1, H1a to H3b), (b) variables derived from the *co-orientation thesis* (H4a to H5b) and (c) *structural factors* included in the analysis as control variables.

Referring to the selective emphasis thesis, three original variables and two interaction variables are used: *Electoral success* of a party, which at the same time indicates *strength of leadership*, is measured by the difference between the vote share the party obtained in the last national election and the second-last national election (source: public archives; see Parsons & Weber, 2011). For political parties that participated for the first time in the last national elections (e.g. AfD in Germany and NEOS in Austria), the vote shares of the last national elections are rated as gains in votes. For parties that participated in the second-last national elections but not in the last national elections, the vote shares of the second-last national elections are rated as losses. *Inner party dissent* (see Parsons and Weber 2011) regarding EU integration is operationalized by the mean value of the party's dissent variable in the 2014 CHES data (Bakker et al. 2015), ranging from 0 (*party completely united*) to 10 (*party completely divided*). *Distance of the 2014 EP election to the next national elections* (see Parsons and Weber 2011) is measured in days and ranges from 245 days in Greece to 1,617 days in Austria (source: public archives; see Adam and Maier 2016).<sup>2</sup> All three variables are z-standardized, as they are also included in two interaction terms. The first interaction term is a combination of the

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<sup>2</sup> At this point, the exact election dates for the next national elections in Germany and Austria are not yet known. Therefore, the tentative dates for the elections in these countries was set to the last Sunday before the end of the current term.



electoral success variable and inner party dissent; the second interaction term is built from the electoral success variable and the distance to the next national election.

Referring to the *co-orientation thesis*, three variables are used, taking into account the EU emphasis of other parties and public opinion. To assess co-orientation between parties (Steenbergen and Scott 2004), the *EU-emphasis* in the press releases of all (other) a) governing and b) opposition parties within the same country is calculated, always excluding the party under consideration (see Adam and Maier 2011; Steenbergen and Scott 2004). *Citizens' EU-support* is measured as the percentage of citizens in a country who evaluated the EU's image as *very positive* or *fairly positive* in the Eurobarometer survey 81.4 (May 2014) (UK: 21.4%; GR: 22.9%; PT: 30.1%; AT: 33%, NL: 33.3%; DE: 35.7%; FR: 36.7%).

Finally, *EU-salience in the national media* is used as a control and is measured based on our own 2014 media content analysis (see Appendix 4). Two additional control variables refer to *party position*: the *party's EU-support* as measured by the mean value of the party's position on EU integration in the 2014 CHES data (Bakker et al. 2015) and the *extremity of the party's EU position*. This second variable is defined by subtracting four points from the party's CHES data on EU support and using only the absolute value from this procedure. This variable takes values from 0, indicating *mainstream positions* towards the EU, to 3, indicating *extreme EU positions* either positive or negative.

### *Logic of Analysis*

After describing EU salience in parties' press releases across countries, the following analyses present the influences of indicators referring to the selective emphasis thesis and indicators referring to the co-orientation thesis on parties' strategic communications based on multinomial logistic regression using STATA 14.2. The relative probability that parties published a press release without an EU reference serves as the baseline of all models, which is compared with the probability that they published a press release mentioning the EU at least twice or using a distinct EU scope. The different models compare the factors driving the communications of governing, established opposition and challenger parties. The analysis is conducted in several steps. First, a base model is calculated, then, interactions are added one effect at a time, as the number of simultaneous interactions is limited by the number of cases on the party and country

level, which also prevents us from calculating multilevel models.<sup>3</sup> However, to address the multilevel structure inherent in the data, the robustness of effect direction is tested with aggregated dependent variable models on the party level, which shows that all effects remain stable (see Appendix 4). To account for the interdependencies of parties' publication strategies within a country, standard errors are clustered by countries. Additionally, due to the low number of countries, robustness checks of model fit measures are performed with standard errors clustered on the party level<sup>4</sup>, yielding highly significant results for each model (see Appendix 4). As the number of cases (press releases) varies greatly among countries, results are weighted on the country level, assigning each country the same weight.

#### 4.2.4. Results

Table 4.1 displays the differences in EU salience in the 2014 EP campaigns among party groups in the seven countries included in the study. The results show that, during the 2014 EP election campaigns, established parties no longer avoided talking about EU matters *per se* – especially governing parties (total per cent of press releases that mentioned the EU at least twice – governing parties: 35.1 per cent; established opposition parties: 25.0 per cent; challenger parties: 27.6 per cent). In four of seven countries (i.e. Austria, Greece, Portugal and the UK), governing parties even mentioned EU matters significantly more often than both established opposition parties and challenger parties. In France and the Netherlands, opposition parties in general attached more salience to EU issues than did governing parties, while only in Germany were challenger parties a bit ahead of the established parties. However, there was a huge variance in the salience that party groups in the different countries attached to the EU, with, for example, Portugal's governing parties mentioning the EU at least twice in 57.6 per cent of their press releases, while in France governing parties stayed below 10.1 per cent (see also Adam and Maier 2016). Of course, variation on the party level was even higher. Based on these first findings, we must answer research question 1 in the negative. That is, challenger parties in general *do not* attach greater salience to EU issues than governing or established opposition parties. The first indications of this were already detected in the 2009 EP election campaigns (Adam and Maier 2016), and this finding from 2014 confirms that, under certain circumstances,

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<sup>3</sup> In Table 4.2, results are summarized for the base model and the seven interaction effects; for all full models see Web appendix.

<sup>4</sup> Possible only for model 1 and 3 due to low number of cases N=23 parties in model 2.

established parties do in fact attach salience to EU issues (see also Adam et al. 2016). But, which factors actually drive the communication strategies of the different party groups, and do they lend stronger support to the selective emphasis or the co-orientation theses?

**Table 4.1: Salience of EU-issues in parties' 2014 EP campaigns (% of press releases)**

	Government Parties	Established Opposition	Challenger Parties	Total <sup>a</sup>
<b>Austria</b>				
EU only mentioned	5.6	4.5	4.7	5.1
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	35.1**	23.2	27.2	30.8
N	1426	491	687	2604
<b>France</b>				
EU only mentioned	4.6	12.2	13.9	11.4
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	10.1**	16.7	19.9	16.6
N	109	329	109	639
<b>Germany</b>				
EU only mentioned	5.2	3.8	4.0	4.4
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	18.3**	17.4	20.5	18.6
N	558	397	351	1306
<b>Greece</b>				
EU only mentioned	5.0	–	4.1	4.2
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	31.2**	–	19.5	21.2
N	301	–	1733	2034
<b>Netherlands</b>				
EU only mentioned	2.3	3.4	7.6	5.3
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	19.5***	26.4	30.9	27.0
N	128	148	275	551
<b>Portugal</b>				
EU only mentioned	3.2	3.1	8.8	5.5
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	57.6***	38.6	38.6	42.0
N	125	290	295	710
<b>United Kingdom</b>				
EU only mentioned	3.5	2.8	4.8	4.0
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	26.3***	4.4	15.6	13.8
N	198	390	668	1256
<b>Total<sup>b</sup></b>				
EU only mentioned	5.0	4.9	5.3	5.2
EU mentioned <u>and</u> EU-scope	30.1**	20.0	22.2	24.2
Total EU-references	35.1***	25.0	27.6	100.0
N	2845	2045	4210	9100

<sup>a</sup> Missing percentages: no EU-reference.

<sup>b</sup> As numbers of cases vary strongly between parties and countries, results are weighted on the party and on the country level.

Significant differences between party groups: \*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01.

France: New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) is not included in the study since information on key structural variables for the regression models is lacking.

Table 4.2 presents the findings from multinomial logistic regression analyses displaying the relative probabilities of publishing a press release mentioning the EU at least twice (step 1) or

even assigning it a distinct EU scope (step 2), as compared with the baseline, that is, publishing a press release without an EU reference. The first model estimates the driving factors for all parties and includes a dummy variable for governing parties (party type) to test whether their communications are significantly different from those of all opposition parties. Model 2 displays the driving factors for the communications of all established parties (i.e. governing parties and established opposition parties), again controlling for a systematic difference between governing and established opposition parties by including a dummy variable for governing parties (party type). Model 3 again includes all parties and finally tests for a difference between established (governing and opposition) and challenger parties by means of another dummy variable for established parties. To test our specific hypotheses, each model is re-estimated separately, including the interactions among the predictor variables and party groups (see interaction terms labelled i1 to i7).

All coefficients reported are relative risk ratios (RRR):

[The] standard interpretation of the relative risk ratios is for a unit change in the predictor variable, the relative risk ratio of outcome *m* [in our case publishing a press release with 1) EU references or 2) even with a specific EU scope] relative to the referent group [in our case publishing a press release with no EU reference] is expected to change by a factor of the respective parameter estimate. (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, n.d.)

This means RRR coefficients greater than 1 indicate a positive effect of the predictor variable, while RRRs less than 1 indicate a negative effect.

The first findings displayed in Table 4.2 generally confirm but also specify our result from the descriptive analysis: governing parties (see party variable in Models 1 and 2) do not mention EU issues less often than opposition parties (step 1:  $RRR_{model1} = n.s.$ ;  $RRR_{model2} = 2.554^{***}$ ), and they are even more prone than opposition parties to choose a distinct EU scope in their communications (step 2:  $RRR_{model1} = 1.266^{**}$ ;  $RRR_{model2} = 2.546^{***}$ ). So, especially for the choice of a distinct EU scope, party type (governing parties) turns out to be a strong predictor. Interestingly, however, the major difference seems to exist between governing parties and established opposition parties, as in Model 2, which distinguishes between these two groups. The party type variable (governing party) shows a strong, positive effect for the salience of EU issues, as well as for the choice of a specific EU scope. Model 3 however, which tests for

differences between all established parties (governing and opposition) and challenger parties, does not show any significant effect of the party type variable. Thus, the major difference in parties' communication strategies during the 2014 EP campaigns seems to be between governing and opposition parties, with the former being more prone to mention the EU and even to choose a distinct EU issue-scope.

**Table 4.2: Factors driving EU salience and EU scopes in different party groups**

	Model 1 Government vs. Opposition		Model 2 Govern. vs. Est. Opposition		Model 3 Established Parties vs. Challengers		Model 1 Government vs. Opposition		Model 2 Govern. vs. Est. Opposition		Model 3 Established Parties vs. Challengers	
	RRR <sup>b</sup>	sig <sup>c</sup>	RRR	sig.	RRR	sig.	RRR	sig.	RRR	sig.	RRR	sig.
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>	<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>						<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>					
<i>Selective emphasis model</i>												
Party type <sup>a</sup>	–		2.554	***	–		1.266	**	2.564	***	–	
Electoral success national	.761	*	.365	***	.789	*	.642	**	.379	***	.659	*
Own party internal dissent	.570	***	.459	***	.577	**	.529	**	.399	***	.545	**
Success x dissent	1.255	**	1.791	**	1.267	**	1.296	*	2.135	*	1.316	*
Election cycle national	.574	*	.204	***	.616	*	–		.208	***	–	
Success x cycle	.678	**	.294	***	.703	*	.649	***	.227	***	.680	*
<i>Co-orientation model</i>												
EU-emphasis opp. parties	–		.825	*	–		1.364	***	1.182	***	1.413	***
EU-emphasis gov. parties	–		1.193	**	–		–		1.256	***	–	
EU-support public	2.276	*	4.390	***	2.094	**	–		3.066	***	–	
<i>Structural controls</i>												
EU-salience media (control)	.776	**	–		.779	**	.810	*	–		.802	*
EU-support	–		.630	***	–		–		.702	***	–	
Extreme EU-position	.799	***	–		.800	***	.779	*	–		.799	*
constant	.100	***	.588		.100	***	.356	**	1.199		.340	**
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> Base-Model (with interact.)	.051		.082		.050							
N	9100		4890		9100							
			<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>establ. party x...</i>		<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>gov. party x ...</i>	<i>vgov. party x ...</i>	
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:</i>												
... electoral success national (i1)	.521	**	–		–		–		2.589	***	–	
... internal EU-dissent (i2)	–		–		–		–		–		–	
... success x dissent (i3)	4.802	*	–		–		–		–		–	
... success x cycle (i4)	–		.422	*	–		–		–		–	
... EU-emphasis opp. Parties (i5)	–		–		.821	***	–		.863	**	1.390	***
... EU-emphasis gov. Parties (i6)	–		–		–		–		.576	***	–	
... EU-support public (i7)	.620	***	–		.801	*	–		–		–	

<sup>a</sup> Party types included in regressions as dummy variables: Models one and two: government parties; model three: established parties (government and opposition).  
<sup>b</sup> Cell entries are relative risk ratios (RRR) obtained from multinomial logistic regression. RRR-coefficients > 1 indicate a positive effect of the predictor variable, while RRRs < 1 indicate a negative effect. <sup>c</sup>Levels of significance: \* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001. N are all press releases published by the individual parties. As numbers of cases vary strongly between parties and countries, results are weighted on the party and on the country level.

Moving on to the test of the selective emphasis model, the results first show that electoral success in the last national election is a relevant obstacle for EU-related campaign messages: both models including all parties (Models 1 and 3), as well as the model including only established parties (Model 2), show significant negative effects (all  $RRRs < 1$ ) on electoral success from mentioning the EU (step 1) and using a specific EU scope (step 2). This means that parties that are successful on the national level are more likely to avoid EU topics, while parties in weak positions are more likely to mobilize on EU issues (for similar findings for the 2009 EP elections, see Adam and Maier [2016]). Unexpectedly, this effect seems pretty stable for all party groups with only two exceptions: the interaction term between electoral success and party type (i1) shows a negative effect in step 1, Model 1 ( $RRR = .521^{**}$ ), meaning that successful governing parties mention the EU less often than opposition parties, while weak governing parties mention the EU more often. Interestingly, however, strong governing parties are more likely than established opposition parties to use specific EU scopes in their campaigns (step 2,  $RRR_{model2} = 2.589^{***}$ ). Also unexpectedly, no significant difference was found between established and challenger parties. In sum, hypothesis 1a, which claims that weak established parties mobilize on EU issues while strong, established parties avoid EU topics, is partly supported. However, hypothesis 1b, which states that strong challenger parties are more likely to campaign on EU issues, has to be rejected.

Turning to the relevance of internal party dissent to parties' communication strategies, we first found that in all models internal dissent decreases the probability that parties will mobilize on EU matters (all  $RRRs < 1$ ). This finding is fully in line with hypothesis 2, and no differences are found between party groups (see i2). Quite surprisingly, however, the interaction between electoral success (also a proxy for the strength of party leadership) and inner party dissent on the EU does not show the expected negative effect on EU mobilization, but instead it shows a strong positive effect for all parties (all significant  $RRRs > 1$ ). This means that parties with high internal dissent on EU integration do in general avoid EU issues in their campaigns; however, if the party is successful on the national level, its strong leadership dares to talk about the EU and distinct EU policies in an EP campaign – and the probability that a strong leader will at least mention the EU is even higher for governing than for opposition parties (i3 step 1,  $RRR_{model1} = 4.802^*$ ). Therefore, hypothesis 3a is rejected.

Testing for the last determinants referring to the selective emphasis model, the timing within the election cycle (i.e. distance to the next national elections following the 2014 EP elections) and the interaction between party strength and this timing, we first found that all parties are less likely to mention the EU if the next national elections are far away and more likely to mention the EU if the next national elections are close (step 1: all  $RRRs < 1$ ). Regarding the use of specific EU scopes, however, this effect was only significant for established parties (step 2:  $RRR_{model2} = .208^{***}$ ): The more distant national elections are, the lower the probability that established parties will use EU scopes. The effects of the interaction term between electoral success and electoral cycle are in line with this finding: if parties are strong on the national level and if the next national elections are far away, their likelihood of mobilizing on Europe is lower than that of parties in weak positions and facing upcoming national elections. This finding is also fairly stable for all party types with one exception: strong governing parties at the beginning of the cycle are even less inclined than established opposition parties to mention the EU (i4 step 1:  $RRR_{model2} = .422^*$ ). In sum, hypothesis 3b is fully supported.

Turning now to the predictions of the co-orientation model, we first found that co-orientation with (other) opposition parties primarily matters regarding the choice of specific EU scopes (step 2: all  $RRRs > 1$ ): The more often opposition parties use specific EU scopes, the higher the probability that all other parties will do so, too. However, established opposition parties seem to have an especially strong orientation towards other opposition parties: as the interaction effect is positive for established parties in general (i5 step 2:  $RRR_{model3} = 1.390^{***}$ ), but negative for governing parties (i5 step 2:  $RRR_{model2} = .863^{**}$ ), it must be established opposition parties showing this special orientation toward other opposition parties. In sum, these findings lend only partial support to hypothesis 4, as all parties are responsive to opposition parties' EU-related communication, especially their choice of EU scope, but governing parties are less affected than established opposition parties. On the other hand, only established parties show a significant co-orientation towards (other) governing parties (step 1:  $RRR_{model2} = 1.193^{**}$  and step 2:  $RRR_{model2} = 1.256^{***}$ ), and again, it is less the governing parties and more the established opposition parties that show this strong co-orientation (i6 step 2:  $RRR_{model2} = .576^{***}$ ). In sum, the results support hypothesis 5: challenger parties are not responsive to the EU emphasis of governing parties.



Finally, testing the relevance of public opinion towards the EU on parties' communication strategies, the results are mixed. Looking at the strategic decision to only mention the EU, all parties seem more likely to talk about the EU if public opinion towards it is positive (step 1: all  $RRRs > 1$ ). However, the interaction terms between public support and party type indicate that, the more positive public opinion is, the more often challenger parties in particular will refer to the EU, as the interaction effect for established parties is negative (i7 step 1:  $RRR_{model3} = .801^*$ ). Looking at the question of which parties are more likely to use EU scopes, the positive impact of public support was found only for established parties (step 2:  $RRR_{model2} = 3.066^{***}$ ). In sum, all parties mention the EU more often in their campaigns if public opinion towards the EU is positive. With regard to choosing a distinct EU scope, public opinion is only stimulating for established parties. Even though these findings are diffuse, it seems that for all parties it is not Euroscepticism that drives EU references and EU scopes, but instead a pro-European climate; so, hypotheses 6a and 6b are both rejected.

#### **4.2.5. Summary and Discussion**

Our analyses show that, in 2014, established and especially governing parties were no longer silenced EU issues, which supports a trend first found for the 2009 EP elections (Adam and Maier 2016). On average, governing parties referred to EU issues in 35 per cent of their press releases, mentioning the EU at least twice and in most cases also using specific EU scopes. However, the variation in the salience of EU issues among countries and party groups was enormous, ranging between more than 60 per cent for the press releases of Portuguese governing parties and seven per cent for the UK's established opposition (see also Adam and Maier 2011), leading to the question of which factors encourage parties to put EU topics on the agenda or restrain them from doing so.

Most indicators derived from the selective emphasis approach, as well as from the co-orientation thesis, turned out to be highly valuable for explaining parties' communication strategies. Stemming from the selective emphasis approach, electoral success on the national level and internal party dissent on Europe, as well as the interaction between these factors, have a highly systematic influence on parties' strategic behaviour: If parties are successful on the national level, they still seem to avoid talking about the EU, while parties in weak positions are

more likely to try to mobilize on EU issues, especially if national elections are approaching – with the major exception of successful governing parties, which are particularly prone to campaign using specific EU scopes. Also, very much in line with the literature (e.g. Adam et al. 2016; Hobolt and De Vries 2015), parties with high internal dissent on EU integration still try to avoid EU issues, though internal dissent will not keep a successful party leader from putting the EU on the agenda. Again, this is especially true for successful governing parties.

Looking at factors derived from the co-orientation model, orientation towards the communication behaviour of opposition parties has the most systematic effect on choosing a specific EU scope. However, established opposition parties seem to be affected more strongly than governing parties in this regard. On the contrary, challenger parties are not at all responsive to the communication strategies of governing parties. Last but not least, unexpectedly, it seems that a pro-European public opinion rather than Euroscepticism promotes EU communications.

In sum, the indicators derived from the selective emphasis approach, as well as from the co-orientation approach, turned out to be also highly valuable when tested in an integrated model. The fact that some effects turned out different or even opposite from the existing literature might be – in addition to an indication of a factual change in parties' communication strategies – a benefit of the simultaneous testing allowed for by the integrated model. Therefore, a combination of predictors (and their interactions) from the selective emphasis and co-orientation approaches seems to be a promising way to analyse the further development of parties' strategic communications.

The explanatory power of the models with pseudo- $r^2$ s of five to eight per cent is rather low, stemming from the enormous heterogeneity within party groups. For example, the established governing parties in Austria (SPÖ and ÖVP) mentioned Europe in more than 40 per cent of their press releases; the governing party in France (PS) did not mention it in even 15 per cent. Similar heterogeneity can also be observed in other party groups. For example, the challenger BZÖ in Austria had a share of 51 per cent EU mentions compared with a Greek challenger (XA) that did not even have eight per cent.

The results thus suggest that the communication behaviour of established parties during EP campaigns has changed significantly, building on a trend that first became visible in 2009: governing parties in particular no longer avoid discussion of EU matters, with the result that

European integration is becoming more politicized. However, parties' approach seems to be quite utilitarian: especially in contexts in which public support for the EU is high, established parties also dare to put the EU on the agenda. Nevertheless, even if the general picture looks promising, variation among countries and parties is high, and for many parties, it remains true that EP campaigns are fully domesticized (Boomgaarden and De Vreese 2016) and fail to provide citizens with the information necessary to 'decide issues' (Schumpeter 1942/200:250), as argued earlier.

Of course, our analysis has two obvious shortcomings that should be taken into account in future research: First, it takes into account EU salience of the messages but not their valence. Second, it does not allow for causal interpretations, which would also be highly valuable in the vein of the co-orientation thesis.

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### 4.3. Fazit der Analyse I

In der Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse der ersten Analyse wird der Trend zur Normalisierung der Wahlkampfkommunikation deutlich. Zum einen hat sich die Kommunikation aller Parteien der EU zugewandt. Zum anderen vermeiden es etablierte Parteien nicht mehr auf die EU im Wahlkampf abzustellen. Zwar liegt der Fokus der Pressemitteilungen nur zwischen einem Viertel bis zu einem Drittel auf der EU, während der Schwerpunkt der Parteienkommunikation noch immer auf der nationalen Ebene liegt – es kann jedoch nicht mehr von einem Verschweigen europäischer Themen ausgegangen werden. In der Analyse stellen sich eindeutig parteiinterne Faktoren als relevant für die Unterschiede in der EU-fokussierten Kommunikation heraus. Gerade interner Dissens über die EU-Integration hat einen negativen Effekt auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit, europäische Themen anzusprechen. Dieser kann jedoch durch starkes Abschneiden in nationalen Wahlen überlagert werden. Darüber hinaus steigern auch äußere Einflüsse die Wahrscheinlichkeit, die EU als Thema anzusprechen. Der Grad der EU-Kommunikation neuer und etablierter Oppositionsparteien sowie die öffentliche Unterstützung der EU durch die Bürger wirken positiv auf die Sichtbarkeit der EU in Pressemitteilungen.

Zwar stellen die Ergebnisse Indizien für die Europäisierung der Wahlkampfkommunikation auf Parteebene dar – somit ist die Voraussetzung für die weitere Analyse erfüllt – dennoch sind zwei Aspekte relevant für die Untersuchung der Interaktion zwischen Medienberichterstattung und Parteienkommunikation. Zum einen sind Effekte der EU-Salienz in den Medien (Kontrollvariable RRR zwischen .779\*\* und .810\*) – sofern signifikant – negativ in ihrer Effektrichtung. Da die Variable allerdings nur auf Länderebene und über den gesamten Untersuchungszeitraum von 12 Wochen gemessen wurde, bedarf es hier einer genaueren Analyse über die Wirkmechanismen besonders in Bezug auf temporale Effekte. Zum anderen variiert die generelle Salienz europäischer Pressemitteilungen ebenso wie die Salienz in den Medien zwischen Ländern (siehe Appendix Analyse I) stark, was die Frage aufwirft, ob bestimmte länderspezifische Unterschiede vorliegen, die diese möglichen Interaktionen beeinflussen.

## 5. Die EU auf der Agenda als Chance der Wahlkampfkommunikation

### 5.1. Befunde bisheriger Forschung zum Potential der EU als Thema für die Wahlkampfkommunikation

Im Zuge der Politisierung eines Themas im Wahlkampf bedarf es entweder Medienberichterstattung oder Parteienkommunikation, um dieses auf die Agenda zu setzen (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Kriesi, 2009; Wilde, 2007). Eine Normalisierung der Wahlkampfkommunikation würde also die EU als Thema (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) auf die Agenda setzen. Die Parteien haben den EU-Fokus ihrer Pressemitteilungen (nachweislich) erhöht, dennoch stellt sich die Frage, wie erfolgreich sie diesen in den Medien platzieren können. Hier wird durch die Analysen der Analyse II eine wichtige Grundannahme des Verhältnisses von *Agenda-Setting* und *-Building* beleuchtet: Berichten Medien über ein Thema, wenden sich Parteien in den darauffolgenden Tagen diesem Thema ebenfalls zu (*Agenda-Setting*) oder folgt die Medienberichterstattung der Parteienkommunikation (*Agenda-Building*)?

Forschung im nationalen Kontext (Bartels, 1996; Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012; Soroka, 2002b; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006) beleuchtet diese zeitlichen Abläufe bereits umfassend. Während der regulären Legislaturperiode geben die Medien Inputs in das politische System und Parteien reagieren darauf (Elmelund-Præstekær & Wien, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010; Lee, 2014; Soroka, 2003; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2016). In der Vorbereitung von Wahlkämpfen werden die Themen, die aufgrund der Medienberichterstattung als wichtig von den Parteistrategen wahrgenommen werden, in die Planung mit einbezogen (Sides, 2006). Für die Zeit des Wahlkampfes weist die Forschung (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; Dalton, Beck, Huckfeldt, & Koetzle, 1998; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006) hingegen ein gegenteiliges Ergebnis aus: Hier folgen die Medien der Parteienkommunikation. Parteien sind in Wahlkampfzeiten also erfolgreiche *Agenda-Builders* (Brandenburg, 2002; Dearing & Rogers, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2012; Norris et al., 1999; Semetko et al., 1991), da Medienberichterstattung die Inputs aus der Wahlkampfkommunikation gezielt aufbereitet. Dieser Effekt ist in Bezug auf den Europafokus im Wahlkampf ausgeprägt zu erwarten, da

durch den geringen Nachrichtenwert der EU der Thematisierung durch nationale Akteure ein entscheidender Anteil bei der Sichtbarkeit der EU zukommt (Adam, 2007; Jalali & Silva, 2011; Schuck et al., 2011).

Ein spezifischer Aspekt der Analyse im Zuge der EP-Wahlen, der in der bisherigen Forschung zur Interaktion von Medien- und Parteienkommunikation selten untersucht wurde (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011), betrifft mögliche Effekte länderspezifischer Charakteristika. Erstens kann die generelle Salienz eines Themas (hier EU-Fokus) in der Parteienkommunikation einen Einfluss haben (Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012; Roberts & McCombs, 1994). Zweitens kann der Nachrichtenwert der EU gesteigert werden, wenn sich die Parteien eines Landes polarisierter positionieren und so *Agenda-Building-Einflüsse* verstärken (Boomgaarden & De Vreese, 2016). Drittens besteht die Möglichkeit, dass *Agenda-Building-Effekte* von Eigenschaften des Mediensystems abhängig sind (Vliegenthart & Montes, 2014).

## **5.2. Who drives the agenda: Media or parties? A seven-country comparison in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections**

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### **Abstract**

In this paper, we examine who drives attention to the European Union (EU) in member nations—the media or the parties—and how cross-national variations in these media-party interactions can be explained by focusing on issue salience in campaign communications, party polarization, and media system characteristics. To answer these questions, we rely on a quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles and party press releases in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) during the twelve weeks prior to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election. Our results from a daily-level vector autoregression (VAR) analysis show that parties are the main driver. However, our findings also indicate that single approaches in comparative research, namely, issue salience, party polarization, and media characteristics, cannot fully explain cross-national variations, which stem from combinations of different determinants, such as low (high) EU issue salience interacting with high (low) party polarization.

