

Culture and Violence: Psycho-cultural Variables Involved in Homicide across Nations

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*To my brother and true friend Iraj,
whose benevolence knows no bounds.*

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Abstract

The basic assumption of this study is that specific cultural conditions may lead to psychopathological reactions through which an increase in interpersonal violence may happen.

The objective of this study was to define to what extent homicide rates across national cultures might be associated with the strength of their attitudes toward specific beliefs and values, and their scores in specific cultural dimensions. To answer this question, nine independent variables were defined six of which were related to the people's attitudes pertaining importance of religion (Religiosity), excessive feeling of choice and control (Omnipotence), clear-cut distinction between good and evil (Absolutism), proud of their nationality (Nationalism), approval of competition (Competitiveness), and high respect for authorities and emphasis on obedience (Authoritarianism). The data for these variables were collected from World Values Survey. For two cultural dimensions, Collectivism, and Power Distance, Hofstede's scores were used. The 9th variable was GNI per capita. After estimation of 7% missing values in the whole data through multiple imputation, a sample of 81 nations was used for further statistical analyses.

Results: Stepwise regression analysis indicated Omnipotence and GNI as the strongest predictors of homicide ($\beta=.44$ $P=.000$; $\beta= -.27$ $P=.006$ respectively). The 9 independent variables were loaded on two factors, socio-economic development (SED) and psycho-cultural factor (Psy-Cul), which were negatively correlated (-.47). The Psy-Cul was interpreted as an indicator of narcissism, and a mediator between SED and homicide. Hierarchical cluster analysis made a clear distinction among three main groups of Western, Developing, and post-Communist nations on the basis of the two factors.

Introduction

*The world is made a hell usually
by those who promise a paradise!*

Human history depicts a gloomy portrait of captivity, torture, humiliation, exploitation, destruction and bloodshed of man by man. The story of mankind symbolically began with a fratricide, and continued the same way. The third millennium dawned with a horrific event, which would promise the escalation of a new wave of ensuing violent retaliations. The Twenty first Century, though may have realized some of our earlier science fiction dreams via its technological and communicative breakthroughs, in human relations however, it has not brought about any tangible signs of progress; rather by reverse, signs of decadence are not hard to find. Astonishingly, still in some parts of the world, myths of superstition and hatred, who in the vision of the Age of Enlightenment pioneers were going to fade in an eternal oblivion, now, in spite of the expansion of modern technology to the four corners of the Earth, from within their cold tombs issue orders of destruction to the living. Zest for annihilation is sometimes so overwhelming that one may sacrifice his own life, not to save someone else, but to deprive him from his natural right to live. A glance over many man made catastrophes within the very recent decades does not give an optimistic perspective of human relations, and

entangles us in a complicated hard-to-solve problem. With a rough estimation, within the recent century only, more than 100 million people have been killed due to international, civil, and interethnic wars, which were mostly waged by governments. The universality of human aggression almost in all times and places may connote an intrinsic propensity to aggressiveness in the human race, and provide documentary support for those who tend to find the roots of evil in human nature. However, drastic differences among human societies in the occurrence of interpersonal or interethnic struggles, suggest that the social interactions and experiences also have an important role and that such concepts as human nature which are sometimes used vaguely, at least are not sufficient (if not inefficient) to clarify the nature and dynamics of human aggression.

Why violence? The above lines indicate that why I have chosen to write on violence; while human society, somewhere more and somewhere less, is still suffering from an archaic persistent problem which due to its negative effects on social life, require serious attention. Of course violence is a vast topic and this study deals only with one form of violence that is, with homicide in an interpersonal level.

Why culture? Looking at the considerable variation in the incidence and prevalence of homicide across nations indicates that homicide rates does not follow a random pattern in the world that is, some nations (e.g. in Latin America, and Africa) show a more or less constant pattern of high homicide rate in the course of years and decades, and some other nations, by reverse, have constantly shown much lower cases of such bloody crimes. This constancy in tendency toward violence and nonviolence implies that there must be some underlying sustaining factors within any given society which to a great extent guarantee a more or less stability in behavior (including violent behavior) across time. Then if specific

patterns of violence occur in generation after generation within a society, those underlying factors should be recognized as responsible for the cycle of violence reproduction. Such behavioral patterns which show great variations across nations and at the same time tend to remain stable within a society, can be reflective of what we usually call culture.

Cultures provide frameworks for thought and judgment and norms for behavior, and therefore can be one of the important determinants of human conduct. However, the cultural approach is only one of several theoretical fields and disciplines which have been proposed to explain human aggression. As the sources of variability in human behavior are various, then it seems that the ideal theorization on this topic should eventually take all the findings of different disciplines and unify and integrate them in a multidisciplinary explanation.

So a main goal of this study is to determine how interpersonal violence (homicide) might be associated with and explained in terms of psycho cultural characteristics of a society. Or more concretely, it can be asked that whether such macro-societal variables as extreme religious and ideological devotion, competitive mentality, nationalism, collectivism vs. individualism, attitudes toward power and authority and their concomitant feelings of superiority, which have undoubtedly impacts on intergroup dynamics, can also predict a phenomenon (homicide) which occurs in interpersonal level? This question directs our attention to the relationship between group-defined norms and individual behavior.

The purpose of this study is therefore to build a bridge between man and society, or more specifically between interpersonal violence and cultural values and dimensions. But of course the psycho cultural variables which have been

studied here are related to only a few number of these values and dimensions. The study will deal with one dependent and nine independent variables.

This dissertation is comprised of five chapters. Chapter One will pay attention to some of the most influential currents in the study of aggression; but due to the huge amount of both theoretical and experimental analyses in this field, it is not possible to refer to many of these works; however four main theoretical currents will be reviewed including Psychoanalysis mainly focusing on Sigmund Freud and Erich Fromm, Ethology and sociobiology, Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation theory, and finally the Social Learning Theory. In Chapter Two, some general ideas about the nature as well as the evolution of culture will be discussed, with an emphasis on the influence of culture on human personality and behavior, and introducing some theoretical efforts to understand cultural dimensions and classification of cultures. In Chapter Three the fifth major trend in the study of violence (after the aforementioned four major theories in Chapter one) which takes the cultural standpoint into account will be reviewed; it will also introduce the following nine hypotheses:

- (1) Nationalism is positively correlated with homicide.*
- (2) Absolutism is positively correlated with homicide.*
- (3) Highly religious societies have higher rates of homicide.*
- (4) Omnipotence is positively correlated with homicide.*
- (5) Cultures with higher authoritarian tendencies have higher homicide rates.*
- (6) Collectivist cultures have higher rates of homicide than individualist cultures.*
- (7) The cultures that tend to competition suffer from higher homicide rates.*
- (8) Power Distance is positively correlated with homicide rate.*
- (9) Poor nations suffer from higher homicide rates.*

In Chapter Four the research methodology including the data gathering process, missing values and increase of sample size through multiple imputation, as well as statistical analyses and the results of testing the nine mentioned hypotheses will be presented.

And finally in the Chapter Five, findings of the study will be discussed and put in a theoretical framework to give a clearer idea about the interrelations amongst the variables and the way they may be interpreted to develop a sensible understanding of the cultural determinants of violence.

Chapter One:

Theoretical Approaches to Human Aggressiveness

In this chapter some of the influential thought currents in the field of aggression are discussed. The scope of theories and experimental efforts are obviously much broader than this brief review. However up to now a great deal of scholarly attention has been given to the theories outlined below. In a broader perspective, these theories can be divided on the basis of their focus on either inborn innate proclivity for aggressive behavior, or the social determinants of aggression. I begin with the psychoanalysis.

1.1 Psychoanalysis and aggression:

Tracing back the origins of violent behavior in the human society, some thinkers have mainly emphasized on the instinctual determinants of behavior. Psychoanalytic conception of the human aggression has been one of the mainstreams of theorization, which ascribes similar motives to mankind regardless of the apparent variation in social formations. Psychoanalysis is both a psychotherapeutic school - introduced by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), which is well-known for its methods of free association, interpretation of resistance, and transference - and a general theory of human psychic development, motivation

and behavior, and in this latter application it doesn't remain confined to the boundaries of morbidity; instead, it steps in other domains of human thought and life, e.g. in literature, politics, art, etc. Although psychoanalysis is intertwined with Freud's name, but psychoanalysts, even some of Freud's contemporaries who were also among outstanding figures of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, namely Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, did not remain loyal to the orthodox Freudian doctrine. They criticized Freud and created their own models. The Adlerian *Individual Psychology*, the Jungian *Analytical Psychology*, and the schools of social psychoanalysis which emerged later, were sometimes much different from what Freud intended of psychoanalysis. Though I should add that, revision in early psychoanalysis was also started by Freud himself. Being aware of this fact that now psychoanalysis is not summarized in its Freudian account, however in giving an outline of the psychoanalytic approach to aggression I will have to mainly refer to Freud, while his theory of aggression not only has attracted lots of attention and debates, but also it typifies how a *psychoanalytic* approach to aggression should look like. Then a summary of Erich Fromm's ideas on human aggression, as a representative of the left wing psychoanalysis will be reviewed.

1.1.1 Sigmund Freud: Aggression as instinct

While, in the early theory of Freud aggression does not occupy an important place, however later, it gets a central place in Freud's theory. Many writers (e.g. Zillmann 1979; Hartman 1999) relate this to the occurrence of the World War I and its aftermaths which might have at least partly persuaded Freud to propose a reformulation in his earlier inference of aggressive impulses – a new approach which has undoubtedly been influential in man's understanding of himself. While propounding the idea of “pleasure principle”, Freud construed aggression as a

reaction to dissatisfaction or suppression of libidinal desires. In his earlier theory, he asserts that human behavior is directed by those instinctive drives known as libido, which get their energy from the Eros, or the life instinct. The repression of such libidinal desires is represented as aggression. We might consider the Freudian concept of Oedipus Complex as a leading example of the childhood aggression. A boy in the age of about five, develops a strong sexual desire toward his mother, as the main love object and the source of protection and hence he seeks for getting the full attention of his mother and a close intimacy with her. This desire causes a feeling of competition with his father, as a serious rival, and leads to a hostile rejection and aggression toward him. Then an internal conflict ensues and the son feels guilty about how he wishes to get rid of his father who is viewed as a nuisance. The father as a powerful figure who might severely retaliate and punish the son induces an intense anxiety in him. The fear of being punished – symbolically castrated – by the father and the outcomes of this fatherly-forbidden sinful secret love leads the child to abandon this unfulfilled desire and eventually to admit the superiority of his father and to identify with him, through which the internal conflict is resolved.

In the Freudian view the father-son relationship is conflictive and full of contention and ambivalence. As Freud describes in *Totem and Taboo (1913)*, this can also be traced back to the early stages of human tribal life, when a group of brothers committed patricide, and consequently felt guilty and remorseful. They erected a totem in the memory of their murdered father. Thus their bloody hatred toward their father dramatically shifts into a high reverence and sanctification of him. So the Oedipus Complex has a central place in the Freudian conception of the human aggression; that is the first hostile rivalry with father provides a pattern for the form of relationship with any father-representative object in

adulthood. The very idea has been used for uncovering the human motivation of revolutions. (e.g. by Victor Wolfenstein) Oedipus complex is one of key concepts in the Freudian theory. Freud uses anthropological records (especially pertaining to the Australian aborigines) as well as mythology to trace the roots of neurosis in the repressed unconscious impulses; the shared core of such impulses is the tendency to incest which is universal. In *Totem and Taboo* (1913) he finds a similarity between the unconscious conflicts and ambivalences of neurotics in the civilized world and thoughts of the primitive tribes. Interpretation of the Sophocles' Oedipus is so important that Freud names this unconscious wish or the complex which underlies neuroses after it. However it is not very clear to what extent Sophocles' tragedy can exemplify the human tragedy! A few steps away from the Greek mythology (which sometimes inspires western thinkers to endorse or decorate their ideas with reminiscent names), counter-Oedipus cases can be found. The Persian tragedy of Rostam and Sohrab is an example in which, father and son dueled incognito, and Father (Rostam) slew the son. In the story there is no woman to be possessed, but Sohrab's mother who had encouraged him to find his father. Though in another Persian tragedy there may be a pseudo oedipal theme, but it ends in a totally opposite result¹. Now a question arises here

¹ In the Epic of Siavosh, composed by Ferdowsi, Soudabeh the queen of King Kaykavous falls in love with Siavosh, her stepson, and the crown prince of Iran (whose mother, the former queen had been died while giving birth to him). She invites him to her residence and tries to allure him. But Siavosh calls this treason against his father and rejects her demands. Soudabeh whose pride is wounded makes a scandal and accuses him of seducing her for infidelity with the king. Then according to the tradition of old Iranians (in mythology) he had to pass through fire to prove his innocence. (Fire was sacred because it casted light on darkness, it was symbolically a way to distinguish truth and honesty from untruth and dishonesty.) Siavosh passed through the fire and was endeared again by his father. However, his trustfulness could only for one time save his life and in another plot of his stepmother he was killed in a foreign land. The content of this story seems to be resistant against an oedipal interpretation.

whose answer depends only on our imaginations: if any mythological tragedy has roots in an unconscious and unfulfilled desire, how would Freud interpret the contents of such Persian stories in the framework of his oedipal theory?

In Freud's earlier theory, man was dominated merely by self-preservation; sexual instincts and aggression were not related to separate instincts; instead they both belonged to the domain of Eros. Furthermore, Eros had a tension-releasing function. In such a hydraulic model of aggression, tension is accumulated within us to be finally discharged and the catharsis (release of this tension) is experienced as a feeling of pleasure. (Rummel 1977). In *Thoughts for the Times on War and Death* (1915) Freud announces his disillusionment of the underlying motives of the civilized man's behavior. By this time he had formulated a major part of his theory on unconscious instinctual drives and their role in human mental functioning (Hartman 1999) and in this essay he writes about why the civilized societies which enact moral rules for their members and expect any individual to observe them, engage in war which in effect contravenes and violates all those moral norms. He traces the roots of such behaviors in human nature as he writes:

In reality, there is no such thing as 'eradicating' evil tendencies. Psychological - or, more strictly speaking, psycho-analytic - investigation shows instead that the deepest essence of human nature consists of instinctual impulses which are of an elementary nature, which are similar in all men and which aim at the satisfaction of certain primal needs. These impulses in themselves are neither good nor bad. We classify them and their expressions in that way, according to their relation to the needs and demands of the human community. It must be granted that all the impulses

which society condemns as evil - let us take as representative the selfish and the cruel ones - are of this primitive kind. (Freud 1915, par. 16)

The ideas in this essay reflect the core concepts that Freud, 15 years later, that is in 1930 elaborated in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. For him, civilization is a colorful deceiving dress for disguising human nature, a cover behind which human instinctive impulses surreptitiously and disguisedly seek satisfaction. Civilization only delays or transforms the gratification of such impulses, and does not necessarily rectify human nature. According to Freud:

Reaction-formations against certain instincts take the deceptive form of a change in their content, as though egoism had changed into altruism, or cruelty into pity. These reaction-formations are facilitated by the circumstance that some instinctual impulses make their appearance almost from the first in pairs of opposites - a very remarkable phenomenon, and one strange to the lay public, which is termed 'ambivalence of feeling'. The most easily observed and comprehensible instance of this is the fact that intense love and intense hatred are so often to be found together in the same person. (*ibid.* par. 17)

According to Hartman (1999), Freud thought that, the intellect as a counterbalance to the destructive impulses is feeble while it is dependent on the drives for the psychic energy it needs. Freud hoped that the human rationality could surpass those drives, but at the same time concluded that as long as nations were so different, war could not be abolished; and by this he meant that the struggle between the rich and poor provide such conditions that give way to release of the repressed drives. (p. 133)

Freud's statements warned us about our intractable impulses which in times may lead our societies to war; at the same time they conveyed pessimism toward the nature and future of mankind and stirred the emotions of those who still needed to believe in man as the bearer of the Divine Spirit. But if we are anyhow to have a more encouraging picture of our nature, we may get it even within the Freudian discourse: with regard to the sources of human motivation, Freud focuses on libidinal (and later also on aggressive) instincts. He points out to defense mechanisms, which we use to protect ourselves against the anxiety stemming from the unconscious impulses that cannot be fulfilled in their genuine form, but why should we not look at these mechanisms as our human skills and capabilities to comply with the reality? What Freud labels as *reaction formation*, can be also construed as part of our nature and as the human *ingenuity* to turn the evil into good and the egoism into altruism. We can say that human nature is a package comprised of those instincts *and* our *faculty* or capacity to put those instincts under control.

Later however, as reflected in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) (cited in Abram, 2007; Greenberg & Mitchell 1983), Freud put forward the Dual Instinct Theory according to which *Eros* and *Thanatos* were the two main (and antithetic) sources of human motivation; *Eros* as the source of self-preservation or the life instinct, and *Thanatos* as the origin of self-destruction or the death instinct. All human beings were now driven by these two competing instincts. The death instinct impels the organism toward breaking up and termination. But in the presence of the life instinct it is diverted outwards, and takes the form of externally oriented aggression, an impetus for exertion of power and dominance. The target of destruction then is changed and is found outside of the self. In addition, an important aspect of the relation between these two sources of

motivation is that, the death instinct can via combination with the Eros lead to the pathological conditions of sadism and masochism, in which aggression toward an external target or toward the self is accompanied by pleasure. (Rummel, 1977). In his earlier theory, Freud had related sadism (that is to enjoy inflicting pain on another) to erotic impulses and also part of child's emotional development; for example, during the oral stage, after the child develops teeth, the satisfaction of the child while breast feeding is accompanied by biting, and in this "oral sadistic stage" biting itself gives satisfaction. (See Siann 1988) However in Freud's later theory sadistic desires would derive from a source other than libido; they stemmed from an independent destructive drive, which is called death instinct as well as the "Nirvana Principle". The idea of death instinct later attracted Melanie Klein's attention in her work with children and she considered aggression in children as a manifestation of this separate source of human behavior. She considered aggression as synonymous to envy, hate, and sadism, all of which stemming from the death instinct. (See Abram 2007, p. 16) However, according to Weinstein (2001), "many psychoanalysts never accepted Freud's death instinct" (p. 231). This idea especially in the way it was reflected in Klein's work led to controversies. Some criticized Klein for "misinterpreting Freud" to an extent that her theory was in odds with his. (Abram, *ibid.*) A full account of these controversies in the British Psychoanalytic Society can be found in King and Steiner (1991). One of Klein's critics was Anna Freud. Edgcumbe (2000) counts the differences of the two founders of child psychoanalysis in their understanding of the death instinct: Klein applied this concept in clinical analysis and considered it as:

the main cause of anxiety in infants who fear destroying themselves or their objects. Anna Freud regarded it as a theory on the biological level.

She developed a psychological theory of aggression more consonant with Freud's later ideas. She pursued the role of aggression within the context of the structural theory, whereas Klein moved to a conflict between instincts. (p. 58)

The debate on the nature and manifestations of death instinct was not confined to the British Psychoanalytic Society. In another comment that is in Herbert Marcuse's (1962) *Eros and Civilization*, Thanatos has been conceived of as a raging protest against pain rather than of a death instinct, a protest which puts no distinction between object and subject and its goal is to obliterate pain and tension, the painful self, and the other, without making a distinction among them. For Freud however, the *nirvana principle* (as he calls death instinct in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*) symbolizes an active and spontaneous instinct, opposite to Eros, and "the fundamental tendency of every living being to return to the inorganic state", and according to Laplanche & Pontalis (1973) it is characterized by Freud as the cardinal instinct, indeed, as the "factor which determines the actual *principle* of all instinct." (p. 102). The combination of libidinal desires and death instinct would lead to two common pathologies of Sadism and Masochism, and the death instinct was the key to solve the problem of masochism which according to Savran (1998) was not satisfactorily explained in Freud's early theory.

The Freudian view about such "instinctual drives" may cast light on part of our pathological behavior; however it does not per se explain its diversity. Such an explanation may be achieved in his theory of psychosexual development, and the distribution of psychic energy among three structures of human personality. Freud conceived five stages for human psychosexual development- oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital- in the first three of which, libido, the psychic energy

can be fixated. Mouth, anus, and phallus are the three areas of pleasure respectively. A normal development guarantees passing through these stages toward the genital stage. But deprivation or over gratification in each of these stages leads to fixation in it, which specifies the character type in adulthood (see Beckett 2002). Those who are fixated in oral-sucking have “oral-dependent” character and those in oral-biting are called “oral-sadistic” (oral-aggressive). Fixation in anal stage may lead to “anal-expulsive” and “anal-retentive” character types (see Riso and Hudson 1996) These writers also refer to a neo-Freudian theory of Enneagram, which through combining the three above-mentioned developmental stages with the three general dispositions of psychic energy in Freudian terms, receptive, retentive, and expulsive, give nine character types, some of which may not be easily applicable to real life settings (ibid. p. 437-8).

In the course of psychosexual development the structure of personality consisting of a tripartite system emerges. *Id* is the main source of all the psychic energy. During the oral stage *ego* is in an early form established and during the anal stage it develops to the ability to delay gratification. The *superego* is established from the phallic stage on in which signifies internalization of social standards and moral norms (see Carducci 2009).

Freud assumed that the aggressive behavior discharges a portion of this ‘destructive energy’ through shifting it into other directions. This is exactly what Freud called *Catharsis* through which the energy is somewhat released and the tension is reduced. An aggressive behavior, in order to be casted out and directed to another person, requires the construction of an enemy. This happens through projection that is attribution of one’s own feelings to others. By ascription of hostility to another person, an outlet is provided for the destructive motives (which are originally parts of the self) to be transposed outwards. This ego

defense mechanism however implies the presence of ambivalence or opposite tendencies toward the same object at the same time. When parts of the self (such as anger or libidinal desires) are not socially permitted, they are repressed and remain unsatisfied, and hence an antagonism happens in the self, so that parts of it restrain or suppress other parts. Such unsatisfied repressed desires then have the principal role in the ensuing ambivalence. The ambivalence causes a conflictual state that should be somehow resolved; by *splitting* the ambivalent feelings are separated and attributed to two objects rather than one. One object receives a total love and devotion and the other a total hatred and rejection. The enemy is born this way. He is the holder of all negative and hostile characteristics. (also see, Fellman, 1999).

Of course such concepts as ‘destructive energy’ are very general and we may hardly be able to extract practical hypotheses from them. On the other hand, by ascription of aggression to an instinct, we should expect for a similar pattern between the expression of aggression and the other instinctual behaviors; however such a similarity may hardly be considered. For example, hunger is the consequence of a few hours deprivation of food, but we have no clue that someone who has not had a reason for showing aggressive behavior for days or months is more inclined to aggression. Psychoanalytic interpretation of aggression as an inborn and universal motive shared by all human beings, has been a very important and influential trend especially in the Western world, mostly because it derives from the scientific determinism of the 19th and 20th Century Europe. I suppose that the mid-20th Century European legislators and policy makers who were horrified by the aftermaths of the two World Wars and who were seeking solutions to put an end to conflict and to eradicate the roots of violence in their societies, consciously or unconsciously under the influence of

the Psychoanalytic discourse of their own time, approved and ratified regulations that might enhance erotic tendencies in society (to counteract aggressive tendencies). Meanwhile it should be added that the Freudian theory may have some cultural connotations: as according to Freud many of our behaviors may be indicative of totally and diagonally opposite drives which are transformed to their reverse via defense mechanisms like reaction formation, hence the high reverence and respect for fathers in patriarchal societies may be a sign of higher Oedipal conflicts in those societies, in the sense that hostility toward father and all father-representative things is reversely (reactively) translated into its opposite behavioral pattern, that is higher respect for them. We should bear in mind that in severely hierarchical societies the figures of power may be highly respected or in a rotation be mercilessly executed.