### 5.2.1. Introduction

As the media can affect the salience citizens attribute to issues (Shaw and McCombs 1977), as well as their decision to turn out to vote (De Vreese 2003:128) and even the voting decision itself, political parties react to and seek to influence the media. Research on parties' media agenda-setting—i.e., the driving forces of issue attention—within a national context (Bartels 1996; Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006), shows that parties are the main agenda-setters, at least during national elections, while the media play a more important role during routine times of politics. While the literature has mainly dealt with specific conditions under which either the media or parties prevail, only few studies have examined cross-national variations in the interdependencies between parties and media agendas (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016) or asked whether the dominance of parties is also visible in non-national elections (e.g. European Parliament [EP] elections).

We address these gaps by exploring the interdependencies between the parties' and the media's agendas within the context of the EP elections in seven Western European countries. The EP elections offer a unique opportunity to investigate agenda dynamics in non-national elections and compare agenda-setting effects between countries (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2011). The EP elections take place simultaneously in all member states and follow common electoral rules set by the European Council and European Treaties (European Parliament 2018). Thereby, these elections hold constant external events on the international level, idiosyncrasies and the different timings of national elections, while they enable analyzing how the media-party interplay is associated with cross-national variations in the political and media contexts of elections. This exceptional setting allows us to answer our two main research questions:

First, we ask whether the media or party agenda is the main driver of attention to the EU. By answering this question, we assess whether findings from national elections can be transferred to the EU level despite the fact that these elections are often characterized as second-order (Reif and Schmitt 1980), subordinate to more pressing national matters and ignored by both media coverage and party campaign communication. Our second question investigates whether systematic differences in the interdependencies between the media and party agenda across countries can be explained by either salience theory, news value theory, or aspects of media

systems, testing the applicability of these theories to the case of the EP election campaign. We focus on three established explanatory factors that could intensify the influence of the party on the media agenda: *issue salience* in election campaign communication, *party polarization*, and *political parallelism*. The first factor refers to the force with which parties try to influence the media agenda; the second concerns a crucial news factor relevant to media take-up, i.e. conflictuality; and the third refers to differences in the ties between the media and the political parties.

To answer these questions, we rely on a quantitative content analysis of news articles and party press releases (PRs) in seven countries published during the twelve weeks leading up to the 2014 EP election. We use vector autoregression (VAR) models to capture the interdependencies between party communication and media coverage. This approach allows us to estimate the causal impact of the party on the media agenda and assess the explanatory potential of established approaches in comparative communication regarding cross-national variations in this relationship.

### **5.2.2. Theoretical considerations**

A main assumption in agenda-setting research is that media coverage raises public awareness of issues—i.e., the more often an issue is covered in the media, the more salient this issue is for the public (Shaw and McCombs 1977). However, the media influence not only the public but also political parties and the salience they attach to issues (Lee 2014; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). Political parties need the media to connect with their voters. Therefore, they react to the agenda set by the media (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). As they “have professionalized their approach toward the media [...], they increasingly adhere to a media logic when communicating to the electorate” (Hopmann et al. 2009:73). In other words, the agendas of political parties are susceptible to issues that are salient in the media (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Soroka 2003; Thesen 2013). As previous research shows, the agenda-setting power of the media on political parties during routine times of politics is quite sizeable (for an overview, see Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016).

However, research indicates that the agenda-setting power of the media declines before elections. During election campaigns, political parties are more important than the media in promoting agenda issues (Dalton et al. 1998; Eichhorn 2005). According to Walgrave and van Aelst (2006), political parties behave differently during such times, as they want to convince voters through the media. Indeed, national election studies clearly show that parties are especially successful in putting their issues on the agenda during campaigns (Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Roberts and McCombs 1994).

However, agenda-setting research on the EU is lacking, and it is not yet clear whether the above-mentioned findings can be transferred to a European election context. While a first study on specific EU issues indicates the relevance of the media in initiating debates (Maier et al. 2017), we do not know who triggers attention to the *EU in general* and who dominates the interplay between the media and party agendas. From a theoretical perspective, it is reasonable to expect national parties to play an important role in European elections because (1) the EU itself needs national actors, i.e. parties, to gain news value (De Vreese 2003; Jalali and Silva 2011; Machill et al. 2006; Schuck and De Vreese 2011); and (2) the introduction of the “Spitzenkandidaten” for the presidency of the European Commission (Van der Brug et al. 2016) personalized the 2014 EP election and led to a party-driven rise in media attention (Schulze 2016). Consequently, we state in our first hypothesis:

*H1: The party agenda influenced the media agenda more strongly than the other way around in the 2014 EP election campaign.*

#### *Explaining cross-national variations in the interdependencies between the media and party agenda*

Agenda-setting research lacks a comparative perspective, and only a few agenda-setting studies have focused on determinants that systematically explain cross-national variations in party-media interactions. Drawing on these studies, we systematically analyze the role of three factors: First, the *salience parties attribute to an issue* (compared to other issues) should influence the success of these issues in getting media coverage (Eichhorn 2005; Hopmann et al. 2012). Second, following news value theory (Maier et al. 2010; Galtung and Ruge 1965;

Harcup and O'Neill 2016), we assume that media are more likely to pick up issues raised by the parties if there is *polarization* in a country regarding the issue under consideration. A third explanatory factor comprises differences in the national media systems (Brüggemann et al. 2014; Hallin and Mancini 2004), with *political parallelism* particularly impacting news media coverage (Vliegenthart and Montes 2014).

#### *Relation between party polarization and issue salience in the EP campaign*

Political parties try to influence the media to address their issues in election campaigns (Green-Pedersen 2007). Research indicates that the relative *issue salience* in parties' campaign communications can impact party-media interactions (Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Roberts and McCombs 1994). In the EP context, this means that the more issues that parties discuss with a European reference (rather than a national one), the more they drive attention to the EU. A complementing factor that might affect whether political messages are reported in the media is *party polarization*. As the news value approach argues (Galtung and Ruge 1965), the news value of specific information, especially conflict (Phillips 2015; van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2015), determines whether it is reported in the media. Therefore, the degree of polarization between parties (i.e. conflict) could play a central role as a "catalyst" affecting the relation between parties and the media agenda (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Schuck et al. 2011). When parties are polarized on the topic of European integration, EU issues adhere to the news value of conflict, and thus the media should be more likely to pick them up (De Vreese et al. 2007). Regarding polarization on EU issues, Schuck et al. (2011:49) find a curvilinear relation between the "dispersion [of political parties' positions on the EU] and the visibility" of EU news coverage, with higher EU visibility in countries with either high or low levels of polarization. They further theorize that this counterintuitive effect stems from the relation between EU issue salience and the level of conflict. High levels of polarization adhere to the news value of conflict, while the absence of polarization enables all parties to campaign on EU issues, leading to an increase in salience (Schuck et al. 2011). Research shows that mainstream pro-EU parties have applied silencing strategies (Hooghe and Marks 2008) in the past to avoid conflict (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004) and maintain control over their campaign agendas (Green-Pedersen 2011) while neglecting EU issues. Adam et al. (2017) find that in the



2014 EP election, silencing by mainstream pro-EU parties led to lower EU issue salience in countries with polarized opinions, while lower polarization led to a higher EU issue salience in party campaign communications. The influence of party communication on the media in different countries is then dependent on at least one of these factors, with higher EU issue salience or polarization about the EU, the simultaneous occurrence of which is unlikely, furthering media reporting. Therefore, we assume

*H2a: The effect of the party agenda on the media agenda is stronger in those countries in which parties communicate more regarding issues pertaining to the EU (compared to national or local issues) in the absence of political polarization.*

*H2b: The effect of the party agenda on the media agenda is stronger in those countries in which party polarization regarding the EU is high (due to the news value of conflict) in the absence of the salience of EU issues.*

#### *Media system characteristics*

Finally, a country's media system could affect the party-media relationship. Following the seminal contribution of Hallin and Mancini (2004), many scholars have addressed cross-country differences in the characteristics and structure of media systems (e.g., see Aalberg and Curran 2012), such as the dimensions of press market reach, role of the state, political parallelism, and journalistic professionalism (but see Norris 2009 for a critique of the absence of empirical clarity in these dimensions). The relevant dimension to address the impact of party communication on media reporting is *political parallelism* (Vliegenthart and Montes 2014), since it is the only dimension that directly connects political parties to journalists' selection criteria for news articles. Based on party-press parallelism (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995), we assume that overall media reporting follows certain political affiliations and that journalists are politically biased towards parties. Therefore, in media systems with high political parallelism, journalists should be more inclined to closely follow party campaign communication. Considering the impact of media system characteristics, we state:

*H3: The effect of the party agenda on the media agenda is stronger in countries with high levels of political parallelism.*

### **5.2.3. Data, Research Design, and Methods**

This study focuses on media and party communication in the twelve weeks before the 2014 EP elections in seven countries: Austria, France, Greece, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. First, we rely on a quantitative content analysis (see Bartels 1996; Hopmann et al. 2012; Neuman et al. 2014; Vliegthart and Montes 2014) of newspaper articles and party press releases. We measure the media agenda based on using print news articles. We selected legacy print media outlets because they are more readily available to, and more often used by, citizens to get information on EU political matters (39%) than the Internet (32%) and online social networks (9%) (see European Commission 2014:47-9), thereby playing a “crucial role” (Bobba and Seddone 2017:6) in European citizens’ voting decisions. Additionally, even in a time of growing online communication, print medias’ agenda-setting power in other media types cannot not be neglected (Harder et al. 2017). Compared to the Internet, print media only allow to capture timing with daily lags (e.g., see Ariel et al. 2017), yet analyses of intermedia agenda-setting between online legacy media and Twitter messages also favor 24-hour time lags (Abdi-Herrle 2018). Thus, we restrict our smallest time lags to days. Second, we rely on press releases to measure the party agenda for two reasons: They are specifically targeted at the media, and, they are not published on fixed schedules (e.g., parliamentary questionings), but potentially on a daily basis and are better suited to capture parties’ strategic reactions to external events or issues published in the media. We decided not to use online campaign communication because parties differ considerably in their online activity within as well as across countries (Klinger and Russmann 2017; Lilleker et al. 2015), and they try to influence their constituents directly via online communication (Serazio 2014) rather than appeal to the media.

For the *media agenda*, we coded all EU-related commentaries and articles on the front page and in the political section of one left-leaning and one right-leaning national newspaper per country, rotating them on a daily base. Up to three political actors—i.e., actors who formulate statements or perform an action to make a political opinion (concerning a specific issue) visible—were

coded per article. For the *party agenda*, we coded the EU-related press releases of national parties that garnered more than 3% of the vote in the last national election or the 2009 EP election. The reliability scores, here Krippendorff's alpha, range from 0.76 to 1.00 for both sources (see Maier et al. 2016 for details concerning codebook, training, and reliability). All relevant EU articles and press releases were selected based on a search string containing at least two EU-related keywords.<sup>1</sup> In a nutshell, our data contains an account of all EU issues advanced in press releases and in the news on a given day in each country.<sup>2</sup>

The independent variables at the country-level are measured as follows. First, *EU issue salience in party communication* is measured as the mean of the share of EU-related press releases in proportion to all published press releases per party in a country over the course of the twelve weeks. Second, we operationalize *party polarization* using Ezrow's (2007:186) measure of weighted party system dispersion (see also Schuck et al. 2011:45, for a detailed discussion). This measure accounts for the deviation of each party  $j$ 's policy position in country  $k$  ( $P_{jk}$ ) from the party system center ( $\bar{P}_k$ )—i.e., the overall party mean in a country—and weights them by each party's vote share ( $VS_j$ ). Higher values indicate higher party system dispersion or, here, party polarization.

$$\text{Weighted Party System Dispersion} = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1} VS_j (P_{jk} - \bar{P}_k)^2}$$

We measure a party's EU position based on the EU-related press releases. For each press release, we coded how a party evaluated the general and fundamental idea of European integration (EUfund) and/or the specific policies and actors of the EU (EUconcrete) as positive, balanced, or negative. We then combined both indicators into an index ranging from -1 (EU opposition) to +1 (EU support), giving more weight to fundamental evaluations than to concrete

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<sup>1</sup> The key words in the search string, here the English version, include Europ\*, europ\*, EU, EP, EC, ECB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, ECJ, EEAS, EESC, EIF, EDPS, EMU, Troika, Frontex, and constitutional treaty.

<sup>2</sup> In line with other studies, we dropped issues related to "elections" and "other" (as the former includes, among other factors, the date of the election or technicalities, rather than substantial discussions on EU issues, while the latter is a residual category—e.g., Hopman et al. 2012).

evaluations.<sup>3</sup> In our final step, we calculated an evaluation index mean over the twelve weeks for each party ( $P_{jk}$ ) and the country's overall party mean ( $\bar{P}_k$ ). A party's vote share ( $VS_j$ ) is operationalized using a party's vote share in the last national election before the 2014 EP election, which was taken from national election websites.

Finally, we operationalize *political parallelism* using the indicators put forward by Brüggemann et al. (2014), who focus especially on the empirical clarity of indicators in their extensive empirical revision of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) original typology. They operationalize political parallelism through an extensive variety of indicators, such as "separation of news and commentary, partisan influence, political orientation of journalists, media-party parallelism, political bias, and public service broadcasters dependence" (2014: 1047-8) and calculate a z-standardized average index. We use the index values for the seven countries in our study.

#### *Research design for cross-national variations*

We selected the countries in our study because they vary considerably in our main country-level determinants. The *EU issue salience* in press releases reaches its peak in Portugal (56% of all PR contain references to the EU), followed by Austria (34%), the Netherlands (32%), France (30%), Greece (29%), Germany (26%), and the UK (25%). Therefore, political parties campaign heavily on EU issues in Portugal and display a national focus in their communications in Germany and the UK. The weighted party system dispersion, on the other hand, measures the highest *party polarization* in the UK (3.63), followed by France (3.03), Austria (2.59), Greece (2.50), the Netherlands (2.37), Germany (1.82), and Portugal (0.72). The dispersion of political parties between rejecting and favoring EU integration is therefore most pronounced in the UK, and political parties in Portugal more consistently evaluate EU integration positively. Our quantification of *political parallelism* relies on the index presented by Brüggemann et al. (2014: 1061). The highest degree of parallelism can be found in Greece (original index value:

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<sup>3</sup> The values of the index are: 1: "Voicing of specific and general EU-support (both indicators positive)", 0.75: "Voicing of general EU-support (EUconcrete: n.a. or balanced)", 0.5: "Voicing of general EU-support and specific Euroscepticism", 0.25: "Voicing of specific EU-support (EUfund: n.a. or balanced)", 0: "Balanced (EUconcrete and/or EUfund: balanced)", -0.25: "Voicing of specific Euroscepticism (EUfund: n.a. or balanced)", -0.5: "Voicing of general Euroscepticism and specific EU-support", -0.75: "Voicing of general Euroscepticism (EUconcrete: n.a. or balanced)", -1: "Voicing of specific and general Euroscepticism (both negative)."

1.43), followed by France (0.62), Austria (0.35), the Netherlands (0.19), Portugal (-0.08), the UK (-0.29), and Germany (-0.56). Journalists' political affiliations therefore impact their reporting to the largest extent in Greece, while they distance themselves from political advocacy in Germany.

### *Methods of analysis*

Our statistical analysis is based on two time series with data available at the daily level—one related to press releases and the other to political actors in the news. These time series allow us to capture “the [interdependent] dynamics of attention to issues over time” (Neuman et al. 2014: 198). We use *VAR analysis* to assess the interdependencies between the media and party agenda. VAR models have recently gained importance in agenda-setting research (Bartels 1996; Lee 2014; Lee et al. 2016; Neuman et al. 2014; Soroka 2002a; Vliegthart and Montes 2014). The advantages of VAR analysis are twofold. First, this method enables capturing the causality structure of the media and attention to EU issues in party communications. Second, VAR analysis is especially suited to account for interdependencies between both forms of communication in a single model, as this method “treats the links across units in an unrestricted fashion” (Canova and Ciccarelli 2013:207). In other words, VAR analysis treats all variables “as a priori endogenous” (Lütkepohl 2009:281), meaning that party and media can influence each other in the same model, allowing exploration of mutual influences in the time series.

Our VAR analysis follows the common approach in the literature (e.g., Vliegthart and Montes 2014). First, we test the main assumptions, such as stationarity and residual autocorrelation, and identify optimal time lags. Then, we proceed with a causal analysis using the *Granger causality tests* to detect whether one entity follows the other in party-media interactions and, if so, who follows whom. Finally, we investigate *cumulative impulse response functions (CIRF)* and *forecast error vector decomposition (FEVD)* to assess the direction and size of the influence (Becketti 2013; Lütkepohl 2009; Neuman et al. 2014:203-4; Vliegthart and Montes 2014:328). More precisely, we check in the first step whether the data is stationary. We examine this using the *augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test* (for details, see, Lee et al. 2016:448-9;

Vliegenthart and Montes 2014:328).<sup>4</sup> We then assess the lag structure—i.e., how many days are needed for the influence to occur—and select the optimal lags using two information criteria (see Lütkepohl 2005:148-50): the *Akaike information criterion (AIC)* and the *Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQIC)*. We further test for residual autocorrelation using the *Lagrange-multiplier test ex-post* (see Becketti 2013:313), as shown in Appendix 5C.

In the second step, we run VARs and perform the Granger causality tests. One variable is said to cause a second variable if it improves the prediction of the second variable once its own past is considered (Granger 1969; Lütkepohl 2009). We then rely on CIRFs to assess the direction of the influence and FEVDs to capture its size—i.e., the part of the variation in one variable that is caused by the shocks (or lags) of another variable (Becketti 2013). The estimation of CIRFs and FEVDs requires an understanding of the order of the variables because it matters which variable is added first (Becketti 2013). Therefore, a sound theoretical argument should be made if a specific order is chosen in a structural recursive VAR (Lütkepohl 2009:310-1). Although we assume that parties influence the media, we control for the opposite influence to address the additional influence of parties after taking the past of media into account and calculate the VAR models for both causal directions. Therefore, there are models for every country with media as a dependent variable (added first) and parties (added second), and vice versa. When testing for the direction and size of effects—e.g., of the party agenda on the media agenda—we add the dependent variable, first to assess the remaining influence of the second (or independent) variable.<sup>5</sup>

#### 5.2.4. Results

Starting with a description of our data, Figure 5.1 shows the dynamics in attention to EU issues in the run-up to the 2014 EP election in the seven countries. We look at the absolute numbers


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<sup>4</sup> We also check whether the data is stable—i.e., not affected by an underlying trend or impact of a third variable excluded in the model. Stability is achieved if the VAR has no unit root: i.e., all the eigenvalues are within the unit circle (for details, see Lütkepohl 2005:15).

<sup>5</sup> The VAR models presented in the next chapter are estimated using Stata (for an overview on relevant commands, see Abrigo and Love 2015 and Becketti 2013).

of press releases and political actors mentioned in EU-related news articles. We can summarize two main findings. First, references to EU issues across countries are, on average, more often present in the media than in press releases<sup>6</sup> (also see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 5A and 5B). The exception is Austria, in which the number of press releases exceeds the number of EU issues in the media.<sup>7</sup> Second, no constant trend leading up to the election day can be detected, with variations between countries. There is evidence for a slightly increasing trend in France and Portugal in party and media communications, while the United Kingdom and Greece see either media or party communication decreasing. The next section tests whether systematic patterns between party communication and media coverage can be found.

**Figure 5.1: Trends of EU issue salience in the party and media agenda**



<sup>6</sup> The results are the same, even if only one actor per article is coded rather than up to three actors.

<sup>7</sup> Austria displays high numbers of press releases due to specific institutional settings in party campaigning (see also, Kritzinger et al. 2014).

### Interdependencies between party and media agenda

Our core interest is to disentangle the interdependencies between party and media agenda. More specifically, we focus on who influences whom and whether cross-national differences can be observed and, if so, explained. Table 5.1 separately presents the results from the VAR analysis based on attention to the EU for each country. A main assumption of VAR analysis is that the variables are endogenous and related to each other. For this reason, each VAR model contains as many regressions as the number of included variables. In our case, this means two regressions, the first including PRs as a dependent (or, in VAR terms, response) variable (see the left-hand side of Table 5.1) and the second with political actors mentioned in the media as the dependent variable (see right-hand side).

**Table 5.1: Interdependencies between the party and media agenda**

Country	Lag	party agenda					media agenda					
		Granger-chi <sup>2</sup>	CIRF	FEVD and CI-bounds (95%)	and	N	Granger-chi <sup>2</sup>	CIRF	FEVD and CI-bounds (95%)	and	N	
Austria	2	.054	–	.001	n.s.	673	<b>22.002***</b>	<b>.490</b>	<b>.194</b>	<b>.045</b>	<b>.342</b>	487
France	1	1.405	–	.013	n.s.	157	<b>4.548*</b>	<b>.694</b>	.043	n.s.		699
Germany	3	<b>9.456*</b>	–	.036	n.s.	257	<b>18.845***</b>	.730 (n.s.)	<b>.151</b>	<b>.019</b>	<b>.283</b>	675
Greece	1	.737	–	.007	n.s.	331	<b>4.575*</b>	<b>.424</b>	.047	n.s.		506
Netherlands	1	.140	–	.002	n.s.	156	<b>4.798*</b>	<b>.564</b>	.054	n.s.		445
Portugal	1	2.374	–	.022	n.s.	204	<b>15.167***</b>	<b>1.170</b>	<b>.142</b>	<b>.009</b>	<b>.274</b>	876
UK	1	.150	–	.001	n.s.	193	<b>26.782***</b>	<b>.934</b>	<b>.241</b>	<b>.080</b>	<b>.402</b>	368

Notes: Results are displayed for the influences by the additional variable on the dependent with \*\*\*=p<.001. \*\*=p<.01. \*=p<.05 for the chi<sup>2</sup> sig. CIRF only reported if CI-bounds do not cross 0 (highlighted bold). Values for CIRF and FEVD are dependent on the order of variable addition to the model. Thus, values in both columns represent the influence of adding the independent variable last. In addition, FEVD cannot be computed for 1-day lags since the dependent variable has an influence of 1 due to input ordering. In this case, additional effects of the lag+1 day (i.e., 2 days) are shown.

Reading the example of Austria from left to right: For a 2-day lag, the Granger causality test is non-significant (.054). So, adding media does not improve forecasting, and the CIRF and FEVD (.007) reflect that fact by their CI-Bounds crossing 0. With a 2-day lag for parties influencing media, the Granger causality chi<sup>2</sup> (22.002\*\*\*) indicates that PR improves the forecasts of media. After two days, an additional PR results in .490 mentions (CIRF) in news articles. For one random shock in PR, 19.4% (FEVD .194) variation in media can be attributed (the borders of the confidence interval bounds should not cross 0 to be significant at the 95% level; significant results are highlighted bold). Please note that the results above stem from single VAR models for different countries with different N. Thus, in contrast to FEVD, CIRF values are only comparable within countries.

Source: Own data.

The results in Table 5.1 support our first hypothesis that the overall *party agenda is the main driver* of party-media interactions when all EU issues are considered. The Granger causality tests show for each country that press releases have a significant influence on EU attention in the media, rather than vice versa. Table 5.1 provides further information on the lag selected for



each country's model, which was identified ex-ante before running our VAR models, and the test of the main assumptions. The second column in Table 5.1 suggests that the optimal lag in most countries is one day and rather immediate. Only Austria and Germany are exceptions, with proposed lag structures of two days and three days, respectively.<sup>8</sup> For Germany, the results further suggest that the media also affect the number of press releases (see the Granger-cause test on the left-hand side of Table 5.1). Yet, the influence is smaller than that of the party agenda, and no significant variation in the party agenda can be attributed to lags in the media agenda, as the FEVD values show.

Comparing the CIRF and FEVD values across countries allows a better understanding of the direction and size of the party-media interaction (see also Appendix 5D). As Table 5.1 shows, the greater the number of press releases that have been published in the past, the more often EU references appear in the media. In Austria, for example, an additional press release results in 0.49 additional media mentions of the EU after two days. However, the influences are not uniform across countries, as the differences in the CIRF and FEVD in Table 5.1 indicate. Moreover, two country groups can be distinguished. The first country group includes the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, and Portugal, in which CIRF values and the FEVD at the selected lag point to party agenda influences. FEVD accounts for the remaining variation in the media agenda after having considered its own past, which is explained by the party agenda. The party agenda has the highest explanatory potential in the UK (24.1% after one day), followed by Austria (19.4% after two days), Germany (15.1% after three days), and Portugal (14.2% after one day). For the second country group, namely, France, Greece, and the Netherlands, we cannot attribute any significant variation in the media agenda to the party agenda, even though the CIRF values point to a positive, but admittedly small, influence of the party agenda on the media agenda.

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<sup>8</sup> In Germany, the lag structure is ambiguous, resulting in two possible models with either a one-day or a three-day lag. The inspection of the VAR coefficients in the model with the media agenda as the dependent variable indicates that the coefficient relating to press releases lagged by one day is significant but that the two-day lagged coefficient is not. However, these regression coefficients should be interpreted carefully. Because of multicollinearity, for instance, between the lags of the same variables, the coefficients might be biased (see also Vliegthart and Montes 2014:329). Since the identification procedure for the lag structure starts with the longest chosen lag, the test statistics are sensitive to the number of chosen lags (Beckett 2013:306). When we start with four lags, the AIC and HQIC propose a one-day lag. Yet, when increasing the number of lags to a maximum of fourteen, both information criteria suggest a three-day lag.

So far, we have not only seen that the party agenda influences the media agenda, but also that this influence varies between countries, being stronger in some than in others. We proceed to explain these differences by comparing the FEVD values with our country-specific variables.

*Explaining cross-country variation*

We now turn to our cross-country hypotheses. Our second pair of hypotheses concerning *issue salience and political polarization* are linked. As Table 5.2 shows, there is evidence for the curvilinear relationships at the extreme edges of the spectrum. In the UK, which has the lowest salience of party communication (25%) and the highest overall party polarization (3.63), the impact of political parties on the media is high. The conflict over EU integration impacts the attention of news media through the rare incidents of EU-focused party communications.

**Table 5.2: Explaining cross-national variations in party-media influences**

Dependent: media agenda				
County	FEVD	EU issue salience (H2a)	Weighted Party System Dispersion (H2b)	Political parallelism (H3)
<b>UK</b>	<b>.241</b>	.25	3.63	-.29
<b>Austria</b>	<b>.194</b>	.34	2.59	.35
<b>Germany</b>	<b>.151</b>	.26	1.82	-.56
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>.142</b>	.56	.72	-.08
Netherlands	.054	.32	2.37	.19
Greece	.047	.29	2.50	1.43
France	.043	.30	3.03	.62

*Notes:* FEVD values from Table 5.1 are sorted in descending order and highlighted bold if significant.

*Source:* FEVD, Party System Dispersion, Party EU Salience: Own data. Parallelism: Brüggemann et al. (2014: 1061, Table 12).

The contrasting case with high salience (56%) and low polarization (0.72) is Portugal. Here political parties generally support the EU integration process and actively campaign with reference to the EU, leading the media to follow due to the perceived relevance of EU issues. Unlike the extreme cases, in Austria and Germany, the effects are not as clear cut. Austria ranks high on both salience and polarization, which is in line with the assumption that the media

follows conflict and perceived relevance, yet the assumption that the two indicators are negatively correlated does not hold. The German case is also puzzling. Here, low salience and low polarization cannot affect the media's attention to party communications, and, contrary to our third hypothesis, *political parallelism* in Germany is least pronounced (-0.56), so political advocacy is not a key factor driving influence. Overall, journalists do not follow political party communication more closely in countries with high political parallelism (Greece and France), but the lower scoring countries in this category (Germany, the UK, and Portugal) display these effects. We therefore must discard the hypothesis with two possible explanations. First, political parallelism could indicate a closeness to a political position rather than a specific political party—i.e. conservative media follows conservative party communication and liberal media follows liberal campaign messages—for which we do not control. Second, we only tested one of the dimensions of media systems theory. It might be possible that, for example, journalistic professionalism and strong public broadcasting affect the media's attention to the EP election campaigns. Journalists can perceive covering the run-up to the election as part of their democratic mandate of serving the public interest by closely covering the political debate with fair attendance to all relevant parties.

#### **5.2.5. Discussion**

The EP elections are often described as second-order elections that differ from the national setting. Regarding the effects of party campaign communications on media reporting, our findings confirm previous research in national settings; parties are the main drivers of the agenda during election campaigns. The transferability of these results (Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012) from the national to the EU context is good news for the EU and European integration, as it shows a trend towards the normalization of EU-related political communication. However, we do not test the effects on a disaggregated issue level because levels of EU-related communication in both media coverage and party press releases are still not on par with the national context, even during election campaigns. However, research in national settings shows that the media might be more important if specific issues (i.e., foreign politics) or politics in routine times are considered (e.g., Soroka 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006).

Media coverage and party communications on EU issues differ extensively in our seven EU member countries. The salience of EU issues in political campaigns is linked to the levels of polarization (Adam et al. 2017), at least on the fringes of our measures, while the absence of conflict enables campaigning by all parties on EU issues and high levels of conflict lead to more nation-centered campaigns. In turn, established approaches of news value theory, especially issue salience and party polarization (Schuck et al. 2011), can explain the influences of political parties on media attendance if certain thresholds are met. At least one factor (Harcup and O’Neill 2016)—either polarization or salience—must be high enough to spark media coverage, yet results in countries with median salience and polarization have to be explained by other factors. As all EU member states face challenges from Eurosceptic parties to varying degrees, the tone of campaign messages could have a significant influence on levels of conflict and thereby impact the news value of the EU (Boomgaarden et al. 2013), even if these challenger parties are rather small in terms of vote shares. The impact of political parallelism as a characteristic of the media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004), on the other hand, falls short of explaining media coverage. It might be promising to look at the perceived democratic mandate of journalists and the impact of strong public broadcasting or to specifically target the impact of political leanings rather than the impact of overall party communication. From a methodological perspective, public broadcasting can only have an impact on print media outlets if levels of intermedia agenda-setting are sufficiently high (Harder et al. 2017), which we did not test in the present study.

Based on the findings and limitations of this study, there are several areas for further research. First, future studies could have a stronger focus on explaining the conditions under which the media might influence the party agenda, especially when specific issues, such as foreign politics (Soroka 2002b), or external events with an EU-issue scope are concerned. Second, further research is needed to explain cross-national variations. The impact of the interaction between political polarization and salience (Schuck et al. 2011) has to be explored further by addressing the effects of emerging Eurosceptic challenger parties regardless of size (started by Meijers and Rauh 2016 with two countries). Eurosceptic campaign messages (for Italy, see Bobba and Seddonne 2017) can differ in impact because the content of campaign messages might directly link to the news value of conflict. The impact of political parallelism especially did not stand

up to empirical testing, which should be addressed in further research by disaggregating the data to the level of political leaning or even to the level of partisan influences on legacy media outlets (for Austria, see Haselmayer et al. 2017).

Finally, levels of intermedia agenda-setting and the impact of new media technologies in political campaigning should be the focus of further research. The ongoing rise of online media has led to a shift in audience attention (Jacobi et al. 2016), even if it is only that citizens prefer the online edition of a legacy media outlet. The advantage of online media is that events can be addressed instantaneously, and therefore, they are important intermedia agenda-setters (Harder et al. 2017) that hasten the news cycle. However, the function of professional journalists as gatekeepers becomes even more important in a fast, supranational newsroom (Shoemaker et al. 2009), so the agenda-setting effects of online campaign communications could either be limited or extensive depending on the journalistic cultures of different countries. Political parties, on the other hand, try to bypass this gatekeeping by directly addressing (Serazio 2014) their constituents, also to varying extents across parties and countries (see Klinger and Russmann 2017 for a two-country comparison). This development, if it proves effective, could in turn lead to a trend of political campaign strategists partially neglecting communication geared to legacy media, focusing on direct communication—a possibility that must be monitored and analyzed under the normative perspective of electoral democracy.

#### 5.2.6. References

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### 5.3. Fazit der Analyse II

Die Ergebnisse der zweiten Analyse zeigen, dass auch im EP-Wahlkampf 2014 die Parteien die Gelegenheit nutzten, sich mit europafokussierter Kommunikation in den Medien zu platzieren. In vier von sieben Ländern beeinflussen die Pressemitteilungen mit EU-Fokus die Medienberichterstattung in den darauffolgenden Tagen. Wie aufgrund der Forschung auf nationaler Ebene erwartet, spielen in Wahlkampfzeiten die politischen Akteure eine wichtige Rolle in der Präsentation eines Themas auf der Medienagenda, sie sind also erfolgreiche *Agenda-Builders*, wenn es um die Repräsentation der EU als Thema geht. Bei Betrachtung der Länderunterschiede ist das Bild jedoch nicht so klar. Ist die Polarisierung der Parteien zur EU-Integration hoch und die Salienz der EU in den Pressemitteilungen eines Landes gering, wird die Medienberichterstattung trotzdem durch Parteienkommunikation stimuliert. Auf der anderen Seite gilt, dass bei geringer Polarisierung hohe Salienz ebenfalls Medienberichterstattung stimulieren kann. Es stellt sich allerdings kein Interaktionseffekt ein. Der Einfluss des politischen Parallelismus wirft zudem weitere Fragen auf. Entgegen der Vorstellung, dass in Mediensystemen mit hohem Parallelismus die Aufmerksamkeit der Medien stärker an politische Parteien gekoppelt sein sollte, gibt es zumindest für kurzfristige temporale Effekte einen gegenteiligen Einfluss. Allerdings ist zu beachten, dass Parallelismus eher an politische Spektren gekoppelt ist. Eine Erklärung kann sein, dass in Systemen mit geringem Parallelismus Medienberichterstattung die Inputs aller Parteien umfassender aufnimmt. Demgegenüber wäre der Einfluss in parallelen Mediensystemen begrenzt, da Medienoutlets nur die Pressemitteilungen der von ihnen präferierten Parteien als relevante Inputs auffassen. Die Chance politischer Parteien, im kompetitiven Umfeld der Kampagnen durch EU-Fokus zu punkten, liegt also auch in nicht parallelen politischen Systemen vor.

## **6. Negativität als Determinante der Sichtbarkeit von Parteien im EP-Wahlkampf**

### **6.1. Befunde bisheriger Forschung zur Determinante 'Negativität' für die Sichtbarkeit der Parteien im Wahlkampf**

Im Werben um Wählerstimmen ist auf EU-Ebene der zunehmende Euroskeptizismus von Bedeutung (Bijmans, 2017; Van Spanje & Vreese, 2014). Die Entstehung des öffentlichen Diskurses – maßgeblich abhängig von der Entstehung zumindest eurokritischer Einstellungen (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004), der Entstehung euroskeptischer Parteien (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004) und der Aufnahme europafokussierter Kommunikation durch etablierte Parteien (Adam et al., 2017) in den letzten Jahren – stellt die Frage nach der Ausgestaltung der Europäischen Integration. Dieser Diskurs drückt sich in einer stärkeren Polarisierung (Wilde, 2011) der Positionen zur europäischen Integration aus, die zwischenzeitlich auch im Zentrum der politischen Eliten angekommen ist (Bijmans, 2017; Leruth, Startin, & Usherwood, 2018). Zentral ist hier die Unterscheidung zwischen eurokritischen und euroskeptischen Einstellungen (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2018). Europakritik kann als normaler politischer Prozess, also Kritik an Sachentscheidungen und somit als Opposition verstanden werden. Euroskeptische Einstellungen hingegen lehnen den Prozess der europäischen Integration in Gänze ab (Bijmans, 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2018).

Im Zuge der Analyse der Wahlkampfkommunikation ist euroskeptische Kommunikation der Parteien von besonderer Relevanz, da sie die Sichtbarkeit der Parteien in den Medien erhöhen könnten. Die häufige Konfrontation der Wähler mit eurokritischen Positionen fördert den Wahlerfolg euroskeptischer Parteien (Van Spanje & Vreese, 2014) und somit den Druck für etablierte proeuropäische Parteien, ebenfalls zumindest eurokritische Positionen zu adressieren, um in der Medienberichterstattung berücksichtigt zu werden. Zwar sind tendenziell große Oppositions- und Regierungsparteien erfolgreicher darin, ihre Wahlkampfkommunikation in den Medien zu platzieren (Jandura & Leidecker, 2015), dennoch besteht die Annahme, dass besonders kleine antieuropäische Parteien von einer dezidiert euroskeptischen Positionierung

*6.1. Befunde bisheriger Forschung zur Determinante 'Negativität' für die Sichtbarkeit der Parteien im Wahlkampf*

(Kriesi et al., 2012; Meijers & Rauh, 2016; Schuck et al., 2011) profitieren. Gerade negativer Inhalt (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O'Neill, 2016; Strömbäck, 2008) kann dabei dazu beitragen, dass Wahlkampfkommunikation in den Medien aufgegriffen wird. In Anbetracht der Ergebnisse aus Analyse I (etablierte Parteien fokussieren EU) und Analyse II (Parteien verstärken EU Berichterstattung erfolgreich) ist dies besonders relevant. Sollten euroskeptische Positionen die Chance für Parteien erhöhen, in den Medien sichtbar zu sein, dann bieten sich proeuropäischen Parteien zwei Optionen: Sie können einerseits diesem Trend in Zukunft folgen oder andererseits ihre pro-europäische Kommunikation verstärken.

## **6.2. Does negativity about Europe propel parties' media visibility?**

### **Abstract**

In recent decades, the prevalence of negative communication has intensified across the world. In this article, we seek to understand the mechanisms that spread negativity about a unified Europe. We study the specific conditions under which negative party communication boosts media visibility, focusing on the role of country-specific party conflicts on European Union (EU) integration. Our analysis is based on content analysis data of parties' press releases and media coverage in the 12 weeks preceding the 2014 European Parliament elections in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom). We find that EU-negative party communication by and large does not matter for party visibility in the media though the results provide scant evidence that cross-national differences relate to a country's party conflict.

### 6.2.1. Introduction

Parties compete to gain attention to promote their issues, frames, and positions. Attention, however, is scarce. Most research on competition among parties has focused on the strategic communication of the parties themselves (see also Adam et al., 2017; Carmines and Stimson, 1986; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012)—thereby neglecting the fact that parties depend on the media to reach their electorate. Indeed, the visibility of parties and political actors in the media is crucial for a functioning representative democracy (Walter, 2017).

However, the media select from parties' communications rather than merely echoing and disseminating them. In this, media follow their selection routines, which are—alongside professional and organizational factors—guided by news factors (e.g., Strömbäck, 2008; Vos, 2014). Researchers have assembled long lists of news factors (e.g., cultural proximity, surprise and elite persons, see Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O'Neill, 2017) that raise the newsworthiness of an event or political statement and thus influence whether it makes it into the news. In this article, we focus on mainly one of them, negativity. We do so because (1) negativity has become more prominent in news reporting (e.g., Soroka, 2014), and (2) we seek to understand its role in the spread of European Union (EU)-critical and EU-sceptical attitudes in Europe, for which the media is the main source of information (e.g., Schuck et al., 2011).

Existing research on the media visibility of parties and politicians focuses primarily on explanatory factors at the micro-level—such as political power and seniority, gender, or personality traits—and political work—such as parliamentary activity (for a literature review, see Vos, 2014). Scholars have only recently paid attention to the effect of parties' media activities (e.g., Gershon, 2012) and, in particular, party communication (e.g., number of press releases). Party communication, yet, has been mainly investigated to explain issue salience in the media (cf. Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012; Nissen and Menningen, 1977). Except for the specific issues covered, the content of party communication, such as negativity, has rarely been analysed, and only a few studies have carved out the conditional factors boosting the media visibility of specific content (but see Van der Pas and Vliegenthart, 2015). Moreover, research has only started to consider macro-level determinants and learn how structural- (e.g., media or political system) and cultural-context (e.g., type of conflict, see Boomgaarden et al., 2013) factors affect this interplay between party communication and media visibility.



This is where our study comes in. We aim to make a twofold contribution to existing research on parties' media visibility by asking whether parties gain visibility by communicating criticism or scepticism towards the EU—and, if so, under which conditions.

First, we go beyond classical actor-related factors for media visibility (e.g., political power), our benchmark model, and ask beyond that how parties' communication (i.e., negativity) affects their media visibility. Thereby, based on strategic party communication research we acknowledge that parties are active actors themselves, indeed they devote many financial and temporal resources to this activity, and thus can at least partly direct their media visibility. Drawing on the news values theory, however, we argue that it is not party communication per se that propels media visibility but rather specific party communication, which is newsworthy, in our case negative. Second, we question whether such negative communication has uniform effects across countries. We build on previous research which has shown that EU negativity differs in terms of level and forms between countries, including media (e.g., Galpin and Trezz, 2018), and argue that the country context, more specifically a country's party conflict on European integration, conditions the effect of negativity.

We analyse the role of negativity in party communication relating to the European integration process encapsulated in the run-up to the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014. In this context, we study how two specific types of negative party communications that are differentiated in the Euroscepticism literature affect parties' media visibility: (1) *EU-critical communication* geared toward concrete EU policies, actors, and institutions and (2) *EU-sceptical communication* that questions the modality and form of EU integration, as such. If these types of negative communication propel parties' visibility on the media agenda, we will have detected a mechanism responsible for the spread of EU scepticism and EU criticism across the continent. This distinction is important for us as we expect parties depending on a country's prevailing party conflict on European integration to use different type(s) of EU-negativity in their party communication. The EP election context has been chosen because evidence suggests that parties are dominating party–media interactions during elections (Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012), and in the EU context, media fail to report and comment on Europe if national politicians remain silent (Adam, 2007; Jalali and Silva, 2011). Thus, we select a “bottleneck” case to examine negative party communication: it is in the EP election context where we should most probably find an effect if negativity matters at all.

To answer our research question, we first show why we expect EU-critical and EU-sceptical party communication to affect parties' media visibility and how the success of negative communication is conditioned by the country context. We then present our study design, data sources, and strategy of analysis before we turn to our results. We conclude by showing our contribution to the research on party visibility in the media and the spread of EU scepticism and EU criticism across the continent.

### **6.2.2. Drivers of party visibility in the media—the role of negative party communication**

There is initial evidence that a party's media visibility depends on the *content of party communication*. Van der Pas and Vliegenthart (2015), for instance, have found that media react stronger to party communication if parties voice diverging issue positions (positional conflict) and, especially, if they use opposing issue frames (discursive conflict). Schmidt's (2017) findings have further shown that populist party communication increases media visibility. She has argued that stylistic elements of populist communication, such as provocations, simplification, and scaremongering, correspond to news factors that drive news selection.

Building on these studies and the news values theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O'Neill 2017) we seek to discover how and under which conditions negativity in party communication boosts media visibility. We focus on negativity for two reasons. First, as part of a general transformation of political communication (e.g., mediatization process; see Strömbäck 2008), certain news factors have become more important than others. Negativity is one of them. According to Galtung and Ruge (1965:69), negativity is more "consensual and ambiguous" in that people agree more on the interpretation of which event is negative as compared to positive ones. Furthermore, as a human trait persons tend to prioritize negative over positive information (see also Soroka 2014), which applies to journalists in the news selection process just as to recipients. Profit-oriented media corporations thus have further incentives to satisfy the demand of their consumers. Research consistently shows that negativity toward politicians and politics has become more relevant in political news coverage over time and goes together with increased negative evaluations of political actors and the political process (Vliegenthart et al. 2011).

The second reason to focus on negativity is that such negative evaluations of the EU have strongly increased in many European countries (e.g., de Vreese et al. 2006). We thus need a better understanding of factors spreading EU negativity across the continent. Here, party–media relations seem crucial as far-distant “Europe” has been shown to rely on national politicians for any media visibility (Adam 2007; Jalali and Silva 2011). Such national politicians, however, have become more polarized about EU integration (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2009). The gap left by established pro-European parties by not critiquing the EU provided an opportunity for Eurosceptic parties, at least in some countries (Hutter et al. 2016). These parties have not only brought controversies and conflict into the EU debate but also (partly) ended the silencing of mainstream parties, thus boosting potential negative input.

We distinguish two forms of negativity in the EU context following Euroscepticism research, which has mainly studied parties and public opinion (for an overview, see Vasilopoulou 2018), as well as the media (e.g., general negative tone about EU; for an overview, see Michailidou 2018): “EU scepticism” as a general rejection of the idea of European integration and “EU criticism” as the questioning of the concrete functioning of the EU regarding specific policies, institutions, or politicians. This distinction corresponds to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002:7) original conceptualization of hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the project of European integration” and soft Euroscepticism as concerning “one (or a number) of policy areas [that] lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.” We refrain, however, from calling the latter EU scepticism because it reflects the normality of functioning democracies (de Wilde et al. 2014). In line with Mair (2007) our definition of EU scepticism can be understood as opposition *to* the EU, that is, “anti-system opposition” against the EU as polity per se, and EU criticism as opposition *in* the EU, either related to the form, depth, and territorial boundaries of the EU political system or specific EU policies.

Taken all together, the media depend on the input of political actors as the remote and faceless EU has little news value on its own (Adam 2007; de Vreese 2003; Jalali and Silva 2011; Schuck et al. 2011). Parties' EU-sceptical and, to a lesser extent, EU-critical communication could provide a convenient input, boosting parties' media visibility by containing a crucial news factor—negativity (see also Van der Pas and Vliegthart 2015). Consequently, we check whether the media follow the logic of the news values theory related to news factors, that is, whether any form of EU-negative communication triggers higher party visibility in the media.

However, we argue that under specific conditions, parties' negative communication increases (or reduces) their media visibility. Next, we focus on one conditioning factor related to the country context, that is, the type of party conflict over European integration.

### 6.2.3. Type of party conflict as a conditional factor of negative party communication

A country's type of party conflict over European integration is central to understanding in which circumstances negative party communication about Europe is newsworthy for the media and increases a party's media visibility. The extent to which parties in a country (dis)agree about European integration affects whether negative EU party communication, and more specifically which kind of EU negativity—EU-sceptical and/or EU-critical—is taken up by the media or not.

At least two dimensions are relevant to capturing the type of party conflict over European integration: first, the *polarization of the conflict* reveals the strength of the conflict among parties, and, second, a country's *majority party position on European integration* describes whether the integration project is overall supported or opposed by the majority of a country's parties (see also Boomgaarden et al. 2013).

Based on these two dimensions, four different types of party conflict can be distinguished that help in understanding whether parties communicate negatively, or not, and thus in explaining country-specific patterns of negative party communication effects on media visibility. First, a "*benevolent conflict on Europe*" is characteristic for countries where the pro-European mainstream remains in a dominant position but faces a countermobilization by parties opposing integration. In these countries, any negative party communication about the EU, regardless of whether it is EU-critical or EU-sceptic, would be taken up by the media as opposition to both is a minority position from which a newsworthy conflict between parties could be constructed. By contrast, a clear-cut countermobilization against Europe is missing in countries characterized by a "*consensus on Europe*." Here, because no party fundamentally opposes the European project, the media relies mainly on EU-critical party communication to construct a conflict, which, however, is less newsworthy and thus triggers less party visibility.

A “*fundamental conflict on Europe*” is prevalent in countries where most parties oppose the EU. Since such criticism is the status quo in these countries, the media depend on EU-sceptical party communication to construct a newsworthy conflict. Therefore, we would expect mainly EU-sceptical party communication to shape media visibility. Finally, a “*consensus against Europe*” describes countries where most parties oppose the European project, and no minority of pro-European parties exists. In such situations, neither EU-critical nor EU-sceptical party communication triggers more media visibility as EU negativity is omnipresent.

To be clear, we neither argue that parties always communicate in line with their ideology nor totally against, for example, to be newsworthy and get media attention. Moreover, we assume that parties under specific circumstances might deviate in their party communication from their ideological position (here: toward the EU) for strategic reasons. We further assume that the scope for ideologically deviating party communication is set by a country's type of party conflict. To give an example, a pro-European party is less likely to criticize the EU in a country with a “*consensus on Europe*” as compared to a country with a “*benevolent conflict on Europe*,” where anti-EU parties have a voice, and hence criticism is more widespread and on the table.

Based on the party conflict typology, we expect that

*H1a: In countries with a “benevolent conflict on Europe” both EU-sceptical and EU-critical communication increases party visibility in the media.*

*H1b: In countries with a “consensus on Europe” EU-critical communication increases party visibility in the media.*

*H1c: In countries with a “fundamental conflict on Europe” EU-sceptical communication increases party visibility in the media.*

*H1d: In countries with a “consensus against Europe” neither EU-sceptical nor EU-critical communication increases party visibility in the media.*

*Alternative drivers of party visibility in the media*

Previous research has found that two factors are important as to whether a party or political actor gains media visibility. First, a party's political power matters (Haselmayer et al. 2017; Helfer and Aelst 2016; Hopmann et al. 2011; Meijers and Rauh 2016). Following news values theory, which also refers to political power more generally as "elite status" (Galtung and Ruge 1965) or "power elite" (Harcup and O'Neill 2001), certain actors find it easier to get media attention simply because they are powerful. More specifically for parties, political power in the form of government participation relates among others to law enforcement and thus increases the newsworthiness for the media (Bennett 1990; Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O'Neill 2017). Empirical research shows that government parties are more often covered in the news compared with opposition parties due to their incumbency bonus (Hopmann et al. 2011; Nissen and Menningen 1977). These insights also apply in the context of European elections. Meijers and Rauh (2016) have shown that during the European elections in 2009 and 2014, incumbent mainstream parties were more visible in media coverage in France and, to a lesser extent, in the Netherlands. Yet, they provide evidence that especially radical right parties increased their media visibility in the 2014 campaign compared with 2009. Research on the media visibility of members of the EP that focuses on individual-level determinants in routine times corroborates this finding; EP members from some (Euro sceptic) parties receive proportionately more media attention than their voter share (Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015). Consequently, we control for the incumbency effect on parties' media visibility.

Second, the quantity of a party's communicative efforts irrespective of the specific content could influence media visibility. Here, our argument builds on the salience logic of traditional agenda-setting research, namely, that high-salience issues on one agenda (e.g., party agenda) should also be on top of other agendas (e.g., media agenda). Accordingly, parties communicating diligently should be more likely to get media visibility. While it is uncontested that the aggregated party agenda influences the media agenda, at least in campaign periods (see Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006), only a few studies have analysed these dynamics at the party level (cf. Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Nissen and Menningen 1977). Their findings suggest that if party attention influences media attention, the effect is only short-lived and prevalent mainly before elections (see also Van der Pas and Vliegthart 2015). Therefore, we control for whether the mere quantity of party communication affects media visibility.

#### 6.2.4. Study design, data, and methods

To study whether parties increase their media visibility by communicating negatively about Europe, we relied on original data from a quantitative content analysis of press releases and media coverage in seven countries covering the 12 weeks before the 2014 EP election. The EP election provides an ideal setting for comparative research in Europe as it takes place at around the same time in each location (May 22–25, 2014). While the use of print media outlets as a data source is less contested, we focused on press releases as a specific form of party communication for the following reasons (see also, Haselmayer et al. 2017:4; Helfer and Aelst 2016:60; Hopmann et al., 2012:178-9): First, press releases are mainly aimed at the media. For parties press releases are an easy and cost-effective form through which to communicate their issues and policy positions in detail. From the media's standpoint press releases are an important source of information in everyday news coverage, especially in campaign periods, because they are easily accessible for journalists working under time pressure and with limited resources. Second, press releases are not issued only once or on fixed schedules but at different times in a campaign period. Thus, they allow parties not only to respond to campaign dynamics and external events (e.g., compared to party manifestos) but also to communicate more in detail (e.g., compared to social media). Another reason not to use parties' online activity, at least for the 2014 EP, is the considerable variation within and among countries (Klinger and Russmann 2017; Lilleker et al. 2015), which makes it less suited for country comparisons. Nonetheless, we assumed that parties conduct integrated multi-channel communication strategies so that parties' press releases and social media activities go hand in hand.

For the analysis, we selected only press releases and articles with at least two references to the EU (including EU policies, institutions, actors, and the EP election; see Supplementary Material). We included all EU-related press releases of parties having at least three percent of the vote share in the last national or EP election and participating in the 2014 EP elections as well as all EU-related articles of two newspapers, rotating daily between a left- and right-oriented quality paper to reduce the workload of our coders (for further details, see Supplementary Material). We followed an actor-oriented approach for our content analysis and coded the party publishing a press release as well as up to three active parties per news article, that is, a party who makes a political statement (for the detailed codebook, see Maier et al. 2016). The following analysis was based on 2,674 press releases and thus active parties and on

679 news articles with at least one reference to an active party, resulting in 989 active party references in the media.

We measured our dependent variable, *party visibility in the media*, by counting how many times a national party was mentioned in the news per day. To operationalize our main independent variable, *EU-negative party communication*, we coded for each press release as to whether a party evaluated the “general idea of European integration” (i.e., *EU scepticism*, e.g., “The European integration project is a failure”) and the “current functioning of the EU, EU institutions (e.g., European commission), EU politicians, concrete EU politics (e.g., process of how policies are made, institutional setting) and EU policies” (i.e., *EU criticism*, e.g., “An MEP revealed his discontent with the EU, referring to free trade negotiations with the US”) as negative, balanced, positive, or not at all. Based on these indicators, we created three dummy variables indicating whether the press release contained EU scepticism, EU criticism, respectively, and any EU evaluation. We further used this data source for our main control variable, *quantity in party communication*, which reflects the number of EU-related press releases published per day, more precisely the day before. To ensure the coding reliability of our 21 coders we used Krippendorff's *alpha* and Holsti's scores as the latter is less sensitive to skewed variables, which is the case for the EU-related evaluations. The reliability scores for correctly identifying active parties in press releases and the media, here Krippendorff's *alpha*, are on average 0.73, while the mean Holsti score for EU-related evaluations is 0.83 (for details see Appendix 6A).


Using secondary data, we measured a party's *political power* based on whether the party was in government when the 2014 EP election took place. For a party's *EU position*, we used a party's overall orientation toward European integration, available in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), for the year 2014 (see Bakker et al. 2015). We also used CHES 2014 data to capture a country's *prevailing party conflict on European integration*. The first dimension, the majority party position on European integration, was measured as the mean of all parties' positions on European integration weighted by a party's vote share in the last national election. To operationalize the second dimension, polarization, we used Ezrow's measure of party system dispersion (2007:186; see also Schuck et al. 2011:45). This measure considers the deviation of a party  $j$ 's position ( $P_{jk}$ ) from a country  $k$ 's mean of all parties' EU positions ( $P_k$ )



weighted by each party's vote share in the last national election ( $VS_{jk}$ ). Higher values refer to higher party system dispersion, here party polarization and vice versa.

$$\text{Weighted Party System Dispersion}_k = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1} VS_{jk} (P_{jk} - \bar{P}_k)^2}$$

The countries included in the analysis are Austria (AT), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and the United Kingdom (UK). These countries differ on the two dimensions of conflict, as Figure 6.1 shows. We can only tentatively assign countries to ideal typical conflict constellations as each conflict dimension forms a continuum. Germany most closely resembles the “consensus” ideal type, whereas Portugal and Austria tend toward a “benevolent conflict.” Although parties in general still slightly lean toward the pro-EU side, Greece comes closest to a “fundamental conflict,” whereas the Netherlands and France have tendencies toward a “consensus against Europe,” and the UK sits midway between the ideal types “fundamental conflict” and “consensus against Europe.”