Application of psychoanalytic theory for an etiological account of social violence have been concentrated on two concepts of Oedipus Complex and Narcissism. For example, Feuer's (1969) Conflict of Generations theory searches the roots of terroristic tendencies in oedipal conflicts of sons with their fathers (see Borum 2004). The same hypothesis has been used for personality analysis of revolutionary leaders, as well as for dictators. A study of this sort is Wolfenstein's (1967) 'Revolutionary Personality' who traces the revolutionary leaders' concern with domination and submission accompanied by feelings of victimization to an oedipal ambivalence, a love-hate relation with the parental authority (as cited in Rothman and Lichter 1996, p. 165). Though in the first appearance such a hypothesis might seem plausible but it is not clear if the revolutionary crowds who stand behind their leaders and show unconditional

obedience toward them also have had problems with their fathers¹. However, with regard to the extrapolation of oedipal concepts to social revolutions a delicate point should be elucidated: oedipal protest has a pre-moral nature, due to the developmental stage from which it originates; they may simply reflect hatred and violence. While revolutions usually have their own ethics; they want to substitute something with something else. They may signify, more than oedipal tendencies, a feeling of guilt, which is projected on an external object; an object which will be the target of subversion. A psychoanalytic explanation of revolutions should not necessarily be based on oedipal concepts. The modern revolutions seem to be related to such a feeling of guilt and a post-oedipal conscientious judgment.

The relation between narcissism and aggression has also received much attention. In Freudian theoretical framework narcissism refers to the investment of libido in self. Freud distinguished primary and secondary narcissism. The former is part of normal development and pertains to the self-involvement during infancy, while the latter is abnormal and develops when libidinal investment is diverted from objects to ego and forms what we usually mean by narcissistic personality disorder.

Recent research has provided evidence for the incremental effect of narcissism on aggression. Pathological narcissism according to Meissner (2003) has a role in many cases of harm to others, especially if this harm is related to the benefit of self, like what happens in revenge or narcissistic rage and can be traced

¹ Wolfenstein studies three revolutionaries two of which, Lenin and Trotsky, come from the Russian culture and the third is Gandhi, who apparently shares some characteristics with the other two. And this analysis apparently has been taken as a basis for understanding the so-called “revolutionary personality”.

also in psychopathic or sociopathic conduct. (p. 171) Siebers (2008) pointing out to the Freudian term *Narcissism of small differences*, states that when people want to be different enough from others (to have a separate identity), but find themselves similar to them the narcissistic rage may arise. (p. 44) Champion (2002) has given a record of the recent studies of narcissism and sexual aggression. Bushman and Baumeister (1998) studied the relation between narcissism and self esteem, and aggression; they reported that the combination of narcissism and insult led to an intense aggression toward the source of insult, however they found self-esteem irrelevant to aggression, suggesting that instead of low self-esteem, “threatened egotism” is an important cause (p. 219); however, Donnellan et al. (2005) argue that low self-esteem is related to aggression, antisocial behavior and delinquency. In three studies they found relation between “low self-esteem and externalizing problems”, however they state that “the effect of self-esteem on aggression was independent of narcissism”, implying that narcissistic individuals who are not low in self-esteem, are aggressive (p. 328). Webster, Kirkpatrick, and Nezlek (2006) have shown special relations among self-esteem, narcissism, and aggression in intrapersonal (within-person) level, to see *when* people may aggress. They showed that in the course of time, in both their studies, the first with weekly and the second with semi-daily intervals, self-esteem was negatively related to aggression, while narcissism was positively related to aggression, but after controlling for self-esteem. Their findings are in general, consistent with the findings that Donnellan et al. have reported in interpersonal level.

Such concepts as narcissism and sadism have received a great deal of attention and elaboration in psychoanalytic theories, and till now have kept their importance in violence studies. Though some psychoanalysts have opened new

windows to the conventional psychoanalysis and have considered the interaction between human psychic dispositions and the social context, through which normal or abnormal personality is developed. Erich Fromm is undoubtedly one of them.

1.1.2 Erich Fromm and the aggressive characters

Erich Fromm is well-known for his Marxist approach to psychoanalysis. This reputation is deserved. Because, the proletariat, that is Marx's hero of the future who would eventually emancipate mankind, gets an eminent place in Fromm's characterology, by virtue of its productive merits. For him, the productive man typifies the sane man.

In Fromm's theory the Psychic energy does not flow in a merely biologically predetermined route, rather, under the influence of social experience (such as class affiliation) in the course of socialization, it is molded into stable patterns of conduct, or *characters*. In case of man, instincts to a large extent leave the scene for human consciousness. As man is more consciously and less instinctually directed, so new needs arise in human life; needs which are unique to man such as need for respect, and effectiveness. When instincts do not play an important role in human decisions, then something should take their role and organize the human motives so that our behavior can remain adaptive and effective. This takes place through the formation of character (which can be defined as socially determined constant behavioral tendencies). Different character types signify different adaptive efforts that man may apply in dealing with his psychological needs in the social life. They shape our everyday manners of conduct, but they are shaped in a social context, and may reflect social demands rather than being

derived solely from human innate dispositions. According to Fromm and Maccoby (1970):

[T]his theory postulates that in the social process human energy is structuralized into character traits common to most members of a class and/or of the whole society; the social character motivates them to behave in such a way that they fulfill their social-economic function. The social character is the result of the adaptation of human nature to the given socioeconomic conditions, and secondarily tends to stabilize and maintain these conditions (p. 230).

Hence, to a large extent, the social pathological conditions, in Fromm's view the capitalist society, bring about unhealthy relations, which would finally lead to the development of morbid character types. Fromm distinguishes two main *frames of orientation* (which may be defined as personal understanding of oneself and others, and mode of relation with the world), one healthy and the other unhealthy. The healthy orientation entails love, productivity, reason, and biophilia (the love of life). On the contrary, the unhealthy orientation brings about irrationality, destructiveness, greed for wealth and power, symbiosis (dependency to others to the degree of losing identity), narcissism, sadomasochism, and necrophilia (love of death). In *Escape from Freedom* (1941) he identified a driving force in man, a psychological reaction to the individuality and detachment of man in the modern society and the resulting feeling of loneliness. The ties that once bound man to nature and other human beings were now torn apart, and man was left alone with his freedom and responsibility. To get rid of this horrible loneliness and restore the lost unity, there are two main ways: to use this freedom productively and connect to the world with love, or to escape from freedom through such mechanisms as *authoritarianism* that reunites

man with others unhealthily on the basis of power not love, which is accompanied by sadism and masochism; it leads to destructiveness or the *malignant aggression*, which is based on elimination of anything that might be considered as a threat. However a large group of people renounce their freedom and identity through *automaton conformity*. In *Man for Himself* (1947), Fromm writes about five orientations in the modern society which give rise to character types:

The Receptive Orientation: man finds the source of all good things in the external objects, and so he expects to get whatever he wants from the outer world. He wants to “be loved” and looks for a “magic helper” to help him in the moment of need.

The Exploitative Orientation: similar to the receptive, the exploitative also is totally dependent on outside. But the exploitative, instead of waiting and expecting to receive, uses force or cunning to get what he looks for. They are manipulative and in extreme cases kleptomaniac.

The Hoarding Orientation: contrary to the two mentioned orientations, hoarders are not open to the external world. Instead, they are preoccupied with their security, and they find hoarding and saving the best way for being secure. Spending can be threatening. They build walls round themselves to be protected from the external threats. Extreme orderliness and obsessions and compulsions are common in their behavior.

The Marketing Orientation: this orientation is specific to the modern times. Here the main activity or tendency is to exchange. They are success oriented, but success in a restricted form in routine life. As if they consider themselves and others like commodities. They are stuck in a groove of everyday life, and are

dependent on being personally accepted by those who are in contact with them for their goods and services.

The Productive Orientation: the productive man is Fromm's ideal type of the sane man, who can actualize his potential capacities through working. He realizes his own potentials, and does not need domination over others. He can love others and he is a biophile. The model is summarized in below:

Table 1.1 Nonproductive and Productive Orientations; excerpted from (Fromm, 1947) p. 111

Assimilation	Socialization	
I. Nonproductive orientation		
a) Receiving (accepting)	Masochistic (loyalty)	} Symbiosis
b) Exploiting..... (taking)	Sadistic (authority)	
c) Hoarding (preserving)	Destructive (assertiveness)	} Withdrawal
d) Marketing (exchanging)	Indifferent (fairness)	
II. Productive orientation		
Working	Loving, Reasoning	

Therefore, different societies, due to their economic relations and social formations, may foster proportionate national or collective characters. In their study in a Mexican village, Fromm and Maccoby (1970) tested the social character theory and found confirmation for it. They found three main character types (i.e. productive-hoarding, unproductive-receptive, and productive-exploitative) correspondent to three socioeconomic groups (i.e., free landowner, landless day laborer, and a new type of entrepreneur) respectively. They recognized these social characters on the basis of their analysis of the villagers'

modes of relatedness to others (love, sadomasochism, destructiveness, narcissism). (pp. 230-231)

In his impressive work, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Erich Fromm (1973), takes issue with both instinctivists and behaviorists; he draws a line between them. There, he first questions the idea of aggression as a phylogenetically programmed instinct, formulated by Konrad Lorenz (see the next section) and found the concept of a self-propelling drive which is spontaneously charged and discharged inappropriate. Likewise, he criticized behaviorists for their rejection of an innate pattern for aggressive behavior. For Fromm, aggression is fundamentally a defensive response to threats against human and animal survival, which in its normal expression, it happens only when it is needed for the protection of life. Then he makes an important distinction between two types of aggression that is between the *benign* and *malignant*. The fundamental difference between the two is that benign aggression is a life-preserving organic drive, and the malignant aggression pertains to a character, a salient behavioral tendency, and serves for the satisfaction of the character needs. Benign aggression has a defensive function, and is biologically adaptive; it is deterrent in nature and then when the threat is over, it subsides. However, man, due to having a greater capacity than animals for the prediction of the future threats, may use this defensive capacity more, and sometimes persistently. Malignant aggression which he finds it only among humans serves for some psychological needs but not in all human beings. It is a product of insane social relations. The unproductive demands in an insane society, pave the way for special characters. Among these, Fromm points out to sadistic and necrophiliac character types as two types of character structures which impel man to destructive behavior (malignant aggression). Sadism is described as the desire for having an absolute control over another person, and by necrophilia, he refers to

the desire and passion toward whatever is dead and collapsed, to destruction. We may say that in necrophilia the libido is reversed or drastically metamorphosed so that it attains to satisfaction only through flowing in harmful directions. Fromm finds examples of such characters in his case studies of Stalin, Hitler, and Himmler. These character types are then byproducts of unhealthy social relations, namely capitalism which fosters pathological anal characters, such as sadism and necrophilia, in which normal aggression turns into destructiveness, a condition that contrary to the benign aggression is no longer defensive; instead it makes aggression the matter of pleasure.

Though Fromm accuses capitalism of producing inhuman conditions, threatening love and hope, and leading to cruelty and destructive characters, however sadism seems not to be a modern phenomenon. It might be considered in any social forms (pre-modern and modern) of unequal power distribution. Swanson (1975) states that he could not get a significant support for Fromm's "expectation of positive association between destructiveness on the one hand and, on the other, patrilineal rule of descent, high agricultural development, or the presence of social classes, castes, or slavery" (p. 1244); but he adds that maybe the number of cases should be increased. He also refers to Slater and Slater's study on the elements of narcissism and destructiveness, such as "prolonged torture of prisoners" in 90 primitive peoples, and that his examination of their tabulations is not consistent with Fromm's expectation. Finally, Fromm provides us with an insightful theory which considers human potentials and social relations together, and does not sacrifice one of them for the other. It is a creative mixture of psychoanalysis and Marxism, with a humanistic flavor.

1.2 Evolutionary Approach to Aggression:

One of the early theories pertaining to the evolutionary backgrounds of human aggression, according to Otterbein (2004) and Cartmill (1996) is the *Killer Ape hypothesis*. Some versions of the killer ape theory can be traced back to the early years of the Twentieth Century (Otterbein, *ibid.*). However according to Susman (1987), the notion of the *Australopithecus Africanus* as the killer ape was first introduced by Raymond Dart (1926, 1957) and then was popularized by Robert Ardrey, the author of *African Genesis* in 1961. In short, according to this hypothesis the human ancestors were distinguished from other primates by their murderous aggressiveness. That is the record of human aggression goes back to pre-Homo times. After Darwin's good news about the human ancestry, this was the second auspicious message that the evolutionists could give us: our ancestors were apes, and in addition they were not that much gentle and genial! However the idea that *Australopithecus* was a killer has been widely challenged by physical anthropologists themselves, and eventually discredited and abandoned (see Otterbein 2004). Brain's (1972) reconsiderations (as cited in Susman 1987) of patterns of fractures and pathologies, had a great role in weakening this theory.

1.2.1 Ethology:

While scholars like Ardrey were interested in finding the roots of human aggression in the apes' world, Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989), a co-founder of Ethology extracted a general theory of aggression from his studies on a wider range of animals; a theory which was applicable both to humans and animals. Ethology, as Siann (1985) states, developed as a new field of study when a group of biologists and zoologists, who were primarily in Germany, preferred to study animal behavior in natural settings rather than in laboratories. This would give more reliable and satisfactory results than confining the subjects of study in small

cages. Ethologists share the idea that aggression stems from an innate motive, an evolutionarily programmed instinct. The ethological approach has a special place in theorization on human aggression. It seems to hold a bridge between biology, more specifically the Darwinian theory, and the Freudian psychoanalysis. The term “instinct” has been widely used by ethologists. Any instinct has been phylogenetically developed to fulfill a biological need and has a benefit for organism. Konrad Lorenz is the most well-known ethologist for his studies on aggression. In Lorenzian view, four instincts or as he calls them the “big four”, that is hunger, sexuality, fight and flight (Lorenz 1966, p. 95) equip living beings with tools for survival and impel them to action. So the four instincts are the four driving wheels of the instinct machines and aggression is as necessary for the animal as the other three. It is activated in a hydraulic mechanism; aggressive energy is stored and increased within animals (and of course including man) and they seek for targets or stimuli to release this energy. In his famous work, *On Aggression*, Lorenz (1966) puts forward his controversial theory in which he finds behavioral similarities or an evolutionary continuity between man and subhuman species. In his definition of aggression he states that it is “the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed *against* the members of the same species” (p. ix). Considering this definition predatory behavior which is essentially performed for nutrition, is not a case of aggressive behavior. However pathological behaviors in man like zoo-sadism though are obviously aggressive are excluded from the scope of this definition. Lorenz rejected the Freudian notion of death instinct, however, similar to Freud, he also considered an innate source for aggression, which contrary to the death instinct had nothing to do against life preserving instincts; instead it would help the species to live longer.

What are the benefits of aggression? In the Lorenzian view aggression, rather than being the outward deflection of the Thanatos, is a beneficial instinct which equips living beings including man with some means of survival. An important feature of aggressive behavior in Lorenz' theory is to preserve a territory. Aggression is then an evolutionary advantage which increases the chance of animals to have access to food resources, and a relatively safe place to live longer and to pass on genes and protect their breed. In chapter three of *On Aggression*, Lorenz, while giving some examples of intra-specific aggression sums up that:

aggression, far from being the diabolical, destructive principle the classical psychoanalysis makes it out to be, is really an essential part of the life-preserving organization of instincts. Though by accident it may function in the wrong way and cause destruction, the same is true of practically any functional part of any system. (pp. 44-45)

An important concept in Lorenzian theory is the *spontaneity* of aggression. This idea comes from Lorenz's view of motivation, in which he got closer to the psychoanalytic concept of energy. This energy which is necessary for any behavior is, in a cyclical way, continuously accumulated and discharged. Then the discharge of this energy takes place inevitably and spontaneously, not in a reactive manner. (see Siann, *ibid*) This concept has undergone criticism. For example, though Robert Hinde (Burckhardt 2005, p. 456) agreed with Lorenz on the biological basis of human aggression, but he questioned the idea of spontaneity of aggression, and he found the problem in "Lorenz's energy model of motivation". Another idea in Lorenz's theory which provoked criticism is the concept of ritualization, by which the course of aggression becomes less harmful and usually nonlethal. Special gestures or movements or what Lorenz calls

'rituals' between victor and loser of a fight signals the end of strife. Then according to this concept, Lorenz concludes that animals usually do not kill a conspecific. But according to Gat (2006) later research has shown that a great deal of intraspecific killing takes place in many species. Wilson (1975/2000) also has previously warned that 'on the contrary [to the Lorenzian view], murder is far more common and hence "normal" in many vertebrate species than in man' (p. 247)

An interesting difference can be found between the Lorenzian and Freudian views: while for Freud the libido had a central place as the source of human love, in Lorenz's theory aggression precedes love and friendship, and this can be construed from his ideas on social organization. Lorenz (Siann 1985, p. 62) puts all species in one of four categories: flocks (herds) (e.g. starlings), colonies (e.g. night heron), large families (e.g. rats), and the fourth a social organization which includes graylag geese, cichlid fish and of course man. In the first three, members do not recognize one another and hence they don't have the ability to form love; however in the fourth, there exists recognition among members and because of this they can establish a friendly or love-based relationship. But these species are also the most aggressive ones, and love and friendship in their societies has the evolutionary function of mitigating aggression. However it is not clear that why love and friendship are not derived from another instinctive source (that is sexual instinct) simultaneously, and why should they be incidental to aggression. For Lorenz, aggression is something omnipresent and universal.

With regard to the human aggression, also he believed that it was spontaneous not reactive, and then we may say that aggression is a rule in all human societies (and therefore we should not consider it as a pathological problem). Maybe such an attitude toward aggression, as a *natural* aspect of

human life, had been established in Lorenz's mind years ago, when he joined to the Nazi party in 1938. In the Lorenzian thought style aggression was expressed more freely in primitive societies, and the civilized society has partly blocked it and channeled its energy to other directions. He suggests to human psychologists and psychoanalysts to test his idea "that present-day civilized man suffers from insufficient discharge of his aggressive drive."(Lorenz 1966, p. 235) He therefore advises the society to provide people with secure outlets for releasing their aggressive impulses. However though he has emphasized on creation of social devices to transform aggression into cooperation, his assertion that aggression is genetically programmed, "has been taken both as deterministic and defeatist" (Singer 2009, p. 356).

For the human aggression and warfare Lorenz, according to Danesi and Perron (1999), suggested that residual territoriality impulses can give an explanation. They write that the idea of territoriality as a concept related to aggression can be also traced in human life, for example in cases of intrusions into people's private life, similar to trespass into the territory of an animal, may be perceived as a signal of aggression. This idea stems partly from Lorenz's studies on territorial birds such as graylag geese and ducks. For Lorenz, as an ethologist, it may be more convenient to conceive continuity between human behavior and subhuman patterns of action. He writes:

Poet and psycho-analyst alike have long known how close love and hate are, and we know that in human beings also the object of love is nearly always, in an ambivalent way, an object of aggression too. The triumph ceremony of geese – and this cannot be stressed too often – is at most an extremely simplified model of human friendship, but it shows significantly how such an ambivalence can arise. (Lorenz 1966, p. 204)

By extending the concept of territoriality to human relations, the human aggression throughout the world and time, can be construed as a struggle for expanding or preserving territories, even in religious wars like the Crusades. And still this is not limited to intergroup violence; in interpersonal clashes also such territorial instincts are involved, something which in civil life is translated into ownership or possession, for which there are usually very strictly defined rules and limits in every legal system, and indeed one of the main functions of any government is to settle proprietary disputes amongst citizens. In such a context, perhaps the most expressive definition of ownership is to deprive anybody else from having access to something. So in the same way territorial animals watch and protect their territories, humans also do the same, albeit through using more subtle ways. Though within a legally controlled society, people are expected to play fair in their competitions over more ambitious positions, attractive mates, and material prosperity, but the *will to have* may sometimes seem to be an insatiable desire, which is a theme of parables, and a truth of everyday life. The analogy between human and animal behavior and ascription of the motives both in human and animal level to some instincts, at least from a literary point of view, should not look strange; cupidity and asking for more, even after having enough to live a fully prosperous life (which perhaps in a psychoanalytic interpretation might symbolize the wish for eternity), may be more explicable by an instinctual motive rather than a logical reason.

Wilson (1978/2004), while rejecting Lorenz (and Fromm), points out that there are at least seven categories of aggression in any species which have different controls in nervous system, one of which is defense of territory. The other six as he writes, are intra-group dominance, sexual, hostile acts leading to termination of weaning, aggression against prey, defensive aggression against

predator, and finally “moralistic or disciplinary aggression used to enforce the rules of society.” (p. 101-2) Bringing examples from the world of reptiles, Wilson argues that according to the zoological findings:

none of the categories of aggressive behavior exists in the form of a general instinct over broad arrays of species. Each category can be added, modified, or erased by an individual species during the course of its genetic evolution, in the same way that eye color can be altered from one shade to another or a particular skin gland added or eliminated. (ibid., p. 102)

Understanding human behavior on the basis of our observation of animals is not exclusive to Lorenz. For example, Behaviorism during its golden age, from Pavlov to Skinner, was based on many experiments on animals. As Smith (1994) writes, Skinner’s “Science and Human Behavior extends animal data by extrapolation to all aspects of the human being” (p. 520). In such theories cognition, as an intermediate between instinct and action, occupies no important place. The funny story Lorenz tells about his widowed aunt is a clarifying example of the extent to which he has analogized between man and fish. Because in the way the cichlid male after a while attacks its mate, his aunt could only bear her favorite maidens for a few months and she would usually find a reason to dislike them and send them away, and to find a new servant or as he writes “a perfect angel”, who after being praised for some months, would finally be disfavored. (ibid. p. 52) Anyway though “confusion” between human and animal data might be dissatisfactory for some social theorists, “separation” of such data, does not satisfy an ethologist who is used to see all the species on one continuum.

1.2.2 Sociobiology:

Later developments in giving an evolutionary account for human aggression come from sociobiology, a new scientific trend since 1970s which according to Zajonc (2002) provides us with a new understanding of fundamental aspects of social behavior such as cooperation, altruism and domination. The most well-known figure of sociobiology, Edward O. Wilson (1975) defines sociobiology as “the systematic study of the biological basis of all human behavior.” (p. 4) Sociobiology as Fiala (2004) puts it attempts to provide genetic and evolutionary explanations for complex social behaviors “by looking at selective pressures that create the conditions for certain behaviors.” (p. 42) however he also warns that sociobiology reduces human violence to genetic dispositions and this way may somehow justify violence in a form of the “naturalistic fallacy”, while it implies that aggression is codified in our genes, and we can hardly abstain from it.

Any theory of human aggression is somehow related to a human nature theory. Sociobiology according to critics (e.g. Lewontin 1991) is genetically deterministic. It looks after biological roots of human social behavior, or better to say that sociobiology admits that human social behavior is genetically determined.