**Figure 6.1: Countries by types of party conflicts on European integration**

Source: Data from 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

As our data were collected for each party daily over 12 weeks and, thus, contain a temporal dimension, we used *panel negative binomial regression* with days as the time variable (i.e., 84 days) and national parties as the panel variable.<sup>1</sup> Negative binomial regression is well-suited for count data with integer, non-negative, and over-dispersed values, that is, higher variance than mean mainly due to many observations containing zero as a value (see Cameron and Trivedi 2013). This is the case for party visibility in the media, our dependent variable. Before estimating the regressions, we tested whether our data were serially correlated, which was not the case. In addition, we ran Hausman specification tests to check whether random effects models, which allow explanatory variables to be included at the party level, are appropriate.

<sup>1</sup> Stata (version 14.2) was used for the analysis.

The results show that random effects estimations should be preferred over fixed effects estimations, with some exceptions.<sup>2</sup> We nevertheless report for those cases the findings of the random effects models as we are interested in the impact of party-related factors, that is, government participation. Fixed effect models were estimated and provide support for the robustness of our results.

Our regression estimations proceeded in two steps. First, we ran panel negative binomial regressions to test our hypothesis. However, whenever the likelihood ratio (LR) test suggested pooled over panel regressions, we then estimated negative binomial regressions using cluster-robust standard errors. The latter considers observations within parties to be dependent on each other. We start our analysis by describing our data.

### 6.2.5. Results


#### *Descriptive results*

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show how negative EU party communication related to media visibility in the 12 weeks preceding the 2014 EP elections. Parties hardly voiced any EU-sceptical communication (see Figure 6.2). We see that most national parties voiced no EU-sceptical communication (many observations with a zero on the x-axis). Those parties that did so (strongly) opposed European integration based on 2014 CHES data (the only ones labelled in Figure 6.2). Nonetheless, even those parties did not primarily communicate EU-sceptically, that is, up to 50 percent of their communication. Moreover, whether a party published EU-sceptical communication depended on the country. EU-sceptical party communication was more widespread in the UK (N = 40) and Greece (N = 32), followed by France (N = 19), while hardly any EU-sceptical party communication could be found in Portugal, Germany, and the Netherlands. Party visibility in the media varied, too, among countries (see y-axis). It was relatively high in Portugal, followed by France, as compared with the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany; Greece and the UK fell in between (for detailed descriptive statistics, see Appendix 6B).

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<sup>2</sup> The exceptions were the French and German models including EU-sceptical party communication.

**Figure 6.2: EU-skeptical party communication and visibility of national parties in the media**



*Comment:* Total number of counts a party has been mentioned in the media or published an EU-negative press release (share of total EU party communication in parenthesis).

*Source:* Own data.

Looking at EU-critical party communication in Figure 6.3, it was voiced more often compared to EU-sceptical party communication, at least in absolute terms. Moreover, parties (strongly) opposing European integration were joined by parties somewhat opposed to it, such as the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ) in Austria, the *Front de Gauche* (FG) in France, *die Linke* in Germany, and *Syriza* in Greece. Interestingly, parties favouring European integration, that is, the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (SPÖ) and *Die Grünen* in Austria and the *Partido Socialista* (PS) in Portugal, also criticized the functioning of concrete EU policies and institutions.



6.2. Does negativity about Europe propel parties' media visibility?

**Table 6.1: EU-negative party communication**

	<i>Benevolent conflict (H1a)</i>				<i>Consensus on Europe</i>		<i>Fundamental conflict on Europe</i>		<i>Intermediate case</i>		<i>Consensus against Europe</i>			
	AT <sup>a</sup>	PT			DE		GR		UK		FR		NL <sup>a</sup>	
<i>Expected effect H1:</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>positive</i>	<i>none/positive</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>	<i>none</i>
# EU-PRs with EU-skeptical eval., (t-1)	0.185+ (0.18)	7.20e-10 (0.00)			2.288 (2.04)		1.050 (0.28)		1.368 (0.54)		0.707 (0.38)		1.29e-07*** (0.00)	
# EU-PRs EU-critical eval., (t-1)		1.144 (0.17)	1.418** (0.18)		1.030 (0.42)		1.077 (0.15)		0.936 (0.36)		1.322 (0.41)		1.330 (0.34)	
# EU-PRs (t-1)	1.158*** (0.04)	1.096** (0.04)	1.064 (0.04)	0.955 (0.06)	0.890 (0.12)	0.909 (0.12)	1.287*** (0.08)	1.259** (0.09)	1.302 (0.22)	1.377+ (0.24)	1.285* (0.15)	1.035 (0.26)	1.285 (0.33)	1.127 (0.27)
In government	1.121 (0.26)	1.293 (0.31)	1.086 (0.53)	1.040 (0.52)	6.373*** (2.64)	6.428*** (2.71)	0.866 (0.68)	0.888 (0.71)	1.893 (1.88)	1.843 (1.82)	2.233+ (0.94)	2.293* (0.96)	1.606 (0.56)	1.637 (0.58)
Constant	0.153*** (0.04)	0.146*** (0.04)	1.664 (0.59)	1.727 (0.62)	0.167*** (0.08)	0.164*** (0.08)	1.579 (0.90)	1.596 (0.92)	1.330 (1.37)	1.230 (1.15)	0.227*** (0.05)	0.228*** (0.05)	0.067*** (0.02)	0.066*** (0.02)
Number of obs.	498	498	332	332	498	498	747	747	498	498	498	498	747	747
Number of parties	(6)	(6)	4	4	6	6	9	9	6	6	6	6	(9)	(9)
Wald Chi2	19.51	19.18	2.50	11.50	21.35	20.15	18.47	18.72	4.90	4.29	7.99	8.92	627.34	2.30
Log likelihood	-271.15	-272.32	-420.71	-418.49	-218.92	-219.25	-366.05	-365.93	-192.25	-192.53	-354.37	-354.17	-206.60	-206.89

Note. Incidence rate ratios (exponentiated coefficients) with standard errors in parentheses from panel negative binomial regression if not stated otherwise.

<sup>a</sup>Negative binomial regressions with robust cluster-robust standard errors.

+ $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

*Panel negative binomial regressions*

The results on the direct impact of a negative EU-related party communication are presented in Table 6.1. Overall, negative party communication did not uniformly translate into higher party visibility in the media across all countries as the news values theory would suggest. Moreover, EU-negativity had hardly an effect in any country, with few exceptions. Our findings do not corroborate the main hypothesis expecting different effects of both types of negative party communication on media visibility depending on a country's party conflict on European integration. For the countries that most tend toward "*benevolent conflict on Europe*," i.e., Austria and Portugal, we expected both EU-sceptical and EU-critical party communication to boost their media visibility. In line with our hypothesis, the findings show that EU-critical party communication significantly affected media visibility. However, this is only the case in Portugal, where the number of EU-critical press releases published the day before increased the probability of a party appearing in the media by around 42%. EU-sceptical party communication had no effect in Portugal and even a negative party-punishing effect in Austria. We, thus, must reject our hypothesis 1a. Turning to Germany, the country closest to a "*consensus on Europe*," we expected only EU-critical party communication to be taken up by the media. Our results do not provide empirical support for H1b, either, as such communication had no significant effect. For Greece, the country that most closely resembles a "*fundamental conflict on Europe*," we have argued that EU-critical party communication was unlikely to yield effects and that fundamental EU scepticism was likely to boost media visibility. Again, we must reject our hypothesis 1c. Finally, we expected neither EU-critical nor EU-sceptical communication to influence parties' media visibility in countries with a "*consensus against Europe*," which France and the Netherlands most closely resemble. The results support this: negative communication had no effect (i.e., France and the UK, our borderline case) or even a negative one (i.e., the Netherlands) on media visibility. In brief, we do not find empirical support that a country's type of party conflict on European integration conditions the impact of negative EU party communication on parties' media visibility.

As controls, we included the quantity of party communications based on the number of press releases published the day before the election and political power measured by a party's government participation. Quantity of party communication had a positive effect in certain countries, namely Austria, Greece, and partly in France, but no effect in the other four countries. This shows that the quantity of communication, which also includes and thus controls for the

number of positive and neutral evaluations (or EU salience), does not automatically translate into higher party visibility. In contrast on the aggregated level, we do not find empirical support that the party attention influences the media, at least when party mentionings are considered. Based on our analysis, however, we cannot imply conclusively that press releases are less important compared to other forms of party communication, such as social media or direct contacts with journalists. Comparably, incumbency had only a positive effect in Germany and France, whereas in the remaining countries governments did not benefit from such a bonus (see also, Meijers and Rauh 2016). In those countries, non-governing and mainly Eurosceptic parties such the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) in Austria, the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) in the Netherlands, and the UKIP in the UK received high media attention as well as Syriza in Greece. We ran various models to check the robustness of our findings as the number of parties in each country is small, at least in statistical terms, with four parties and coalitions in Portugal; six in Austria, France, Germany, and the UK; and nine in Greece and the Netherlands. Consequently, the number of explanatory variables that can be included in the robustness models was restricted and included, among others, both EU-critical and EU-sceptical party communication, EU-critical or EU-sceptical together with the respective positive communication toward EU and European integration, and party size as an alternative measure of political power. These estimations corroborate the findings discussed above; the coefficients are slightly different and significant at the same level (see Stata do files in Supplementary Material). Briefly, neither positive communication on the functioning of the EU nor European integration per se—as an additional news factor—increased party visibility in the media. This is in line with the news values theory that positive events have it even harder to be selected by the media compared to negative events. It is only in Greece and the UK, both countries with a rather negative majority party position, where EU-positive communication had a bare significant ( $p < 0.1$ ) but negative effect. In other words, parties praising the EU integration or its functioning were less visible in the media in the two countries with rather negative majority party positions on the EU. As in the case of EU-sceptical party communication, the media again intervened by reducing their media visibility.



### 6.2.6. Discussion

We set out to explore whether parties gained media visibility by communicating negatively about the EU—and, if so, under which conditions. Our findings show that EU-sceptical and EU-critical party communication hardly influences whether parties are visible in the media or not. It is only in Portugal where EU-critical party communication decreases media visibility. In line with these findings, the country context, that is patterns of party conflict on European integration, cannot explain cross-national variations in our findings.

The implications of our study for research on negativity and parties' media visibility are twofold. First, the role of the media in the selection process needs more theoretical elaboration and closer inspection. In this paper, we have argued that we needed to broaden our focus when trying to understand the conditional factors under which parties gain media attention. We only considered the party supply side (i.e., party communication and a country's party conflict) because in the EU election context the media rely heavily on the input from parties. However, our results indicate that the media penalized criticism (and praising) of the general idea of European integration by not reporting on it, resulting in lower party visibility. At least in some countries such as Austria and the Netherlands, the media tend not to be responsible for the spread of EU scepticism but behave as a pro-EU guardians. Taken together, our scant findings suggest that media select news but that this selection process is not uniformly triggered by negativity about Europe—something that news values theory also needs to consider. In this view, more research on the media side is needed to disentangle the mechanism behind media's selection of negative news. A first step could be to consider that the media select news based on their ideological inclinations of newspapers, including positions toward European integration and thus to include the political leaning of a newspaper rather than to focus on newspapers altogether, as we did in this study. Most likely, left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers or EU-sceptical and EU-friendly newspapers differ not only in the way they select EU-sceptical and EU-critical party communications in general but also in how they select specific parties voicing negativity about Europe.

Second, there are cross-national differences in EU-negative party communication. Our descriptive findings have shown that EU-sceptical party communication is more widespread in certain countries, such as France, the UK, and Greece, but not in other countries, such as Austria, Germany, and Portugal, and voiced mainly by parties that strongly oppose European

integration. However, EU criticism is more common and in addition voiced by parties supporting European integration, especially in Austria and the Netherlands. Our results do not conclusively show whether negative communication per se or if voiced by specific parties has no effect. We tested the effect of party characteristics as conditional factors, that is whether negative party communication, but only if voiced by specific parties, affects party visibility in the media (e.g., a pro-EU or government party criticizing the functioning of the EU should be more newsworthy and thus more likely to have a higher media visibility as compared to an anti-EU or opposition party), but found no effects (see Stata do files in Supplementary Material). Research on conditional factors such as party characteristics and the country context beyond party conflict on European integration (e.g., public opinion about the EU and European integration, media “logics”/traditions) could be considered.

As with all studies, our work has limitations. EU-sceptical party communication is absent in some countries or very rare, which makes it difficult to reach an empirically based conclusion about its impact. Some critiques might advise eliminating the distinction between EU-sceptical and EU-critical evaluations and analysing only the impact of negativity. However, we strongly argue that these two concepts should not be conflated as criticism is essential for a working representative democracy, while scepticism in contrast tends to undermine the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Galpin and Trenz 2018; Soroka 2014:ch. 7). In addition, our study focuses only on quality print papers that cover EU news (e.g., Boomgaarden et al., 2013), thereby excluding tabloids. Moreover, as is often the case in comparative research, a theoretically developed country classification of party conflicts does not translate directly to empirical cases, and, as such, our results on borderline cases require further analyses. Finally, in this study we have only shed light on the role of negativity, and empirically also on positivity, but future research should consider other content-related factors.

What does all this mean for the future of EU integration and the mechanisms that spread EU scepticism or criticism across the continent? Our data indicate that negativity exists, at least when considering the party supply side—and might have increased with the Brexit by challenging the functioning of the EU, if not necessarily the idea of European integration, and thus sparking a debate about the future shape of the EU—but that the quality media we analysed serve as guardians that, in general, withstand the opportunity to give special attention to parties relying on EU-sceptical or EU-critical party communication, though only in selected countries.

Future studies will show whether other countries will join the media's bulwark against EU-negativity.

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### **6.3. Fazit der Analyse III**

Die zentralen Befunde der dritten Analyse zeigen, dass euroskeptische Kommunikation nicht zielführend im Wahlkampf ist. Zum einen entfällt auf rein euroskeptische Kommunikation ein geringer Anteil an Pressemitteilungen, der sich erwartungsgemäß bei Parteien bündelt, die die europäische Integration ablehnen. Europakritische Wahlkampfkommunikation ist dagegen verbreiteter und auch Parteien, die die europäische Integration unterstützen, nutzen Kritik an der Funktionsweise und politischen Sachentscheidungen auf der EU-Ebene im Wahlkampf. Beide Ergebnisse zeigen erneut eine Normalisierung europäischer Wahlkampfkommunikation. Wie auf der nationalen Ebene ist eine Fundamentalopposition seltener präsent und auch dezidiert euroskeptische Parteien setzen verstärkt eurokritische Schwerpunkte (AT: FPÖ; FR: FN; GR: KKE; UK: UKIP). Zudem kann konstruktive Opposition auch von Parteien, die sich nicht gegen das politische System (in diesem Fall der EU) stellen, vertreten werden. Zum anderen ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, in den Medien präsent zu sein, nicht abhängig von negativer Positionierung. Zwar sind drei von 46 Parteien (FR: FN; GR: KKE; UK: UKIP) klar euroskeptische Parteien auch in den Medien durchaus sichtbar. Bei Betrachtung der Ergebnisse erhöht euroskeptische Kommunikation jedoch in keinem Land die Sichtbarkeit der Parteien in den Medien. In Österreich und den Niederlanden stellt sich sogar ein negativer Effekt euroskeptischer Kommunikation ein, Parteien verlieren also an Sichtbarkeit, wenn sie negativ kommunizieren. Die Medienberichterstattung wird somit keinesfalls von negativer Wahlkampfkommunikation getriggert. Darüber hinaus spielt die Differenzierung der Länder nach der Art des Parteienkonfliktes keine Rolle in der Stärke und Richtung des Einflusses negativer Kommunikation. Weder bei hoher noch bei niedriger Konflikthaftigkeit des Parteiendiskurses stellt also negative Positionierung eine vorteilhafte Wahlkampfstrategie dar. Pro-europäische Parteien benötigen also keine zusätzlichen Anstrengungen, um ihre Wahlkampfkommunikation zu platzieren. Es ist eher anzunehmen, dass Medien nach denselben Logiken wie im nationalen Kontext die Auswahl für Berichterstattung treffen, also große und etablierte Parteien bevorzugen – ein weiteres Indiz für die Normalisierung der EP-Wahlkämpfe.



## **7. Restriktionen europafokussierter Wahlkampfkommunikation durch Themensalienz in den Medien**

### **7.1. Befunde bisheriger Forschung zu den Restriktionen europafokussierter Wahlkampfkommunikation**

Grundlage der Erforschung einer fortschreitenden Normalisierung europäischer Wahlkampfkommunikation kann nicht nur die Betrachtung der EU als Thema an sich sein. Normalisierung ist auch am Übergang von einer ‚second-order-election‘ mit europäischen Themen als ‚specific arena issues‘ (vgl. Reif & Schmitt, 1980) hin zu einer eigenen europäischen Themenagenda zu beobachten. Europäische Themen haben sich herausgebildet (Adam et al., 2017) und konstituieren multidimensionale, europazentrierte Politikfelder, denen sich Parteien unterschiedlich stark im Wahlkampf zuwenden können (Green-Pedersen, 2011; Hobolt & De Vries, 2015; Kriesi et al., 2006). Gerade die Themenbereiche der Aussen-, Wirtschafts,- und Einwanderungspolitik werden verstärkt auf unitär europäischer Ebene wahrgenommen (Boomgaarden et al., 2013). Bei Betrachtung der Salienz von Themen auf der gesamten Themenagenda können sich Effektrichtungen verändern und politische Parteien in ihrer *EU-Agenda-Builder* Rolle einschränken.

Spezifische Themen weisen unterschiedliche Grade an *Agenda-Setting* und *-Building* in Studien auf der nationalen Ebene auf (Bartels, 1996; Soroka, 2002b; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Gerade die Außenpolitik ist prädestiniert für Themensetzung durch die Medien (Bevern, 2015; Soroka, 2002a), da außenpolitische Ereignisse selten die Bürger direkt betreffen und somit nicht unitär auf der Agenda der Parteien liegen (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Für die Parteien kann Gestaltungsspielraum in der Außenpolitik abhängig sein von externen Akteuren wie Ländern und supranationalen Institutionen sowie nicht zu planenden Ereignissen und Krisen (Bytcek, 2011; Van der Brug et al., 2016), die das Handeln der Parteien einschränken. Gerade im Zuge der Ukraine-Krise, die sich zeitgleich zum Europawahlkampf 2014 entwickelte, kann dies die Interaktion zwischen den Agenden der Medien und Parteien beeinflussen. Reale und dabei besonders sensationelle Ereignisse beeinflussen einerseits die Themenstrukturierung der

Medienagenda stärker (Edwards & Wood, 1999; Eichhorn, 1996 / 2005), da ihr Nachrichtenwert hoch ist (Harcup & O'Neill, 2016; Maier et al., 2010). Für politische Parteien auf der anderen Seite sind Wahlkampagnen detailliert in Bezug auf Zeitabläufe und Themensetzung geplant (Kleinnijenhuis & Nooy, 2013). Eine kurzfristige Abweichung, also eine Reaktion auf die Medien, ist daher unwahrscheinlicher. Dies betrifft die temporalen Effekte zwischen *Agenda-Setting* und *-Building*. Wie in Analyse II festgestellt, ist *Agenda-Building* der vorherrschende Fall bei der Betrachtung kurzfristiger Effekte. Unter der Annahme, dass Kampagnen politischer Parteien stabiler als die Medienberichterstattung gegenüber Veränderungen der Themenagenda sind (Kleinnijenhuis & Nooy, 2013; Roberts & McCombs, 1994; Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2008), werden in der folgenden Analyse längere Zeitspannen untersucht.

## **7.2. Agenda-Setting or Agenda-Building? Inferring knowledge from the 2014 EP election campaign via Bayesian cross-lagged-panel methods**

### **Abstract**

Europeanization of EP-election campaigns is fueled by recent discussions about the future of the EU. As EU-related issues seem to diverge and the second order character of EP-elections diminishes, an EU issue agenda can be perceived. It is not only relevant to explore the most important issues on the EP campaign agenda, but also who determines the agenda in campaign periods, and in which temporal pattern. A Bayesian-modelling cross-lagged panel approach is used to infer knowledge from content analysis data of the 2014 EP-election campaign. Data from seven countries provide prior research for following analysis concerning agenda-setting and agenda-building in a European issue setting. Results indicate that economy and international affairs are relevant topics in the 2014 election campaign, that issue salience is dependent on the media system and independent of the delay over the course of the campaign, and that media agenda-setting is more pronounced than party agenda-building.

### **7.2.1. Introduction**

In light of the recent EP election in 2019, research on Europeanization and campaigning on EU issues will be stimulated by new data and findings. Long-term conceptions of the European Union's lack of politics and democratic legitimacy (Schmidt 2006:5) and of its mainly elite driven policies have been changing over the last decade. Discussions about the future of the EU, Brexit and a nationalist rollback of EU integration have catapulted EU issues on the agenda. The characterization of EP elections as second order elections, in which campaign strategies displayed low visibility and low Europeanness (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; De Vreese 2003; Marsh 1998; Reif and Schmitt 1980), has to be discarded (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). The politicization and political mobilization on EU issues rises and creates the possibility of a public debate, a chance for the citizenry to form attitudes and stances on issues (Wilde 2007), and the possibility of political parties to campaign on those issues. For a European context – similar to national agendas – different issues emerged. The issues attached to the EU seem to have diversified (Adam et al. 2017) and become multidimensional, each to be picked up by different parties (Green-Pedersen 2011; Hobolt and De Vries 2015; Kriesi, Adam and Jochum 2006). The relationship between political campaigning and media coverage can therefore be prone to the same dynamics before an EP election as within a national setting. So, over the course of election campaigns, the questions always asked are: First, which issues on the issue agenda are most relevant? Second, who drives issue-salience and therefore has an impact relevance, media coverage or political parties campaign communication? Third, how is this process structured over the time-limited course of an election campaign? Yet, for those questions, tackling an EU-issue agenda, research on classical agenda-setting or agenda-building is lacking. This paper aims to inform further research by creating a baseline on data from the 2014 EP election campaign. First descriptively, to provide a comprehensive EU issue agenda for 2014. Second, in order to prevent common methodical misconceptions, with a Bayesian modelling cross-lagged panel (CLPM) approach to address agenda-setting and agenda-building effects. Third, in comparing the Bayesian CLPM for different delay times to infer about the time structure of agenda effects. In doing so, this study would like to endorse the use of ranking data for agenda effect research by overcoming the methodological shortages with the use of Bayesian models and aims to provide upcoming research with the informed priors which we are still lacking for a European sphere.

### **7.2.2. Theoretical considerations**

The first question to address is what issues are likely to be salient on an EU issue-agenda per se. Boomgarden (2013:609) states: “In the cases of humanitarian military intervention, common defense and security policy, or monetary and immigration policy, Europeanisation has been observed”. European issues, perceived as multidimensional, can constitute a European issue agenda. This agenda could then be susceptible to the same media reporting, campaign strategies, issue characteristics, and agenda-setting and -building effects as within a national-level agenda interaction between media and political actors. In periods of routine politics, ‘Europe’ as a topic might still be lacking, yet specific events tied to EU-level politics (Adam 2007) open the window for the EU communication, especially in times of EP elections (Schuck et al. 2011). First, campaigning on EU issues is on the rise not only for challenger parties (Adam and Maier 2016; Jalali and Silva 2011), and the promotion of EU issues in media is more visible in election campaign periods (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Schulze 2016; Walgrave and Swert 2004). Second, real-world events can put an issue on the agenda (Bytzek 2008; 2011; Edwards and Wood 1999). In times of crisis, the news value of an event is raising awareness to an issue by the media due to the media’s need for exclusive sensational news (Eichhorn 2005:132) furthering the issues’ salience in coverage. For political parties, real-world events can have a direct impact on their agenda by overshadowing meticulously planned campaign strategies (for the case of the Kosovo War see De Vreese 2003). Over the last years, the EU had to deal with various crises, two of those being especially relevant in the context of the EP election 2014 campaign (Van der Brug, Gattermann and de Vreese 2016): the financial crisis primarily related to economic and monetary issues, and the Crimean crisis bringing a foreign affairs issue to the fore. Assuming the politization of EU issues lead to the emergence of a European issue sphere, the first research question to be answered is which topics are prone to be key in political parties’ campaigns and media coverage. Adding findings on Europeanization and real-world events and combining these pieces of information to customary issues labels, I state:

*H1: International Affairs, Economy and Immigration are more salient than other topics in the 2014 EP Election campaign period.*

### *Agenda-setting versus agenda-building*

Considering issue-salience on the agenda, research also commonly asks if the media agenda influences the agenda of political parties, i.e. agenda-setting. Agenda-setting effects, by the media for the public, are well documented for nearly five decades (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Shaw and McCombs 1977). For political actors, the general agenda-setting assumption is that media sets the issues for politics (Lee 2014; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). In routine times of politics, mass media can convey citizens' priorities, on which the elected officials then base their actions. Although policy-output seems to be limited (Elmelund-Præstekær and Wien 2008; Walgrave et al. 2008), government parties (Soroka 2003) as well as opposition parties tend to be susceptible to salient issues in the media (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Thesen 2013; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). Even in formulating their strategies, campaign planners are responsive to the issues they deem to be relevant in the public at the given time (Sides 2006). According to previous research, the agenda-setting power of the media for political actors in routine times of politics is quite sizeable (for an overview see Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016).

This changes when the run-up to the election begins. In times of election campaigns, research shows that agenda-building by political parties is more feasible than agenda-setting by the media and that these agenda-setting effects seem to be overstated (Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt 1998; Eichhorn 2005; Semetko et al. 1991). "The short campaign period of several weeks before Election Day is fundamentally different from routine periods: The behavior of political actors, their reaction on media coverage, and even the dynamics of media coverage itself follows different logics in both periods [agenda-setting by the media being] limited or even absent" (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006:96). During a campaign political parties attach salience to specific issues in order to generate votes (Green-Pedersen 2007; Petrocik 1996; Riker 1986). This form of strategic agenda-building (Gerhards and Schäfer 2006; Mathes and Pfetsch 1991) does not even have to be related to an issue position in order to win the vote (Riker, 1986; 1996). Empirical results on a national level show clear evidence that parties are successful in promoting their issues on the agenda in campaign times (Brandenburg 2002; Hopmann et al. 2012; Norris et al. 1999; Roberts and McCombs 1994; Semetko et al. 1991). Yet in a European context, research is limited as to whether agenda-setting or agenda-building is more pronounced. Concerning message content in the 2014 EP elections campaign, Maier et al. (2017) state that media coverage is able to start discussions about European issues and that

media has the agenda-setting power. On the other hand, Jansen et al. (2019) found political parties to be successful in getting media attention dependent on the number of their press releases. Both avenues of research focus on different approaches in a temporal setting, one considering content, the other quantity, and both can be viable (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2011) depending on the methodical approach. Yet it remains unclear as to whether the overall salience of issues on a combined agenda is susceptible to agenda-setting or agenda-building effects. So, for the second research question, it is important to address two conflicting perceptions of effects: first, the agenda-setting power of media coverage for the issue agenda and, second, the agenda-building power of the political parties' campaign communication before elections.