In *Sociobiology: the new synthesis*, Wilson (1975) while distinguishing eight types of aggression – Territorial, dominance, sexual, parental disciplinary, weaning, moralistic, predatory, and antipredatory – states that “aggressive behavior serves very diverse functions in different species, and different functional categories evolve independently in more than one control center of the brain.” (p. 242) Behavior, in this model serves for three different evolutionary purposes: survival of the individual, reproduction of the group, and altruism that

is helping and cooperation with the group, sometimes at the expense of the individual. However, all these behaviors within the long course of evolution have been coded in genes, which constitute our innate behavioral tendencies, and determine the way we express our emotions, or react to different conditions. Our emotions are controlled by the *hypothalamic-limbic complex* which is programmed to harmonize or as he writes “orchestrate” a series of responses which are beneficial for the survival of individual and group. Our behaviors are usually influenced by our emotions which in turn are determined by our genes. These emotions have the functions for achieving to the three evolutionary goals, survival, reproduction, and altruism; so that hatred and aggression serve for individual survival, love for reproduction of new offspring, and guilt for altruism. (also in Siann, 1985) Wilson explains human behavioral repertoire including the ethical behavior, on the basis of the evolutionary biology. He writes "Scientists and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized." (Wilson 1975, p. 562) An evolutionary biologist then recognizes that “self-knowledge” is formed by the loci for emotional control in hypothalamus and limbic system. So there is a biological basis for any human behavior which is genetically activated.

With regard to aggression, sociobiologists suggest that it is especially functional for resolution of either interspecific or intraspecific contest over limited resources; being equipped with more efficient abilities (usually the aggressive ones), the genetically fitter members, take advantage of others in having access to more and better rewards, and then have a more chance to pass on their genes. But what makes sociobiology very controversial lays in the idea that we may label as the *autonomy of genes*. In Wilson’s words:

In a Darwinist sense the organism does not live for itself. Its primary function is not even to reproduce other organisms; it reproduces genes, and it serves as their temporary carrier. [...] Samuel Butler's famous aphorism, that the chicken is only an egg's way of making another egg, has been modernized: the organism is only DNA's way of making more DNA. More to the point, the hypothalamus and limbic system are engineered to perpetuate DNA. (Wilson, *ibid.* p. 3)

Considering such a genetic determinism, it is also noteworthy to know that as Siann (1985) points out, Wilson has not denied the role of learning and culture in behavior, and instead he has acknowledged that the individual is affected by the experiences and norms of his own culture. But at the same time he considers the social values as products of evolution. For instance, magic rituals, have been emerged as adaptations to the unknown and unpredictable natural environment. All the cultural forms are construed as "a hierarchical system of environmental tracking devices." (Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 560) Such devices are biological reactions or capabilities which increase gene's fitness and adaptability, and by "hierarchical" he means that these environmental tracking devices are at work in any level of the genetic evolution; that is "from millisecond-quick biochemical reactions to gene substitutions requiring generations." (*ibid.*) Then here again it is the gene's choice to adapt itself to environmental changes, in order to guarantee its survival, and then after such endless "hierarchical environmental tracking" to *create* the human culture. In the sociobiological reductionism, therefore, the world, including the social world, is the arena for spectacular display of genes, or even the battleground in which the fittest genes win, and open their ways to future by defeating the weaker ones. The social beings, as temporary carriers of the genes, are only observers of the historical moments, the honors and shames their genes

make. Every individual man is a piece of a long bridge which paves the way for genes to reproduce themselves, and if for example someone deliberately splits this chain by committing suicide, it means that his genes were so defective that they couldn't give him capabilities for finding logical solutions, and showing resistance against life stresses. In the same way, the fitter and more successful genes can lead their carriers to power, wealth and higher social status. And apparently this biological *principle* is not necessarily in accordance with the common understanding of ethics; for example, in an authoritarian and suppressing political atmosphere, those who remain deadly silent and especially those who sycophantically laud and idolize the ruling elite, have a more chance to live a safer life and attain to social rewards, than intellectuals who are brave enough to express their antagonism. So adaptability and intelligence (and in this example in its Machiavellian sense) is the key to success and survival. Human behavior, according to sociobiology, has an adaptive nature; because of this, Wilson (1975) answering the question "is aggression in man adaptive?" writes:

From the biologist's point of view, it certainly seems to be. It is hard to believe that any characteristic so widespread and easily invoked in a species as aggressive behavior is in man could be neutral or negative in its effect on individual survival and reproduction. To be sure, overt aggressiveness is not a trait in all or even a majority of human cultures. But in order to be adaptive it is enough that aggressive patterns be evoked only under certain conditions of stress such as those that might arise during food shortages and periodic high population densities.(p. 254-5)

In other words, because of the adaptive nature of aggressive behavior, it is activated only when it is needed. In addition, the role of learning in aggressive behavior is underestimated:

It also does not matter whether the aggression is wholly innate or is acquired part or wholly by learning. We are now sophisticated enough to know that the capacity to learn certain behaviors is itself a genetically controlled and therefore evolved trait. (ibid. p. 255)

Even if there is no doubt that the *capacity* of learning, as Wilson states, is by and large, genetically controlled (though there is evidence on the effect of nutrition, as well as special environmental substances on children's learning abilities), however learning aggression seems to be related to *content* rather than to *capacity* of learning. Wilson here shows to be a full-scale sociobiologist. For him, every behavior in man can be traced back to something deep in human nature. In some concluding remarks he writes:

If we wish to reduce our own aggressive behavior, and lower our catecholamine and corticosteroid titers to levels that make us all happier, we should design our population densities and social systems in such a way as to make aggression inappropriate in most conceivable daily circumstances and, hence, less adaptive. (ibid. p. 255)

In his famous Pulitzer prize-winning work, *On Human Nature*, which has been described by Washington Post as “compellingly interesting and enormously important”, Wilson (1978) for the second time gives an answer to the question “[a]re human beings innately aggressive?”. His answer is definitely “yes”, because in the course of human history as he states, “warfare, representing only the most organized technique of aggression, has been endemic to every form of society, from hunter-gatherer bands to industrial states”; (p. 99) because for a long time most of the European countries have been in conflict and war. He also notes that aggression in man is “species-specific”; while in its basic form it is

primate, but because of some other features it is distinguished from aggression in other species. To be able to say that human aggression is not innate, as he mentions, the only way is to *redefine* “to the point of uselessness” (and may be he means to distort the meanings of) the terms innate and aggression. The following excerpt is clearly expressive of how a sociobiologist looks at the human aggression:

Theoreticians who wish to exonerate the genes and blame human aggressiveness wholly on perversities of the environment point to the tiny minority of societies that appear to be nearly or entirely pacific. They forget that innateness refers to the measureable probability that a trait will develop in a specified set of environments, not to the certainty that the trait will develop in all environments. By this criterion human beings have a marked hereditary predisposition to aggressive behavior. (Wilson 1978, p. 99-100)

He further brings examples of such pacifist societies which have proved to be harmful enough in case the occasion arises. He mentions the Semai society in Malaya (see chapter three) who had no idea of violence and killing, but after being recruited by the British local government in early 1950s for fighting against communist militias, and being involved in such operations their aggressive side were awakened.

It seems not so easy to criticize sociobiology; partly because it is endorsed by the evolutionary theory, and partly because it reflects the prevailing scientific paradigm of our time. Sociobiologists give a plethora of evidences from millions of years or more, while their critics have to deal with meager evidences that belong to a few thousands of years. Such a condition has made the evolutionary

geneticist and social critic Richard C. Lewontin (1991) to open a frontier against sociobiology using his talent as social critic. His colleague, the paleontologist Stephen J. Gould is also well-known for his fervent criticisms of sociobiology.

Lewontin states that science is a social institution, and then like other social institutions has a function of legitimization of the status quo. Science has taken the role once was performed by the church, to explain why people are in unequal conditions. The modern western societies *in theory* are based on such ideals as equality, freedom, and fraternity; ideals which led to the subversion of old aristocratic and unequal exploitative social systems and gave rise to the modern society. However, *in practice*, contrary to the revolutionary slogans of the recent centuries, which would promise equality and justice, the new society came out to be a new system of the social and material privileges of one class over another. To solve this dilemma, science, and here biology steps in. It ensures people that though apparently there are some observable inequalities in society, however they have nothing to do with the social and legal system; instead, inequality exists in our nature. It exists from the beginning and pertains to something within us, something called gene. So this is the message of sociobiology for the human society: some people are genetically superior to others. The carriers of defective genes have less chance than those who carry fitter genes for enjoying a better life and attaining to better social positions; our genes are responsible for our happiness or misery. According to Lewontin this is a new version of a same ideology which prevailed in 19th Century, claiming that the human behavioral traits were hereditary and in the blood of people. He brings examples from literature, Dickens' *Oliver Twist*, Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*, and Zola's *Les Rougon-Macquart*, which reflected such a dominant attitude in the literature of their time. He finds sociobiology an ideology rather than a mere science; an

ideology that provides some myths to preserve peace and tranquility in a discriminative society. Gene is such a myth. It is introduced as responsible for almost everything. So Lewontin warns about the side effects of sociobiology for society, while it may lead to oversimplification of social problems and negligence toward their real roots which cannot be reduced to genes. The debate is not over yet.

However a point should be added here, that the social outcomes and any accidental connotations of a theory are not good criteria for assessment of the scientific truth of that theory. Should science always give us good and promising news? This is a choice between exigency and truth.

1.3 Drive Theory: Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

The theoretical models which explain aggression on the basis of instinctive energy have not been very satisfactory to those researchers who have had an experimental approach to the study of aggression. Vogue concepts like instinct and psychic energy are not easy to study in such research frameworks. According to the Drive Theory, aggression does not stem from an inner spontaneously activated source of aggressive energy; instead it is the result of a heightened arousal state, a drive, which can be reduced by overt acts of aggression (Baron & Richardson 1994). One of the earliest but at the same time most influential efforts in experimentation of aggression studies is the model developed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears in 1939 at the Yale University, which is known as the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis. This theory, according to Zillmann (1979) has had a profound influence over the current Western thought on aggression. It has been very influential in the study of violence for decades. However as Siann (1985) points out, the association between frustration and

aggression, was partly influenced by Freud's work on the repression of aggressive and sexual impulses, and, Dollard et al. intended "to integrate Freudian insights with an experimental methodology"(p. 138). Indeed this theory did not dismiss the psychodynamic assumption of psychic energy; instead as Hogg and Vaughan (2008) write the hypothesis was based on this concept, assuming that there is a fixed amount of energy for performing psychological activities, which themselves have a cathartic nature, so that after expending this energy the system goes back to psychological equilibrium. This hypothesis supposes that an aggressive behavior is expressed not merely because of innate factors; rather, it is due to a drive that is instigated by frustration, and frustration is resulted from a condition in which a person is prevented of reaching his goal. Then it is supposed that when someone's behavior which is accompanied by expectation of a reward, fails and he cannot get to what he expects, aggression arises. But as Campbell (1998) points out, the degree of frustration we may feel depends on three factors: the strength of the drive (the motivation level for attaining to a goal), number of frustrating incidents (that is how many times it happens), and whether the failure is total or partial (that we absolutely fail or we get something lower than our expectations).

This theory in its early version claims that frustration leads always to a form of aggression and aggression is an inevitable consequence of frustration. However if the source of frustration is a physically or socially strong figure, the resulting aggression might be directed toward a less threatening target. This can happen in two ways: first *stimulus generalization* in which aggression is directed to another target which is as similar as possible to the frustrating agent (Hogg & Abrams 1998); second, the direction of aggression may be shifted to a totally different target and this is called *displacement*, a concept that is adopted from

Psychoanalysis. Though, according to Berkowitz (1998) the displacement of aggression was not much considered in the 1939 formulation, but in Miller's (1948) conflict model which was based on a learning theory, the intensity of the displaced aggression has been viewed as a function of the strength of first, instigation to aggression resulted from frustration, second, the tendency to avoid that response, and third, the magnitude of association between the perceived source of frustration, and the available target. (p. 54) There are some conditions under which such a displacement can happen; under the conditions that the source of frustration is amorphous or non-personified, indeterminate and vague, too dangerous or powerful, inaccessible, or a beloved person, aggression can be directed to an alternative target, that is a scapegoat, which has less or no threatening consequences. (See Hogg and Vaughan 2008) For example, one may blame special social minorities for his own failures in finding a job or a social position. In such occasions, when a weaker target is found, the oppressors usually show a great intrepidity! There have been cases in which, after an authoritarian government has failed in warfare against a foreign enemy, then it has mercilessly punished "their fifth column". The idea of displacement of aggression is applicable to both interpersonal and intergroup violence. For example, Dollard and his associates have explained the intergroup prejudice and persecution in Germany before and during the World War II, on the basis of frustration of economic goals after the Versailles Treaty which led to anti-Semitism, as a displaced form of aggression. (See Hogg & Abrams 1998).

Some early studies have given evidences in support of this hypothesis. In an experiment (Barker, Dembo, & Lewin 1941, cited in Siann 1985), "frustrated" children showed more "destructive" behavior after being allowed to play with toys. Out of laboratory, in a historical study, Hovland and Sear's (1940, as cited

in Bethlehem 1985) found a relationship between lynchings in the southern parts of the USA during 1882-1930, and the price of cotton, as the most important economic index in the countryside. They showed that when the price raised more than what their regression equation predicted (which could be interpreted as less frustration), the number of lynchings were decreased; and with prices lower than predicted (more frustration) the number of lynchings increased. Bethlehem (ibid.) warns that acceptance of economic stagnation in such studies as tantamount to frustration is very dubious (p. 101). However it should be mentioned that economic indices are among the best possible objective society-level measures of what we define as frustration; economic indices (such as inflation rate, unemployment, and the like) indicate the general conditions or facilities of a society for the gratification or unfulfillment of our wishes. But the model may be questioned by considering that the frustrating experiences do not necessarily lead to similar aggressive reactions in all people. It may sometimes result in other reactions such as weeping (as a way for emotional discharge) and sadness; for example, in a final match of soccer world cup both teams have a great motivation for winning, but indeed few of those who fail may express aggression and instead many discharge their negative emotion through weeping. Sometimes, people may even keep calm and show a form of indifference through rationalization, or better to say philosophization of their emotions; for example, while there are men who may 'retaliate' women's negative answers, a man who for several times receives a "no" from women, may appease himself by saying "this is life" or "so are women, they like liars". So frustration *sometimes* leads to aggression. Also in other instances a hatchet man who is hired for murder commits a bloody violence for money rather than for discharging his negative emotions.

On the other hand, aggressive behavior might also be considered as something beyond a mere reaction to frustration; sometimes, it may become a source of satisfaction, for example as in sadistic behavior by which the perpetrator gains a pleasure. In such and similar cases, aggression turns into the lifestyle of the person. Even if sadistic behavior, as Wilhelm Reich (1926, cited in Macmillan 1991) has claimed, is resulted from sexual frustration (or “libido obstruction”), then at least some personality factors intermediate between frustration and aggression. Here, it seems that the causal attribution plays a role, and this is what has been considered in Berkowitz’s reformulation of the hypothesis. It should also be noted that the experience of frustration might depend on the ‘level of expectation’. People may react differently to the frustrating situations, due to their expectations and previous experiences. A prolonged frustration (e.g. in destitute districts, or labor camps) may lead to ‘habituation to frustration’ and or, as also mentioned by Tedeschi (2003) bring about depression and “learned helplessness”, rather than aggression. Human behavior is sometimes more complicated than what we may expect. The evidences for being cautious with this simple version of frustration-aggression hypothesis come from our daily life. If not seen, at least we have heard about many prisoners in concentration camps or many people under the oppression of suppressing autocratic regimes who have felt humiliation and despise and long-term frustration, and finally passed away without showing any heroic resistance! In addition, in some religious cultures, adversities may be seen as signs of the “Divine examination”, and in some others as lessons for “spiritual refinement”, “self-purification”, and “conquering our vanity”.




Fig. 1.1 Intermediate factors between frustrating stimuli and final responses

1.3.1 Cue-Arousal Theory:

Berkowitz's revision in 1960s, the Cue-Arousal Theory, has strengthened this hypothesis via introduction of some intermediating concepts between frustration and aggression. In Cue-Arousal Theory intervening cognitive factors have also been taken into account. According to Berkowitz (cited in Mummendey & Otten 1988) frustration does not automatically invoke aggression; instead it may provoke a state of emotional arousal, that is *anger*, which in its turn causes an inner tendency for expression of aggressive behavior. But only in the presence of some stimuli around him which have aggressive meaning, an aggressive behavior may be elicited. These stimuli are the special *cues*, associated (through classical conditioning) with anger-releasing conditions or anger itself. So there are two elements to be considered in here: emotional arousal which is a personal experience, and the cues which depend on the situation and give hints to the person to express aggression. Each frustrating stimulus may increase anger, but an interpretation of the situation on the basis of the cues can be involved. In the famous *weapon effect* experiment by Berkowitz and Le Page in 1967 (see Mummendey & Otten, *ibid*), participants after receiving different amounts of

electrical shocks by a confederate of the experimenters, were divided in two groups: the angered, those who had received higher shocks and the non-angered, those who received a slight shock. The first group while giving back shocks to the confederate, gave more shocks in the presence of the guns which were on a table near them, than those angered ones who saw no guns in surroundings. The non-angered showed no significant difference in the two conditions. Other experiments, confirm in a different way the effect of cues on subsequent aggression, and imply that such cues act as cognitive primes of aggressive thoughts. “Exposure to aggressive cues, independent of a preceding frustration or anger, can facilitate access to aggression-related schemata in memory.” (Mummendey & Otten, *ibid.* p. 320) To these findings, we may add Zillmann’s (1979) Excitation Transfer theory according to which residual arousals from a previous condition may actually be added to arousal states in a new situation, and while anger is intrinsically related to aggression, these other arousal states may indeed stem from non aggressive sources such as sport and physical exertion or erotic excitement. Siann (*ibid.*) records a series of experiments, some of which are not in congruence with the predictions of frustration-aggression hypothesis; she then sees it “reasonable to conclude with Baron (1977) that in the experimental situation frustration is a relatively weak instigator of aggression” (p.140); she further adds that some other variables which may be present in the situation, such as gender of participants, as well as their knowledge of the efficacy of aggression, and the amount of imposed frustration, have effects. However, sometimes experimental settings are factitious and do not reflect real life conditions, and participants themselves know this, and therefore they may show more self-restraint, comparing to natural settings, with more serious problems than what is usually going on in laboratory settings.

1.3.2 Relative Deprivation:

Ted Robert Gurr has applied the frustration-aggression hypothesis in a group level study of political violence. In *Why Men Rebel*, Gurr (1970) puts forward his main hypothesis derived from this theory that “The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity.” (p. 24) Gurr states that frustration leads to aggression in the condition which he refers to as “relative deprivation”; a condition which he defines as “actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities” (Gurr 1970, p. 35; 1975 p. 80), or in Welch's (1980) words “perceived gaps between an individual's aspirations and his accomplishments” (p. 132). Value expectations according to Gurr (1975) are “the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled”. (p. 80) but value capabilities are related to the social environment, and they determine how people may perceive their chances to obtain and preserve those values they expect to acquire. He relates relative deprivation to the concept of frustration “by extending Yates's distinction between the frustrating situation and the frustrated organism” (ibid., p. 82) and explains that a frustrating situation puts physical or social barriers on the way of an actor who attempts to attain or keep enjoying a value. In such a condition if the actor is aware of the imposed limitation he can be considered as frustrated, and this awareness “is equivalent to the concept of relative deprivation”. (ibid. p. 82) Then with regard to the source of frustration he points out that people feel frustration only if they perceive themselves in comparison to others, to be treated worse than others. So they should be in some respects comparable.

On the basis of expectations- capabilities relations four basic models have been developed: 1) static capabilities and increasing expectations; 2) increasing

expectations exceeding increasing capabilities; 3) capabilities going along in a same pace with expectations for a while and then suddenly dropping behind; 4) drastic fall in capabilities due to economic crises, while the level of expectations is static. Each of these models may have different consequences. (see Pandey 2006, p. 39)

Gurr's reformulation of frustration-aggression hypothesis may fit some forms of social violence such as riots and revolutions, and explain why the people who have been maltreated and deprived of what they think they are eligible to attain, tend to violence. Such movements may sometimes take the form of an emancipatory movement for reviving some violated rights. However we may realize that not all the people who aggress, can be described as "frustrated"; by reverse, a considerable part of social and systematic violence and oppression has been committed by the over-gratified ruling classes (e.g. feudal lords' violence against serfs) whose aggression seems to be out of *megalomaniac* fantasies. In such cases an *anticipation* of frustration seems to be at work, rather than being frustrated. Then aggressive behavior itself may stem from two different motives, which result in two distinct forms of aggression: *hostile* versus *instrumental* (Feshbach 1964; Buss 1961; as cited in Sian 1985), which Zillmann (1979), in response to the critics who saw the hostile aggression also as instrumental (because of serving for a purpose and being goal-oriented), labels them as *annoyance-motivated* and *incentive-motivated*; and Dodge and Coie (1987) have used the terms *reactive* and *proactive* to distinguish between these two forms. All these three paired terms differentiate between aggression for *eliminating* something (an undesired condition that is the source of frustration), and *attaining* to some desired outcomes or specific incentives. The former can be considered in revolutionary and vindictive violence, while the latter may typify criminal

violence which sometimes becomes the prolonged pattern of behavior, because it entails secondary gains. Of course sometimes both these forms can exist together, for example in religious terrorism. If we accept such a distinction, Gurr's model may fit better to the former kind of aggression than to the latter. For the prolonged patterns of aggressive behavior we may hardly be able to apply this model, because the drive theory (including the concept of relative deprivation) of aggression focuses on negative emotional arousal which is reduced after an aggressive behavior (either direct or displaced) is elicited. The physiological mechanisms of emotional arousal seem to be almost the same in humans, while emotional behavior is different in people. It seems that the prolonged patterns of aggressive behavior demand clarifications on the basis of personality theories rather than the concept of arousal. Considering the conditions for which the drive theory does not explain, yet it has helped to cast light on some parts of the dark side of human aggression.

1.4 Social Learning Theory

The social learning theory of aggression underestimates the biological backgrounds of behavior and puts emphasis on the role of environmental factors. Aggressive behavior, according to Albert Bandura (1973, cited in Durkin 1995) is "learned through essentially the same processes as those regulating the acquisition of any other form of behavior. People learn by observation and by direct experience." (p. 68, p.403) In this theory, reinforcement of the aggressive behavior has an important role in the maintenance of aggressive response tendencies.

Bandura does not deny the role of biological and motivational factors, however he gives priority to the social learning influences. (see Baron &

Richardson 1994) According to Bandura (1978, p. 39) “a theory must explain not only how aggressive patterns are acquired but also how they are activated and channeled” (also see Sian 1985, p. 144). Bandura pays attention to three aspects of aggression: acquisition, instigation, and maintenance. Aggressive behavior is first acquired, and then when there are instigators, it is elicited. He counts five main instigators for aggressive patterns: modeling, incentive inducements, instructional control, delusional control and aversive treatments. Finally if these aggressive patterns are reinforced, they can be preserved and frequently used in life. The three mentioned aspects are summarized in the following table:

Table 1.2 Three main aspects of aggression in Bandura’s Social Learning Theory

<p><u>Acquisition:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>neurophysiological conditions</i>, consisting of hormonal, genetic, physical characteristics. - <i>Observational learning</i>, in family or close relationships, in a subcultural milieu, and through symbolic modeling (such as movies) - <i>Direct experiences</i>, such as participation in war, or reinforcement of aggressive behavior
<p><u>Instigation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Aversive treatments</i> leading to frustration, physical assault, verbal insult, adverse reductions in reinforcements. - <i>Modeling influences</i>, through disinhibitory effects, facilitative arousal, and stimulus enhancement through attention. - <i>Incentive inducements</i> (such as money, admiration) leading to instrumental aggression. - <i>Instructional control</i> (such as orders) - <i>Delusional control</i> (bizarre beliefs, paranoid inspections)

Reinforcement:

- *Direct external reinforcement* (including, material, social, alleviation of aversions, and expression of injury)
- *Vicarious reinforcement* through observed rewards or punishments.
- *Neutralization of self-punishment* through moral justification, palliative comparison, euphemistic labeling, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, dehumanization of victims, attribution of blames to victims, misrepresentation of consequences, graduated desensitization.