*H2a: The media is the dominant actor in promoting issues on the agenda over the course of the campaign.*

*H2b: Due to the election campaign setting, political parties are successful in promoting their issue-agenda.*

Additionally, characteristics of the country's national media system could affect the provenance of either agenda-setting or agenda-building being more pronounced. Following Hallin and Mancini (2004), many scholars have addressed cross-country differences in the characteristics and structure of media systems (e.g., see Aalberg and Curran 2012). Most relevant for addressing the interdependencies of party communication and media reporting is the dimension of political parallelism (Vliegenthart and Montes 2014). Based on the concept of party-press parallelism (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995), media reporting follows political affiliations and journalists are politically biased towards parties (Brüggemann et al. 2014). Although direct effects on media's reporting of individual party press releases is not affected by political parallelism (Jansen et al. 2019), it is the only dimension that directly connects political parties to journalists' selection criteria for news articles. Yet it could indicate closeness to a political position and its relevant issues as presented by the dichotomy liberal vs. conservative (for a detailed discussion see Jansen et al. 2019). Therefore, in media systems with high political parallelism, where journalists are more inclined to closely follow party campaign

communication, the impact of the issues promoted by political parties should be more pronounced. Considering the impact of political parallelism, the contiguity is stated as:

*H2c: The higher the amount of political parallelism, the more pronounced agenda building effects are.*

#### *Time structure of agenda impacts*

Depending on the focus of research – issue-salience vs. impact of content or quantity – and the methodical approach – cross-lagged issue ranks vs. time series –, the time structure of possible impacts is prone to questions. Over the course of campaigns, political actors try to dominate the agenda in order to achieve advantages over their competitors. If one looks at a daily time series, lag times typically range between one and a few days up to a total of seven days of circular effects between political actors and the media (Bartels 1996). Yet if effects between the ranking of issues are studied, temporal effects are prone to take longer and are said, in routine times of politics, to best be analyzed in intervals of four to eight weeks (Winter and Eyal 1981), yet before election lesser delay times are used in order to grasp the concentrated nature of the campaigning period (see Roberts and McCombs 1994 for the use of three weeks). One can argue that this is a more informed choice since the routine and campaign times are different. Depending on the impact directions outlined above, campaign strategists could be quick to follow events and media coverage (Elmelund-Præstekær and Wien 2008). Or, they could be successful in promoting their issues due to meticulously planned campaigns in terms of issue-salience and issue positions (Kleinnijenhuis and Nooy 2013) with professional spin doctors adding to strategic communication (Hopmann et al. 2009) over the time frame of a campaign. In the latter case, impacts on media coverage are prone to be faster, since media outlets must react to emerging stories, events and issues by both parties and other media outlets on a daily base due to the inherent “competition for audience” (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2008:861), and emerging agenda changes tend to be addressed instantly (for reaction times between media outlets see Golan 2006). So, considering the lack of research in delay times for issue rankings on the agenda in times of campaign periods, the final hypothesis is:



*H3: In times of election campaigns, agenda-setting and agenda-building effects can be observed in shorter intervals than 4 to 8 weeks.*

### 7.2.3. Data and methods

In the run up to the 2014 EP election, a quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles and party press releases was performed in seven countries (see Maier et al. 2016 for details concerning codebook, training, and reliability)<sup>1</sup>. The period of investigation for the analysis was set to 12 weeks (calendar week 41 – 52) prior to the election ranging from March 3rd to the different dates for the election in a set country (i.e. Germany, DE; Austria, AT, France, FR; Greece, GR; Portugal, PT: May 25th; United Kingdom, UK; Netherlands, NL: May 22nd) in order to cover the most likely phase of the election campaigns. Relevant articles and press releases were derived via a search string containing at least two key-words<sup>2</sup> connected to the EU (only EU-related items are coded). If an article or press release was about Europe as a geographic unit or Brussels, the capital of Belgium, we did not automatically code that article or press release. The content had to deal with European policies, politics or political. Focusing on analyzing the content of communication channels was a widespread method to disentangle the agenda-setting effects between these channels (Bartels 1996; Neuman et al. 2014; Vliegthart and Montes 2014).

*Press Releases (PR)* are coded for all national parties that achieved more than 3% of the vote shares during the last national or EP election in the aforementioned countries<sup>3</sup>. The focus on press releases seems appropriate for analyzing party-media-interactions since they are specifically geared towards the media and can be published independently from fixed schedules better reflecting the possibility to adjust to external events popping up in the media.

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<sup>1</sup> Project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration – Empirical Studies of Issue Politicization in the Run-up to the 2014 EP-Elections“. Funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF, SNF 100017E-144592) and the German Research Foundation (DFG), „Lead Agency Procedure“ (DACH) (MA 2244/5-1).

<sup>2</sup> The search string contains the following key words or word components that have to appear at least twice, or the press release has to contain two different words/components to be identified as a relevant press release: “Europ\*, europ\*, EU, EP, EZB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, EuGH, EAD, EWSA, EIF, EDSB, EWU, Troika, Frontex, FRONTEX, constitutional treaty”.


<sup>3</sup> **DE:** CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Grüne, Linke, AfD - **AT:** SPÖ, ÖVP, Grüne, Neos, BZÖ, FPÖ - **UK:** Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, Greens, BNP - **NL:** VVD, PVdA, PVV, SP, CDA, D66, Groenlinks, PvdD, CU, SGP - **PT:** PPD-PSD, CDS-PP, PS, CDU, BE, PCP - **GR:** ND, PASOK, SYRIZA, ANEL, XA, DIMAR, KKE, LAOS, Greens - **FR:** EELV, FG, Parti Communiste, FN, MoDem, MPF, NPA, Parti Socialiste, UMP, AEI.

*Media Coverage (MC)* is derived from two national newspapers (one “right-wing”, one “left-wing”): only the Monday-until-Saturday editions have been coded with an alternating selection of newspapers (e.g. Monday, Wednesday, Friday: right-wing; Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday: left-wing, and vice versa in the following week). We then analyzed three sections of newspapers – front page, political section and commentaries – to ensure the capture of the whole media coverage. All stories on the front page as well as all stories on one randomly chosen page are coded if EU content is mentioned. On average, reliability measures range on formal variables from 0.991 to 1.0 (Holsti’s *r*) and 0.987 to 1.0 (Krippendorff’s *alpha*). In a second step, the main issue as the focus unit of analysis is coded. The types of issues are derived from the PIREDEU issue catalogue (Schuck et al., 2010) containing Administration and Bureaucracy (including Corruption), Agriculture and Food, Citizens Rights, Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU, Consumer Protection, Culture and Other, Economy, Education and Research, Environment and Energy, Immigration, Infrastructure, International Affairs, Law and Order, Social and Labor Market Policy, Territorial Questions (in alphabetical order). For this analysis, the additional categories “Elections” and “Other” were dropped, since one concerns e.g. modes of the election or the date of the election rather than substantial EU issue discussions, while the other is a residual category (for a similar approach see Hopmann et al. 2012). Reliability coefficients of the main issue variable vary between 0.747 to 0.977 (Holsti’s *r*) and between 0.597 to 0.940 (Krippendorff’s *alpha*) across all countries.

#### *Research design for cross-national variations*

The seven countries were selected due to considerable variation in main country-level determinants. First, the quantification of *political parallelism* relies on the index presented by Brüggemann, et al., (2014:1061). Figure 7.1 shows that the highest level of parallelism can be found in Greece (original index value: 1.43), followed by France (0.62), Austria (0.35), the Netherlands (0.19), Portugal (-0.08), the UK (-0.29), and Germany (-0.56). Journalists’ political affiliations therefore impact their reporting to the largest extent in Greece, while they distance themselves widely from political advocacy in Germany.

**Figure 7.1: Levels of political parallelism**




Source: Own visualization of values by Brüggemann et al. (2014:1061)

A distinction between parallel and non-parallel countries is then drawn if the level of parallelism is above or below 0, resulting and categorizing three countries as non-parallel (PT, UK, DE) and four countries as parallel (NL, AT, FR, GR). This distinction is not only relevant for addressing the different agenda-setting impacts between media and parties but also is the overall salience of EU-related campaigning impacted (see Figure 7.2).

Second, the *EU issue-salience* in *Press Releases* (PR) differs, reaching its peak in Portugal (56% of all PR contain references to the EU), followed by Austria (34%), the Netherlands (32%), France (30%), Greece (29%), Germany (26%), and the UK (25%). Therefore, political parties campaign heavily on EU issues in Portugal and display a more national focus in their campaign communications in Germany and the UK.

**Figure 7.2: Salience of EU-Topics Press Releases**




Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592).

If the salience of EU-related PR is plotted over the course of the campaign, we can see that types of countries only differ slightly (exception: w47) in their overall percentage of EU-related campaigning. Parties in parallel countries address the EU more often, whereas in non-parallel countries the overall salience is generally lower. The overall u-shaped trend is represented in both types of countries (except the outlier w47 in parallel countries) which has to be observed in the following analysis. However due to the stability of the combined trends, the potential problems of overestimating impacts of one type of countries is minimized.

*Data structure*

The common approach to agenda-setting refers to the ranking of issues in news and press releases. The data at hand was used at a weekly level, and ranks were created for the aforementioned issues based on their appearance in either news articles or press releases. The overall n per week functions as the baseline from which the percentage of sample units per issues are calculated before ranking the issues in ascending order (for an overview of issue ranks see Appendix 7A). This approach prevents from overestimating the impact of prominent topics in the later models. To test the variability between MC and PR within weeks, Figure 7.3 provides us with an overview of the rank correlations resembling autocorrelation of the agendas. Over the course of the campaigns period, the correlations rise and fall in nearly every week, creating a zig-zagging pattern. This has two implications: First, the overall absence of perfect correlations leaves room for agenda-setting effects over the course of the campaign, i.e. the agendas of MC and PR are not congruent. Second, there are weeks where the agendas are more separated from one another, essentially meaning that they diverge in one week and converge in the next (see especially w44 to w49).

**Figure 7.3: Autocorrelation of agendas within weeks**




Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592), separate rank order correlations.

An additional important finding is, that here convergence and divergence are also dependent on the level of parallelism since they follow inverted patterns. This provides us with the following insights for the analysis: First, agenda-setting between MC and PR *is* possible. Second, divergence is dependent on the week as well as on levels of parallelism, so models should be addressed at least on the weekly level, and a comparison should be drawn between a combined approach and separate one by parallelism, as theoretically assumed.

### *Analysis*

In line with the classical agenda-setting studies, I use a cross-lagged model to estimate agenda-setting effects. Older approaches using cross-lagged correlation and examining zero-order and partial correlations as well as Rozelle-Campbell-Baselines (Roberts and McCombs 1994) yet have major drawbacks. They cannot reliably control for “contemporaneous relationships between variables [... and ...] stability of each construct over time” (Kearney, 2017:314) referring to problems arising from autocorrelation at  $t_1$  (contemporaneous) as well as the autocorrelation over time ( $t_1 \rightarrow t_2$ , i.e. stability). To counter the problems at the same measuring point, only an integrated cross-lagged path model (CLPM) which controls for both autocorrelation problems is feasible. In this paper, the model shown in Figure 7.4 is used, which controls for correlation both between agendas at  $t_1$  as well as stability of the agendas and possible omitted variables affecting the correlation of residuals (van de Schoot et al. 2014).

**Figure 7.4: Model for Bayesian CLPM**




Source: own visualization.

These models are seldom used in agenda-setting research with ranked issue variables. With ranked variables, overall  $N$  is always capped with the number of issues addressed. Although there are some workarounds, i.e. constructing agendas by random number charts or stacking datasets, artificially overblowing the dataset does not seem feasible. Here, the possibilities of the Bayesian approach can be used to infer knowledge about the correlations, even if large data samples are not available. Basically, Bayesian statistics are based on three major components (Stigler 1986): the knowledge that we have before calculating the model (prior distribution), the actual information overserved in the data and the posterior inference as a combination of prior knowledge and observation. In order to calculate the Bayesian models, one therefore needs to address prior knowledge first. As stated in the theoretical section above, the prior knowledge about agenda-setting and -building effects are somewhat unclear, ranging from positive MC impacts to PR impacts depending e.g. on the analysis method, the aggregation level of the data and on the distance to elections (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2016). In light of these findings, I opt for uninformative priors since no clear-cut decisions can be made on them. Due to the explorative notion of the research questions I address the observed evidence in order to provide informed priors for further Bayesian analysis. With uninformed priors, models are calculated

in AMOS<sup>4</sup> by the use of Monte Carlo methods. Overall, 66 separate models are calculated addressing all possible impacts over different lag structures. As mentioned above, it is not clear as to which is the optimal delay for one agenda to affect the other. Figure 7.5 provides an exemplary overview for the different delay structures. For example, with a one-week delay (arrows in the center), effects from w41 on w42, w42 on w43, and so forth are calculated.

**Figure 7.5: Overview for different delay structures**



Source: own visualization.

When a delay structure of five weeks is chosen, w41 is set to affect w46, w42 to affect w47, and so on. Therefore, in prolonging the delay, the overall measuring points are gradually

<sup>4</sup> Settings: Fixed Seed, burn-in: 1000, Tuning Parameter: 0.35, Convergence Criterion: 1.002, Max. observations to Retain: 100000 (see also Arbuckle 2017), all models must reach at least an additionally N=50000\*16 observations drawn after crossing convergence criterion in order to stabilize



reduced until only one model can be estimated for an 11-week delay. Additionally, all models are repeated for parallel and non-parallel countries for a total of 198 models. After model estimation, the posterior distribution is diagnosed via trace- and autocorrelation-plots to assure proper convergence and burn-in per model. Afterwards the means of the posterior distribution of cross-lagged effects (see path b,c in Figure 7.4) are drawn and presented below (for means of a,d effects per model see Appendix 7B).

#### 7.2.4. Findings

The first hypothesis calls for an overview of the ranking of specific issues over the campaign period. For combined ranks over the twelve weeks, we can see that *Economy* is the most relevant issue in the campaign period (see Table 7.1). This is neither dependent on differentiation between MC (Mean Rank 1.6) and PR (1.0) nor on differences between parallel (MC 1.6, PR 1.0) or non-parallel countries (MC 1.5, PR 1.1) with next to no variation (sd 0.0 to 0.5). The second ranking issue *International Affairs* does not provide that clear of a picture. Whereas for MC, regardless of political parallelism, international affairs are the second highest ranking (1.7 overall), for PR, the issue is not nearly as high-ranked (5.3 overall with higher variation 3.0), ranking lower in parallel countries (6.4) than in non-parallel ones (5.2). The issues of *Social- and Labor-Market Policy* (on which parties are more likely to campaign on: mean rank 3.2) and *Constitutional Questions and Functioning of the EU* (on which media coverage is more likely to focus: 3.7) are taking the sorting slots three and four, before *Immigration*.

The third issue in question, *Immigration*, is also dissimilarly ranked in MC (5.7 with less variation of 2.3) and lower in PR (7.8, sd 3.1), albeit it is not at a top-three rank neither in MC nor PR over the campaign period. So far, we can see that for the 2014 EP campaign period, *Economy* is the most salient issue. *International Affairs* is highly salient in the media coverage, yet political parties do not push in campaign messages on this issue that often. *Immigration* is not as close to a top rank as expected; it is firmly set in the middle of the issue agenda (by sorting value of 6.7 out of 13.5) with a tendency to the top (5.5 out of 15 by rank).


**Table 7.1: Salience of issues in the 2014 EP election campaign**

Issue (sorting value)	All 7 Countries				Parallel				Non-Parallel			
	MC		PR		MC		PR		MC		PR	
	Mean Rank	sd	Mean Rank	sd	Mean Rank	sd	Mean Rank	sd	Mean Rank	sd	Mean Rank	sd
<i>Economy (1.3)</i>	1.6	.5	1.0	.0	1.6	.5	1.0	.0	1.5	.5	1.1	.3
<i>International Affairs (3.5)</i>	1.7	.8	5.3	3.0	1.7	.8	6.4	2.9	1.9	1.6	5.2	3.0
Social & labor market pol. (4.8)	6.5	1.6	3.2	1.6	8.4	2.6	3.2	1.5	5.9	1.3	6.4	4.5
Const. Quest. & Func. of EU (5.8)	3.7	1.2	8.0	3.2	4.1	1.8	6.7	2.9	4.5	2.0	10.6	2.4
<i>Immigration (6.7)</i>	5.7	2.3	7.8	3.1	6.3	3.3	9.6	1.9	7.2	2.7	7.9	3.9
Territorial Questions (6.7)	5.2	1.8	8.3	2.8	6.6	2.1	12.0	2.2	5.0	1.6	4.9	3.5
Environment & Energy (7.2)	8.4	2.5	6.0	3.0	8.3	3.6	5.8	2.7	9.0	2.6	7.6	2.7
Law & Order (8.0)	7.6	2.8	8.5	3.4	8.3	2.9	8.3	3.1	7.1	3.4	9.2	4.2
Citizens Rights (8.6)	10.2	2.5	7.1	3.0	9.5	2.6	6.4	3.6	10.1	3.6	8.3	4.2
Agriculture & Food (10.0)	11.8	2.8	8.3	2.7	11.8	3.2	8.1	3.4	11.9	3.4	10.3	3.5
Administration & Bureaucr. (10.7)	8.9	2.1	12.5	2.9	6.8	2.1	11.3	3.0	13.1	2.1	13.6	2.8
Infrastructure (11.5)	11.6	3.0	11.5	3.6	12.2	2.9	11.3	4.2	12.1	3.6	11.5	3.5
Culture & Other (12.3)	12.8	1.2	11.9	2.8	12.7	1.9	11.0	2.3	12.7	2.6	12.8	3.2
Education & Research (13.3)	12.6	2.0	14.0	1.5	13.2	2.0	14.0	1.5	11.3	2.9	12.9	2.4
Consumer Protection (13.5)	14.4	.9	12.7	2.8	14.6	1.0	12.6	2.4	13.7	2.2	12.8	3.5

Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592). Mean of ranks for issues in 12 weeks. SD of mean indicates variation in ranks per 12 weeks. Sorted ascending by column "All 7 Countries": (MC Rank + PR Rank)/2.

Grasping the trajectories of issues over a campaign period is a task commonly addressed by descriptive analysis of cross-tabulation. In light of the amount of data at hand (a rank matrix of 15 issues over 12 weeks, see Appendix 7A), the following figures show relevant examples of issues to help understand the possible implications for the following analysis. Figure 7.6 displays the top issue (*Economy*), the bottom issue (*Consumer Protection*) and the issue *Immigration* which is ranked close to the middle.

**Figure 7.6: Salience of selected issues in the 2014 EP election campaign**



Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592).


First off, the top issue *Economy* is very stable<sup>5</sup>. It is always ranked 1 in PR with MC taking it on either on first (5 times) or second rank (7 times). Campaigning on economic messages has therefore absolute priority for political parties, providing a very stable picture which could in turn hamper the ability for MC to impact PR since no variation is present. In the middle section, on the other hand, the picture presents itself quite differently. *Immigration* shows a high amount of dynamic over the campaign period. In the starting weeks, MC picks up stories about the issue, yet along the timeline a decline in rank shows itself. PR also pick up the issue albeit later (after a small peak at the fourth week) and inconsistently over the campaign period converging with MC at the end. At the bottom of the issue ranks, *Consumer Protection* is mostly a non-issue for MC, yet occasional spikes in PR are followed by slight increase in coverage, which does not come close to the relevance of the issue in PR.

<sup>5</sup> As indicated by the sd-value in Table 7.1.

### *Crisis impacts*

At first glance, trajectories of *Immigration* (convergence to MC rank later in the timeline) and *Consumer Protection* (no convergence after spikes in PR) might be interpreted as a hint for a lead in agenda-setting by MC. Yet then the impacts of *International Affairs* should be even more influential for the political parties' campaigns. In light of the Ukrainian crisis, events are unfolding over the course of the campaign to which the position of *International Affairs* as top-ranked MC issue in the beginning of the campaign period resembles the importance of these events. This could (via MC) impact PR by political parties reacting to the events unfolding in Ukraine. Figure 7.7 shows that this is not the case. The PR addressing *International Affairs*' decline gradually over the course of the campaign until the last two weeks, where News and PR converge in rank. Additionally, this effect is not dependent on political parallelism. Neither does the media in more parallel countries follow the decline in PR more closely, nor do political parties adjust their campaigns to the events reported by MC in non-parallel countries. To sum up the descriptive findings, the notion of the media impacting campaign communication in *International Affairs* has to be discarded, yet there are hints that media affects the communication on other topics which the descriptive display cannot grasp.

**Figure 7.7: Salience of International Affairs in the 2014 EP election campaign**



Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592).

### Agenda impacts

In order to get an overview of mutual influences between media and parties, Table 7.2 provides an aggregated overview of impacts found in the Bayesian CLPM. The first two columns represent the results if all 7 countries are combined. The overall combination of model parameters shows that stability in agendas is within media coverage ( $MC t_1 \rightarrow MC t_2$  .691) and that parties' campaigning ( $PR t_1 \rightarrow PR t_2$  .462) is high yet not perfect, with the PR agenda being more volatile. In the cross-lagged effect, there is room for the agendas to affect each other after a given delay. Here agenda-setting power by the MC (.253) is more pronounced than agenda-building by PR (.135), yet the percentage of leading the agenda is nearly equal<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> To correct the lack of data points in long delay models % over all delay times is calculated as mean % of column above.

**Table 7.2: Influences between media coverage and press releases in the 2014 EP election campaign**

Delay (Models estimated)		All 7 Countries		Non-Parallel		Parallel	
		Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead	Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead	Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead
1 Week (11)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.237	63.6	.361	72.7	.111	36.4
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.200	36.4	.254	27.3	.176	63.6
2 Weeks (10)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.339	50.0	.345	60.0	.167	30.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.208	50.0	.244	40.0	.216	70.0
3 Weeks (9)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.258	66.7	.302	66.7	.133	55.6
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.118	33.3	.163	33.3	.119	44.4
4 Weeks (8)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.266	75.0	.421	100.0	.201	75.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.056	25.0	.058	0.0	.116	25.0
5 Weeks (7)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.177	42.9	.275	57.1	.161	85.7
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.099	57.1	.242	42.9	.000	14.3
6 Weeks (6)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.381	100.0	.374	100.0	.260	83.3
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.058	0.0	.207	0.0	.103	16.7
7 Weeks (5)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.211	60.0	.014	40.0	.312	100.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	-.010	40.0	.158	60.0	.020	0.0
8 Weeks (4)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.332	50.0	.324	50.0	.262	75.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.228	50.0	.453	50.0	.185	25.0
9 Weeks (3)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.070	0.0	.342	66.7	.149	66.7
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.311	100.0	.206	33.3	.184	33.3
10 Weeks (2)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.065	50.0	.310	50.0	.147	50.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.051	50.0	.426	50.0	-.074	50.0
11 Weeks (1)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.011	0.0	.883	100.0	-.086	0.0
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.177	100.0	.002	0.0	.194	100.0
Overall (66)	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.691		.528		.659	
	MC $t_1 \rightarrow$ PR $t_2$	.253	50.7	.327	69.4	.177	59.8
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.135	49.3	.215	30.6	.123	40.2
	PR $t_1 \rightarrow$ MC $t_2$	.462		.276		.522	

Source: Own calculations based on data from the project „Political Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration“ (DACH, MA 2244/5-1; SNF 100017E-144592).

66 models calculated for all countries, parallel, and non-parallel (N=198 models). Displayed are means of cross-lagged effects (MC on PR and PR on MC) per delay and percentage of models in which either PR or MC have shown a higher influence based on the number of models calculated.

Reading example 1 week delay: 11 models were calculated for all countries combined. The mean effect of MC on PR in these models is .237; PR on MC is .200. In 63.6% of the 11 models MC took the lead in agenda-setting. For non-parallel countries the mean effect of MC on PR is .361 (PR→MC: .254) with MC taking the lead in 72.7% of the 11 models. For parallel countries the mean effect of PR on MC is .176 (MC→PR: .111) with PR taking the lead in 63.6% of the 11 models. In the overall block combined results for all models are presented, i.e. mean of posterior effects (path a,b,c,d, see Fig. 7.4) for all models and mean of lead percentages presented in the respective column above.

The agenda-setting power of MC is also more pronounced almost regardless of the delay time. The only notable examples are a 9-week delay (PR → MC .311) and an 11-week delay (PR → MC .177). However, within the interpretation, it has to be considered that, due to the structure

of the data, the higher the delay, the fewer the number of models calculated. Therefore, fewer datapoints to derive precision from are available. If we turn to a 5-week delay, a special case can be found in that the mean effect of MC on PR (.177) is overall higher than the effect of PR on MC (.099), yet PR affects MC in 4 of 7 models (57.1%), so no clear picture can be derived (also the 10-week delay is inconclusive). Regarding delay structure, impacts of MC are stable until 9 weeks where impacts of PR become pronounced. Effect sizes are stable over all delay ranging between .177 (5 weeks: MC → PR; 11 weeks PR → MC) and .381 (6 weeks: MC → PR) structures. The data does not yield information on a definitive high-impact delay that stands out, nor is there a rise or decline in effect sizes over delay time.

Effect means and impact structures in analyzed non-parallel countries are even more pronounced in effect size. Overall, MC affect PR to a larger degree (.327) in 69.4% of the models, the converse mean effect of PR on MC is also stronger (.215) even so in a fewer percentage of models (30.6%). The picture points to a more clear-cut agenda-setting by the media, also supported by the lesser overall effect of PR  $t_1 \rightarrow PR t_2$  .276 allowing for more volatility. Effect directions are stable with MC impacting PR up until a 6-week delay where a zig-zagging pattern sets in (7 weeks: PR → MC; 8 weeks: inconclusive; 9 weeks: MC → PR; 10 weeks: inconclusive; 11 weeks: MC → PR possible outlier). Informative effect sizes range from .275 (5 weeks: MC → PR) to .421 (4 weeks: MC → PR), again not pointing to a clear-cut picture on crucial delay time. Parallel countries display an overall different structure: First, effect sizes for the cross-lagged impacts and differences between agenda-building (.123) and agenda-setting (.177) are far less pronounced as with the previous settings. Also, variability of agendas is far higher, especially for PR  $t_1 \rightarrow PR t_2$  (.552). Additionally, the impact of PR on MC can be found to be stronger in 40.2% of the models<sup>7</sup>, so agenda-building happens more often. Second, a profound difference can be found for different delay times. PR can only be successful if shorter periods are examined (1 week: PR → MC .176; 2 weeks: PR → MC .216). Beginning with a 3-week delay, the MC agenda starts to influence PR with moderate effect sizes (.113 to .312) again. Again, no specific high-impact lag, nor a rise or decline over delay

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<sup>7</sup> Here the importance of calculating percentages via the overview table comes to pass. Since PR affects MC with a 1- and 2-week delay more often – and in these delay structures more models are calculated – lead percentages could be skewed if calculated via individual model comparison.

time, is present with effect sizes ranging from .133 (3 weeks: MC → PR) to .312 (7 weeks: MC → PR).

### *Impact delays*

The contentual take on the findings from Table 7.2 can be described as a media agenda-setting in EU election campaigns as far as issue-salience is concerned. So political parties can campaign on their own strategic issues, yet they do not have the power to substantially influence the issue ranking in the media. The EP election campaign period therefore resembles everyday reality in agenda-setting effects. In terms of delay of agenda-building as well as agenda-setting, stable effects are likely to occur over short periods of up to 6 weeks. The media- and campaign-issue change happens faster than in normal times of political settings. Therefore, political parties being only able to marginally impact the issue-salience, are better off serving the issue agenda presented by the media than adhering to their message content to provide consistency. We can see these impacts in non-parallel countries more clearly, where the agenda-setting effects are more pronounced, but even in parallel countries, the agenda-building by political parties only proves effective in short-term impacts of one to two weeks. In the long run, the issue agenda in MC prevails and sets the frame in which parties' campaigning has to work. From a methodological standpoint, the models yield stable results, the shorter the delay is set.

### **7.2.5. Summary of results and evaluation of hypothesis**

The descriptive findings show that *Economy* was the most relevant issue in the 2014 EP election campaign for media and political parties. In the media coverage, it is followed by *International Affairs*, yet party press releases neglect to campaign in the issue even in lights of events of the Ukrainian crisis unfolding. *Immigration* is ranked in the middle of the 15 issues analyzed and is less campaign-worthy for political parties than for media to report on. Therefore, *H1* can be considered as being partly confirmed since *Economy* and *International Affairs* (for media) are more salient, yet for *Immigration*, the effect has to be discarded. Events are still unfolding, in *International Affairs* (Brexit crisis, US foreign policy), *Economy* (international trade wars) and *Immigration* (immigration crisis). During the 2019 EP election period, it is therefore a fair assumption that these issues will still be highly salient in recent campaigns, perhaps even more



so with the issue of *Immigration* being salient in times of crisis and Europeanization rising on this issue (Boomgaarden et al. 2013).

In order to provide insights into the interrelation between agenda-setting and agenda-building, the competing *H2b* has to be discarded. Overall, political parties are not more successful in influencing the media agenda. The general finding for the EP election period is, that almost regardless of delay time, media agenda-setting is more prominent. The effect of a campaign period (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006), where media is closely following election campaign efforts of political parties, cannot be stated for the ranking of issues on the agenda. So why the conflicting results in previous research (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011)? It can be stated that impacts differ due to the methods used in the analysis. Daily lag structures (Bartels 1996), Vector-Autoregressions (Jansen et al. 2019), Time-Series-Cross-Section (Brandenburg, 2002) and similar time series approaches are prone to especially address short-term impacts of one time series variable on another. Interpretations are mostly found for impacts between the occurrences of campaign messages and media reporting of these messages. The interpretation for the idea of ranking the agenda is different. Here, effects of the position of issues on the agenda of either media or parties is focused. The results above indicate that the media agenda is not easily changed by political parties (in contrast to the findings by Roberts and McCombs 1994), which does not mean that media is not covering campaign PR on a daily basis. Rather effects of issue rankings over longer periods of time are impacted by the media as *H2a* is indicating or driven by real-world events and general public discourse which is relayed to the campaigns by the media.

This also holds true for differences in parallel and non-parallel countries. In parallel countries, impacts of campaign PR can be found (when shorter delay times are used), overall percentage of models with influences of PR are higher, and media impacts are generally lower (PR agenda more stable) than in non-parallel countries. Therefore, *H2c* can be accepted in that a higher amount of parallelism furthers agenda-building effects. Nevertheless, PR can impact the media agendas in short terms of one or two weeks, after which effects fade (although a conservative measure is used in order not to overstate the number of models estimated with short-term delay). This supports the notion of media reacting faster to shifts in agendas. Media coverage is therefore less susceptible to shifts on the parties' agenda the longer the delay time under scrutiny, but can be easily observed in weekly intervals. *H3* is therefore accepted, since effect

sizes (with one outlier) are stable over time regardless of the delay. In the phase of a campaign, no long-time span is needed (in contrast to Winter and Eyal 1981) for media or parties to affect each other. The effects are stable, and changes in the interrelation of effects can be attributed to media logic, campaign strategies and the level of parallelism rather than to delay time.

#### **7.2.6. Discussion**

The aim of this paper is to provide further research with baseline insights into a comprehensive EU issue agenda for EP elections. With a Bayesian modelling cross-lagged panel approach addressing agenda-setting and agenda-building effects, common methodical misconceptions are avoided and issue rankings can be used in agenda research on a sound methodological basis. In comparing the Bayesian CLPM for different delay times, this infers about the time structure of agenda effects. First, in the 2014 EP election *Economy* and *International Affairs* as high-ranking issues are prone to be relevant for 2019, with *Immigration* being also prone to be addressed even more often since the recent immigration crisis. Second, issue-salience is driven by the media as far as the ranking of issues is concerned. These effects are dependent on media systems level of parallelism. Third, over the course of a campaign, effects are stable regardless of the delay time in weeks.

Here, a major limitation in the research of agenda impacts comes to pass. Results seem dependent on overall delay time. In campaign times, choosing a temporal structure of days tends to favor impacts of party communication on media, whereas a weekly delay structure favors shifts in campaign strategy due to changes in issue ranking. Further research has to address that problem in comparing different delay times for the same data. Effects are also dependent on underlying media systems. In comparative research in an EU context, changes in levels of parallelism can occur over the timespan of parliamentary terms of either the EP or national parliaments. In case of the 2019 EP elections, research has to address media system changes, especially in Hungary and Poland. This paper does not feature these countries, so the scope in determining impacts of parallelism has to be widened and additional countries have to be incorporated in further research. The level of party-press parallelism is yet only relevant if legacy media is scrutinized. Upcoming research has to focus on new digital media outlets, which are prone to be distant from a classical journalist's profession, and direct communication

by political campaign strategists may be able to bypass the issue agenda set forth by legacy media. Upcoming digital media might also change the top EU issues due to ongoing events crisis, perhaps overlaying the issue rankings in legacy media and political communication (promoting i.e. *Immigration*), so issue rankings and Europeanization of issues in campaigning and media coverage has to be addressed anew in research of the 2019 EP election campaign.

### 7.2.7. References

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### 7.3. Fazit der Analyse IV

Die Europäisierung wirtschafts- und außenpolitischer Themen zeigt sich in den Ergebnissen der vorliegenden Analyse speziell in den Medien. Parteien versuchen dagegen, außenpolitische Themen über den Verlauf des Wahlkampfes immer stärker zu meiden. Immigration hingegen spielt keine zentrale Rolle auf den jeweiligen Agenden. Hier ist zu beachten, dass gerade die Immigrationspolitik im Jahr 2014 noch nicht den Stellenwert erreicht hat, der während der Zunahme der Migration in der Legislaturperiode vor der Europawahl 2019 zu beobachten war. Hier kann es, ebenso wie in der Umweltpolitik zu gravierenden Unterschieden kommen, wenn die Relevanzzuschreibung politischer Entscheidungen künftig stärker auf die europäische Ebene verlagert wird – ein weiteres Indiz für die Politisierung der europäischen Ebene.

Die Effektrichtung der Einflüsse bezüglich *Agenda-Setting* und *-Building* zeigen klar eine Dominanz der Medienberichterstattung, Parteien folgen eher den Themenrankings der Medien als umgekehrt. Diese Ergebnisse sind nur auf den ersten Blick konträr zu den Befunden von Analyse II. Bei Betrachtung dieser kurzfristigen Effekte gibt die Medienberichterstattung ein klares Bild der Wahlkampfkommunikation der Parteien wieder: Parteien veröffentlichen Pressemitteilungen und Medien kommen ihrem demokratischen Auftrag, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger über die Positionen der Parteien zu informieren, nach. Darüber hinaus informieren Medien aber auch zeitnah über aktuelle Ereignisse, präsentieren Berichte mit hohem Nachrichtenwert und beobachten Themensetzungen anderer Medien. Der Medienlogik entsprechend müssen diese Nachrichten aktuell berichtet werden, da anderenfalls der Verlust von Rezipientinnen und Rezipienten droht. Parteien sind in ihrer Kampagnenplanung im Gegenzug stabiler. Das Ändern einer Wahlkampfstrategie birgt die Gefahr, inkonsistent zu wirken, indem gegebenenfalls zu Themen Position bezogen werden muss, auf denen sich keine Wählerstimmen für die Partei akquirieren lassen. Ein generelles, langfristiges Verschweigen von auf der Medienagenda präsenten Themen birgt allerdings ebenfalls die Gefahr, Stimmenanteile zu verlieren. Bei Betrachtung der längerfristigen, temporalen Einflüsse der Agenden zueinander wird eine Anpassung der Parteien auch im europäischen Kontext sichtbar: die Parteien unterliegen im EP-Wahlkampf den Restriktionen, aktuelle Themenrelevanzen zu setzen. Wiederum ist eine Normalisierung der Effektrichtungen europäischer Kommunikation gegeben.

Mit Blick auf die Länderunterschiede ist hier der Effekt des politischen Parallelismus ausgeprägter. Bei Betrachtung der langfristigen Effekte der Themenrankings zeigt sich, dass Einflüsse in Systemen mit hohem Parallelismus geringer ausfallen. In Mediensystemen mit hohem Parallelismus sind Parteien bei kürzeren Zeitspannen von einer oder zwei Wochen in der Lage, *Agenda-Building* zu betreiben. Liegt hingegen kein Parallelismus vor, ist dies in keiner der Zeitspannen der Fall. Anzunehmen ist, dass dieser Unterschied auf die höheren Freiheitsgrade medialer Entscheidungslogik in nicht-parallelen Systemen hinweist. Medien sind hier daher eher in der Lage, Themen anhand ihrer Nachrichtenwerte in der Berichterstattung zu berücksichtigen und diese dort zu präsentieren.

## 8. Fazit und Diskussion der empirischen Analysen

Die fortschreitende Normalisierung europäischer Wahlkämpfe ist ein gutes Zeichen für die Demokratisierung europäischer Politik, doch welche Implikationen lassen sich daraus für politische Parteien im Europawahlkampf ableiten? *Erstens* lässt sich beobachten, dass ein europapolitischer Fokus der Wahlkampfkommunikation nicht mehr nur auf Seiten der kleinen (euroskeptischen) Parteien zu finden ist. Etablierte Parteien setzten Europa im Wahlkampf 2014 auf die Agenda und überließen mögliche Stimmenpotentiale nicht den Nischenparteien wie sich bereits in vorherigen Forschungsergebnissen angedeutet hat (Adam & Maier, 2016; Jalali & Silva, 2011). Zwar lag der Hauptschwerpunkt der Wahlkampfkommunikation immer noch auf der nationalen Ebene, eine weitere Europäisierung ist jedoch auch hier zu erwarten. Für zukünftige Wahlkämpfe stellen sich Parteien auch auf der europäischen Ebene dem üblichen Parteienwettbewerb, allerdings müssen sie in diesem Wettbewerb auch Europa thematisieren, um zu bestehen (Van Spanje & Vreese, 2014). Hierbei ist vor allem eine klare, konsistente Botschaft zur Positionierung einer Partei bezüglich der EU-Integration vonnöten – innerparteilicher Dissens sollte nicht den Europafokus der Außenkommunikation einschränken.

Verfolgen die Parteien einen europapolitischen Fokus in ihrer Wahlkampfkommunikation, haben sie *zweitens* gute Chancen, in der Medienberichterstattung präsent zu sein. Auch im Wahlkampf 2014 setzten politische Akteure Europa auf die Agenda der Medien (Brandenburg, 2002; Dearing & Rogers, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2012; Norris et al., 1999; Semetko et al., 1991) und überschrieben damit den zuvor geringen Nachrichtenwert der EU (Adam, 2007; Jalali & Silva, 2011; Schuck et al., 2011). Die Parteien haben also besonders in Wahlkampfzeiten eine profitable Möglichkeit, ihre Positionen zu Europa in den Medien sichtbar zu machen. Die Sichtbarkeit der EU hat seit dem EP-Wahlkampf 2014 allerdings weiter zugenommen, wie erst kürzlich die Wahlbeteiligung 2019 gezeigt hat. Für zukünftige Wahlkämpfe ist es daher umso wichtiger, auf europafokussierte Kommunikation zu setzen, da die europäische Ebene in der Lebenswirklichkeit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger eine wichtigere Rolle einnimmt. Sollte diese Relevanz auch von den Medien aufgenommen werden, so ist zu erwarten, dass sich die Chance auf erfolgreiches *Agenda-Building* verringert, da zusätzliche Nachfrage nach Medienberichterstattung über europäische Themen auch zu einer größeren Relevanz des Themas in den Medien führt. Gegenteilig kann der Effekt des politischen Parallelismus in einigen Mitgliedsstaaten durch zunehmendes Press-Party-Dealignment (Norris et al., 1999;

Seethaler & Melischek, 2012) sinken, was ferner dazu führt, dass auch in diesen Ländern Parteien in ihrer Gesamtheit bessere Chancen auf erfolgreiches *Agenda-Building* haben, da sich Medienoutlets – bezogen auf ihre redaktionelle Linie – nicht mehr streng entlang der Themenlinie einer Partei orientieren. Interessanterweise würden sich dann die Effekte in nicht-parallelen – durch verstärktes *Agenda-Setting* – und parallelen – wenn sich Medien stärker an Nachrichtenfaktoren als Parteilinien orientieren – Mediensystemen aufeinander zu bewegen.

Sollten die Medien (in parallelen Systemen) stärker auf Nachrichtenfaktoren setzen oder (generell) die Sichtbarkeit der EU in ihrer Berichterstattung erhöhen und zudem das gesamte Parteienspektrum seinen Europafokus im Wahlkampf steigern, müssen die Parteien *drittens* Strategien ihrer Wahlkampfkommunikation stärker an Medienlogiken orientieren (Hopmann et al., 2009), um erfolgreich *Agenda-Building* zu betreiben. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zeigt dabei, dass in Bezug auf europäische Wahlkampfkommunikation ein negativer Tenor nicht zum Erfolg führt. Konflikthafte Kommunikation zur EU steigert nicht die Sichtbarkeit einzelner Parteien, auch nicht jene der euroskeptischen Fundamentalopposition. Vielmehr besteht die Chance, auch eurokritische Positionen zu äußern in einem Umfeld, das wie in nationalen Wahlkämpfen konstruktive Inputs mit in den öffentlichen Diskurs nimmt. Für zukünftige Wahlkämpfe kann sich diese Entwicklung ebenfalls verfestigen, wodurch die Positionierung in der Ausgestaltung europapolitischer Sachfragen und deren Kommunikation für die Parteien an Relevanz gewinnen wird.

Eine klare Positionierung auf politischen Sachfragen bereitet Parteien *viertens* auch auf die Restriktionen der weiteren Ausbildung einer europäischen Themenagenda (Adam et al., 2017; Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Boomgaarden & De Vreese, 2016) vor.

Durch die Europäisierung spezifischer Themenfelder, die Nachfrage des Elektorats nach Berichterstattung über bestimmte Themen und reale Ereignisse mit europapolitischen Implikationen können europäische Themensalienen in den Medien beeinflusst werden.

Mittels klassischen *Agenda-Settings* werden diese Themensalienen dann an Parteienkommunikation übergeben. Wenngleich auch manchmal widerstrebend, müssen saliente Themen auch in Wahlkämpfen aufgegriffen werden. Zwar sind Parteien in der Anpassung ihrer geplanten Kampagnenkommunikation auf den Themenfeldern gegebenenfalls langsamer als der tagesaktuelle Medienzyklus, dennoch können aufkommende Themen oftmals schwer ignoriert werden. 2014 die Ukraine-Krise als außenpolitische Herausforderung, 2019

die Immigration und die grenzübergreifende Umweltbewegung sind nur Beispiele für mögliche zukünftige Themenfelder, die in europäischen Wahlkämpfen auch in Zukunft eine Rolle spielen können. Diese Normalisierung der Interaktion zwischen Parteien und Medien auf europäischer Ebene schränkt die Parteien in ihrer Fähigkeit, erfolgreich *Agenda-Building* betreiben zu können, zumindest ein. Für zukünftige Wahlkämpfe sollten sie analog zu nationalen Wahlkämpfen also darauf vorbereitet sein, flexibel auf Veränderungen der Themensalienz zu reagieren.

## 9. Limitationen der Studie: Einordnung und Ausblick

Die vorliegende Arbeit unterliegt naturgemäß forschungspragmatischen (in den Analysen genannten) Einschränkungen, die in ihren Implikationen in zwei Bereichen, methodisch und theoretisch, weitere Forschungsvorhaben anregen können. Aus der vorliegenden Datenbasis konnten keine Schlüsse auf die Interaktionen zwischen der Salienz, die das Elektorat der EU zuweist, und daraus resultierenden Einflüssen auf die Medienagenda gezogen werden. Die Einflüsse wurden durch die theoriegeleitete Aufarbeitung des Forschungsstandes mit Annahmen versehen, die nicht geprüft, sondern als gegeben vorausgesetzt wurden. Hier sollte weitere Forschung zu EP-Wahlkämpfen alle drei Agenden (Elektorat, Medien, Parteien) in zukünftige Analysen mit einbeziehen. Gleiches gilt für die Salienz der EU auf der Medienagenda im Vergleich zur Berichterstattung über nationale Themen. Ein direktes tagesaktuelles Maß des Verhältnisses von EU vs. national fokussierter politischer Berichterstattung würde Kausalanalyse der Sichtbarkeit des EP-Wahlkampfes ermöglichen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit konnte dies nur für die europäische Themenagenda umgesetzt werden.

Darüber hinaus sollte die Interaktion zwischen der Agenda des Elektorats und der Parteien durch das verstärkte Aufkommen direkter Wahlkampfkommunikation stärker mit europäischem Bezug untersucht werden. Hier besteht die Möglichkeit, dass die Gatekeeping-Funktion der klassischen Medien durch die direkte Kommunikation umgangen wird und negative, euroskeptische Kampagnen dadurch erfolgreicher auf das Elektorat wirken. Weitere Untersuchungen bedürfen auch der Berücksichtigung länderspezifischer Effekte. Gerade die Einflüsse politischen Parallelismus auf die Interaktion zwischen Parteien und Medien, die durch den verstärkten Einfluss der Politik auf die Medien in manchen Mitgliedsstaaten bestehen, sollten hier konkreter analysiert werden. Die mangelnde Offenheit für den Diskurs zwischen parteipolitischen Kampagnen in parallelen Systemen könnte dabei zu einer Spaltung des Elektorats führen, die sich ebenfalls an Parteilinien ausrichtet – ein Zustand, der Agenda-Building verhindert und den Parteienwettbewerb nachhaltig ausbremst.

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## 11. Appendix

### *Appendix 4A: Political Parties included in the Study*

Our study takes into consideration all parties from Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal and the United Kingdom that won at least 3% of votes in the last European or national elections and participated in the European elections 2014. For Austria, all press releases were available from the Originaltext-Service GmbH (OTS). For all other countries, we collected the press releases from party archives and party homepages. Parties included in the Analysis are as follows:

#### *Austria*

ÖVP (Austrian People's Party), governing party  
SPÖ (Social Democratic Party), governing party  
Greens, challenger party  
NEOS (the New Austria), challenger party  
FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party), established opposition  
BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria), challenger party

#### *France*

UMP (Union for a Popular Movement), established opposition  
PS (Socialist Party), governing party  
MoDem (Democratic Movement), established opposition  
Europe Ecologie (The Greens), challenger party  
Front de Gauche (Left Front), established opposition  
FN (National Front), challenger party

#### *Germany*

CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union), governing party  
SPD (Social Democratic Party), governing party  
FDP (Free Democratic Party), established opposition  
Greens, established opposition  
Linke (the Left), challenger party  
AfD (Alternative for Germany), challenger party

*Greece*

ND (New Democracy), governing party  
SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left – Unitary Social Front), governing party  
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), challenger party  
DIMAR (Democratic Left), challenger party  
KKE (Communist Party of Greece), challenger party  
LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally), challenger party  
ANEL (Independent Greeks), challenger party  
XA (Golden Dawn), challenger party  
The Greens, challenger party

*Netherlands*

CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), established opposition  
PvdA (Labour Party), governing party  
VVD (Volkspartij voor People’s Party for Freedom), governing party  
Groenlinks (Green Party), challenger party  
SP (Socialist Party), challenger party  
CU (Christian Union), challenger party  
D66 (Democrats 66), established opposition  
PVV (Party for Freedom), challenger party  
PvdD (Party for the Animals), challenger party

*Portugal*

Aliança Portugal (an electoral alliance of PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party) and CDS-PP (People’s Party)),  
governing party  
PS (Socialist Party), established opposition  
CDU (Unitary Democratic Coalition, a coalition of the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) and the Greens),  
challenger party  
BE (Left Bloc), challenger party

*United Kingdom*

Conservatives, governing party  
Labour Party, established opposition  
Liberal Democrats, governing party  
Greens, challenger party  
UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), challenger party  
BNP (British National Party), challenger party

**Appendix 4B: Selection Routine for Relevant Material**

The (English-language) search string contained the following key words and word components: Europ\*, europ\*, EU, EP, EC, ECB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, ECJ, EEAS, EESC, EIF, EDPS, EMU, Troika, troika, Frontex, FRONTEX.

**Press releases per party type**

	Challenger	Established opposition	Governing party	
<b>Austria</b>				
OEVP (party as a whole)			535	
SPOE (party as a whole)			891	
Gruenen (party as a whole)	379			
FPOE (party as a whole)	0	491		
BZOE (party as a whole) (since 29. September 2013, no longer in Parliament)	182			
NEOS (party as a whole) (since October 2012)	126			
N	687	491	1426	2604
<b>France</b>				
UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire) (party as a whole)		80		
PS (Parti Socialiste) (party as a whole)			109	
MoDem (Mouvement Democrate) (party as a whole)		13		
Europe Ecologie (Verts) (party as a whole)		43		
Front de Gauche (Parti communiste français+Parti de gauche) (party as a whole)		193		
Front National (FN) (party as a whole)	201			
N	201	329	109	639
<b>Germany</b>				
CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) (party as a whole)			226	
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (party as a whole)			332	
FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) (party as a whole)		118		
Gruenen (party as a whole)		279		
Die Linke (party as a whole)	290			
Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD, party as a whole)	61			
N	351	397	558	1306
<b>Greece</b>				
Nea Dimocracia (party as a whole)			110	
PASOK (party as a whole)			191	
KKKE (party as a whole)	182			
Syriza (party as a whole)	635			
LAOS (party as a whole)	89			
Oikologoi Prassinou (OP) (party as a whole)	111			
Democratic Left (party as a whole)	194			
Independent Greeks (party as a whole)	356			
Golden Dawn (party as a whole)	166			
N	1733		301	2034
<b>Netherlands</b>				
CDA (party as a whole)		75		
PvdA (party as a whole)			86	
VVD (party as a whole)			42	
GroenLinks (party as a whole)	57			
SP (party as a whole)	81			
ChristenUnie/SGP (either one the two parties, or both, as a whole)	64			
D66 (party as a whole)	0	73		
PVV (party as a whole)	25			
Partij voor de Dieren (party as a whole)	48			
N	275	148	128	551
<b>Portugal</b>				
PS (Partido Socialista) (party as a whole)		290		
BE (Bloco de Esquerda) (party as a whole)	175			
CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária) (party as a whole)	120			
AP (Aliança Portugal) (party as a whole)			125	
N	295	290	125	710
<b>United Kingdom</b>				
Conservative Party (party as a whole)			34	
Labour Party (party as a whole)		390		
Liberal Democrats (LibDems) (party as a whole)			164	
UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) (party as a whole)	98			
Green Party (party as a whole)	82			
BNP (British National Party) (party as a whole)	488			
N	668	390	198	1256
<b>Overall</b>				
N	4210	2045	2845	9100

**Appendix 4C: Measures from Media Content Analysis**

To measure EU-salience in the national media, we used our own 2014 media content analysis. In all seven countries we analyzed, analogous to our analysis of press releases, the press coverage (title page, political part and editorial section, including comments) of two national quality newspapers (one right-leaning and one left-leaning newspaper) in the 12 weeks before the 2014 EP elections. These newspapers are:

*Austria*

Die Presse (right), Der Standard (left)

*France*

Le Figaro (right), Le Monde (left)

*Germany*

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (right), Süddeutsche Zeitung (left)

*Greece*

I Kathimerini(right), Efimerida ton Sinkaton (left)

*The Netherlands*

NRC Handelsblad (right), De Volkskrant (left)

*Portugal*

Diário de Notícias (right), and Público (left)

*United Kingdom*

The Daily Telegraph (right), The Guardian (left)

We distinguished whether a newspaper article referred to European issues, European policies, European institutions, European politicians, and/or the European Parliament elections at least twice (using the electronic search string mentioned above) or not. Then we calculated the average amount of articles referring to EU-issues in each country (UK: 3.9%; FR: 7.9%; DE: 8.7%; PT: 8.9%; AT: 12.6%; NL: 15.6%; GR: 17.4%).

**Appendix 4D: Models in Table 2***Testing the stability of the model fit measures*

Since the analysis in the paper relies on clustered standard errors on country level (n=7), probability levels for model fit measures cannot be computed. To test for stability standard errors are clustered on party level (N=46). Table 2 shows the overall stability and significance levels for the model fit measures.

**Sig. tests of mlogit Model with clustered std.err. on party level**

	<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>			<b>Model 3 Established Parties vs. Challengers</b>		
	<b>cluster country</b>	<b>cluster party</b>		<b>cluster country</b>	<b>cluster party</b>	
	Pseudo $R^2$	Pseudo $R^2$	Prob > $\chi^2$	Pseudo $R^2$	Pseudo $R^2$	Prob > $\chi^2$
Effects of interactions with party						
type:gov. party x ...						
... electoral success national (1)	.053	.053	***	.051	.051	***
... internal EU-dissent (2)	.051	.051	***	.051	.051	***
... success x dissent (3)	.053	.053	***	.053	.053	***
... success x cycle (4)	.052	.052	***	.051	.051	***
... EU-emphasis opp. Parties (5)	.052	.052	***	.054	.054	***
... EU-emphasis gov. Parties (6)	.052	.052	***	.050	.050	***
... EU-support public (7)	.052	.052	***	.050	.050	***
<i>Base-Model</i>	.051	.051	***	.050	.050	***
<i>N</i>	9100	9100		9100	9100	

*Full models (presented in the paper in Table 2)*

Due to the high number of effects to be calculated the analysis is conducted in several steps. First, a base model is calculated, then, interactions are added one effect at a time, as the number of simultaneous interactions is limited by the number of cases on the party and country level, which also prevents us from calculating multilevel models

11. Appendix 4D: Models in Table 2

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Base Model</b>		
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.269	.258	.243
	Electoral success national	.761	.085	.015
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.570	.092	.000
	Success x dissent	1.255	.095	.003
	Election cycle national	.574	.155	.040
	Success x cycle	.678	.091	.004
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.955	.140	.754
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.105	.120	.359
	EU-support public	2.276	.728	.010
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.776	.058	.001
	EU-support	.975	.059	.672
	Extreme EU-position	.799	.030	.000
	constant	.100	.025	.000
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	interactions	overview	
	... electoral success national	.521	.125	.007
	... internal EU-dissent	1.426	.359	.159
	... success x dissent	4.802	3.766	.045
	... success x cycle	1.576	.520	.168
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.843	.106	.174
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	1.503	.497	.218
	... EU-support public	.620	.039	.000
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.266	.113	.008
	Electoral success national	.642	.085	.001
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.529	.101	.001
	Success x dissent	1.296	.168	.046
	Election cycle national	.932	.135	.626
	Success x cycle	.649	.075	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.364	.109	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.911	.075	.258
	EU-support public	1.004	.171	.982
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.810	.068	.012
	EU-support	1.062	.060	.286
	Extreme EU-positions	.779	.093	.037
	constant	.356	.125	.003
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	interactions	overview	
	... electoral success national	1.412	.613	.427
	... internal EU-dissent	1.143	.226	.500
	... success x dissent	.638	.613	.640
	... success x cycle	.743	.356	.535
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.226	.161	.122
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.865	.153	.412
	... EU-support public	.877	.063	.069
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.051		
	N	9100		

11. Appendix 4D: Models in Table 2

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... electoral success national</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.284	.232	.166
	Electoral success national	.929	.159	.666
	Own party internal dissent	.571	.099	.001
	Success x dissent	1.128	.133	.308
	Election cycle national	.566	.142	.023
	Success x cycle	.577	.076	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.041	.132	.753
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.057	.089	.506
	EU-support public	2.221	.643	.006
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.726	.061	.000
	EU-support	.996	.058	.951
	Extreme EU-position	.768	.016	.000
	constant	.096	.026	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		.521	.125	.007
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.305	.147	.019
	Electoral success national	.563	.152	.033
	Own party internal dissent	.522	.094	.000
	Success x dissent	1.394	.244	.057
	Election cycle national	.953	.145	.750
	Success x cycle	.699	.093	.007
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.309	.130	.007
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.931	.077	.386
	EU-support public	1.005	.185	.980
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.832	.081	.060
	EU-support	1.056	.061	.348
	Extreme EU-positions	.788	.079	.017
	constant	.352	.113	.001
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		1.412	.613	.427
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.053		
N		9100		
<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... internal EU-dissent</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.191	.196	.287
	Electoral success national	.735	.090	.012
	Own party internal dissent	.492	.090	.000
	Success x dissent	1.232	.131	.051
	Election cycle national	.569	.151	.033
	Success x cycle	.632	.117	.013
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.930	.130	.601
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.132	.125	.261
	EU-support public	2.295	.707	.007
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.783	.060	.001
	EU-support	1.012	.052	.820
	Extreme EU-position	.765	.050	.000
	constant	.091	.025	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		1.426	.359	.159
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.250	.116	.016
	Electoral success national	.625	.097	.002
	Own party internal dissent	.499	.134	.010
	Success x dissent	1.300	.160	.033
	Election cycle national	.927	.136	.608
	Success x cycle	.631	.093	.002
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.358	.116	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.915	.080	.313
	EU-support public	1.003	.168	.987
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.809	.068	.012
	EU-support	1.078	.075	.278
	Extreme EU-positions	.767	.103	.048
	constant	.340	.123	.003
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		1.143	.226	.500
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.051		
N		9100		