1.4.1 Acquisition

Acquisition of new behaviors happens in a social setting consisting of the learner (observer or participant) and the environment (family, peers, educational settings, cultural groups...) which has a defining role in this process. The concept of acquisition is fundamental to this theory, through which Bandura emphasizes on the relation between individual and educational environment in its general sense, as the preponderant determinant in learning to be aggressive. So such terms as *instinct* seem to have no place in the vocabulary of the Social Learning Theory. Acquisition of aggressive behavior takes place through either observation or personal direct experiences. Also the process of learning in Social Learning Theory, as construed from the processes mentioned in table 1.2, also takes cognitive concepts into account. Aggressive behavior in many social settings may be learned through aggressive models. Indeed, modeling is a very important way of social transmission. In the course of his experiments with children, using dolls which were maltreated by adults, Bandura showed that after a mere observation, children acquired and imitated the very behavior when they had the opportunity to play with dolls. Their behaviors were similar to the models they had observed during the experiment. Aggressive parents, influential peers, or symbolic models such as 'invincible' movie stars who usually 'justifiably'

demolish the 'enemies' one after another, give examples of such models. In these cases patterns of aggressive behavior are rewarded and reinforced. Sometimes aggressive figures because of their authoritarian roles get high reverence, and therefore, children wish to have the same characteristics.

Though it is said that aggressive behavior is acquired in social environment, usually through modeling, but a question is that why parents, teachers, school counselors, and educators, should spend much time and energy to shape the socially accepted behaviors to the youth, but aggressive patterns (which are usually disapproved by society) are learned fast and are resistant to change?

1.4.2 Instigation of aggression

Individuals, after learning the ways they can be aggressive, and after knowing about when and where and against whom they may express it, then something must happen to transfer this potential behavior into an actual behavior. Some processes are involved:

1.4.2.1 Aversive conditions:

Aversions pertain to negative emotional arousals due to injuries or abusive behavior. For example, when an individual is constantly under attack or sarcasm, that is aversively treated, he may learn to defend aggressively. Conditions leading to pain, humiliation, insults, frustration and resentment, may provoke the individual to behave aggressively. In such conditions aggression, similar to what was discussed in Drive Theory, is rather hostile or reactive, than instrumental. But in critique of the drive theorists Bandura argues that they are too involved with 'hostile' aggression and have not paid enough attention to the instrumental gains which might be attained consequent to an aggressive behavior (Siann 1985, p. 144). However, such aversive stimuli do not necessarily induce aggressive

responses; rather, depending on other acquired behavioral dispositions and as an instigator, aversions may lead to “several generally equipotential possible consequences in addition to aggression, such as regression, withdrawal, dependency, psychosomatization, self-anesthetization with drugs and alcohol, and constructive problem solving” (Goldstein 2001, p. 46).

1.4.2.2 Modeling influences:

In addition to influence on acquisition of aggressive patterns, modeling is also an important instigator which can lead to expression of aggression. According to several studies of 1960s (cited in Bandura 1973b/2009, p. 221), both children and adults who have been exposed to aggressive models show more punitive behavior than those without such an exposure. Three conditions increase the likelihood of modeling: first, the observers being angered; second, the justifiability of aggression; and third, if the victim is associated with aggressive behavior. So modeling increases the likelihood of aggression through losing formerly learned inhibitions pertaining to aggression, and change in observer's perception about the aggressive use of instruments which were previously not associated with aggression, for example a special toy which is usually used for other purposes. (See Siann, 1985, p. 145) When a model is not punished after expressing aggression, a *disinhibition effect* happens; i.e. the observer's inhibitions towards expression of his own aggression are weakened and he is likely to imitate the model. Sometimes aggressive models, in addition to not being punished, are somehow rewarded for the violence they exhibit, and then a *facilitation effect* is resulted. In disinhibition effect the observer, through a process of vicarious extinction of fear, becomes less cautious or reserved in showing his aggression; in facilitation effect, the observer is encouraged to be aggressive. In both disinhibition and facilitation effects there are informative cues

which either reduce the restraints against a similar behavior or approve it. (see Bandura 1971; also Goldstein 2001) So reactions of others to the model's behavior may decrease or increase the contingency of a similar behavior to be elicited from the observer. For example, brutal behavior especially when it is 'unjustified' is socially disapproved, and has less contingency than 'justified' violence to happen; and that is the reason why violent people usually concoct justifications for their behaviors. *Stimulus-enhancing effect* is another process through which modeling instigates aggression. That is according to Bandura (1973b, p. 222), the behavior of a model draws the observer's attention to a particular object used by the performer, which may evoke the observer to use the same instrument more, however not necessarily imitatively. A further point is that as Bandura (ibid.) cites from (Cline 1970; Zillmann 1969; Welch & Welch 1968), the observation of an aggressive behavior induces *emotional arousal*, in humans and animals, which in its turn can amplify the aggressive response. This arousal can facilitate aggressive response, "especially in persons for whom such a response is well-practiced and readily available" (Goldstein, ibid. p. 46).

1.4.2.3 Incentive inducements:

Incentives induce learning aggressive behavior if they are observed to be a consequence of aggression (for instance, when a movie star knocks a counter-hero down and is seen by others with awe and respect, it may give the hint to the observer to learn similar behaviors). In many cases people behave violently in order to get some rewards, rather than to retaliate something or purposely hurt someone. In such cases the aggressors are supposed to be emotionally neutral toward their victims; an armed bank-robbier has usually no personal hostile emotions against the people to whom he may even shoot. Though one may think 'in a general way' that 'such criminals may want to revenge the society which

has not been fair to them’; a serial-killer who kills others, without knowing them, to get their money, may have at least an ‘idea’ about the value of people’s lives. So in the personal history of such criminals, “who aggress just to get rewards” some basic hatred or pessimism toward others can also be found, and then maybe it is not always that easy to make a clear distinction between “hostile” or “anger-based” and “instrumental” aggression.

1.4.2.4 Instructional control:

According to Bandura, in the course of socialization people are extensively trained and rewarded for being obedient to orders. Those who acquiescently obey the instructions at home, school, or work place, that is those who partly or totally submit to authority get more rewards, and the refractory are punished. Then the social control may rear obedient and well-disciplined citizens who are usually ready to put in practice the decisions made by authorities. These “good citizens” may feel no personal moral responsibility for whatever they perpetrate to execute commands; especially if their income and social status depends on such a behavior. Bandura (ibid., p. 228) quotes this expressive sentence from Snow (1961) that, “when you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have been committed in the name of rebellion.”

1.4.2.5 Delusional control:

Sometimes aggression can be instigated by illogical suspicions, paranoid and bizarre beliefs, and strange visions or revelations like what members of some religious sects may experience. Hallucinogens may have similar effects. Of course such cases especially in individual level, are referred to psychological disorders, which sometimes eliminate legal responsibility of the individual.

However as an instigator of aggression they usually exist. For example, the British Daily Mail of (Dec. 3. 2009) gives a terrible report titled “Satan worshippers kill and eat four Russian teenagers after stabbing each of them 666 times.” Such bizarre forms of aggression combine with delusional thought are not rare in eccentric and queer sects.

1.4.3 Reinforcement

Aggressive behaviors are usually maintained if they can serve for specific purposes; as Bandura states, “behavior is extensively controlled by its consequences” (as cited in Siann, 1985, p. 146). For example, a father’s loud yelling accompanied by attacking gestures, may put an end (though usually temporarily) to a matter of dispute; a youngster’s rebellious conduct may give him a feeling of manly strength and assertiveness. In such and similar cases, aggressive behavior may have some gains, by which it is reinforced and maintained. The maintenance of aggressive patterns in people’s behavioral repertoire depends on two forms of reinforcement.

First, *direct reinforcement* through which an individual is rewarded for his aggression. This may sometimes happen when the aggressive behavior is somehow, by means of social norms, justified. For example, a person who interferes in a fistfight to defend a bullied person and knocks down the first aggressor may receive both attention and confirmatory signs from bystanders, which can increase the likelihood of this behavior in similar occasions. Direct reinforcement can be *tangible* (such as money, or any other material reward), *social* (consisting of rewards pertaining to status, or approval by others), *alleviation of aversive treatments* (e.g. if defensive aggression brings about satisfying results like when the offender gives in and flees), and *expression of*

injury (which can provide the person with some self-justification, leading to severe retaliations). Though according to Feldman (1993, p. 306) the expression of injury by a victim may have either reinforcing or inhibiting effects, depending on the extent to which it can successfully work as a means of aggression. Its inhibitory effect can be resulted from substitution of physical attack by verbal aggression.

The second process is *vicarious reinforcement*, in which aggressive behavior may be reinforced after observation of an aggressive model being rewarded. A major part of our social experiences come from the “lessons” we learn from what happens to others. People do not need test everything by themselves. As Bandura (1971) writes, “in everyday life performances are invariably accompanied by outcomes which affect the degree to which observers act in a similar manner” (p. 47). So when a specific behavior, performed by a model, is reinforced, this can increase the contingency of a similar behavior in more or less similar conditions by observers. Children’s imitation of cartoon heroes, or of other powerful models who influence them is an example; heroes are those figures whom people admire. The highly violent societies may offer more aggressive models who are constantly imitated and reproduced.

In Social Learning Theory, some cognitive mechanisms exert a regulatory function in violent behavior. These mechanisms are used in order to neutralize *self-punishment* that is, to lighten the burden of conscience and avoid self-criticism and feeling guilty resulting from violating one’s own standards of conduct. This is especially important for those people whose social functions or interests (interests which are sometimes translated into ideologies) make them involved in violent actions (e.g. police or army in despotic societies, and ideological criminals). To avoid self-punishment they use such mechanisms as:

Moral justification (like saying “society should be protected from such infidels. I only perform my religious task.”) Moral justification is a way for cognitive reconstruction of the behavior. According to Bandura (1999) people can harm others only when they are able to justify their actions as socially or morally worthy, so that when they are engaged in harming others, they can preserve their self-concepts as moral agents.

Palliative comparison (e.g. “I have not done one tenth of what he has done against me”) Through comparing oneself to other aggressive models and finding them still more aggressive, one lessens his feeling of guilt.

Euphemistic labeling (like saying “I was a little harsh, I know. But I hit him, not out of hatred; it was only a necessary punishment for his future”).¹ This mechanism reduces the guilt by giving a new name to the aggressive conduct.

Displacement of responsibility (e.g. “I wasn’t myself! They made me crazy.”) In many cases aggressors believe that others, the people in charge, make the decisions and they only follow orders of their superiors.

Diffusion of responsibility (“I am not the only one to blame, others also have a role”). To have accomplices make the blame to be divided among several persons, so that one feels less responsibility for the crime.

¹ Years ago, when Iranian teachers were not yet prohibited from inflicting physical punishment on pupils, strict and punitive teachers would sometimes, after slapping and stick hitting children, quote an old proverb which literally means “teacher’s stick is better than fatherly love”!

Dehumanization of victims (“they are an inferior race”). By ascription of negative and disparaging labels to victims, they are introduced as less human than others, and this way less pity or sympathy toward them is resulted.

Attribution of blames to victims (“he shouldn’t have tussled me, this is the result of his own behavior”). An English proverb says “he who sows the wind reaps the storm”.

Misconstruing the consequences (“he pretends to be injured; I didn’t touch him!”). Sometimes the outcomes of violence are selectively disregarded. A fighter pilot who bombards a non-military area may be unwilling to know about the number of casualties.

Such cognitive mechanisms are then frequently used in different perpetrator-victim relations, by aggressors, for the purpose of self-exoneration. (see Bandura (1990/1998; 1999)




Fig. 1.2 Psychological mechanisms involved in disengagement from detrimental behavior toward victims; from Bandura (1999, p. 194), *Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities*, in *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, Vol. 3, No.3.

The Social Learning Theory offers an easy-to-understand model which can be applied to many domains of social life. At the same time, this theory has an important implication, that is, if aggression as a learned behavior is shaped in the context of social relations, then it should be affected also by cultural variables. As different cultures across the world bring about diverse social formations, each portrayed with its own value system and behavioral norms, they may explain part of the etiology of human violent behavior. This is discussed in the Chapter Three, after pointing out to some general issues in cultural studies in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two

Culture, the Common Human Experience

“Culture is to society what memory is to individuals.”

Clyde Kluckhohn

2.1 The Evolution of Culture

Cultural evolution can be considered as the third major wave of evolution following the pre-organic and organic phases. Hence culture might be viewed either as a mere extension of the organic evolution with almost the same features and laws as it is usually discussed in the human ethology, or a separate and different process with its own specific characteristics as considered in the non-evolutionary approaches to culture. For example Gabora (2001) writes that “it is inappropriate to dismiss culture as a predictable extension of biological evolution. It is qualitatively different from anything else biology has produced.” (p. 7) She finds the application of the Darwinian theory insufficient for the explanation of culture. Because human mind with all its complicated conscious functions “refines”, “evaluates”, and “selects cultural novelty”. (p. 213)

The biological foundations of behavior have widely been described by ethological terms such as the fixed patterns of action including reflexes and

instincts (e.g. Lorenzian theory, as discussed in Chapter One; see also Kim 1976). However in the cultural level the relation between biological needs and the consequent proportionate behavior is mediated by cognition and conscious processes, and hence may necessitate more subtle concepts than those biological terms. Though, in general it seems that the dominant tendency in the modern science has been to infer human behavior (including his social conduct) on the basis of our biological knowledge. For example Stephen Hawking (2008), the well-known British physicist, in a presentation, while speaking about the future survival of mankind states that “our genetic codes still carry the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past” (06:48-06:56). Many scholars prefer to pay more attention to the biological, rather than social backgrounds of human behavior.

The cultural phase developed when human groups invented new ways for coexistence and for cognitively mediated adaptation to their environments. Such adaptations had been possible consequent to gradual changes in the size and complexity of the human forebrains (consisting of loci for information processing and volitional behavior). Increasing use of symbols led to unprecedented social relations. The new modes of mutual behaviors might be called parabiological because they reflected such emotions as fear, jealousy, and sexual desires (also shared with primates) in such a sublimated manner that in effect became congruent to social necessities and regulations. In this sense, these new modes of social behavior might be even construed as *anti* biological because they would practically lead to the repression of such forceful biological instincts as sexual drives. Therefore, culture serves also the function of regulating and controlling our biologically based behaviors.

The increasing body of social and political regulations, economic institutions, technological inventions, arts, common beliefs and customs, which form a culture, may last for a long time, because of the functions they serve for maintaining the adaptive relation of man to his environment. So the evolution of any specific culture -because of being embedded in a special environmental context- does not follow a universal pattern, and is not necessarily the same as of another. Thus non homogenous cultures arise in different environments (and we may logically expect similar cultures to be arisen in similar ecologies).

We may speculate that early human societies had very simple and small structures, and were free from any formal regulations and governmental institutions. Comparing those early societies to the present industrial ones indicates directionality in the process of cultural evolution: a movement from simplicity to complexity (comparable to the similar processes in the biological evolution which started with simple unicellular structures) and from informality to formality (e.g. from tribal communities to nation states).

Culture can be construed as the natural continuation of evolution in a higher level, but toward a same direction, i.e. toward adaptation and fitness to the environment. In the pre-cultural or biological level, this goal is usually achieved through instinctive capabilities that enable organism to fight or flee effectively enough to survive and pass its genes on to its offspring. This is true both in interspecific and intraspecific relations. In the cultural level, again, such adaptive capabilities might be repeated in new forms to provide their holders with wealth, prosperity, and social privileges, and to mark them as the winners of the “battlefield of life”. This is the epitome of what is usually claimed in Social Darwinism, and its modern version, that is Sociobiology, in the most succinct way. It assumes an essential co-directionality and similarity between

the biological and cultural evolutions, even though the genesis of any specific culture is mediated by unprecedented recently developed conscious processes which altogether equip the members of that society with the ability to imagine different outcomes for different actions (instead of moving toward a fix instinctually determined consummatory behavior), to get to consensus, and to establish a social contract, and to show altruism and prosocial behavior.

The evolution of human culture can be distinguished from the biological evolution by means of the diverse products of cultures such as language, symbols, artifacts, socifacts, and mentifacts, which lead to what is called “the extragenetic transmission of information” (Plotkin 1996, as cited in Jeffreys 2000). Another distinguishing factor is Tomasello’s (1999) “ratchet effect”, that is the continuous cumulative increase and modification of knowledge and practice over generations. This longitudinal transfer of knowledge and information is mediated by conscious processes. Still others (e.g. Heyes 1998, and Alvard 2003) refer to the ability of having a “theory of mind” as a precondition for the evolution of culture and transmission of cultural contents. Premack and woodruff (1978) had used this term before to distinguish animal and human learning (as cited in Sperber and Hirschfeld 1999). In short, a theory of mind is the ascription of similar intentions to other members of the species; it is inference of the presence of mental states in others and deduction of a causal relationship between such mental states and the elicited behaviors on the side of another person. This can facilitate mutual relations and a sense of prediction of other’s behavior. Having a theory of mind normally develops in humans in childhood, perhaps except for the autistic children who might have problems in mindreading (Baron-Cohen, 1995) while primates seem to lack this ability.

2.2 Memes, the building blocks of culture

An important part of information which are conveyed across society and spread over both horizontally and vertically, are developed, adopted and enriched via cultural means, that is social learning and imitation. The approach of Neo-Darwinian thought to culture stands for a strict analogy between the genetic and cultural evolutions. The famous representative of this approach, Charles Dawkins (1976), has introduced his well-known genetic based model of cultural evolution in which he explains in the same way that genes replicate themselves and spread over through organisms, cultural replicators spread over through human brains. He calls these cultural replicators “memes” to sound even phonetically like genes. He coined this term in the English literature in *The Selfish Gene* (unaware of a similar term, which was the title of a book, *Die Mneme*, written by another Richard, Richard Wolfgang Semon, a German evolutionary biologist, in 1904) to describe the elements or the fundamental units of cultural inheritance which seem to be transmitted spontaneously. Memes have the same characteristics of genes: they are self-replicating; they evolve in a natural selection mode and propagate via the processes of variation, mutation, and competition; the more successfully propagated memes are inherited and last longer and the less successful ones become extinct. In chapter 11 of the *Selfish Gene* titled *Memes: the New Replicators*, Dawkins puts “most of what is unusual about man can be summed up in one word: ‘culture’”... “Cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution” (p. 189). Pointing out to P.F. Jenkins’ work on saddleback, a singer bird of islands of New Zealand, and how this bird is able to increase its ‘song pool’ by invention of

new songs, which as he writes “evolves by non-genetic means”, he extrapolates that the human language, as well as:

Fashions in dress and diet, ceremonies and customs, art and architecture, engineering and technology, all evolve in historical time, in a way that looks like highly speeded up genetic evolution, but has really nothing to do with genetic evolution. (p. 190)

But at the same time he further adds...“for an understanding of the evolution of modern man, we must begin by throwing out the gene as the sole basis of our ideas on evolution” (p. 191), and it may seem to be in odds with the common understanding of his ideas. However in the next pages while counting some examples of memes, he states that:

Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process, which in the broad sense, can be called imitation. (p. 192)

What seems new in this idea is breaking human thoughts and behavioral habits and so on, into small pieces or basic units and giving them a new name which sounds like one of the most scientifically wrought terms in biology. And we can expect that just in the same way genes transfer from generation to generation, memes also open their ways from brain to brain and settle down in our behavioral repertoire. And as I construe from Daniel C. Dennett’s works (e.g. *Breaking the Spell* 2006, pp. 80-81, and 120-21) these memes are autonomous in making up our minds and apparently there is no selector or decision making faculty in our minds to approve or disapprove their presence in us. In other words we can analogize human mind and consciousness to a castle

without any guardians or even any landlord into which everyone can enter and reside without being questioned. An interesting point in *memetics* is that the benefits of memes for their hosts do not necessarily guarantee their survival, and instead it is the effectiveness of their replication which leads them to propagate the best, that is a successful meme may or may not need to provide any benefit to its host. As Dennett (1995, in Blackmore 2003) explains:

[t]he difference between other theories and the memetic theory proposed here lies in the question ‘Who benefits?’ Previous theories suggest that either the individual person or their genes are the primary beneficiaries; memetic theory suggests that the memes are. (p. 25)

Indeed memes seem to act like viruses and the more rapid and effective in spreading they are the more chance for a prolonged inheritance they have. We are nobody to select memes (ideas, beliefs, etc.), instead, memes select us! (The words like ‘I’ or ‘we’ make us falsely perceive ourselves as conscious wills.) That’s why human consciousness is undermined by researchers like Dennett and Kinsbourne (in *Consciousness Explained* 1991) and Blackmore (ibid.). For example Blackmore calls consciousness as an “illusion” and also “persisting conscious self” as a “false idea” (ibid. p. 26). However it is not clear that she has *consciously* rejected the idea of consciousness or unconsciously! Dennett and Kinsbourne find the Cartesian mind-body dualism as the basis of our common *misunderstanding* of consciousness. They (according to Baars 1997) “maintain that the Cartesian Theater reflects a widely shared intuition that consciousness involves a single point center.” (p. 11) Baars also explains that in the modern understanding of consciousness and certainly since 1950 the Cartesian idea occupies no place. It seems that the neuropsychologists of our time accept the multiple centers of consciousness model and nobody is trying to

trace our 'souls' in the pineal gland. Though the concept of consciousness is not so easy to handle especially from an ontological or philosophical standpoint (Dennett's specialty) however from an experimental psychological standpoint we may have a clearer idea of it. Consciousness is accompanied by the 'attention process' and in a conscious behavior, depending on many factors, we 'select' and 'retrieve' parts of our previous experience from our long-term storage into our working memory, where we can creatively apply them for a special purpose such as solving a current problem, in a spatio-temporal context. The idea of unconsciousness introduced in philosophy and psychology by thinkers like Leibniz and almost two centuries later by Sigmund Freud attracted a great attention to the hidden sources of human motivation and behavior, so that in the first half of the 20th century the idea became a focal one and overshadowed the conscious part of human mind, and now, this not very vast territory of human consciousness is being invaded by a myriad of autonomous and uninvited invisible phantoms who do whatever they want, careless about their sleeping host! However, at least as long as I *need* the idea of consciousness, I won't acknowledge the rule of these selfish memes on human consciousness!