11. Appendix 4D: Models in Table 2

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... success x dissent</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.818	.215	.445
	Electoral success national	.942	.126	.653
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.453	.089	.000
	Success x dissent	1.035	.118	.763
	Election cycle national	.571	.117	.006
	Success x cycle	.457	.116	.002
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.967	.105	.754
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.151	.095	.086
	EU-support public	2.251	.546	.001
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.718	.068	.000
	EU-support	1.064	.057	.250
	Extreme EU-position	.702	.071	.000
	constant	.084	.026	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... success x dissent	4.802	3.766	.045
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.432	.409	.208
	Electoral success national	.603	.136	.025
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.559	.116	.005
	Success x dissent	1.383	.245	.067
	Election cycle national	.950	.154	.754
	Success x cycle	.731	.228	.315
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.359	.113	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.898	.100	.334
	EU-support public	1.002	.187	.990
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.823	.088	.069
	EU-support	1.040	.082	.622
	Extreme EU-positions	.795	.086	.034
	constant	.376	.142	.010
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... success x dissent	.638	.613	.640
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.053		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... success x cycle</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.185	.275	.465
	Electoral success national	.837	.112	.181
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.556	.095	.001
	Success x dissent	1.160	.132	.195
	Election cycle national	.632	.159	.069
	Success x cycle	.558	.120	.007
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.030	.153	.844
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.080	.115	.470
	EU-support public	2.062	.663	.024
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.735	.074	.002
	EU-support	.992	.064	.900
	Extreme EU-position	.794	.032	.000
	constant	.093	.025	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... success x cycle	1.576	.520	.168
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.310	.167	.035
	Electoral success national	.597	.117	.008
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.540	.093	.000
	Success x dissent	1.388	.249	.068
	Election cycle national	.895	.182	.587
	Success x cycle	.747	.211	.301
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.316	.155	.019
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.909	.086	.312
	EU-support public	1.052	.229	.816
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.834	.090	.091
	EU-support	1.050	.061	.408
	Extreme EU-positions	.788	.078	.016
	constant	.363	.126	.003
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... success x cycle	.743	.356	.535
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.052		
	N	9100		



<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-emphasis opp. Parties</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.235	.240	.277
	Electoral success national	.773	.093	.033
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.577	.097	.001
	Success x dissent	1.243	.098	.006
	Election cycle national	.610	.179	.093
	Success x cycle	.669	.105	.010
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.033	.206	.870
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.047	.152	.752
	EU-support public	2.107	.733	.032
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.773	.069	.004
	EU-support	.976	.059	.683
	Extreme EU-position	.814	.039	.000
	constant	.095	.023	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x				
...				
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.843	.106	.174
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.281	.157	.044
	Electoral success national	.633	.072	.000
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.519	.095	.000
	Success x dissent	1.305	.166	.036
	Election cycle national	.855	.141	.343
	Success x cycle	.649	.068	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.216	.139	.087
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.987	.093	.890
	EU-support public	1.128	.213	.524
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.810	.060	.005
	EU-support	1.066	.061	.265
	Extreme EU-positions	.764	.087	.018
	constant	.365	.121	.002
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x				
...				
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.226	.161	.122
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.052		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-emphasis gov. Parties</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.558	.522	.185
	Electoral success national	.824	.118	.175
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.605	.103	.003
	Success x dissent	1.238	.118	.025
	Election cycle national	.560	.177	.067
	Success x cycle	.694	.097	.009
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.092	.192	.615
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.966	.143	.817
	EU-support public	2.103	.645	.015
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.735	.059	.000
	EU-support	.975	.058	.668
	Extreme EU-position	.822	.036	.000
	constant	.092	.028	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	1.503	.497	.218
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.197	.125	.085
	Electoral success national	.618	.101	.003
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.516	.104	.001
	Success x dissent	1.307	.163	.032
	Election cycle national	.933	.126	.609
	Success x cycle	.639	.084	.001
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.295	.133	.012
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.962	.096	.696
	EU-support public	1.042	.171	.803
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.827	.066	.017
	EU-support	1.064	.060	.272
	Extreme EU-positions	.769	.094	.033
	constant	.361	.124	.003
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.865	.153	.412
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.052		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 1 Government vs. Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-support public</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.485	.203	.004
	Electoral success national	.820	.099	.099
	Own party internal dissent	.567	.072	.000
	Success x dissent	1.242	.103	.009
	Election cycle national	.554	.120	.006
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.658	.091	.003
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.922	.114	.510
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.178	.115	.092
	EU-support public	2.716	.724	.000
	EU-salience media	.800	.057	.002
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.979	.055	.713
	Extreme EU-position	.796	.022	.000
	constant	.095	.023	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		.620	.039	.000
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.298	.098	.001
	Electoral success national	.658	.093	.003
	Own party internal dissent	.528	.096	.000
	Success x dissent	1.291	.171	.054
	Election cycle national	.926	.117	.542
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.645	.079	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.353	.102	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.925	.074	.325
	EU-support public	1.050	.162	.752
	EU-salience media	.814	.067	.012
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	1.063	.058	.262
	Extreme EU-positions	.776	.095	.039
	constant	.358	.129	.004
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		.877	.063	.069
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.052		
N		9100		

<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Base Model</b>		
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.554	.658	.000
	Electoral success national	.365	.025	.000
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.459	.047	.000
	Success x dissent	1.791	.311	.001
	Election cycle national	.204	.037	.000
	Success x cycle	.294	.040	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.825	.075	.034
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.193	.061	.001
	EU-support public	4.390	.649	.000
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.855	.079	.090
	EU-support	.630	.040	.000
	Extreme EU-position	.894	.292	.732
	constant	.588	.271	.249
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	interactions	overview	
	... electoral success national	1.233	.347	.456
	... internal EU-dissent	1.148	.268	.554
	... success x dissent	.365	.208	.076
	... success x cycle	.422	.152	.017
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.074	.267	.773
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	1.318	.247	.141
	... EU-support public	1.358	.273	.128
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.564	.392	.000
	Electoral success national	.379	.024	.000
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.399	.020	.000
	Success x dissent	2.135	.667	.015
	Election cycle national	.208	.030	.000
	Success x cycle	.227	.053	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.182	.032	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.256	.064	.000
	EU-support public	3.066	.310	.000
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.985	.020	.456
	EU-support	.702	.033	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.103	.158	.493
	constant	1.199	.335	.516
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	Interactions	Overview	
	... electoral success national	2.589	.467	.000
	... internal EU-dissent	1.292	.387	.391
	... success x dissent	.337	.236	.120
	... success x cycle	1.591	.899	.411
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.863	.040	.001
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.576	.082	.000
	... EU-support public	1.104	.358	.760
	Pseudo $R^2$ Base-Model	.082		
	N	4890		

<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... electoral success national</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.688	.723	.000
	Electoral success national	.301	.043	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.443	.048	.000
	Success x dissent	1.950	.305	.000
	Election cycle national	.196	.036	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.283	.047	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.806	.072	.016
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.187	.071	.004
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	4.587	.714	.000
	EU-salience media	.868	.088	.163
	EU-support	.608	.043	.000
	Extreme EU-position	.947	.301	.863
constant	.602	.295	.300	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		1.233	.347	.456
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	3.271	.475	.000
	Electoral success national	.198	.021	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.375	.031	.000
	Success x dissent	2.488	.575	.000
	Election cycle national	.234	.034	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.263	.035	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.110	.042	.006
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.190	.065	.002
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	2.896	.358	.000
	EU-salience media	1.071	.027	.006
	EU-support	.621	.016	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.387	.295	.124
constant	1.150	.384	.676	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		2.589	.467	.000
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.084		
N		4890		
<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... internal EU-dissent</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step 1: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.642	.731	.000
	Electoral success national	.352	.018	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.409	.105	.001
	Success x dissent	1.677	.445	.052
	Election cycle national	.205	.039	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.299	.052	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.830	.082	.060
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.185	.069	.004
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	4.375	.710	.000
	EU-salience media	.847	.078	.073
	EU-support	.641	.052	.000
	Extreme EU-position	.861	.317	.684
constant	.559	.207	.117	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		1.148	.268	.554
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.807	.358	.000
	Electoral success national	.354	.018	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.323	.082	.000
	Success x dissent	1.860	.572	.044
	Election cycle national	.212	.029	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.235	.051	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.200	.037	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.237	.062	.000
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	3.030	.297	.000
	EU-salience media	.966	.026	.195
	EU-support	.723	.049	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.027	.156	.859
constant	1.092	.318	.761	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		1.292	.387	.391
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.082		
N		4890		

<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... success x cycle</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	3.211	.559	.000
	Electoral success national	.274	.044	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.475	.032	.000
	Success x dissent	1.825	.350	.002
	Election cycle national	.189	.032	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.541	.088	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.755	.078	.006
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.059	.031	.050
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	4.971	.851	.000
	EU-salience media	.955	.092	.637
	EU-support	.596	.039	.000
	Extreme EU-position	.976	.310	.939
constant	.521	.214	.113	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x cycle		.422	.152	.017
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.331	.303	.000
	Electoral success national	.434	.098	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.388	.032	.000
	Success x dissent	2.121	.665	.016
	Election cycle national	.210	.036	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.159	.052	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.229	.093	.007
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.364	.120	.000
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	2.939	.510	.000
	EU-salience media	.935	.065	.336
	EU-support	.721	.050	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.044	.230	.844
constant	1.309	.471	.454	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x cycle		1.591	.899	.411
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.082		
N		4890		
<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-emphasis opp. Parties</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.537	.667	.000
	Electoral success national	.369	.032	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.464	.063	.000
	Success x dissent	1.789	.311	.001
	Election cycle national	.197	.040	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.295	.038	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.782	.186	.302
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.233	.171	.132
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	4.510	.812	.000
	EU-salience media	.852	.071	.056
	EU-support	.628	.030	.000
	Extreme EU-position	.920	.332	.817
constant	.575	.291	.274	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-emphasis opp. Parties		1.074	.267	.773
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.760	.409	.000
	Electoral success national	.363	.021	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.387	.023	.000
	Success x dissent	2.137	.669	.015
	Election cycle national	.217	.037	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.222	.052	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.322	.070	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.177	.074	.010
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support public	2.992	.372	.000
	EU-salience media	.991	.029	.760
	EU-support	.696	.040	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.055	.173	.742
constant	1.267	.340	.378	
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-emphasis opp. Parties		.863	.040	.001
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.082		
N		4890		

<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-emphasis gov. Parties</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.679	.699	.000
	Electoral success national	.416	.082	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.518	.022	.000
	Success x dissent	1.720	.468	.046
	Election cycle national	.225	.061	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.334	.104	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.910	.130	.507
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.038	.115	.737
	EU-support public	3.949	1.017	.000
	EU-salience media	.803	.083	.035
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.649	.046	.000
	Extreme EU-position	1.066	.249	.785
	constant	.338	.081	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-emphasis gov. Parties		1.318	.247	.141
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.199	.378	.000
	Electoral success national	.279	.030	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.317	.047	.000
	Success x dissent	2.535	.771	.002
	Election cycle national	.176	.039	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.160	.045	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.972	.086	.751
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.658	.202	.000
	EU-support public	3.723	.704	.000
	EU-salience media	1.130	.043	.001
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.684	.019	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	.828	.191	.413
	constant	2.700	1.152	.020
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-emphasis gov. Parties		.576	.082	.000
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.084		
<hr/>				
<b>Model 2 Government vs. Established Opposition</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-support public</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.492	.573	.000
	Electoral success national	.316	.033	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.450	.044	.000
	Success x dissent	1.884	.295	.000
	Election cycle national	.162	.036	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.249	.040	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.781	.079	.015
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.190	.054	.000
	EU-support public	4.180	.576	.000
	EU-salience media	.892	.084	.225
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.573	.048	.000
	Extreme EU-position	1.021	.333	.948
	constant	.799	.414	.665
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		1.358	.273	.128
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.532	.522	.000
	Electoral success national	.361	.066	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.396	.018	.000
	Success x dissent	2.182	.780	.029
	Election cycle national	.193	.063	.000
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.214	.080	.000
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.161	.085	.041
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.254	.055	.000
	EU-support public	3.020	.243	.000
	EU-salience media	.996	.041	.920
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.682	.068	.000
	Extreme EU-positions	1.151	.284	.571
	constant	1.322	.454	.415
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		1.104	.358	.760
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.082		
N		4890		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Base Model</b>		
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.148	.249	.524
	Electoral success national	.789	.091	.040
	Own party internal dissent	.577	.098	.001
	Success x dissent	1.267	.095	.001
	Election cycle national	.616	.146	.041
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.703	.110	.024
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.981	.124	.881
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.082	.098	.385
	EU-support public	2.094	.575	.007
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.779	.059	.001
	EU-support	.973	.074	.720
	Extreme EU-position	.800	.023	.000
	constant	.100	.025	.000
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	interactions	overview	
	... electoral success national	.793	.146	.208
	... internal EU-dissent	1.204	.337	.508
	... success x dissent	1.388	.321	.156
	... success x cycle	1.248	.458	.547
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.821	.044	.000
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.897	.058	.097
	... EU-support public	.801	.071	.013
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.981	.172	.914
	Electoral success national	.659	.110	.013
	Own party internal dissent	.545	.105	.002
	Success x dissent	1.316	.166	.030
	Election cycle national	1.009	.124	.944
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.680	.106	.013
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.413	.100	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.878	.066	.085
	EU-support public	.925	.149	.627
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.802	.069	.010
	EU-support	1.079	.057	.146
	Extreme EU-positions	.799	.080	.026
	constant	.340	.105	.001
	Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...	interactions	overview	
	... electoral success national	1.374	.508	.390
	... internal EU-dissent	.763	.119	.084
	... success x dissent	1.620	.613	.203
	... success x cycle	.676	.351	.451
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.390	.119	.000
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	1.079	.135	.546
	... EU-support public	1.053	.204	.791
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.050		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with ... electoral success national</b>		
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.151	.274	.554
	Electoral success national	.908	.164	.593
	Own party internal dissent	.565	.106	.002
	Success x dissent	1.254	.101	.005
	Election cycle national	.666	.141	.054
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.710	.102	.017
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.030	.134	.820
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.047	.102	.635
	EU-support public	1.949	.502	.010
	EU-salience media	.761	.069	.003
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.969	.072	.670
	Extreme EU-position	.765	.056	.000
	constant	.109	.032	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		.793	.146	.208
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.017	.203	.933
	Electoral success national	.538	.182	.066
	Own party internal dissent	.559	.101	.001
	Success x dissent	1.366	.166	.010
	Election cycle national	.936	.137	.650
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.683	.099	.008
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.336	.123	.002
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.917	.073	.278
	EU-support public	.994	.169	.970
	EU-salience media	.819	.080	.041
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	1.087	.055	.099
	Extreme EU-positions	.838	.075	.049
	constant	.302	.074	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... electoral success national		1.374	.508	.390
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.051		
N		9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with ... internal EU-dissent</b>		
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.179	.271	.475
	Electoral success national	.791	.097	.056
	Own party internal dissent	.517	.118	.004
	Success x dissent	1.307	.120	.004
	Election cycle national	.638	.179	.108
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.694	.113	.024
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.970	.130	.823
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.084	.108	.418
	EU-support public	2.066	.618	.015
	EU-salience media	.776	.063	.002
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.988	.072	.865
	Extreme EU-position	.770	.062	.001
	constant	.097	.029	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		1.204	.337	.508
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.948	.131	.697
	Electoral success national	.663	.107	.011
	Own party internal dissent	.639	.083	.001
	Success x dissent	1.251	.139	.043
	Election cycle national	.964	.100	.724
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.698	.100	.012
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.412	.072	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.876	.051	.023
	EU-support public	.956	.133	.748
	EU-salience media	.809	.061	.005
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	1.056	.041	.165
	Extreme EU-positions	.840	.064	.021
	constant	.357	.095	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... internal EU-dissent		.763	.119	.084
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.051		
N		9100		



<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... success x dissent</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.219	.317	.448
	Electoral success national	.764	.063	.001
	Own party internal dissent	.582	.090	.000
	Success x dissent	1.112	.149	.429
	Election cycle national	.557	.143	.022
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.601	.115	.008
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.955	.126	.727
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.121	.112	.253
	EU-support public	2.253	.661	.006
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.791	.052	.000
	EU-support	.972	.074	.706
	Extreme EU-position	.790	.032	.000
	constant	.101	.026	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x dissent		1.388	.321	.156
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.019	.176	.912
	Electoral success national	.644	.074	.000
	Own party internal dissent	.558	.092	.000
	Success x dissent	1.098	.140	.466
	Election cycle national	.887	.152	.484
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.558	.136	.017
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.370	.100	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.919	.082	.344
	EU-support public	1.012	.186	.947
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.813	.041	.000
	EU-support	1.082	.054	.117
	Extreme EU-positions	.797	.103	.080
	constant	.336	.109	.001
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x dissent		1.620	.613	.203
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.053		
N		9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... success x cycle</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		RRR	SE	sig.
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.117	.267	.643
	Electoral success national	.792	.087	.034
	Own party internal dissent	.561	.113	.004
	Success x dissent	1.219	.151	.109
	Election cycle national	.619	.145	.040
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.611	.181	.096
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.997	.120	.980
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.068	.094	.454
	EU-support public	2.092	.571	.007
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.763	.076	.006
	EU-support	.984	.087	.856
	Extreme EU-position	.794	.035	.000
	constant	.096	.027	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x cycle		1.248	.458	.547
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.015	.174	.933
	Electoral success national	.629	.114	.010
	Own party internal dissent	.575	.102	.002
	Success x dissent	1.443	.245	.030
	Election cycle national	1.002	.148	.991
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.871	.380	.752
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.390	.129	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.888	.077	.169
	EU-support public	.924	.160	.648
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.821	.083	.052
	EU-support	1.062	.057	.262
	Extreme EU-positions	.827	.087	.072
	constant	.344	.120	.002
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... success x cycle		.676	.351	.451
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.051		
N		9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-emphasis opp. Parties</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.181	.228	.390
	Electoral success national	.815	.103	.105
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.612	.110	.006
	Success x dissent	1.237	.101	.009
	Election cycle national	.657	.168	.102
	Success x cycle	.714	.112	.031
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.098	.170	.547
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.030	.106	.774
	EU-support public	1.907	.567	.030
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.803	.067	.009
	EU-support	.969	.076	.692
	Extreme EU-position	.870	.064	.056
	constant	.086	.021	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.821	.044	.000
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.930	.093	.465
	Electoral success national	.625	.095	.002
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.482	.095	.000
	Success x dissent	1.375	.182	.016
	Election cycle national	.940	.110	.597
	Success x cycle	.663	.089	.002
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.131	.105	.184
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.930	.062	.271
	EU-support public	1.066	.176	.696
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.773	.076	.008
	EU-support	1.091	.051	.065
	Extreme EU-positions	.682	.074	.000
	constant	.442	.125	.004
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.390	.119	.000
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.054		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact.with</b>	<b>... EU-support public</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.106	.231	.628
	Electoral success national	.789	.087	.032
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.590	.093	.001
	Success x dissent	1.259	.087	.001
	Election cycle national	.644	.155	.067
	Success x cycle	.723	.099	.018
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.968	.118	.791
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.139	.099	.132
	EU-support public	2.036	.568	.011
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.800	.056	.002
	EU-support	.967	.074	.662
	Extreme EU-position	.825	.032	.000
	constant	.098	.023	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.897	.058	.097
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.989	.154	.945
	Electoral success national	.662	.113	.015
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Own party internal dissent	.538	.109	.002
	Success x dissent	1.320	.175	.036
	Election cycle national	.991	.133	.945
	Success x cycle	.673	.109	.014
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.425	.119	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.840	.121	.227
	EU-support public	.934	.161	.691
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.790	.077	.016
	EU-support	1.084	.056	.119
	Extreme EU-positions	.785	.076	.012
	constant	.346	.107	.001
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	1.079	.135	.546
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.050		
	N	9100		

<b>Model 3 Government Parties vs. Challengers</b>		<b>Interact. with</b>	<b>... EU-support public</b>	
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>		<b>RRR</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>sig.</b>
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.297	.290	.245
	Electoral success national	.791	.092	.045
	Own party internal dissent	.565	.095	.001
	Success x dissent	1.267	.102	.003
	Election cycle national	.561	.140	.021
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.659	.101	.007
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.934	.130	.625
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.120	.112	.259
	EU-support public	2.516	.762	.002
	EU-salience media	.793	.068	.007
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	.975	.076	.749
	Extreme EU-position	.796	.031	.000
	constant	.097	.025	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		.801	.071	.013
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Party type <sup>a</sup>	.966	.178	.851
	Electoral success national	.657	.107	.010
	Own party internal dissent	.546	.106	.002
	Success x dissent	1.318	.163	.026
	Election cycle national	1.030	.131	.818
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	Success x cycle	.688	.113	.023
	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.429	.108	.000
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	.871	.057	.034
	EU-support public	.885	.191	.570
	EU-salience media	.799	.067	.007
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-support	1.080	.057	.146
	Extreme EU-positions	.798	.080	.025
	constant	.341	.104	.000
Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...				
... EU-support public		1.053	.204	.791
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		.050		
N		9100		

**Appendix 4E: Testing the stability of the effect directions**

The analysis in the paper relies on a data structure with press releases nested in parties, nested in countries. Due to the low number of cases on country and party level a multilevel model cannot be computed. To test the stability of the effect directions ols regression models on an aggregated (party level) dependent variable are calculated with std.err. clustered on country level. The effect directions remain stable.

Model 1	Government vs. Opposition	effects from paper	ols models for % of type of PR vs. EU not mentioned		
			Coeff	p	R <sup>2</sup>
	<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>				
	<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				.397
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	-	.013	.601	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.761 *	-.032	.106	
	Own party internal dissent	.570 ***	-.054	.133	
	Success x dissent	1.255 **	.026	.175	
	Election cycle national	.574 *	-.073	.187	
	Success x cycle	.678 **	-.043	.087	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	-	-.015	.578	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	-	.017	.322	
	EU-support public	2.276 *	.094	.172	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.776 **	-.027	.083	
	EU-support	-	.005	.474	
	Extreme EU-position	.799 ***	-.015	.116	
	constant	.100 ***	.064	.080	
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...</i>	... electoral success national	.521 **	-.020	.462	.401
	... internal EU-dissent	-	.052	.091	.450
	... success x dissent	4.802 *	.116	.273	.444
	... success x cycle	-	.014	.693	.399
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	-	-.003	.909	.397
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	-	.020	.604	.403
	... EU-support public	.620 ***	-.033	.001	.422
			Coeff	p	RSQ
	<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				.496
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	1.266 **	.063	.016	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.642 **	-.089	.022	
	Own party internal dissent	.529 **	-.124	.028	
	Success x dissent	1.296 *	.048	.146	
	Election cycle national	-	-.030	.527	
	Success x cycle	.649 ***	-.087	.027	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.364 ***	.056	.068	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	-	-.011	.678	
	EU-support public	-	.015	.792	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.810 *	-.045	.058	
	EU-support	-	.012	.375	
	Extreme EU-positions	.779 *	-.053	.059	
	constant	.356 **	.278	.013	
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...</i>	... electoral success national	-	.072	.491	.511
	... internal EU-dissent	-	.039	.520	.505
	... success x dissent	-	-.087	.721	.504
	... success x cycle	-	-.077	.486	.515
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	-	.037	.265	.505
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	-	-.029	.520	.500
	... EU-support public	-	-.027	.141	.501
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> Base Model	.051			
	N	9100	46		

11. Appendix 4E: Testing the stability of the effect directions

Model 2	Government vs. Established Opposition	effects from paper	ols models for % of type of PR vs. EU not mentioned		
			Coeff	p	R <sup>2</sup>
<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>					
<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>					.763
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.554 ***	.060	.242	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.365 ***	-.126	.038	
	Own party internal dissent	.459 ***	-.103	.001	
	Success x dissent	1.791 **	.104	.066	
	Election cycle national	.204 ***	-.191	.021	
	Success x cycle	.294 ***	-.163	.043	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	.825 *	-.023	.336	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.193 **	.016	.323	
	EU-support public	4.390 ***	.172	.017	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	-	-.027	.200	
	EU-support	.630 ***	-.040	.053	
	Extreme EU-position	-	-.048	.337	
	constant	.588	.349	.000	
	... electoral success national	-	.143	.024	.827
	... internal EU-dissent	-	.125	.049	.811
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...</i>	... success x dissent	-	-.161	.404	.787
	... success x cycle	.422 *	-.144	.071	.802
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	-	.010	.860	.765
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	-	-.018	.750	.766
	... EU-support public	-	.083	.006	.814
<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>					.871
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	2.564 ***	.157	.028	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.379 ***	-.197	.010	
	Own party internal dissent	.399 ***	-.172	.000	
	Success x dissent	2.135 *	.155	.084	
	Election cycle national	.208 ***	-.262	.008	
	Success x cycle	.227 ***	-.279	.016	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.182 ***	.046	.078	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	1.256 ***	.023	.201	
	EU-support public	3.066 ***	.182	.008	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	-	-.029	.317	
	EU-support	.702 ***	-.053	.055	
	Extreme EU-positions	-	-.008	.900	
	constant	1.199	.490	.000	
	... electoral success national	2.589 ***	.248	.005	.930
	... internal EU-dissent	-	.116	.338	.883
	... success x dissent	-	-.309	.184	.897
	... success x cycle	-	-.051	.783	.872
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.863 **	.011	.834	.871
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	.576 ***	-.090	.113	.894
	... EU-support public	-	.096	.168	.891
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> Base Model	.082			
	N	4890		23	

11. Appendix 4E: Testing the stability of the effect directions

Model 3	Established Parties vs. Challengers	effects from paper	ols models for % of type of PR vs. EU not mentioned		
			Coeff	p	R <sup>2</sup>
	<b>Baseline: EU not mentioned</b>				
	<b>Step I: EU mentioned min. twice</b>				.397
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	-	.011	.583	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.789 *	-.030	.143	
	Own party internal dissent	.577 **	-.054	.144	
	Success x dissent	1.267 **	.027	.165	
	Election cycle national	.616 *	-.069	.170	
	Success x cycle	.703 *	-.041	.110	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	-	-.014	.578	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	-	.016	.272	
	EU-support public	2.094 **	.089	.155	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.779 **	-.027	.078	
	EU-support	-	.005	.508	
	Extreme EU-position	.800 ***	-.016	.150	
	constant	.100 ***	.066	.080	
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...</i>	... electoral success national	-	-.011	.589	.398
	... internal EU-dissent	-	.011	.742	.399
	... success x dissent	-	.059	.063	.462
	... success x cycle	-	-.003	.927	.397
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	.821 ***	-.019	.151	.408
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	-	-.026	.025	.417
	... EU-support public	.801 *	-.013	.234	.401
				Coeff	p
	<b>Step II: Distinct EU-scope</b>				.478
	Party type <sup>a</sup>	-	.000	.990	
<i>Selected emphasis model</i>	Electoral success national	.659 *	-.079	.079	
	Own party internal dissent	.545 **	-.112	.046	
	Success x dissent	1.316 *	.051	.141	
	Election cycle national	-	-.011	.775	
	Success x cycle	.680 *	-.071	.115	
<i>Co-orientation model</i>	EU-emphasis opp. parties	1.413 ***	.064	.033	
	EU-emphasis gov. parties	-	-.020	.427	
	EU-support public	-	-.007	.891	
<i>Structural controls</i>	EU-salience media	.802 *	-.046	.058	
	EU-support	-	.015	.225	
	Extreme EU-positions	.799 *	-.045	.053	
	constant	.340 **	.267	.009	
<i>Effects of interactions with party type:gov. party x ...</i>	... electoral success national	-	.074	.375	.502
	... internal EU-dissent	-	-.031	.352	.484
	... success x dissent	-	.089	.305	.522
	... success x cycle	-	-.110	.313	.517
	... EU-emphasis opp. Parties	1.390 ***	.052	.027	.503
	... EU-emphasis gov. Parties	-	-.006	.822	.478
	... EU-support public	-	.004	.894	.478
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> Base Model	.050			
	N	9100	46		

11. Appendix 5A: Overview of EU issues in press releases and the media

**Appendix 5A: Overview of EU issues in press releases and the media**

<i>Issues (PRs and political actors in media articles)</i>	AT			FR			DE			GR			NL			PT			UK									
	<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>PR</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Total</i>					
Economy	145	99	244	21%	73	178	251	29%	63	94	157	17%	151	199	350	42%	31	55	86	14%	111	442	553	51%	22	23	45	8%
Social and Labor Market Policy	78	22	100	9%	11	9	20	2%	12	16	28	3%	51	28	79	9%	13	11	24	4%	47	81	128	12%	13	9	22	4%
Education and Research	11	4	15	1%	0	3	3	0%	5	2	7	1%	5	2	7	1%	0	6	6	1%	3	30	33	3%	3	1	4	1%
Law and Order	46	31	77	7%	7	17	24	3%	24	52	76	8%	2	3	5	1%	11	31	42	7%	3	30	33	3%	7	18	25	4%
Immigration	32	31	63	5%	7	56	63	7%	17	26	43	5%	8	26	34	4%	7	35	42	7%	2	22	24	2%	24	46	70	12%
International Affairs	56	172	228	20%	11	241	252	29%	50	295	345	37%	21	105	126	15%	12	120	132	22%	1	110	111	10%	23	97	120	21%
Culture and Other	25	3	28	2%	2	6	8	1%	5	9	14	2%	10	5	15	2%	2	5	7	1%	5	9	14	1%	1	2	3	1%
Environment and Energy	60	21	81	7%	8	9	17	2%	17	25	42	5%	16	24	40	5%	13	22	35	6%	7	12	19	2%	12	17	29	5%
Infrastructure	26	7	33	3%	1	4	5	1%	7	13	20	2%	3	5	8	1%	8	16	24	4%	5	12	17	2%	5	1	6	1%
Agriculture and Food	40	12	52	4%	3	11	14	2%	10	14	24	3%	6	2	8	1%	16	6	22	4%	13	14	27	3%	2	9	11	2%
Consumer Protection	29	0	29	3%	0	2	2	0%	9	6	15	2%	1	0	1	0%	4	1	5	1%	-	-	-	-	1	4	5	1%
Citizens' Rights	59	15	74	6%	7	6	13	2%	26	11	37	4%	21	10	31	4%	17	18	35	6%	0	22	22	2%	7	12	19	3%
Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU	29	25	54	5%	19	94	113	13%	5	51	56	6%	18	29	47	6%	12	74	86	14%	3	81	84	8%	12	41	53	9%
Territorial Questions	20	34	54	5%	2	34	36	4%	7	52	59	6%	6	15	21	3%	2	27	29	5%	0	8	8	1%	58	83	141	25%
Administration and Bureaucracy (Corruption)	17	11	28	2%	6	29	35	4%	0	9	9	1%	12	53	65	8%	8	18	26	4%	4	3	7	1%	3	5	8	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>673</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>1.160</b>		<b>157</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>856</b>		<b>257</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>932</b>		<b>331</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>837</b>		<b>156</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>601</b>		<b>204</b>	<b>876</b>	<b>1.080</b>		<b>193</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>561</b>	

Source: Own data.