Regardless of the concept of consciousness, here we could or should ask what makes a meme more efficient in its replication pace? If there are successful memes which spread in a population and in the course of time, and there are unsuccessful memes which fail to propagate sufficiently then they must be different in some ways. This pseudo-virus should be established in its hosts and be transferred more effectively to others. But if its functional values for the hosts are not of a considerable importance for its survival, then what determines the degree of its transferability and sustenance; a sheer randomness,

its salience, its practicality, or its novelty? Or indeed what causes a meme to propagate more successfully than others? In the genetic realm genes are formed by combination of a four-letter alphabet in diverse and infinite ways. In the genes microcosm, it seems obvious that a defective gene which lacks functional benefits for its host, has a less chance for survival in long run, and if we are to accept a strict genetic analogy of culture, how can we believe that less functionally beneficial memes might have an even greater chance for survival? Though it is beyond the scope of this work to go into details of this model, however it seems to me that the functional benefits of the so-called memes for their “hosts” should have an important role in their survival. Let’s make this notion clearer by an example. In the world of art some new “cheap” styles or movements may develop and overshadow the so-called “genuine” art. The recently developed “jargon” and noisy music gets more popularity and priority to the “outdated” classical music. A few traces of dots and lines on a piece of canvas or chaotic mixtures of colors are widely hanged in fine art museums, as the modern art, and so forth. Such new styles might be conceived by professionals- who are much less in number than the laymen- as signs of decadence. These kinds of art may spread widely and substitute or overshadow well-wrought artistic creations. This may indicate that cultural inventions and evolution are not necessarily directed to “perfection” (at least the Persian synonym of the term “evolution” so implies). Apparently these new forms have no functional benefits; however, they are beneficial for their hosts because they provide the people who are lacking an aptitude for “the genuine arts” with feeling like an artist! Dawkins and those cultural evolutionists who think along with him seem to be interested in giving a simple and at the same time all-encompassing formula, a golden key that unlocks any lock. So it seems that the genetic analogy of culture has its own weak points and can undergo criticism.

As related to memes some ambiguities may exist; while genes have their own material entities, we could ask where do the memes come from? Memes similar to Leibniz's monads have no clear physicality (shape, matter, size and energy) (see www.memes.org) and they seem to be *nothings* that do *everything*! How can a meme which has no beneficial function for its host continue to survive? The meme theory as reflected in the ideas of Dawkins and his co-thinkers in other thought domains, is based on an analogy in which it is usually concluded just as genes do this, memes do that. Similarity to a gene is usually appealed to explain a meme. Though now it is said that memes supersede genetics. Meme is a metaphor and it seems that people (including academics) are much interested in metaphors, while they can explain and clarify new ideas through analogy to formerly known concepts. This is a cognitive parsimony method. However the question remains that why the messages which have been created in human minds and exchanged amongst them should take precedence over their creators?

There is no doubt that the evolution theory has had a great impact on social sciences. However, Loye (2000) insists that the current neo Darwinian approach to evolution has widely invaded all arenas of the social sciences, but this approach has indeed nothing to do with Darwin's ideas about evolution in human level. According to Loye:

In *The Descent of Man*, Darwin clearly tells us, for example, that he will now move on beyond the prehuman base of the theory outlined in *Origin of Species* to develop a theory of evolution at the *human* level. In page after page of his long ignored writings, he tells us that moral sensitivity, not selfishness, and love and cooperation, not survival of the fittest, are the primary motivations driving evolution at our level! I

show how he moved on from biology to pioneer in the development of systems science and cognitive, developmental, and humanistic psychology—these “higher” levels of evolution that along with the second and completing half of Darwin’s theory were then ignored or faced an uphill struggle for over 100 years. (p. 5)

The essence of this criticism is that the prevailing wave of neo Darwinian theories find mechanistic deterministic explanations on the pre-human evolution and then extrapolate them to human mind and culture. For example Loye counts eleven evolutionary levels after the evolution of human brain, which have been achieved through a “vertically ascending process”, consisting of psychological and cultural categories, levels that have been claimed to be ignored by evolution theorists.

Though it can be said that culture is not an appendage of biology, however we can hardly overlook an essential similarity between biological and cultural evolution, which pertains to their adaptive function; the former in a preconscious and the latter in a conscious (cognitive) level. Culture is not biology, but at least it has been basically developed to satisfy our biological needs in ecologies with limited vital resources in a conscious programmed way. Hence we may call the cultural evolution as *conscious evolution* which can be the continuation of a general process, or a part of a continuum. There seems to be no convincing evidence to make us believe that cultural evolution goes to a different direction. However the term *cultural evolution* itself has been evolved since its introduction by the early anthropologists and sociologists, who usually viewed the formation and evolution of cultures in a unilinear process, beginning from the so-called primitive cultures and ending to civilization. This standpoint can be found in the works of such thinkers as Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte,

and Lewis Henry Morgan. The unilinear evolution theories were the leading thought currents in the realm of cultural anthropology during the 19th Century and they especially fitted to the Colonialism Era politics. Segall et. al. (1990, p. 96) call this, scientific justification of “European conquest and domination”. In addition to scientific usage, they were also part of a justification for colonizing the “primitive” cultures and helping them to achieve to a standard westernized life style. Such theories were not confined to anthropology and they opened their way to other domains of social thought. For example Friedrich Engels’ *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* was inspired by Morgan’s *Ancient Societies* (for example, see Robin Fox’s Introduction, in Morgan 2000; or Foster & Clark 2004) in which he had distinguished three eras, Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization each characterized by a technological advance (i.e. fire, bow, and pottery for the first era; agriculture, domestication of animals, and metalworking for the second, and finally alphabet and writing as the turning point of the rise of civilization). This would also support the Marxist view about the determining and decisive influence of material progress in shaping human social relations.

Within decades the unilinear cultural evolution theories which were mainly based on the notion of progress levels, gradually gave ground to the multilinear theories, partly because of theoretical problems for giving an all-encompassing interpretation of different social formations, and partly due to the derogative implications they might convey against some human groups. It seems that besides the mere scientific argumentation, *expedience* has also had a role in changing the attitude of contemporary thinkers and substituting the ‘biased’ and ‘dogmatic’ unilinear approaches with the more ‘liberal’ cultural relativism which seems to be in a more harmony with the contemporary zeitgeist.

2.3 The Regulatory Role of Culture

There are many definitions for the term “culture” and they usually pay attention to its structure. Kroeber and Kluckhohn in their *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (1952) (as cited in Borofsky et al. 2001) have found more than 150 definitions of culture in other writings, which more or less show both the wide realm of cultural theories as well as diverse understandings of researchers of this concept, and up to now such definitions have probably been manifold. Their own definition is as follows:

Culture consists of explicit and implicit patterns of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts; cultural patterns may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of further action. (p. 357, cited in Morling & Lamoreaux 2008, p. 201)

Hofstede (1997) defines culture as:

the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. (p. 5)

In this definition, such groups or categories might be distinguished on the basis of their common experiences such as language, religious beliefs, etc. But from a functional standpoint, I would like to add one more definition to this long inventory of definitions: Culture is a constellation of adaptive ways and solutions that any human group invents or adopts to cope with emerging problems and to preserve society and social structures. In a shorter expression it is *the mode of group behavior*. And I find this definition conceptually very close to Damen’s (1987) definition of culture as:

learned and shared human patterns or models for living; day-to-day living patterns. these patterns and models pervade all aspects of human social interaction. Culture is mankind's primary adaptive mechanism (p. 367).

Culture has a function through which it provides us with ready-made cognitive shortcuts or heuristics for information processing, judgment, and decision-making. It regulates the mode of interaction among the members of a given society. In ambiguous and ambivalent conditions of decision-making, people usually tend to make their decisions according to their in-group norms. Conflictual conditions that may lead to violence are also of this sort. That is, in such conditions people may tend to behave according to norms than to their own creative solutions; it is more parsimonious and less time taking.

Culture may be figuratively called as the “personality of society” or the “collective mind”. It is the outcome of a prolonged shared experience and interaction. It equips us with a meaning system and a framework of reference to interpret the world. This notion may give a background to the Jungian concept of the Collective Unconscious as something deeply rooted in the human culture which is precedent to the personal experience.

Metaphorically culture is the trunk and personality is the branch of the human experience and identity. Human societies have evolved in different ecological, geographical, and historical contexts, and therefore their modes of interactions (cultures) depending on the needs of each society, are expected to be different. This is what Triandis and Suh (2002) have also discussed. For example, they find geographical obstacles like large mountains or ocean as a cause that decreases cultural transfusion, leading to isolation and as a result to cultural homogeneity, which makes a culture “tight” with more or less strict

norms and serious rules against deviation from those norms. And also the human groups whose life resources are moveable acquire more aggressive traits in order to preserve their vital resources, and this may lead to the cultures of honor previously studied by Nisbett and Cohen (1996). By the same token, according to Triandis and Suh such characteristics as equality and inequality in distribution of survival resources are affected by ecology, so that in hunter-gatherer societies (as they cite from O'Kelly & Carney 1986) food is distributed almost equally because it cannot be preserved for a long time; while in those societies where members can store the resources (in a preservable form e.g. money) most inequalities might be observed. They write:

The cultures that emerge in different parts of the world often reflect the availability of flora, fauna, and other resources, as well as historical factors, such as migrations, wars, revolutions, and inventions. (ibid. p. 138)

It seems that every component of a culture (including, myths, religion, values, norms and traditions, etc.) has an adaptive function, usually matches with other parts (is normally expected to be in coherence with others), and reflects in a way the real historical experiences of a given society. For example, heroes and saviors come into existence in the hard and unbearable conditions of a tribe or nation. The Middle East which has been repeatedly under invasion and oppression has given birth to some Last Day saviors. The established thought habits may reflect life-styles of human groups in diverse cultural milieus. For example, in dry-farming based economies people are mostly dependent on the forces which are out of their control that is, they should wait for rain in order to provide their food. So the belief in destiny must be more prevalent or stronger in such societies than in those with irrigated farming (this

hypothesis seems to be easily testable). Because, the subsistence of people in the former societies, usually depends more on “chance” rather than on their own activities.

Culture has an adaptive function. It orients its members toward adjustment in a common way. As long as the cultural inventions can serve for their adaptive functions, they will continue to exist, but while the cultural institutions can no longer provide people with proper solutions for their daily problems, then they tend to be forgotten and substituted by new ones, or at least to be modified.

According to Keesing (1974) Cultures are systems (of socially transmitted behavior patterns) that “serve to relate human communities to their ecological settings” (p. 75). These ways-of-life of communities include technologies and modes of economic organization, settlement patterns, modes of social grouping and political organization, religious beliefs and practices, and so on. He then adds that:

Seen as adaptive systems, cultures change in the direction of equilibrium within ecosystems; but when balances are upset by environmental, demographic, technological, or other systemic changes, further adjustive changes ramify through the cultural system. Feedback mechanisms in cultural systems may thus operate both negatively (toward self-correction and equilibrium) and positively (toward disequilibrium and directional change). (p. 76)

Then every culture in the course of its development faces a series of crises. The issue of cultural change is an issue of a never-stopping challenge between old and new. Many now-traditional conservative ideologies were once

innovative and revolutionary; once religions in the time of their rise had appealing and promising messages for the suffering people, before being transformed into a reason of human suffering, and before being converted into institutions of wealth and power. In a similar way, Marxism with all its promises for the emancipation of mankind, within one century, in the hands of dictators like Stalin was transformed into a dreadful means of enslavement and humiliation of mankind. The cultures which are demarcated with such ideologies may sooner or later show the signs of disharmony between ideology and reality. Utopian ideologies cannot adjust themselves to the status quo, and then efforts to preserve and apply them in social decisions may be accompanied by challenge and violence. In such societies, the pace of cultural change may not be proportionate to the real changes in the material life and hence a “cultural lag” happens. So when we contemplate over civilization and its discontents, such discontents may reflect a disharmony between the previously shaped “inert” and conservative cultural habits and institutions on the one hand, and the new emerging material and civilizational progress on the other hand, i.e. a gap between civilization (as the hardware) and culture (as the software). See Fig. 2.1.




Fig. 2.1 Disharmony between established culture and the emerging modus vivendi

Many of such discontents stem from expectations which are not compatible with the new social settings. We may find many proofs for this in history: the Industrial Revolution imposed many alterations on human relations in the *sociosphere* and changed peoples' life styles, and then altered the way people should deal with such transformations. As a consequence in the cultural level, some important intellectual and social movements, such as and above all Marxism ensued which in turn, led to many other deep changes in man's interpretation of the social life. In the same way we may explain even some mythological metaphors which might have some roots in our ancestors' daily lives. For example, the God of rain who riding on his chariot would pass above clouds across the sky to cast rain drops on the Earth came into appearance shortly after the invention of wheel (Loeffler-Delachaux 1985) whose sound while moving on the ground would resemble to the thunder sound (that is to the Rain God's chariot). Or in a same way, I suppose that the legend of Adam's sin and his Fall to earth can be explained according to a pre-historical event, and it metaphorically reflects a real change in human society: that is an agricultural revolution occurred in the Neolithic era, and the hunter gatherer man fell from the forests down to fields. The first villages appeared and man became a sinful "wheat-eater", who had to produce his own food in the fields, and to take more responsibility toward his life. This might be the reason that why in most religious texts, mans guilt and misery starts with eating the forbidden food that is "wheat". Therefore, cultures and their constituents represent special ways of adaptation to specific ecologies, and hence they are embedded in the real material life, and in their turn, they strengthen those values and ethical rules which are in accord with those specific material relations. This concordance continues to the point that the cultural achievements can no longer adjust themselves to the newly emerged economic formation, and then a culture

change becomes necessary. This is what has usually happened in the process of transformation from a traditional society to a modern one.

There might be variations among cultures in their degrees of rigidity or flexibility toward change. It seems that more rigid cultures which resist against any innovations are prone to harsh transformations and social revolutions. Thus, there must be some characteristics in societies which lead them to rigidity or flexibility toward change.

A similar logic might be applied for an interpretation of cultural habits or behaviors, to understand why a group of people might think or behave in a special way. Each socio-economic formation may have its own concomitant behavioral habits. Indeed this idea is the foundation of all theoretical efforts that have been made to classify world cultures. Because, the main goal of all such classifications is to specify those factors which are involved in human behavioral variations.

Though thinkers like Levi Strauss have argued for the basic universal design of the human mind (through studying myths and kinship systems) and have tried to find the universal structures of human thought shared by all cultures, an idea which according to Burridge (1975) sounds similar to Adolf Bastian's assumption of the "psychic unity of mankind" (p. 579), and according to Levi-Strauss (1963, as cited in Goodenough 1969, p. 334) refers to man's constitutional inclination "to think in certain ways and to develop certain kinds of ideas", however the diversity of cultures is notable, and within cultures which may be thought of as stemming from a similar structure, there are differences which have been reported in cross cultural studies. Barkow,

Cosmides, and Tooby (1992) provide a solution by dividing cultures in three levels:

1) Meta Culture based on pan-human characteristics and biology. It is consisted of shared (but not adopted) modes of behavior; we may compare it to the idea of basic structures of human mind.

2) Evoked Culture which depending on ecology and geography takes different forms; this is the reason of cultural diversities across the world.

3) Epidemiological Culture, which is common among human groups, but only due to exchange and the process of cultural diffusion.

The different experiences may have led to the emergence of some “cultural types” amongst which we may refer to violent/nonviolent ones. Anthropology provides some evidence for violent vs. nonviolent cultures; this will be reviewed in the next chapter.

2.4 Culture, personality and behavior

According to Margaret Mead (1954) “the individual’s inclination to respond in a certain way is relatively stable when the cultural context is understood.” (Benet-Martinez 2007, p. 185) This sentence from Mead might be inferred as the priority or precedence of culture to merely individual differences in shaping our behavior.

Nexus between culture, personality and behavior is a key concept in this analysis. It can be asked whether different cultures produce individuals who differ in the internal organization of their behavior, in their traits and personal dispositions. Such a question has been posed by LeVine (1982): “*Are there psychological differences between human populations?*” (p. 15) The simple

question may have important connotations. It is also a question of national character. Students are usually being told not to ascribe this or that trait, or behavioral style to a group of people. But what if a special way of behavior is more prevalent in one cultural group rather than in another? As Kluckhohn and Murray (1948, cited in LeVine 1982) write:

Every man is in certain respects

- a. like all other men,
- b. like some other men,
- c. like no other man. (p. 22)

Similarity to some other men (e.g. in-group members) can be explained under the rubric of cultural differences, but is especially comparable to what Barkow et al. (1992) describe as “evoked culture”. Dissimilarity to any other man pertains to individual differences which are resulted from a unique interaction (affected by individual biological characteristics) between man and the world, as something totally related to one’s personality. Considering *self* as the core of personality Marsella et al. (1985, cited in Brown 1990) find self as the “fundamental link between culture and biological (or psychological) factors and stressors”. (p. 147)

Morton Deutsch (1990) gives a clear picture of the psychological consequences of different forms of social organizations. According to him:

the nature of the social organizations and institutions in which we participate, and our positions in them, influence not only *what* we think but also *how* we think; they affect our motivations, feelings, and attitudes

toward ourselves and toward others, and they determine our moral perspectives. (p. 174)

Nevertheless he points out to the insufficiency of his research for making definitive statements pertaining to the psychological consequences of different social organization types, however he provides us with a practically useful model of correspondence between socio-cultural settings and psychological responses. He delineates four fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relations, and their consequent cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations. The four dimensions are cooperation-competition, power distribution, task-oriented vs. social-emotional, and formal vs. informal. (Though according to him there are still other important dimensions such as complexity, stability, openness, and affluence which are also of considerable psychological relevance.) Psychological responses to any of these four dimensions can be considered through looking at the cognitive, motivational and moral concomitants they may bring about. In cooperation-competition dimension the basic cognitive schema is: “we are ‘for’ or ‘against’ one another”...“we gain or lose together”...or “if one gains the other loses” (p. 163) Thomas Hobbes’ famous statement *homo homini lupus est* is an example of such a cognitive orientation. According to Deutsch, Henry Murray’s (1938) descriptions of the needs for affiliation and for aggression, defendance, infavoidance, and counteraction characterize the motivational orientation to this dimension, and tendency toward egalitarianism or by contrast toward legitimization of a win-lose struggle are the possible moral orientations to this dimension.

Power equality/ inequality dimension also is accompanied by such psychological responses as “use of tactics of coercion, intimidation and power bluffs” (ibid. p.164) in the cognitive level; need for self-esteem, need for self-

respect and worthiness/or defensiveness, anxiety, and need for dominance alongside many behavioral habits such as servility, submissiveness, and acquiescence, in the motivation level; in the level of moral orientation in a cooperative-unequal relationship, high-power figures of the society are expected to support the weak, and reciprocally the less powerful ones to somehow appreciate and esteem the powerful person. By contrast in an equal-competitive relationship, “equal opportunity” matters more than “equal outcomes”. This seems to be the moral approach of many western liberal democracies.

Task-oriented/ social-emotional dimension in cognitive level pertains to the “focus of involvement”, that is to something external to their relationship/ or to be related to the intra-group relations. So a task-oriented relationship leads to achievement-oriented motivations, while social-emotional relationship evokes affection, and affiliation and such other motivations. The moral orientation of this dimension can be *utilitarianism*, *universalism*, and *achievement* versus *particularism*, *affectivity* and *ascription*.

By the same token, formal/informal dimension which may be distinguished by the degree of the freedom people have in order to deviate from the conventional behaviors, in cognitive level can be characterized by more predictability, less friendliness, and more inequality in formal rather than informal relations. Deutsch describes the motivational orientation of this dimension (the formal relationship) with such terms as bureaucratic personality and obsessive-compulsive personality (citing from Merton 1957). And morally, in a formal relation the form of relationship dominates on its spirit. But in the informal the relationship itself matters rather than the rules.

The theoretical model that Deutsch propounds, takes for granted a close relationship between the cultural types and personal attitudes and demeanors. Just like the similar tendency we can find for example in the works of Triandis, Hofstede, and others who are interested in tracing the roots of our behaviors in our cultural backgrounds. In relating dimensions of culture to personality Hofstede and McCrae (2004) write: “In studying personality we compare individuals; in studying culture we compare societies, even if our data have partly been collected from individuals within those societies.” (p. 65) They also warn about confusion between levels of analysis, for example comparing individuals on the basis of data retrieved from their societies, or the “ecological fallacy”, as well as a “reverse ecological fallacy”, that is comparing societies on the basis of indices developed for the study of individuals. “Cultures are not king-sized individuals; they are wholes, and their internal logic cannot be understood in the terms used for the personality dynamics of individuals. Ecologic differs from individual logic” (p.66) However we might ask, is there such a great difference between a culture and the individuals who by and large convey the contents of that culture to the next generations? Aren’t members of a society more or less representatives of the prevailing values and norms of that given society? And as we will read below, to rate a culture as masculine or feminine, or individualist and the like, Hofstede has himself used the information resulted from his study on individuals.

A major point that should be noticed here is the causation arrow between culture and personality. Which one has the sole or the most effect on the other? McCrae (2004) while discussing about the achievements of trait psychology especially as reflected in the Five Factor Model, argues that traits are determined by biology and puts forward the hypothesis that “culture does not

affect personality, but that personality traits, in the aggregate, in some circumstances, may affect culture” (p. 5). However this does not mean that our behaviors are determined by biology; because he also speaks of Characteristic Adaptations that is the psychological structures - such as attitudes, schemata, and self-concept - that are shaped through the interaction between personality traits and the environment as shown in the Fig. 2.2. Then our behavior is still a resultant of our biologically based personality traits and the environment, and even though culture does not affect our personality traits but it certainly determines part of our behavioral variations. A comparison between people with similar personality trait scores and dissimilar cultures may be of a great importance. It would be interesting to compare behavioral patterns of cross-cultural samples of subjects who have similar scores on the basis of the Five Factor Theory. Triandis and Suh (2002) point out that “though biological factors have an important role in shaping personality, they do not account for most of the variance.” They also suggest that “Ecology among other factors, shapes the culture, which in turn shapes the socialization patterns, which shape some of the variance of personality”.




Fig. 2.2 A simplified representation of components of the personality system and their interrelations, according to Five Factor Theory. (McCrae, 2004, P. 5)

Though the main discussion of Hofstede and McCrae (2004) centers around the precedence of either culture or personality over one another, however the mere significant correlations between personality and culture is instructive. Schmitt et al. (2007) in a worldwide study show the geographic distribution of the Big Five personality traits. According to this study there are differences in personality traits among world cultures. For example according to their data Western Europeans and North Americans are more Extravert than South Americans, East- and Southeast Asians. In the same way again, a significant difference has also been found in Agreeableness among different regions; “nations from Africa scored significantly higher and East Asians scored significantly lower than all other world regions” (p. 197-8)

Emphasizing on the biological basis of personality traits by itself adds nothing new to our present knowledge about the sources of human behavior. It has always been asserted that personality is a result of interaction between biology and social communication. We may assess personalities of others or ascribe specific traits (stable behavioral tendencies) to them usually after observation of their behaviors. There are biological constants either we call them traits or whatever else. Though there is always a biological basis for any of our behaviors, those behaviors have other sources as well and McCrae calls them Characteristic Adaptations. So if human personality traits impose an effect on culture, this is done through our behavior. It is also expected that the expression of human traits are not similar in dissimilar cultural contexts. Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği (2006) conducted a research on psychiatric symptoms and individualism-collectivism. Their study includes samples of two different cultures, United States as individualist and Turkey as collectivist. Using different diagnostic questionnaires, they report significant correlations

between the two culture types and psychiatric symptoms measured by such assessment devices as Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Liebowitz's Social Anxiety, Attention Deficit Disorder, Beck Depression Inventory, and Impulsiveness Questionnaire, they found significant differences between allocentrics and idiocentrics in those measures; however, an interesting point was that "Turkish idiocentrics and American allocentrics had the highest scores on the clinical tests". (p. 350) this may indicate that having a personality which is discrepant from societal values and norms (e.g. individualist person in a collectivist culture and vice versa) can be a stressor and increase the probability of psychological syndromes.

Rather than a one way direction of causality in the interaction between culture and personality, a mutual causality via a dialectical relation may be at work, in which human biological needs in different ecological settings lead to the formation of specific culture types (comparable to what McCrae have argued) and then cultures also in their turn determine part of our behavioral variation. For example, the hierarchical social organizations may be natural reactions of societies to the competitive conditions which stem from scarcity or shortage of vital resources. In the conditions of affluence of resources human biological needs are satisfied without much stress, and highly competitive conditions in which satisfaction of biological needs (accompanied by a feeling of pleasure) coincides with dissatisfaction and deprivation of the other who is seen as a rival, may somewhat facilitate the development of sadistic personality disorder. And after all sadism is nothing but pleasure of another person's pain.

Supposing a one-way causality direction in which our personality traits determine cultures has some shortcomings. McCrae (in Hofstede and McCrae 2004), while trying to explain the association of mean traits and Hofstede's

culture dimensions, puts forward two hypotheses: according to the *selective migration hypothesis* “individuals may move in or out of a social group to find a niche appropriate for their personality traits” (p. 75) in describing why high power distance cultures are inclined to be more Introverted he writes that in such cultures leadership positions are available to a few people, and the rest should be submissive. Introverts tolerate such conditions easier than extroverts and the latter may choose to emigrate. In brief, the rate of introverts in a society makes that society prone to high power distance and not the reverse. This hypothesis seems to be interesting but it can’t explain why a great number of neighboring cultures in special regions show similar attitudes and behavioral styles. Have much of the extroverts of the Middle East or China or South America or Africa emigrated? When and whereto? Emigration of extroverts can be because of novelty seeking and similar reasons, and there is no clue that the high number of the British who immigrated to the New World were necessarily leaving their society because of its high power distance conditions. And it is interesting to know that after so many extroverts have emigrated from the Western Europe especially Great Britain to America and Australia, still such societies are more extrovert than those Middle Eastern societies which have not had comparably widespread emigrations.

According to the *reverse causation hypothesis* (Allik & McCrae 2002, McCrae 2004) culture may be shaped by the aggregate personality traits of their members, and value systems and social institutions may be “social adaptations to the psychological environment that a distribution of personality traits represents.”(p. 76) for proving or disproving such a hypothesis vast studies across nations are needed, however this hypothesis at least implies that cultural differences may be due to biological variations across different human

populations. So we may ask if human populations across the world are biologically different or not. Though we may not have a definite answer for this question, however we obviously know that human groups live in different ecologies; and whatever our biological capacities are, they should be manifested in an environmental and social context. The diversity in the ways through which people use their biological capacities to develop ways for coping with ongoing life problems leads to diversity in cultures. A culture also is a shared effort to give a meaning to the phenomenological world. So, many value systems and beliefs have a relation with the way people choose to live. Different ideas get different functions in diverse cultures. A same claim may be considered as a hallucination in one society and as an eminent ideology in another. Such a claimant may be chained in one culture and worshiped as a prophet in another!

An important question which arises here is that whether cultural diversity leads to different behavioral patterns, and if yes, what culture types produce what behavioral patterns? First we need to have a cultural typology and some criteria according to which we can put any specific culture in a category.

Culture is undoubtedly a source of human behavior variability. On the basis of Nisbett and Cohen's experimental work with the Southern and Northern subjects (see, the next chapter), Richerson and Boyd (2002) get to two main points: "*Culture is fundamental to understanding human behavior*", and "*Culture causes behavior by causing changes in our biology*". (p. 60) They point out to Nisbett and Cohen's findings in which a similar insult results in two different biological outcomes in Northern and Southern cultures of America (such as the levels of biochemical secretions in blood), and then argue that on the basis of such findings culture and biology are inseparable, and an analytical distinction between the contributions of cultural and genetic factors in human

behavior, though methodologically useful, does not give a reason to deal with culture and biology as two ontologically separate entities. Richerson and Boyd see culture as a part of human biology, and write:

Most of the important threads of twentieth-century social science have rejected one of these two principles. Some traditions within the social sciences—for example, those of rational choice theorists, many psychologists, and human sociobiologists—place little emphasis on culture as a cause of human behavior and sometimes view cultural explanations as limited to historical-descriptive accounts devoid of real explanatory power. While we sympathize with critics of current culture studies, this state of affairs is not inherent in the culture concept. [...] We want to convince you that a Darwinian science of culture is a respectable and promising pursuit and that the easiest way to see why is to place culture squarely in the middle of human biology. (p. 61)

Richerson and Boyd describe culture as part of biology, however it seems that our biological capacities for establishing culture, are oriented to different directions in different ecologies. Man strives for satisfaction of his biological needs, but in different geographies, he may get different feedbacks for his biologically determined adaptive strivings. This view has been illustrated in the figure 2.3.




Fig. 2.3 Biological constants and ecological variables shape culture and behavior: Human biology in diverse ecologies leads to the emergence of different cultures, which form our ethnic experiences and history. Again a combination of personal experience and ethnic experience form our personalities.

2.5 Cultural forms:

It seems also to be essential to classify cultures in different typologies, like what has already been done for the assessment of human personality. So far, some steps have been taken in a series of efforts in order to distinguish cultures by means of several dimensions, the most famous of which are reflected in the works of Hofstede, Triandis, Schwartz, and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner. However, such classifications are based merely on the etic rather than emic aspects of the cultures in order to make them comparable. Such researches which follow a functionalist paradigm, usually pay attention to etic perspectives, in which, according to Martin and Nakayama (2008) (who cites from, Brislin 1993; Headland, Pike, & Harris 1990; Gudykunst & Nishida

1989) “a theoretical framework is externally imposed by the researcher and research often involves a search for universals” (p. 75).

2.5.1 Hofstede's Dimensions of Value

Hofstede has developed a model of cultural dimensions, which has been especially welcomed by those researchers who look for cross-cultural comparative data. There seems to be an increasing tendency among social scientists to measure and compare societies quantitatively and such studies as what Hofstede has conducted provide them with such easy to use numbers. Hofstede considers five dimensions for any culture four of which, Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance, according to Bond et al. (1987) are richly suggestive of psychological processes (as cited in Chanchani & Theivanathampillai, 2002). The fifth dimension that is long-term vs. short-term orientation was added later to the four mentioned.

Hofstede's typology is now very famous in cross-cultural studies, and up to now has instigated many other studies, debates, and criticisms. Hofstede (1980) has observed four layers and five dimensions for any culture: values are the core layer (and pertain to moral aspects), and the other three are Rituals (the manners of conduct), Heroes (Admired persons), and Symbols (that carry special meanings).

He also specifies five dimensions, which can provide a ground for cross-cultural comparisons:

Power Distance, or the degree of accepting unequal power distribution in society. That is to what extent the (powerless) members of a culture accept the hierarchy of power structure in their society.

Individualism/Collectivism, i.e. whether people are loosely or tightly bound to each other. Individualist cultures let their members to act individually and to be more or less free from collective criteria. In collectivist cultures members are tightly bound to each other.

Masculinity/Femininity, i.e. are social gender roles strictly distinct and separated or not? In masculine cultures there are clear-cut distinctions between gender related tasks. Social roles are strictly defined for men and women. Masculinity is characterized by assertiveness and competitiveness for more material achievements, and femininity by modesty, paying more attention to relationship and quality of life. Dominant masculine values can be easily considered in all arenas of the social life including family, market, politics, etc.

Uncertainty Avoidance, that is how much do they feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations? It reflects the extent to which a society attempts to cope with anxiety by minimizing uncertainty. Cultures that scored high in uncertainty avoidance prefer rules and structured circumstances. Societies with high Uncertainty Avoidance, according to Chanchani and Theivanatampillai (2002), “are intolerant towards deviant persons and ideas”. While, low Uncertainty Avoidance societies provide “a more relaxed atmosphere and deviance is more easily tolerated.[...]Uncertainty Avoidance has consequences for the way people build their institutions and organizations.” (p. 5)

Long vs. Short term orientation, the former specified by thrift and perseverance, and the latter by respect of tradition, keeping “face” and reciprocation of interpersonal favors.

2.5.1.1 Hofstede's Findings:

During the early 1970s, Hofstede has performed two surveys in worldwide countries, and counting on the estimated values for some countries, he has given data for some 80 nations (including 14 nations he puts in three categories of Arab world, West Africa, and East Africa). Though for the dimension of Long-Term Relationship, only 28 countries have scores. Hofstede could compare a great number of cultures on the basis of their performance in the above-mentioned five dimensions, and gave a score to each country. Considering such scores, for example, countries like China and Japan got a low score in Individualism and then were labeled as collectivist, and such nations as Sweden and Denmark as individualist. Many developing countries showed high Power Distance and Western European nations got lower scores in this dimension.

2.5.1.2 Criticism:

Hofstede's work has been a great and time taking effort and probably one of the first endeavors to measure and compare cultures quantitatively. However it has not been spared from criticism, especially for its methodology. McSweeney (2002a) first challenges the idea of 'national culture' (which is the cornerstone of Hofstede's work), and states that Hofstede's claim for the existence of influential national culture is based only on an *a priori* belief. Citing from Anderson (1991) who describes nations as 'imagined communities', and from Wallerstein (1990) who expresses skepticism toward the possibility of operationalization of the concept of culture, for using it 'for statements that are more than trivial', McSweeney goes on then somewhat in a sarcastic tone to discredit Hofstede's work, reiterating MacIntyre (1971) and

Smelser (1992), to suggest that “[h]is project could be dismissed as a misguided attempt to measure the unmeasurable.” (p. 90) Regardless of conceptual issues, McSweeney finds problems in Hofstede’s methodology, especially in the sample size, or more specifically in unequal distribution of samples, so that in some countries the sample size was more than 1000, and in some others less than 100. Another problem pertains to representativeness of the samples. He states that a group of IBM employees in each country are not representative of the whole nation. In reply to McSweeney, Hofstede (2002) puts all the criticisms of his work in five categories and promptly reply them:

- First, unsuitableness of surveys for measuring cultures, which he answers must not be the only method for this purpose.
- Second, unsuitableness of findings on nations for studying cultures, and he properly points out that they are the only available units for comparison.
- Third, subsidiaries of one company (IBM) are not representative of a whole culture, and his answer to this point is that these employees though were in similar conditions in other respects, however they were totally different in nationality and the purpose of the study was also to study national difference.
- Fourth, the research data are now obsolete, and he answers that the dimensions have developed within centuries, and that he has maintained only the data which were stable in two subsequent surveys.

- Fifth, the five dimensions are not enough, and he replies that any new dimension must be both conceptually and statistically independent from his dimensions.

The debate between Hofstede and McSweeney is detailed. Hofstede reminds that by terms like culture he doesn't mean to cover everything and such terms are only constructs (construed from human behavior) to increase our understanding. He also adds that validation of his "dimension scores do not imply assumptions about causality" (p. 1359). Anyway, McSweeney believes that Hofstede's reply is 'characterized by evasion'. He points out to Hofstede's idea about the effect of Sigmund Freud's nationality on his theory, and gives contrary examples from the Austrian culture; i.e. from political and literary figures who belonged to the same culture and could not be explained by Hofstede's view. He also challenges the dimension of *masculinity*, and for example, gives evidences for Ireland and England (as 'masculine' cultures) and Spain (as 'feminine') which he finds them contradictory to Hofstede's conceptualization. (see McSweeney 2002b). With such examples as the one McSweeney mentions about Freud's nationality, this idea may come to mind that Hofstede is willing to interpret individuals of different nationalities according to the dimension scores of those nationalities, however Hofstede has warned against what he calls "ecological fallacy", and by this he means that we should not mix the individual and national levels of analysis, or in other words we can not construe the behavior of any given individual on the basis of such national scores (see Hofstede 2001, p. 16); though Van de Vijver and Poortinga (2002) point out that: "country-level indicators that are derived from individual-level data, such as Hofstede's (1980) four dimensions, are repeatedly and almost unavoidably applied at the individual level... It is almost a catch-22 to say that

social indicators cannot be applied to the level from which they are clearly derived” (see Mooradian and Swan 2006, p. 778). Williamson (2002) argues that McSweeney’s criticism fails to refute Hofstede’s model, however, his critique contains three serious warnings for the researchers who follow Hofstede’s model. The first danger is the assumption of uniformity of a culture and homogenous distribution of cultural attributes amongst members; second, to think that the cultural background totally determines the individual values; and third, confusing the cultural dimension scores, as only approximate measures of cultural constructs, with these constructs. (p. 1391) Williamson states that McSweeney criticizes Hofstede mainly through a functionalist paradigm, and though Williamson does not deny the possibility of refuting Hofstede’s model from this paradigm, however he adds that this model could be challenged from the interpretive paradigm(which has an emphasis on emic perspectives); he considers that moving research on national culture “outside the functionalist paradigm” enriches the findings of such studies, but at the same time, he notes that shifting away from the functionalist paradigm may be in expense of “objectivity, the precision of nomothetic methods, the credibility of large studies focusing on a few controlled variables, and the comparability of quantitative studies using positivist epistemology” (p.1392).

In addition to the above debates, which I have briefly summarized, there also remain some minor points to note. Dimensions of *Individualism-Collectivism* and *Power Distance* in Hofstede’s model seem to have more distinguishing power than for example *Masculinity*. Many developing countries show lower scores in individualism and higher scores in power distance. But *Masculinity* is apparently not related to socio-economic development. In addition, some cultures which are very similar in many respects (e.g.

geographical region, political system, religion, patterns of social relation, etc.) may inexplicably show a great difference in this dimension, and instead be similar to a far away culture which is usually considered as a different. For example, the score of Germany in masculinity is 66 which is comparable to the score of China (also 66) but much greater than Sweden (which is 5). Another point pertains to Hofstede's idea about culture change:

Cultures, especially national cultures, are extremely stable over time. [...] this stability can be explained from the reinforcement of culture patterns by the institutions that themselves are products of the dominant cultural value systems. The system is in a self-regulating quasi-equilibrium. Change comes from the outside, in the form of forces of nature or forces of human beings: trade, conquest, economical or political dominance, and technological breakthroughs (Hofstede 2001, p. 34).

Accepting the latter sentence of the above statement, cautions us about the accuracy of the first sentence in our time; while, the necessary preconditions for culture change are now more available and prevalent than any other time. Multinational trade companies who export their products throughout the world, to be successful in their business, need similar changes in the habits and consumption patterns of their customers; economic and consequently political dominance is also a salient feature of relations between the developed and underdeveloped nations; and 'technological breakthroughs' in the same way, is the characteristic of our time. Modern communicative achievements, especially internet and satellite networks have facilitated and enormously increased cross cultural contacts. These are the symptoms of what we usually call globalization. Then it seems that the pace of culture change, at least in comparison to the past, has been increased. The seeds of cultural transition are spawned through

generation gap during which cultural values may be subject to change. If this gap is broadened, due to cultural contact and globalization, then it may lead to faster culture change.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that Hofstede has launched a new wave in cross-cultural research. The numerous references as well as criticisms are indicative of this wave.

2.5.2 Harry Triandis - cultural syndromes

Triandis (1994) describes culture as “a set of human-made objective and subjective elements that in the past have increased the probability of survival and resulted in satisfaction of the participants in an ecological niche, and thus became shared among those who could communicate with each other because they had a common language and lived in the same time and place” (p. 22).

In this description, Triandis makes a distinction between the objective and the subjective elements of culture; the former including material achievements and facilities (such as communicative means, transportation, architecture, etc.) can remind us of what we usually call civilization, and the latter includes ways of relationship among members, values and behavioral norms, beliefs and attitudes.

Triandis (2004) divides cultural dimensions into “primary” which are “directly linked to variations in ecology”, and “secondary” which evolve from the primary, and he writes that “Hofstede has identified many of the primary dimensions” (P. 90). In addition to individualism and collectivism, which Triandis finds the most important dimension of culture, he pays attention to two more dimensions: *Tightness*, and *Complexity*.

2.5.2.1 Individualism-Collectivism:

Triandis (2004) summarizes 25 years research on individualism-collectivism dimension in: first, difference between the peoples of individualist and collectivist cultures in their perception and behavior: e.g. in communication with others, collectivists emphasize more on the *context* than the *content* of messages (to *how* something is said than to *what* is said); collectivists consider people as relatively unstable and ascribe behavior of others more to external factors than to internal factors such as their personalities, while, individualists see others as stable and tend to attribute behavior to internal factors; for collectivists in-group goals are prior to personal goals, and norms get more attention than attitudes; also collectivists see interpersonal relationships as more stable (citing from Triandis and Suh 2002); and cultural differences in thought patterns (citing from Nisbett 2003) have been reported. To this we may also add differences in causal attribution. In collectivist cultures Causal attributions for failure tend to be more external, though for success, causal attribution was not systematically related to collectivism (Carpenter 2000).

Dividing people of any culture to *idiocentrics* (who think and behave like people of individualist cultures), and *allocentrics* (who resemble to people of collectivist cultures), Triandis states that allocentrics form between 30 per cent to 100 per cent of collectivist cultures, and less than 35 per cent of individualist cultures. The remainder of the population of each culture is comprised of idiocentrics, those who feel dissatisfied in collectivist cultures and want to emigrate. Idiocentrics, as Triandis writes, tend to dominance, high expressiveness, aggressiveness, more eye contact, logical arguments, and strong opinions, while allocentrics have a preference for compromise and avoidance from arguments, and tend to shift their opinions easier than idiocentrics.

Triandis and Tratimow (2001, as cited in Triandis 2004) describe the factors influencing on idiocentrism and allocentrism, and find idiocentrism positively correlated with affluence, higher social position, much education, international travels, immigration to a new culture, socialization in a bilateral family (in which the relatives of both parents are influential), and exposure to the Western mass media, and to Western culture. While, on the contrary, allocentrism has a more likelihood in the conditions of financial dependence to an in-group, lower social class, limited education, socialization in a unilateral family, being traditionally religious, and acculturation within a collectivist culture. Meanwhile, Triandis warns about the applicability of findings on allocentrics and idiocentrics in all individualist and collectivist cultures, because most of the research in this field has been conducted in East Asia and North America.

Triandis introduces two varieties for both individualist and collectivist cultures: Horizontal and Vertical, which reflect the same concept of Power Distance in Hofstede's model. So the combination of the above dimension with these two varieties, yields four cultural forms: Horizontal Individualism is found commonly in Nordic cultures, in which people are on their own, and at the same time, they are not much interested in taking advantage over others or to be in the limelight. Reciprocally, in Vertical Individualist cultures (like United States), people, in addition to be individually motivated for acting out their decisions, are also competitive and they make effort for being "the best". Horizontal Collectivism as typically found in Israeli collective farms (kibbutz), in which farmers live collectively, in a comparably similar condition. And the Vertical Collectivism which can be found vastly in traditional cultures in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is especially characterized by conspicuous hierarchical relations. Nelson and Shavitt (2002, as cited in Triandis 2004) have

found significant differences between two Danish and American samples, in use of the four mentioned patterns, as summarized in the following matrix. The numbers indicate percentage of time used for each pattern:

Table 2.1 Differences of Danish and American samples in Individualism and Collectivism (data taken from Triandis 2004)

Cultural Samples	HI	HC	VI	VC
Danish	% 49	% 35	% 8	% 8
American	% 44	% 28	% 22	% 6

2.5.2.2 Tight versus Loose cultures:

Tightness is another dimension in Triandis' model. The concept this term conveys is very similar to what Hofstede means by Uncertainty Avoidance. According to Triandis (2004) “[i]n tight cultures there are many rules, norms, and standards for correct behavior” (p. 92). Such cultures are usually ceremonious, in which social behavior is strictly defined for special situations. Deviation from behavioral rules in such societies is considered as provocative and may receive harsh criticism or punishment. The loose cultures show more tolerance toward deviations and people in such cultures may use such expressions as “take it easy” very often. Isolation of a society and as a result its homogeneity increase the tightness. Multicultural societies seem to be loose, because in such societies there exists diverse norms for same tasks, and people learn to be more tolerant. For example, Triandis mentions Thailand as a loose culture which is located between and influenced by the Indian and Chinese cultures. In addition to homogeneity, ‘high population density’ may increase the chance of tightness and as we know both these requirements are present in

Japan, and it is considered as a tight culture. Tight cultures also tend to be collectivist. Also Carpenter (2000) has found relationship between self-concept and the two dimensions of tightness and collectivism. So that the occurrence of interdependent self-concept is higher in tight and collectivist cultures, and by reverse independent self-concept was more likely in loose and individualist ones.

2.5.2.3 Complexity:

Cultural complexity is another major dimension. Information societies in contrast to hunter gatherer tribes show poles of this spectrum. Triandis (2004) states that, in combination with tightness-looseness, complexity might be related to individualism-collectivism; so that, collectivist societies tend to be tight and simple, and the individualist cultures tend to other poles, that is looseness and complexity. The combination of collectivism, tightness, and simplicity, seem to be characteristic of the underdeveloped world and related to socio-economic development. “The contrast between simple and complex cultures is the most important factor of cultural variations in social behavior” (Ember and Levinson 1991, as cited in Chanchani and Theivanathampillai 2002). The term may also imply the concept of cultural evolution, with the complex cultures being construed as the more evolved. This concept, that is evolution from simple to complex, can be also traced in the ideas of the 19th Century evolutionists like Tylor, Morgan, and Spencer (Chick 1997).

The concept of complexity has been operationalized through linking to some variables as the scales for levels of complexity; such variables as *writing and records, land transport, social stratification, political integration, technological specialization, money, fixity of residence, agriculture, population*

density, and *urbanization*, have been considered as ten subscales of complexity in the work of Murdock and Provost (1973) (as cited in and evaluated by Chick 1997; and Denton 2004). However as Chanchani and Theivanathampillai (2002) write, Triandis has not offered any objective methods for measurement of the cultural complexity. In an evaluation of Triandis' Cultural Syndromes, they write:

Triandis presents a unique and interesting interpretation of cultural typology through his syndromes. The syndromes are rich with meaning and replete with pioneering insights, often drawn from deep knowledge of cultural-history. The syndromes are embryonic, and if developed fully offer fertile grounds for insights into culture (ibid. p. 8)

However, at the same time they find this model 'in its current form' weak in application of quantitative analysis, and also limited in its ability to explain culture change. There are similarities between the models offered by Triandis and Hofstede. They seem to discuss similar concepts, but sometimes with different words. In Triandis' model however there is a more emphasis on individualism-collectivism dimension. Cultures of the world fall in four categories, and are only distinguished on the basis of their tendency to individualism or collectivism and also on the hierarchy of power. Though this gives a simple and practical model for comparing cultures, but at the same time may somewhat ignore other aspects of culture which may be important for such an analysis and then lead to an oversimplification of the subject.

The field of cross cultural studies is replete of researchers whose main interests are in trade and business studies. A myriad of oriental researchers and students of business and marketing, approach to cross cultural studies,

sometimes with the impetus of having a better influence on their customers' choices and minds across the world. With the expansion of such studies in the future, maybe the international businessmen have a more chance in selling their air conditioners to Eskimos and their heaters to the Sudanese! The Dutch who have precedence in trade, are also pioneering in the use of cross cultural research for commercial purposes, and after Hofstede, Trompenaars is the second famous Dutch figure in the realm of cross cultural theory.