**Appendix 5B: Descriptive statistics of EU issue salience in the party and media agenda**

	AT	FR	DE	GR	NL	PT	UK
<b>Press releases (N)</b>	673	157	257	331	156	204	193
Mean (SD)	8.0 (6.5)	1.9 (2.2)	3.1 (2.9)	3.9 (3.1)	1.9 (1.9)	2.4 (2.3)	2.4 (2.1)
Minimum, Maximum	[0, 28]	[0, 10]	[0, 13]	[0, 18]	[0, 11]	[0, 11]	[0, 8]
<b>Political actors in media (N)</b>	487	699	675	506	445	876	368
Mean (SD)	5.8 (4.9)	8.3 (6.8)	8.0 (6.3)	6.0 (5.9)	5.5 (4.4)	10.4 (6.9)	4.5 (3.9)
Minimum, Maximum	[0, 18]	[0, 25]	[0, 27]	[0, 25]	[0, 16]	[0, 32]	[0, 14]

Source: Own data.

**Appendix 5C. Test statistics regarding the identification of lag structure and main assumptions, such as stationarity, stability, and residual autocorrelation**

County	Identification of lag structure			Test of stationarity and stability <sup>b</sup>			resid autocorr <sup>b</sup>
	Lag	AIC	HQIC	ADF PRs	ADF media	Eigenvalues inside unit circle	Lagrange-multiplier test
Austria	2	12.223*	12.343*	-6.392	-6.331	yes	3.697
France	1	10.763*	10.835*	-6.435	-4.914	yes	6.429
Germany	1	11.276*	11.350*	-5.551	-6.586	yes	3.706
Germany (maxlag 14)	3	10.870*	11.072*	-5.452	-4.742	yes	6.460
Greece	1	11.354*	11.426*	-5.856	-5.491	yes	5.302
Netherlands	1	9.942*	10.015	-5.845	-5.589	yes	1.834
Portugal	1	11.093*	11.165*	-4.030	-5.387	yes	3.599
UK	1	9.589*	9.662*	-4.305	-5.923	yes	5.295

Notes: \*\*\*=p<.001. \*\*=p<.01. \*=p<.05;


<sup>a</sup> ADF tests and Lagrange-multiplier tests indicate stationarity, non-unit-root, and no residual autocorrelation by confirming the null hypothesis (i.e., not being significant)

Reading example for Austria: Two days are needed for changes in one variable to be reflected in the other, whereas AIC and HQIC are both significant at p<.05. ADF and Lagrange tests (testing the remaining autocorrelation) are non-significant; stationarity and stability are given. Eigenvalues inside the unit circle indicate non-unit-root, i.e., stability.

Source: Own data.

**Appendix 5D: CIRF figures on the interdependencies between the party and media agenda**

**Cumulative impulse response functions (CIRFs)**



Source: Own data.



**Appendix 6A: Data sources, search string, and parties included in the analysis**

*List for electronic EU search string used by coders to preselect relevant articles and press releases*

The search string contains the following key words/word components in the respective languages: “Europ\*, europ\*, EU, EP, EC, ECB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, ECJ, EEAS, EESC, EIF, EDPS, EMU, Troika, troika, Frontex, FRONTEX, constitutional treaty”

*Note:* Coders have been instructed not to automatically code every article or press release but to sort out articles or press releases which are about Europe as a geographic unit or Brussels, the capital of Belgium, and only consider articles and press releases that deal with European actors, policies, politics, or politics (e.g., European elections, European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, etc.).

*Parties included in the analysis*

- Austria:* Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (**FPÖ**), Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (**BZÖ**), Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (**SPÖ**), Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (**NEOS**), Die Grünen, Österreichische Volkspartei (**ÖVP**);
- France:* Front National (**FN**), Front de Gauche and Parti Communiste (**FG**), Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (**UMP**), Parti Socialiste (**PS**), Europe Ecologie - Les Verts (**Verts**), Mouvement Démocrate (**MoDem**);
- Germany:* Alternative für Deutschland (**AfD**), Die Linke, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (**CDU-CSU**), Freie Demokratische Partei (**FDP**), Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (**Grünen**), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (**SPD**);
- Greece:* Golden Dawn (**XA**), Communist Party of Greece (**KKE**), Independent Greeks (**ANEL**), Popular Orthodox Rally (**LAOS**), **Syriza**, Oikologoi Prasinoi (**OP**), Democratic Left (**DIMAR**), Nea Dimokratia (**ND**), Panhellenic Socialist Movement (**PASOK**);
- Netherlands:* Partij voor de Vrijheid (**PVV**), Socialistiese Partij (**SP**), ChristenUnie - Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (**CU/SPG**), Partij voor de Dieren (**PvdD**), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (**VVD**), Partij van de Arbeid (**PvdA**), Christen Democratisch Appèl (**CDA**), GroenLinks, Democraten 66 (**D66**);
- Portugal:* Coligação Democrática Unitária (**CDU-PCP**), Bloco de Esquerda (**BE**), Partido Socialista (**PS**), Aliança Portugal (**AP**), including Partido Popular and Partido Social Democrata;
- UK:* UK Independence Party (**UKIP**), British National Party (**BNP**), Conservatives (**Cons**), The Green Party (**Greens**), Labour (**Lab**), Liberal Democrats (**LibDem**).

*Newspaper sample*

- AT: Der Standard (L); Die Presse (R)  
FR: Le Monde (L); Le Figaro (R)  
DE: Süddeutsche Zeitung (L); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (R)  
GR: Efimerida ton Syntakton (L); I Kathimerini (R)  
NL: de Volkskrant (L); NRC Handelsblad (R)  
PT: Público (L); Diario de Noticias (R)  
UK: Guardian (L); Daily Telegraph (R)  
*L = left-leaning; R = right-leaning*

**Appendix 6B: Descriptive statistics**

	# of active actors	# of press releases	thereof: EU-negative <sup>1</sup>	thereof: EU-sceptic	thereof: EU-critical	2014 CHES	Government participation
<b>FPÖ(at)</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>0</b>
BZÖ(at)	11	93	53	9	49	2.7	0
SPÖ(at)	25	362	91	2	89	6.0	1
NEOS(at)	9	20	6	0	6	6.3	0
Grünen(at)	12	106	35	0	35	6.5	0
ÖVP(at)	25	218	23	0	23	6.7	1
<b>FN(fr)</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0</b>
FG(fr)	9	69	41	4	40	2.4	0
UMP(fr)	66	7	0	0	0	5.4	0
PS(fr)	44	16	1	0	1	5.8	1
Verts(fr)	16	8	1	0	1	6.2	0
MoDem(fr)	15	11	3	0	3	6.6	0
<b>AfD(de)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>0</b>
Die Linke(de)	3	60	37	0	37	3.0	0
CDU-CSU(de)	47	53	7	2	5	5.6	1
FDP(de)	2	28	3	0	3	5.7	0
Grünen(de)	13	56	16	0	16	6.2	0
SPD(de)	19	78	7	0	7	6.4	1
<b>KKE(gr)</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>XA(gr)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0</b>
ANEL(gr)	9	61	19	2	19	2.2	0
LAOS(gr)	0	37	11	2	9	3.3	0
Syriza(gr)	70	144	48	3	47	3.4	0
OP(gr)	3	33	8	1	8	5.6	0
DIMAR(gr)	13	36	12	1	12	5.8	0
ND(gr)	26	45	2	1	1	6.6	1
PASOK(gr)	28	64	6	1	5	6.6	1
<b>PVV(nl)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0</b>
SP(nl)	3	32	25	2	25	2.1	0
CU/SGP(nl)	4	22	13	1	13	3.0	0
PvdD(nl)	2	20	10	0	10	3.7	0
VVD(nl)	7	8	3	0	3	5.2	1
PvdA(nl)	12	20	7	0	7	5.5	1
CDA(nl)	2	23	10	0	10	5.5	0
GroenLinks(nl)	9	26	8	0	8	6.5	0
D66(nl)	7	21	8	0	8	6.8	0
<b>CDU-PCP(pt)</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>0</b>
BE(pt)	38	60	26	0	26	3.1	0
PS(pt)	119	121	33	0	33	6.4	0
AP(pt)	119	76	20	1	20	6.5	1
<b>UKIP(uk)</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>BNP(uk)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0</b>
Cons(uk)	16	6	0	0	0	3.1	1
Green(uk)	1	30	6	0	6	5.2	0
Lab(uk)	11	28	13	2	13	5.6	0
LibDem(uk)	13	53	5	0	5	6.7	1
<i>Reliability scores</i>							
Krippendorff's alpha	0.726	0.892	-	0.551	0.576	-	-
Holsti's R	0.777	0.920	-	0.874	0.778	-	-

*Comment:* <sup>1</sup>Note numbers do not sum up as a press release can contain both an EU-sceptic and EU-critical evaluation but only counts once as EU-negative press release.

*Source:* Own data and CHES 2014.

**Appendix 7A: Overview of issue ranks (intended as supplementary material)**

Type	Issue	Rank of Issue in MC											
		Distance to election: calendar week:	12 w41	11 w42	10 w43	9 w44	8 w45	7 w46	6 w47	5 w48	4 w49	3 w50	2 w51
All EU	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)	6	10	11	12	7	10	9	7	11	11	7	6
	Agriculture and Food	15	5	14	10	10	10	15	14	13	14	11	10
	Citizens' Rights	7	7	9	8	14	12	11	10	12	15	9	8
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU	5	3	5	5	3	5	3	4	3	3	4	1
	Consumer Protection	15	13	15	15	15	15	13	15	15	14	13	15
	Culture and Other	13	12	13	15	14	14	13	13	11	12	12	11
	Economy	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2
	Education and Research	11	15	11	15	12	13	15	13	11	8	14	13
	Environment and Energy	9	6	4	5	9	11	7	10	8	9	10	13
	Immigration	3	11	7	7	4	7	7	5	4	7	3	3
	Infrastructure	12	15	12	12	5	8	9	11	15	11	15	14
	International Affairs	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	4
Law and Order	10	9	4	7	12	3	11	8	6	6	5	10	
Social and Labor Market Policy	4	8	8	9	6	6	4	6	7	5	8	7	
Territorial Questions	9	4	6	3	8	4	5	3	5	4	6	5	
Non-Parallel	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)	10	15	12	15	9	12	15	15	15	14	13	12
	Agriculture and Food	15	6	14	15	15	6	15	10	15	13	9	10
	Citizens' Rights	6	5	11	7	10	15	12	15	10	15	10	5
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU	5	4	5	4	6	10	3	3	4	3	5	2
	Consumer Protection	15	13	15	15	15	15	8	15	15	10	13	15
	Culture and Other	15	10	14	15	15	15	12	10	7	13	11	15
	Economy	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
	Education and Research	11	15	7	15	15	12	12	8	9	7	14	10
	Environment and Energy	8	11	8	5	6	9	8	11	15	8	8	11
	Immigration	3	9	9	8	6	9	12	6	8	9	4	3
	Infrastructure	15	13	11	10	3	7	15	15	15	13	15	13
	International Affairs	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	7
Law and Order	9	8	3	9	15	3	6	7	5	7	3	10	
Social and Labor Market Policy	5	8	6	7	7	5	4	5	7	4	7	6	
Territorial Questions	8	3	5	3	8	4	5	5	4	5	6	4	
Parallel	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)	3	8	9	10	5	8	6	5	8	9	5	5
	Agriculture and Food	15	5	15	8	8	15	13	15	11	14	12	11
	Citizens' Rights	7	10	6	10	15	9	8	7	12	13	8	9
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU	5	3	7	7	3	4	3	6	3	3	4	1
	Consumer Protection	15	12	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	13	15
	Culture and Other	13	15	13	15	13	12	11	12	15	13	12	8
	Economy	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2
	Education and Research	12	12	13	15	11	15	15	15	11	9	15	15
	Environment and Energy	9	4	3	3	13	11	7	10	5	11	12	12
	Immigration	10	15	4	7	5	8	6	5	4	5	3	3
	Infrastructure	12	15	13	15	9	10	6	10	15	11	15	15
	International Affairs	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	4
Law and Order	7	10	6	5	11	3	13	11	9	6	7	11	
Social and Labor Market Policy	4	7	10	15	6	8	10	8	7	9	9	7	
Territorial Questions	9	6	9	5	8	5	10	3	8	4	6	6	

Type	Issue	Distance to election: calendar week:	Rank of Issue in PR											
			12 w41	11 w42	10 w43	9 w44	8 w45	7 w46	6 w47	5 w48	4 w49	3 w50	2 w51	1 w52
All EU	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)		13	13	9	15	14	13	5	14	15	10	14	15
	Agriculture and Food		10	6	5	6	14	9	9	7	13	8	7	6
	Citizens' Rights		3	8	8	10	9	6	12	11	6	3	3	6
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU		5	11	5	13	11	6	12	7	3	5	10	8
	Consumer Protection		15	13	14	13	7	15	8	15	9	14	14	15
	Culture and Other		12	15	11	13	14	10	13	4	14	12	14	11
	Economy		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Education and Research		11	14	15	15	15	15	15	11	13	15	14	15
	Environment and Energy		10	5	11	9	2	3	2	3	5	8	6	8
	Immigration		7	9	8	5	10	12	7	14	8	6	4	3
	Infrastructure		15	11	14	7	4	12	6	12	13	14	15	15
	International Affairs		2	4	2	3	3	7	5	7	5	12	10	4
	Law and Order		7	3	12	9	9	2	12	9	13	10	5	11
Social and Labor Market Policy		4	2	3	2	7	6	3	2	2	2	3	2	
Territorial Questions		10	7	8	4	7	9	15	9	7	4	10	9	
Non-Parallel	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)		12	15	15	15	15	15	5	15	15	13	13	15
	Agriculture and Food		15	15	12	9	12	7	15	7	11	5	6	9
	Citizens' Rights		3	6	5	5	15	9	15	15	4	9	6	7
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU		9	9	12	15	12	7	11	11	11	7	14	9
	Consumer Protection		15	15	5	15	6	15	11	15	15	15	13	14
	Culture and Other		9	15	12	15	12	15	15	4	15	13	15	14
	Economy		2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Education and Research		12	15	15	15	15	15	11	10	7	13	13	14
	Environment and Energy		12	8	12	9	4	4	5	10	6	7	8	6
	Immigration		9	5	12	4	12	10	7	15	11	4	3	3
	Infrastructure		15	15	15	15	6	9	7	10	6	13	13	14
	International Affairs		1	4	2	3	3	3	5	7	11	9	9	5
	Law and Order		5	8	12	9	12	2	5	7	15	15	6	14
Social and Labor Market Policy		9	3	12	9	7	15	11	2	2	3	2	2	
Territorial Questions		5	3	3	2	2	7	15	4	3	3	8	4	
Parallel	Administration and Bureaucracy (corruption)		13	13	7	15	11	13	5	12	14	8	14	11
	Agriculture and Food		6	3	5	5	13	11	9	8	12	11	11	3
	Citizens' Rights		3	9	8	15	4	5	10	8	6	2	2	5
	Constitutional Questions and Functioning of EU		6	9	5	12	10	6	11	4	3	4	5	5
	Consumer Protection		15	13	14	12	9	15	9	15	8	13	14	14
	Culture and Other		13	15	10	12	13	7	13	8	12	11	9	9
	Economy		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Education and Research		10	14	15	15	15	15	15	12	14	15	14	14
	Environment and Energy		8	5	10	9	2	3	3	3	5	8	5	9
	Immigration		8	13	7	9	9	11	9	12	8	11	7	11
	Infrastructure		15	7	12	5	4	13	6	15	15	14	15	14
	International Affairs		2	6	2	5	7	8	5	8	4	12	9	9
	Law and Order		10	2	12	9	7	5	12	12	10	5	7	9
Social and Labor Market Policy		4	5	3	2	7	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	
Territorial Questions		11	13	13	9	14	11	14	15	10	8	11	15	

Source: own data

**Appendix 7B: Means of cross-lagged effects (path a,b,c,d) (intended as supplementary material)**

Delay (Models est.)		All 7 Countries		Non-Parallel		Parallel	
		Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead	Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead	Mean Effects	% Agenda Lead
1 Week (11)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.672		.543		.671	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.237</b>	<b>63.6</b>	<b>.361</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>.111</b>	<b>36.4</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.200</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>.254</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>.176</b>	<b>63.6</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.490		.360		.574	
2 Weeks (10)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.692		.517		.647	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.339</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.345</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>.167</b>	<b>3.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.208</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.244</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>.216</b>	<b>7.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.439		.338		.594	
3 Weeks (9)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.693		.577		.635	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.258</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>.302</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>.133</b>	<b>55.6</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.118</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>.163</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>.119</b>	<b>44.4</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.386		.260		.532	
4 Weeks (8)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.750		.618		.676	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.266</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>.421</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>.201</b>	<b>75.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.056</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>.058</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.116</b>	<b>25.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.397		.085		.487	
5 Weeks (7)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.692		.441		.763	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.177</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>.275</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>.161</b>	<b>85.7</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.099</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>.242</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>14.3</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.460		.225		.547	
6 Weeks (6)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.725		.490		.649	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.381</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>.374</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>.260</b>	<b>83.3</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.058</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.207</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.103</b>	<b>16.7</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.271		.129		.398	
7 Week (5)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.790		.591		.719	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.211</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>.014</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>.312</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>-0.10</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>.158</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>.020</b>	<b>0.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.471		.526		.362	
8 Weeks (4)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.574		.347		.532	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.332</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.324</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.262</b>	<b>75.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.228</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.453</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.185</b>	<b>25.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.492		.321		.436	
9 Weeks (3)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.509		.548		.536	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.070</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.342</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>.149</b>	<b>66.7</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.311</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>.206</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>.184</b>	<b>33.3</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.794		.302		.547	
10 Weeks (2)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.698		.379		.677	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.065</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.310</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.147</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.051</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>.426</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>-0.074</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.782		.405		.629	
11 Weeks (1)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.684		.785		.611	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.011</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.883</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>-0.086</b>	<b>0.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.177</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>.194</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.910		-.112		.838	
Overall (66)	News t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	.691		.528		.659	
	News t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.253</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>.327</b>	<b>69.4</b>	<b>.177</b>	<b>59.8</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → News t <sub>2</sub>	<b>.135</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>.215</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>.123</b>	<b>40.2</b>
	PR t <sub>1</sub> → PR t <sub>2</sub>	.462		.276		.522	

Source: Own data, 66 models calculated for all countries, parallel, and non-parallel (N=198 models). Mean of posterior effects (path a,b,c,d, see also Fig.4) are presented.

In bold: means of cross-lagged effects (MC on PR and PR on MC) per delay and percentage of models in which either PR or MC have shown a higher influence based on the number of models calculated.

In the overall block combined results for all models and mean of lead percentages in the respective column above are presented.

## Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich eidesstattlich, dass ich, Andreas Severin Jansen (geb. Bathelt),

- die Dissertation selbst angefertigt habe und alle Hilfsmittel in der Dissertation angegeben habe,
- dass die Dissertation noch nicht als Prüfungsarbeit für eine staatliche oder andere wissenschaftliche Prüfung eingereicht wurde und
- die gleiche oder eine andere Abhandlung nicht bei einer anderen Hochschule als Dissertation eingereicht habe.

Das Manuskript "*Agenda-Setting or Agenda-Building? Inferring knowledge from the 2014 EP election campaign via Bayesian cross-lagged-panel methods*" (*Analyse IV*) wurde von mir in Alleinautorenschaft konzipiert und erstellt. Das bedeutet: alle Daten wurden von mir ausgewertet. Das Manuskript befindet sich derzeit im Review-Prozess bei *Electoral Studies*.

Bei gemeinsam verfassten Publikationen habe ich folgende individuelle Beiträge erbracht:

*Analyse I* (eingereicht und im Review-Prozess bei *Political Communication*, wurde im Review Prozess abgelehnt, eine aktualisierte Version wird zur Einreichung bei *Western European Politics* vorbereitet):

Maier, M., Jalali, C., Jansen A. S., Leidecker-Sandmann, M., Eugster, B., Adam, S. & Negrine, R.. When Do European Election Campaigns Become About Europe? An Analysis of Parties' Communications in the Run-up to the 2014 EP Elections.

- Datenaufbereitung
- Prüfung der statistischen Analyse, Fehlerbereinigung und Robustnesschecks
- Finalisierung der Ergebnisdarstellung
- Korrektur und kritische Durchsicht

*Analyse II* (publiziert, Erstautorenschaft):

Jansen, A. S., Eugster, B., Maier, M. & Adam, S. (2019). Who Drives the Agenda: Media or Parties? A Seven-Country Comparison in the Run-Up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 7(3), 34-54.

- Konzeptualisierung, Theorieaufbereitung und Verschriftlichung des Manuskripts
- Konzeptualisierung der Daten und Methode
- Datenaufbereitung
- Ergebnisdarstellung
- Korrektur und kritische Durchsicht
- Einreichung, Überarbeitung für Resubmit, Resubmit und Finalisierung.

*Analyse III* (eingereicht und im Review-Prozess bei *Political Communication*, wurde im Review Prozess abgelehnt, derzeit eingereicht bei *European Journal of Communication*):

Eugster, B., Adam, S., Jansen, A. S. & Maier, M.. Does Negativity about Europe Push Parties on the Media Agenda? A Seven-Country Comparison on Parties' Influence on the Media Agenda in the Up-Run to the 2014 European Parliament Elections.

- Konzeptualisierung von Teilen des Manuskripts (Kapitel 'Introduction', 'Drivers of party visibility in the media – the role of negative party communication', 'Type of party conflict as a conditional factor of negative party communication')
- Theorieaufbereitung
- Konzeptualisierung der Datenaufbereitung, Analyse und Ergebnisdarstellung
- Korrektur und kritische Durchsicht

Stuttgart, den 27.06.2019

Andreas Severin Jansen

# Lebenslauf

Andreas Severin Jansen (geb. Bathelt)

**Geburtsdatum** 28.05.1981 in Stuttgart

**Anschrift**

**Kontakt**

## Studium

10/2008 | **Magister Artium an der Universität Stuttgart (2,0)**

09/2002 - | **Magisterstudium, Universität Stuttgart**

09/2008 | Hauptfächer: Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie

09/2001 - | **Diplomstudium, Universität Stuttgart**

09/2002 | Technologiemanagement

## Berufliche Tätigkeiten

seit 03/2019 | **Lehrbeauftragter an der Hochschule der Medien Stuttgart**  
Fakultät Electronic Media, BA-Studiengang Werbung und Marktkommunikation

08/2016 - | **Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Koblenz-Landau**  
09/2018 | Institut für Kommunikationspsychologie und Medienpädagogik, Abteilung angewandte Kommunikationspsychologie

09/2015 - | **Evaluationsbeauftragter der Hochschule Ludwigshafen**  
09/2016 | Stabsstelle Studium und Lehre, Bereich Qualitätsmanagement

01/2015 - | **Freier Mitarbeiter an der Universität Koblenz-Landau**  
08/2015 | im Projekt „Zeile: Zeitunglesen macht Azubis fit“

04/2010 - | **Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Koblenz-Landau**  
12/2014 | Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Abteilung Politikwissenschaft

12/2008 - | **Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Technischen Universität Kaiserslautern**  
03/2010 | Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften

03/2006 - | **Tutor für sozialwissenschaftliche Methodik an der Universität Stuttgart**  
08/2008 | an den Lehrstühlen für Politische Theorie und Empirische Demokratieforschung sowie Internationale Beziehungen und Europäische Integration

08/2000 - | **Zivildienst beim Arbeiter Samariter Bund, Esslingen**  
04/2001

## Schulbildung

08/1991 - | **Albertus-Magnus-Gymnasium, Stuttgart**  
06/2000 | Abschluss: Allgemeine Hochschulreife (2,5)

## Publikationen und Vorträge



- Jansen, A. S., Eugster, B., Maier, M. & Adam, S. (2019). Who Drives the Agenda: Media or Parties? A Seven-Country Comparison in the Run-Up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 7(3), 34-54.
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