2.5.3 Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner: cultural dimensions

For Trompenaars (1993) culture is “a way in which a group of people solve problems” (p. 6). This succinct definition as Chanchani and Theivanathampillai (2002) point out is very similar to Edgar Schein's (1985) conceptualization of organizational culture.¹ Trompenaars and Hampden Turner have developed this model of cultural dimensions together. In this model, the problems to be solved pertain to three kinds of relationship: relationship with people, with time and with environment. Depending on how a culture involves in these relations and how it solves any problems with these three issues, it can be distinguished from others on the basis of seven dimensions, five of which pertain to relationship with people and the other two, to relationship with time, and the environment. According to Hofstede (1996, p. 196) the five dimensions pertaining to relation with people, originate from the “General Theory of Action” formulized by Parsons and Shils (1951). Hofstede writes:

¹ Schein defines culture as "a pattern of basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration-that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (p. 9)" (Reviewed by William G. Tierney 1986)

These authors labelled the dimensions “pattern variables.” Trompenaars’ “Individualism versus collectivism” was called by Parsons “Self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation”; [...] The other two of Trompenaars’ “dimensions” are taken from a book by anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and F. L. Strodtbeck (1961). Their classification of five “value orientations” was inspired by a field study of five geographically close, small ethnic or religious communities in southwestern U.S.A. The five orientations are: (1) human nature, from evil to good; (2) relationship to the environment; (3) orientation in time; (4) orientation toward activity, and (5) relationships among people, from lineal to collateral. From these, Trompenaars took the second and third only. (ibid. p. 196)

The seven dimensions of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner are as follows:

2.5.3.1 Universalism versus Particularism:

Universalist cultures have a tendency toward general rules. People in such cultures believe that general values and codes are prior to particular relations. Any exceptions may break the rule and then should be avoided. This may remind us of a sentence ascribed to both Socrates and Aristotle that “I love Plato. But I love Truth more than Plato.” In particularist cultures, on the contrary, intimate relationships and friendship do matter, and they are scarcely sacrificed for rules. So in some cases we may hear a familiar sentence in such societies: “Rules are made to be broken!” They are broken because there are always some exceptions.

2.5.3.2 Individualism versus Communitarianism:

In individualist cultures which is similar to what we have read under the same title in Hofstede and Triandis, people are inclined to make their decisions according to their personal preferences, and the community matters only to the extent that it can provide opportunities for individuals and serves the interests of them. In communitarian cultures, however, community and public interests are always prior to personal interests. Individuals are conceived of as bits and pieces of a greater and more important entity, that is of society. In such cultures individual freedom is subject to be sacrificed for what is meant as public interest.

2.5.3.3 Affective versus Neutral:

In affective cultures feelings are freely expressed. People do not keep silence and they express their emotions in public. But in neutral cultures people learn not to show their emotions and keep quiet in emotional conditions. An example is the comparison between burial ceremonies in Middle Eastern cultures which is usually accompanied by emotional eruptions of mourners and a western beholder may see it as a sign of lack of self control or primitiveness, and the silence and solemnity of western mourners which may be construed by a Middle Eastern beholder as a sign of apathy and cold-bloodedness. So apparently the people of affective cultures are more subject to emotional excitement.

2.5.3.4 Specific versus Diffuse:

In specific cultures there is a preference to first concentrate on separate components and then to pay attention to the whole; the whole which is a resultant of those components. Accordingly, people regulate their social

relations and interactions in a well-defined and purposeful manner. They interact to achieve to specific goals. Then their public spheres are larger than their private spheres. They tend usually to interact on these public shared spheres and less communication is devoted to private sphere. They are task oriented.

In diffuse cultures whole has priority to elements and it is something more than a combination of elements. In contrast to the specific cultures, in diffuse cultures private sphere is larger than public sphere. People may establish relationship on lots of different tasks with one person, because they see him or her as friend in all conditions. So a friend may play many different roles in ones life, roles which have not separated. This dimension has also been called Analyzing versus Integrating. Specific cultures analyze things to details and diffuse cultures integrate things to get to the big picture.

2.5.3.5 Achievement versus Ascription:

Status acquired by people in a society can be *achieved* through their efforts and accomplishments, or *ascribed* to them because of their ages, wealth, gender or any other inherited characteristics. In the Achievement oriented cultures people should prove their merit. We may call them *meritocracies* and their opposites as *heritocracies*. Meritocracies are based on what people *do* and heritocracies on what people *are*. It also defines equality versus hierarchy in *opportunities* to get to social positions. Chanchani and Theivanathampillai (2002) find this dimension very similar to Hofstede's Power Distance.

2.5.3.6 Sequential versus Synchronic:

With regard to time orientation cultures may be sequential or synchronic. In the former, time is structured in a sequence, or definite successions, in which each part may have a definite value for getting to a purpose, and in the latter time passes in undivided time cycles. In cultures with sequential time structuring, people tend to do one task at one time, and hence they prefer to schedule their time. Perhaps we may call them time-cognizant. However, people who structure time synchronically do some tasks in a same time. They may easily change their schedules, because they understand time as flexible, and they are not much worried about the pass of time. This can be also related to life style; such differences can be especially found between inhabitants of a metropolitan city and a quiet village. Time attitude is very different in an introvert culture which encourages members to some sort of introspection, say a Buddhist community, in comparison to an industrial community. Also cultures can be classified as past-oriented, present-oriented, and future-oriented; the first pertains to emphasis on historical achievements and sorts of ancestral rites. The second is characterized by more attention to the present time; people in such cultures may repeat such sayings as “don’t trade your today for tomorrow”. In the third orientation planning and attention to the conditions of next generations have importance.

2.5.3.7 Relation with Environment:

Again two opposite attitudes might be found in different cultures, with regard to relation with nature. To survive, some cultures have the attitude to control the nature so that they can practically have an effect on our future and fate. Others may see a harmony in nature and consider man as a part of this

harmonized nature. So people have either an internalistic (inner-directed) or externalistic (outer-directed) attitude. The former people believe that they can finally control the nature, and that man is not predestined to live in any specific way. By contrast, the externalists have an organic view of the world and they believe that man should accept the nature the way it is. As Chanchani and Theivanathampillai (2002) point out this dimension reflects Rotter's (1969) concept of *locus of control*; in this dimension some cultures have *internal* and others have *external* loci of control. However its relevance to Hofstede's *uncertainty avoidance* (as they claim), is not very clear.

Finally this model provides us with another opportunity for comparing cultures on the basis of some dimensions, which may be similar to dimensions in other models in some respects and different from them in some other respects. Seven dimensions – if they are independent criteria with high distinguishing power – may give a clearer profile of any given culture; however Trompenaars' and Hampden-Turner's model, though may have taken into account several dimensions – which sometimes imply simplified commercially formulized recipes for international cross-organizational relations (like what we can read in Hole 2006), has received serious objections on the side of Hofstede (1996). Hofstede writes that the database of this model does not support its theory, and through a comparison between the two studies he concludes that Trompenaars' questionnaire which has been the basis of his empirical data, measures mainly what Hofstede calls individualism; also the items pertaining to this concept fall into two groups, one of which combines Trompenaars' individualism with Achievement, and the other Universalism with Specific-Diffuse (p. 195).

The critique of Trompenaars' and Hampden-Turner's model from the side of someone whose own model has undergone similar (methodological as well as theoretical) criticism, indicate that the field of cross cultural studies is a touchy field. Models are built after several years of concentrated studies and then are subject to collapse after the critics arrive in the scene. Some problems of such models may stem from theorists' dualistic thought styles. In cross cultural comparisons they seem to be searching for *poles* which may distinguish one culture from another. Cross cultural theorists seem to be involved in an endless game. That is they are always looking for something *versus* something else. Maybe this is only the mentality of our theorists which is imposed on the reality. Distinction between *East* and *West* which are geographically located in opposite sides gives a hint to them to search for opposites also in other domains and if they are not very successful in discovering these opposites they may invent them.

2.5.4 Schwartz' cultural dimensions

This model is based on Schwartz' theorization of ten basic value orientations in different cultures. Schwartz and Bardi (2001) have estimated pan cultural rankings for the priority or hierarchy of these ten values on average. In pan cultural level the first priority is given to Benevolence, and the last to Power. Afterwards Schwartz has compared each culture with this pan cultural baseline. His method seems simple and at the same time practical. These values are ranked in a pan cultural value hierarchy in the following order:

1. Benevolence (helping others and participation in public welfare activities...)
2. Self-direction (being free from control of others...)

3. Universalism (emphasis on justice, tolerance, peace, equality...)
4. Security (seeking health and safety in a greater extent than others)
5. Conformity (obedience to established and agreed rules)
6. Achievement (making effort and competition for more prosperity and better status)
7. Hedonism (emphasis on enjoying life and pleasure)
8. Stimulation (getting pleasure from excitement and novelty experiences)
9. Tradition (conservative emphasis on customs and the way world is)
10. Power (having social positions to dominate and control others)

This order of the ten value orientations reflects the pan cultural average. The next step is to compare each culture to this pan cultural baseline. This has been done and the distances of several cultures have been estimated. The logic of this method is clear. Schwartz and Bardi (2001) explain: “Just as one must interpret personality scores in light of the scores for normative samples, so value ratings take on clear meaning only in light of the pan-cultural normative baseline” (p. 284). Schwartz (2004) explains three problems or conditions for which any society should make a decision. These decisions are based on the value orientations and lead to three bipolar dimensions:

The first problem pertains to the relationship between individual and group: people may be *Autonomous* or *Embedded*, that is either they determine their minds, decisions, in order to actualize their intentions; autonomy takes two forms, intellectual and affective. *Intellectual Autonomy* can be described by such words as creativity, broadmindedness, while *Affective Autonomy* refers to spontaneous motivation for positive emotional experiences and an exciting life. *Embeddedness* refers to a context that keeps people together. In

such cultures people identify themselves with their group, and predominant values in such cultures are maintenance of social order, observance of traditions, obedience, and security.

The second problem that each culture confronts pertains to the ways which lead to preservation of social structure. Again one of two alternative options may be chosen on the basis of those basic values: *Egalitarianism* or *Hierarchy*. The former is based on equal rights and opportunities, social welfare, and cooperation. Mutual responsibility, justice, honesty, and support of the rights of others are the dominant values of such cultures. While in the latter, people are encouraged to get better social positions and to keep their distance from other social classes. These cultures can be described by such values as getting to power, humility (usually of lower class towards the higher class), and respect for authority.

The third problem is how may people in any given society, regulate their relations with nature and the social world: they may choose to be in *Harmony* and comply with the world, that is to tune themselves with the world rather than trying to change the world; or, they may choose to try assertively to change nature and control it, that is to impose their *Mastery* on nature. Cultures which encourage harmony are based on such values as peace, protection of environment and unity with nature; while, cultures which seek for mastery encourage such values as competence, self-assertion, venture, ambition, achievement, and entrepreneurship. The ten value orientations can also be grouped in a way to form a four-value model arrayed on two bipolar dimensions:




Fig. 2.4 two-dimensional structure of the Schwartz's 10 values
 (adopted from: http://changingminds.org/explanations/values/schwartz_inventory.htm)

Using his value inventory in samples from more than 60 nations, totally larger than 75000 participants, Schwartz has compared cultures on the basis of their scores in the above-mentioned values. He also reports some conceptual overlap as well as difference between his and Hofstede's dimensions, for example between Autonomy/ Embeddedness dimension and Hofstede's Individualism/ Collectivism: while both take into account the relations between individual and group and make distinction between an autonomous and an interdependent attitude, however at the same time in autonomy resides the value of openness to change which is in contrast with conservation (maintenance of status quo) as a value of Embedded cultures, but in Hofstede's Individualism/Collectivism such a distinction cannot be found. Anyway in the four above mentioned models, similar ideas and concepts can be found, and these similarities indicate to some extent a consensus among researchers at

least on parts of their theories, and this sheds light on a small part of the field of cultural studies. These common concepts have been shown in fig. 2.5.




Fig. 2.5 Cultural dimensions in four models; the red and green lines show more or less conceptual convergence among the models.

Before closing this chapter, I think one simple but important point should be noted: in most cross cultural surveys, questionnaires have been widely used (for example in Hofstede's and Schwartz' studies). It is not very clear to what extent may the ideas people *express* in such questionnaires (in checkmarks, Lickert scales, or even interviews) reflect what they really *believe*, or how they really *behave*. Especially, when the questions are related to values and morals. That is such subjective preparations may not be representative of objective realities, and it would be ideal if we could apply some objective devices. For example, let's consider Schwartz' ten value orientations in pan cultural level. The filled-in questionnaires indicate that on average

benevolence gets the first and *power* gets the last rank of values in the minds of the world people. Ignoring all those philosophies which explain human motivation under such rubrics as “will to power” or those theories which look for “instinctive drives” (e.g. Lorenzian approach) to interpret human behavior, we can pay attention to some objective indices to construe the hierarchy of values across cultures. If the goal of cross cultural studies is to understand behavioral variations across cultures, and if we define *value* as something which satisfies a need, we should accept that our values have influence on our behavior, and then they can be construed on the basis of our overt behaviors.

Objective methods which might be used can be obtained from social statistics. For example a comparison between the two values of benevolence and hedonism, which have the first and seventh ranks in Schwartz’ pan cultural value hierarchy, can be estimated by the amount of money the people of a society spend for charity per year in comparison to the amount of money spent for their cigarettes, or spent for their leisure time. Or with regard to power, concrete measures like people’s competition for obtaining social positions, more income, and the like can be more expressive than what people may claim in a questionnaire. If benevolence is the first and power is the last in hierarchy of values, then it won’t be a great expectation from the world people to leave their routine businesses, to stand in long lines for helping orphans or institutionalized seniles! Values are not those things that people only speak about; they are reflected in our actions. That is “actions speak louder than words”.

Chapter Three

Culture and Violence

After paying attention to the relationship between culture and behavior in general, now it is the time to consider this relationship more specifically between culture and violent behavior. In this chapter, in the first part, the role of culture in shaping violence will be reviewed in the light of studies on the social learning approach, subculture of violence, and also conflict resolution strategies. In the second part however, several variables which might have a decisive role in the incidence of violence, not only in group struggle but also in interpersonal conflicts, will be proposed and discussed. These variables are mostly culture-bound psychosocial predictors, i.e. social psychological orientations which are supposed to develop or to be justified within specific cultural contexts. And finally, after reviewing some facts and figures about homicide across nations, a number of hypotheses will be presented.

Part One

3.1 General considerations in cultural sources of violence

In the previous chapter we considered culture as the patterns of perception, judgment, and behavior which are shared by a group of people. So an inherent and important characteristic of culture is the reproduction of those patterns

across generations, so that it keeps the identity of the group unchanged across the time. This is guaranteed by the social institutions which carry out the functions of reproduction and transmission of cultural beliefs to the next generations, that is the formal and informal educational system. Then apart from ‘turning points’ or the unique historical events which impose sudden changes, the normal function of such social institutions is to reproduce a replica of themselves. Hence any given society tends to remain more or less intact and go on its habitual ways, and sometimes to resist against the ‘cultural mutations’ which may alter the group identity. It is logical to assume that societies differ in the ways they propose for the solution of problems. In interpersonal conflicts for example, some may introduce or innovate tolerant solutions, and others may appeal to harsh ways. This is something more than a mere surmise or assumption, because looking at different societies indicates that such a distinction is real, that is there are cultures which in comparison to others prescribe more violent solutions. So the first step in here is to acknowledge that there are some cultures of violence in reality rather than in mere theory. As cultural patterns are learned and maintained and then transmitted to the next generations, then the first question which comes to mind is that, how such violent solutions are learned?

3.1.1 Learning to be violent

Human development takes place within a cultural context and is affected by education. Value systems and beliefs and behavioral patterns are reproduced across generations; though because of many factors such as social contact especially with members of dissimilar groups these reproductions may be partially or even totally altered, but in a macro social level they seem to be

persistent in the course of time. For example the majority of the world people have inherited their religious beliefs from their ancestors and in their turn they transfer them to their children. This happens through parent-child relations and also the influence of social institutions.

In his review of cross-cultural studies on aggression, Bandura (1973) points out that, ethnographic records reveal and distinguish in a very clear way the effects of aggressive modeling in warlike societies in comparison to peaceful ones. He takes an example, the New Guinean warlike tribal community Dugum Dani (studied by Gardner and Heider, 1969), which is comparable to the South American Waorani society in Robarchek and Robarchek's (1998) study. In this tribe war is usually waged for "spiritual purposes" rather than economic resources, and hence it is somehow glorified. Their children have to pass warriorship training programs and to learn fighting skills long before they are expected to engage in real combats. They practice battle games and in a symbolic way they kill their enemies. And the last stage of their military apprenticeship is to watch a real combat from a long distance to learn the tactics of defeating the enemy. By contrast in Polynesia (Bandura 1973, Levy 1969) as well as in Tahitian society, physical aggression is not valued, and hostile behavior is rarely expressed. In the latter societies, contrary to the Dani community, people believe that the ancestral spirits are aroused against the provocateur of the upheaval and then may hurt him. So the Tahitians are not good warriors and in physical aggression they are usually inept. Bandura finds the reason of this difference in the training of Tahitian children who from the early ages learn to be afraid of the consequences of anger and to know that their ancestors watch their behavior and may somehow punish them for their evildoings. In his speculation of the origins of the cultural practices, Bandura

takes issue with the proponents of biological determinism who according to him ascribe cultural variations in behavior to inherent racial qualities of the members of those cultures. He writes: "As previously shown, man's biological endowment creates response potentialities, not preformed pattern of social behavior" (p. 112). Bandura finds out that in those societies where aggressive models are provided people learn to be more aggressive than in the societies without such models. Then for example in Apache and Comanche tribal communities who were used to raise their children like warriors (also noted in Goodwin 1942, and Linton 1945) the models of violence have been reproduced and repeated generation after generation, while in Hopi and Zuni, as he points out, due to the lack of such aggressive models people learn to live a peaceful life. In some interesting sentences Bandura writes:

Individuals raised in aggressive societies are prone to attribute fighting to man's biological makeup and have difficulty conceiving of people living peaceably. Researchers coming from these settings who subscribe to the belief that man possesses an aggressive drive requiring periodic discharge selectively search for evidence of psychological disorders when they study the people of pacific societies. Considering the omnipresence of problems of living, the dubious validity of personality tests, and the elasticity of referents for psychiatric conditions, one who sets out to demonstrate that noncombativeness is hazardous to mental health should have no difficulty in finding confirmatory evidence, regardless of the merits of the belief. The reinforcement customs and habits of aggressive societies are rarely, if ever, studied by observers from gentle cultures. Were they to conduct anthropological field research revealing that in societies in which aggressiveness is idealized and cultivated people

recurrently humiliate, injure, and kill each other, they would undoubtedly be struck with how aggression is generated by man's social customs. From the social learning perspective, human nature is characterized as a vast potentiality that can be fashioned by social influences into a variety of forms. (p. 113)

Such cultural forms and aggressive habits, after being institutionalized and getting some sort of authorization, tend to be self-perpetuating for a long time, even if their social backgrounds and historical determinants are no longer in existence. The above lines reflect the essence of Bandura's understanding of the social transmission of aggressive behavior, and at the same time it is a critique of biological and hydraulic models of aggression. His examples of more or less peaceful communities may suggest a reasonable suspicion towards the general applicability of biological models; however, such communities are in minority. In fact, they are so minor that usually only ethnologists or cultural anthropologists, due to their professions, are aware of them. While a great number of human societies, scattered in the five continents, have a daily experience of aggression, either in interpersonal or intergroup levels. One may ask even if we suppose modeling of aggression or the presence of environmental rewarding cues as the main source of aggressive behavior, how can we explain the universal extent of assault, intentional injury, and brutality without taking into account the possibility that such behaviors may also be somehow intrinsically appealing and therefore they are learned easily. However learning to be brutal and aggressive especially in presence of social environmental cues, such as prison settings seems to be important and experimentally endorsed. Zimbardo's Stanford prison experiment in 1971 (cited in Waller 2002) is a revealing example. His *Lucifer Effect* indicates how people, though belonging to

an academic sample, may deliberately change from “good” into “evil” and take the role of hard-hearted pitiless prison guardians and show hostile sadistic behaviors to a degree that makes the experimenter stop the experiment in six days. Though learning to be cruel in such situations may also be accompanied by some real or imaginary second gains, such as material rewards or just the feeling of power and mastery (which are sometimes considered as biological motives), however, the very unequivocal influence of situational factors on human conduct is instructive; it also reveals that when university students (of a democratic culture) can turn into merciless oppressors only in a few days, how the less intelligent people who are kept in similar conditions for longer times, and whose lives are bound to such conditions, might have a chance for not assimilating the violent patterns of behavior. Bandura shows that cultural settings and their aggressive models have definitive influence in our behavior. Then we should find out those special characteristics of these cultural settings that make them aggressive or peaceful.

Cross-cultural differences in child rearing practices might to a large extent define violence or peacefulness of a culture. Prescott (1996) has found loss of mother love (which according to him is sort of Somatosensory Affectional Deprivation) a predictor of peaceful/violent behavior in adult life. In one of his studies, 49 “primitive” cultures including 20 violent and 29 peaceful (as a sample drawn from 400 cultures listed by Textor 1967) were compared on the basis of physical contact and maternal care. His data can be summarized in the Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Adult violence predicted by physical affection during infancy (data extracted from Prescott 1996)

Adult Physical Violence	High Infant Physical Affection	Low Infant Physical Affection
High	4	16
Low	23	6

He has predicted the peacefulness vs. violence of about 80% of the sample, according to a single measure of “body bonding”/”affectional bonding” in the mother-infant relationship. 20% of the prediction has been made on the basis of tolerance vs. punishment of adolescent sexual relation. He considers the cultures which allow adolescent sexual expression to be mostly non-violent. Prescott construes the early sensory stimulation or deprivation, especially in a social relation between mother and infant, as an important predictor of the future behavior. He concludes that:

vestibular-cerebellar stimulation is the most important sensory system (followed by touch) for the development of ‘Basic Trust’ in the affectional bonding between mother and infant which establishes the neurobiological and neuropsychological foundations for all other human relationships. My conclusions follow from the experimental brain studies of isolation reared monkeys... the studies of Mason (1968) and Mason and Berkson (1975) which documented the prevention of emotional-social abnormalities including violence in isolation reared monkeys given artificial movements (vestibular- cerebellar) stimulation (swinging mother surrogate); my

cross-cultural studies on 'primitive' cultures which carry or do not carry infants on the body of the mother/caretaker...(Prescott 1996, p. 155)

In Prescott's study, loss of enough body contact between mother and infant predicts violent behavior in adult age. However, we are not very certain that such sensory deprivations in human infants, as Prescott says, leads them to be more inclined to violent behavior in adulthood; instead, loss of such sensory stimulations may be only a sign of a general carelessness of mothers towards their children, not only in infancy (during which they need more care) but also in other ages. After all, there is almost a long way between infancy and adulthood, and many other experiences happen between them. So mothers who do not establish body contact with their children, in comparison to those who do, may show a general apathy toward the children during the years to come.

In addition to ignoring children's needs by parents (especially mothers), inflicting physical punishments on children, and strict undue disciplining might also increase the chance of future violent behavior. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) have pointed out to the significance of "parent-child relationships in the general development of the personality and in the transmission of cultural and subcultural themes and values". (p. 147) Referring to research literature and the findings of parent-child studies, they write that there is a consensus that identification especially between son and his father has an important role in the learning of aggressive behavioral patterns. Though they continue that, according to Anna Freud's view which has been experimentally endorsed by Bandura and Huston, imitation itself is sufficient to explain the "transmission of the behavior from a meaningful adult to the child." Child-rearing practices are of course part of the social learning, and perhaps the most important part of it, while they take

place in the early social climate of a child in which he learns to regulate his future social contacts.

De Zoysa, Newcombe, and Rajapakse (2006) summarize the findings of several studies as follows: physical punishment models aggression, and therefore is presumed to be a predictor of an increase in children's aggression (Avonfreed 1969, cited in Coie and Dodge 1998). It may facilitate hostile attributions which predict violent behavior (Dishion and Patterson 1999), and also it shapes the parent-child relations through cycles of coercive behavior (Dodge, Pettit, and McClaskey 1986). They argue that application of corporal punishment in the early age may lead to modeling and lifelong legitimization of violence (Simons et al. 1998), and its early application in childhood has been indicated as the strongest predictor of adolescents' aggression eight years later. (Cohen, Brook, Cohen, Velez, and Garcia 1990).

In the etiology of antisocial and criminal behavior of both children and adults, physical punishment is involved (Wilson and Hernstein 1985), and it may be due to deterioration of parent-child relations as a result of corporal punishment, and then a decrease in child's motivation for internalization of parental moral values (Hirschi 1969, as cited in Gershoff 2002). A study by Straus et al. (1997) indicates that the antisocial behavior is expressed more, when more corporal punishment is experienced during childhood, regardless of the ethnic groups in the study. They also consider the possibility that the prediction of antisocial behavior from a punitive parent-child relation may simply indicate that there are some pre-punishment characteristics in some children who receive corporal punishments, which instigate their parents to apply such a punishment; that is they become antisocial not only because they receive punishment but because of their temperaments which sometimes make

parents use force. However their study supports a causal link between physical punishment and antisocial behavior in children (see de Zoysa et al. 2006, pp. 6-7)

Physical punishment utterly reflects the authoritarian values and attitudes within a society in which the less powerful people, children, are suppressed by parents or trainers. Indeed it can be regarded as a very expressive index and predictor of violence, through which children, apart from the emotional distress, learn to find harsh solutions for problems. This idea can be found also in Koot, Oosterlaan, Jansen, Neumann, Luman, and van Lier (2008).

Finally, as Straus and Donnelly (2001) point out talking to children as an alternative behavior for corporal punishment increases the brain neural connections and as a result boosts the cognitive performance, and states that corporal punishment in preschool age may have a negative effect on cognitive development (see also Dorpat 2007). Such retarded cognitive development might be construed as a facilitator of aggression resulting from lack of learning social communicative skills.

Another correlate of violence in children is cruelty to animals. As far as I know there are no systematic comparative studies on zoo-sadism in many world countries. In the underdeveloped world, systematic studies on human aggression are meager, let alone on violence against animals. However anyway there seems to be a significant difference amongst societies in their conducts with animals. In some societies (usually in the rural countries) cruelty to animals seems to be common. This problem may indicate that aggression does not always necessarily stem from a present conflict, and it may sometimes bring about some pleasure and satisfaction. Cruelty to animals is not usually considered as a crime in such

societies. Animals may provide suitable targets for displacement of aggression: they are not protected by law, and they cannot express anything about what people have done with them, and then it is much easier to direct violence against them. So this is a real cultural difference between those societies which pile up their supermarket shelves with beautifully packaged animal foods, and those which torture and severely abuse animals. For example, in some Middle Eastern countries, especially in rural areas where men and animals coexist, animals are usually under cruel hitting. It is sometimes a familiar scene to see a group of boys who having stones in their hands follow a wounded helpless dog to injure it more. It seems that they enjoy this game! There is no conflict between dogs and men. This gives them pleasure. The pleasure of torture!

In addition, violence toward animals may also be predictive of violence against humans. It is one of the MacDonald triad (see Merz-Perez & Heide 2004) which accompanied by fire-setting and enuresis (bedwetting) comprise the sociopathic behavior. In a study on 267 college students, Flynn (1999) has found a relationship between parental corporal punishment and perpetration of animal abuse; that is, the males who committed animal cruelty during childhood or adolescence, had received physical punishment from their fathers. However this relationship exists especially between father and son and when the punisher is mother or when a female is spanked by parents, such a relationship was not found. His regression analyses showed that after controlling for child abuse, father-to-mother violence, and father's education, the association between corporal punishment by father and animal cruelty by male child persisted. (p. 971) Displacement of aggression from humans to animals, as Robin and Bensel (1985) point out, may explain this problem. They write:

Severely abused children, lacking in the ability to empathize with the sufferings of animals, take out their frustrations and hostility on animals with little sense of remorse. Their abuse of animals is an effort to compensate for feelings of powerlessness and inferiority. (p. 74)

The cultural differences in affection or hostility towards animals, might at least partially reflect tolerant and democratic versus intolerant autocratic parenting patterns and the behavioral models they provide for children. However, this can be also like a connecting circle between a strictly harsh and punitive father-son relationship and communicative problems with society in the years to come. After all, father is the first and the most important man with whom a son establishes a relationship. This first relationship may have a great influence on the way the son regulates his relations with other members of the society. Cruelty to animals in childhood has been repeatedly considered as a precursor of homicide (serial killing) in adulthood. In a study on 261 prisoners in the southern states of America, Hensley & Tallichet (2009), have found out that more than half of their sample who were imprisoned for such violent criminal convictions as homicide, assault and rape, had shot animals in the past. These researchers have also distinguished six different common animal cruelty methods (drowning, hitting, shooting, choking, burning, and sexual abuse), and their regression analysis revealed that drowning and having sex with animals were predictive of their interpersonal violence in adulthood. (p. 147)

Heimer (1997) states that lower socioeconomic status may reward obedience to authority and the people who work under such conditions apply the same methods in their parenting situations (Heimer, 1994, Kohn 1977), and hence they may use coercive means or “power assertive discipline strategies” like threatening, or shouting, or corporal punishment. While higher status jobs

reward more self-restraint and self-determination, which in turn is transferred through parents to the children and provides them with a successful child rearing method. (Heimer 1997, Kohn 1977, Wright & Wright 1976). In addition to this underlying social psychological mechanism through which job related values are generalized to other domains of life and then learned by children as their life style (they learn to apply violence to solve ordinary problems), there remain two other points which are related to the lower socioeconomic status: parents have less time to monitor their children, and this may lead to the higher chances for learning new violent delinquencies from peers. Learning violent solutions may hinder the youngsters from learning about legal processes and means which can render the application of coercion unnecessary.

Ember and Ember's (2005) multiple regression analyses indicate that higher levels of social stratification and political integration, as well as "long-term use of an alien currency" predict the higher incidence of physical punishment of children. Their findings confirm their theory according to which societies are probably tending to apply physical punishment in order to prepare children for getting along in a society with native or imposed (e.g. colonial) power inequality. Furthermore, they believe that corporal punishment appears more likely in societies in which non-relative caretakers have a hand in raising children, and in "non-pacified" societies, undemocratic political decision making and a culture of violence also predict corporal punishment of children. The biological distance of caretakers also matters; the non-relative caretakers or trainers apply more physical punishment than close relatives.

Physical punishment seems to be a connective circle between the past and the future which repeats and reproduces violent relationship patterns along generations. According to Gelles and Straus (1979) the studies of physical

punishment indicate that parents who apply physical punishment to control the aggressive behaviors of their children, are probably increasing rather than decreasing such behaviors of their children (see also Bandura, 1973). Learning violence can also be strengthened by specific group norms, which develop within subcultures of violence.

3.1.2 Subculture of Violence

As Kurst-Swanger and Petcosky (2003) write, the “*culture of violence theory* looks at violence based on the larger societal norms and structure”, and it entails “two perspectives: the *cultural approval of violence* and the *subculture of violence*” (p. 47). Cultures of violence may be identified by racist, sexist, and homophobic tendencies, as well as devaluation of selected outgroups, and may provide justifications for both structural and direct violence (see, Jones 2003, p. 145); structural and direct violence refer to Johan Galtung’s distinction of the two forms of violence. Direct violence refers to what we usually judge as case of criminality, something that happens in a specific time and place, while structural violence pertains to inequalities and discriminations which are inherent to social system and the legal frameworks, and they can impose serious, usually ongoing negative effects on lives of discriminated people. For instance, a jobless tenant who commits a direct criminal violence against his landlord may have been for a long time under social pressures (structural violence).

In their well wrought study, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) put forward the subculture of violence thesis. This thesis takes the normative aspects of criminal behavior into account; that is criminal violence may be reflective of an inconsistency between a subcultural norm and the norm of the larger society. Wolfgang and Ferracuti argued that violence is more prevalent among those

social groups whose subcultural attitudes, values, and norms give way to aggressive solutions to problems, and then expected such subcultures to be found more frequently among blacks and Southerners, as an explanation for higher incidence of violent crimes in such ethnicities rather than in others.⁵ According to Wolfgang and Ferracuti, members of any social group establish their self-images and then their relationship to others via using one another as reference; this way, subcultural values are reinforced. (ibid. p. 102) In-group affiliation leads to internalization of group values and norms of behavior. It is essentially argued that complex societies comprise diverse and competing groups whose conceptions of right and wrong differ, so that some groups will sanction unlawful behavior to a greater extent than others; individuals who associate with such group norms are likely themselves to come to favor unlawful acts (including violence) via a process of socialization. (Brookman 2005, p. 108) So, a law-breaking criminal behavior may reflect a contradiction between the societal and subcultural values, in which the perpetrator may be even convinced of the rectitude of his behavior. Behavioral stereotypes specific to subcultures distinguish them from others. Such subcultures reflect attitudes and values of some minor groups who share similar social status and experiences. In short, a subculture of violence provides members with intragroup values and norms which partly take personal responsibility from the shoulders of the perpetrator of a criminal behavior. This controversial claim stimulated numerous studies, many

⁵ Examples of such subcultures of violence might be found in many societies. Machismo subcultures in the underdeveloped world, especially in Caribbean and Latin America, emphasize on extremely masculine values (accompanied by depreciation of delicacy in interpersonal behavior as a sign of femininity). In Iran, for example, until a few decades ago, there were some groups who would exaggerate in looking very manly and behaving in an extremely virile manner. Their emphasis on their virility would sometimes produce serious bloody outcomes.

of which found no evidence of a subculture of violence by race or region once socio-economic factors were controlled (Dixon & Lizotte 1987; Loftin & Hill 1974; O'Connor & Lizotte 1978; Parker & Smith 1979; as cited in Heimer 1997). However, as Heimer (*ibid.*) cites from Blau and Blau (1982) economic inequality rather than subcultural values, was found to be the major cause of violence, implying that socioeconomic factors may better than culture explain criminal violence. But others, while acknowledging the importance of structural factors like economic inequality in the prediction of violence, consider that they are not enough for a full understanding of variation in cross-regional and cross-racial homicide rates. (Messner 1982, 1983; Williams 1984, in Heimer 1997). Then such studies give a place for cultural predictors. However, the distinction between structural and cultural models may be obscured, and also both these models suffer from over-prediction (Brookman 2005); that is for example contrary to such theories as relative deprivation (see Chapter One) or the socioeconomic explanations, the majority of people who are afflicted by such strictures do not commit homicide. And as Heimer points out, in the literature of the studies of subcultural processes, the relations between structure and culture have seldom been precisely distinguished. So Brookman states that there is a missing link between the structural and cultural theories (*ibid.* p. 110). Cross-cultural psychology may have the potential to find the connective circle between the two models.

Also a few years after the introduction of Wolfgang and Ferracuti's thesis, Ball-Rokeach (1973) has found it inefficient. Her study is an investigation of the hypothesis that violent behavior is a consequence of commitment to a subcultural value and attitude pattern. Considering two types of violent behaviors, that is, interpersonal violence and violent crimes, she has extracted

findings from two independent studies: the first on the values and attitudes related to interpersonal violence in 1429 adult Americans, and the second on value differences among 363 men imprisoned in Michigan for commitment of offences. She concludes that in the national sample neither socio-economic status nor social class values are associated with violence (p. 736). Ball-Rokeach, in her examination of this thesis could only find a very weak association, amongst offenders, between a favorable predisposition to violence and involvement in interpersonal violence; and amongst the imprisoned men, she couldn't find very different values with respect to violence between offenders and non-offenders. (Sian 1985) Ball-Rokeach's rejection of Wolfgang and Ferracuti's thesis, however, is not the last word. Austin (1980) writes that by a reinterpretation of Ball-Rokeach's data and by considering new data her conclusion can be contradicted. As according to the subculture of violence thesis, violence is more likely to happen among adolescent members of deviant subcultures, as well as among the adolescents who have machismo or adult values than others, so adolescent violence may result more from amorality than from a contracultural morality, as Wolfgang and Ferracuti have propped. Part of such adolescent or adult violence emerges from lack of efficient interpersonal conflict resolution skills and capacities a culture may provide for its members. Then in addition to the specific elements in those cultures which may provide justifications for some forms of violence, cultures are also different in their violence rates because of the specific intervention methods they apply or advise to resolute a conflict before it leads to an uncompensable catastrophe.

3.1.3 Conflict resolution

Human societies may adopt different ways to solve their conflicts. An important aspect pertains to the formal appearance of any society. According to

Georg Simmel (Spencer, 1999), conflict and cooperation can be found in any human relationships. He calls the interdependence of conflict and cooperation as “the web of conflict”, by which he partly means that when conflict between two groups increases, cooperation also increases within each group. Then these two concepts have a dynamic relationship. But in the modern society this relationship is not very simple, because the modern society is comprised of multiple groups (contrary to simple groupings in primitive communities), and it brings people in astonishingly complex relationships, so that they may be allied in one situation and opponent in another. The concept of “Cross-cutting cleavages” (divisions within society that make groups more heterogeneous or different) stems from his work according to which dimensions of interest and identity within a same social class or group make members have diverse devotions and obligations, so that the persons or groups who are disadvantaged in one social domain, may find themselves advantaged in another domain (Jenkins and Gottlieb 2007, p. 7). Such cross-cutting cleavages then, according to the theorists of pluralism make a democratic society more stable, because in a democracy which facilitates establishment of numerous social groupings and civil institutions, people may have conflicts in one social situation and cooperation in another. For example, two people may be opponents in their political devotions, but at the same time they may play in a same sport club and cooperate in a sportive event. Simmel’s theory provides us with an explanation of conflict and violence which is based on a formal distribution of social groups and diversity of their interests, and scarcity or abundance of the opportunities that make them participate in different confrontations. Higher incidence of violence is predictable when groups of people are opponents in any respect. Lewis Coser who has elaborated Simmel’s ideas “has distinguished more clearly between conflict and violence”, and in the same line with Simmel he argues that,

“the main explanation for the absence of a bitter class struggle in North American society is that its workers participate in so many varied groups that have smaller-scaled conflict among them. The workers do not store up their energy for use in one single, highly divisive struggle” (Spencer, *ibid.* p. 341).

If any culture applies its own methods to resolute conflicts, then some methods may be more effective than others. Though in the previous lines it was discussed that democracies with their pluralistic traditions, may pave the way for prevention of violence, however nonviolent societies are not merely found amongst the western democracies. Fry and Björkqvist (1997) count some cultures in different continents which can effectively resolute their conflicts, and hence they have the least violent conflicts. According to Robarchek (1997), Semai community in Malaysia is one of the most peaceful cultures in the world. Robarchek & Robarchek (1998) write: “The Semai are among the most peaceful people known. Physical violence is extremely uncommon: adults do not fight; husbands do not beat their wives, nor parents their children. Homicide is so rare as to be virtually nonexistent”. (p. 124) Any conflict among members receives a great attention and is not considered as a private problem; instead, the community takes responsibility to resolve the problem. The headman convenes an assembly (which is called *Becharaa'*), and the sides of disputes and their kindred participate in it and talk together. The *becharaa'* continues until no words from any sides are left unspoken. The conflict resolution in Semai is based on dialogue and intervention of community to prevent any forms of violence. The mentality of this people is that any unresolved dispute between two members may threaten the public peace. Robarchek states that any “human conflict has three universal components: affective, substantive, and social and the *becharaa'* successfully addresses all three.” (1997, p. 55) Expression of all

words by all sides, so that there remains nothing more to be said, results in a type of emotional catharsis, or in Freudian terms in abreaction. Then the dissipation of emotions, facilitates the resolution of the substantive and social components of the conflict. Semai and some other similar tribal communities which have been reported as peaceful and less aggressive are small communities with close kinship, and they are mostly informal and sometimes kinship based communities.

There are other similar studies on tribal communities to show the methods they use to peacefully solve conflicts and avoid a violent solution. Another example of this sort is Schlegel's (2004) study on the Hopi of Northern Arizona, in which in addition to a report on habits and ceremonies of this community the peace promoting mechanisms have been explained. Schlegel writes about the important spiritual beings that play a role in this regard. They consist of some gods and goddesses (e.g. *Masau* the god of the earth and the dead, and *Talautumsi*, the mother of animals) and angel-like creatures (*kachinas*), who somehow have attention to the people's conduct and manners. There are some dances and rituals through which people are every time convinced of being nonviolent. In their rituals there is no glorification of violence, even if its application is necessary. Also some other mechanisms like peer pressure, their child-rearing habits, and rewarding nonviolent behavior have made the Hopi a peaceful community in spite of the daily conflicts they experience.

Peaceful societies then may enjoy some shared characteristics like what some writers have proposed. Ross (1993) mentions seven characteristics in the "low-conflict" societies:

Psychocultural practices which build security and trust; a strong linkage between individual and community interests and high identification with the community so that individuals and groups in conflict trust that its interests are their own; a preference for joint problem solving which leaves ultimate control over decisions in the hands of disputants; available third parties (sometimes in the form of the entire community) to facilitate conflict management; an emphasis on the restoration of social harmony that is often at least as strong as the concern with the substantive issues in a dispute; the possibility of exit as a viable option; and strategies of conflict avoidance. (Ross 1993, pp. 59-60, in Fry 1999, p. 720)

Sponsel (as cited in Fry, *ibid.*) describes peaceful societies, as being small communities with egalitarian structures, which enjoy cooperative relations, generalized sharing, consensus-based decision making, as well as values, world views, successful enculturation, and efficient conflict resolution procedures which altogether pave the way for nonviolence.

Fry also reports his data in a comparative study of two Mexican communities, San Andres and La Paz. In the latter, there is a preference of verbal alternatives to corporal punishment, consisting of discussion, explanation, teaching how to behave, and an emphasis on respect. As a result the La Paz children are raised more respectful and obedient and less aggressive than the children in San Andres. So a quantitative significant difference has been reported between the 3-8 year old children of the two communities. In addition in adulthood the values which are emphasized amongst the La Paz people are internalized and they tend to behave peacefully.

In his concluding remarks, Fry states that the presence of tens of peaceful societies indicates that nonviolence is possible. He refers to Bonta's (1996, p. 404) statement that "the Western world-view boils down to an acceptance of the inevitability of conflict and violence", and finds it incongruent with the beliefs of peaceful cultures. He points out that moderate and high levels of violence which happen in many societies are not inevitable, and they can be prevented through egalitarianism, and that peacekeeping is also achieved by 1) avoidance of antagonists, 2) child rearing methods which bring about self-restraint and internalization of peaceful values, and 3) psychocultural social controls, which are usually informal. (See Fry 1999, pp. 719-732)

Considering the fact that every culture adopts or approves special methods for conflict resolution, and that cultures are also different in their attitudes toward violence, we may categorize them in two groups: Cultures of peaceful coexistence and cultures of violence. The latter are based on values that encourage, glorify, or even sanctify violence, while the former are more liberalistic and tolerant. It seems useful to consider violent vs. nonviolent societies from three standpoints:

- *The way they perceive* themselves and others, their worldviews, beliefs and value systems;

- *The ways they prescribe* to achieve those values, their attitudes toward important social issues such as equality, individual rights and freedom, and distribution of power and social rewards;

- Their socio-economic development.

So we may expect to find differences in these three aspects between the so-called cultures of violence and of peaceful coexistence. Though there exist more determining variables, but this study can obviously not be exhaustive, and instead it takes a number of them into account.

PART TWO

3.2 Cultural facilitators of violence

In part one two main cultural sources of violence were proposed: first lack of sufficient learning about how to resolve conflicts peacefully, and second learning to behave destructively. Facilitation of violence may happen through structural and cultural means or variables. In the cultural level many of these variables may have *cognitive* and *prescriptive* functions.

Table 3.2 Differences between cultures of violence and cultures of coexistence in three levels.

	Structural Level	Cognitive Level	Prescriptive Level
Culture of Coexistence	Socioeconomic welfare Individualistic modernized, Democratic	Relativistic thought and worldview, Privacy of religion, Plural-minded	Belief in equality Tolerance Cooperativeness
Culture of Violence	Underdevelopment Collectivistic Traditional	Absolutistic thought Extremism in religiosity or in group identity affiliation	Belief in inequality Intolerance Competitiveness

Though structural variables are assumed to be chronologically precedent to the cultural ones, however it seems more appropriate here to start with the cognitive and prescriptive mechanisms:

3.2.1 Cognitive facilitators

In the cognitive level, any given culture provides its members with criteria for perception of the world, self-comprehension and moral judgments. People may to some extent appeal to the worldviews and values propagated by their cultures, to define their identities and to identify the boundaries between right and wrong. They learn to understand and interpret social realities in their own special ways which are also under the influence of their cultural settings.

Such worldviews, and value systems, may establish theoretical backgrounds or justifications for the future discriminations and prejudices. They may be codified in complicated ideological systems. However such ideological systems which have the claims of pure veracity, show less toleration when the values they propagate are violated. Instead the violators are duly punished. In many cases of interpersonal violence there lies a feeling of offence or humiliation. Such feelings largely depend on the appraisal of the situation as offence or insult (which reflects the value system of the person) and then a decision for action (which pertains to the behavioral norms). So the culturally constructed values and norms reflect the ruling attitudes and belief systems. If culture shapes our social cognition and perception, then it has a decisive role in our understanding of a situation as insult and prepares us to behave in a special way. Then considering the S-O-R model of behavior, response to a stimulus is elicited after the organism makes a decision in a cultural field:




Fig. 3.1 stimuli are perceived and interpreted within a cultural field.

Ideologies are potentially amongst the most important facilitators of violence that is, amongst those factors within a culture which diminish or eliminate personal responsibility for perpetration of a violent action. These factors indeed justify the expression of violent behavior under the pretext of defending a higher value. So people may torture or annihilate in the name of God, in the name of honor, nation, or whatever else. Utopian dogmas pave the way for extreme responses. Religious dogmas provide people with justifications for releasing their aggression. Especially in cases of “family disgrace” in patriarchal communities, angry fathers and brothers sometimes feel free to inflict a bloody revenge against the “guilty” female. Sexual intrigue and infidelity of women provide men with sufficient reason to exert physical violence, and in such communities even if men are reluctant to inflict a severe punishment, they are under public pressure. In these communities people have special titles of notoriety for the men who are not jealous or vigilant of their females. So violence against women is prevalent and commonplace in many rural areas in parts of Asia and Middle East, Africa, and the Latin America.

3.2.1.1 Hyper religiosity

Religious fundamentalist ideologies impose many burdens on human society, but they remain inviolable. They feel free to offend others, but they receive a respect which they don't deserve. This is what Charles Dawkins (2006) complains about. In the *God Delusion* he writes:

A widespread assumption, which nearly everybody in our society accepts - the non-religious included - is that religious faith is especially vulnerable to offence and should be protected by an abnormally thick wall of respect, in a different class from the respect that any human being should pay to any other.... Here's a particular example of our society's overweening respect for religion, one that really matters. By far the easiest grounds for gaining conscientious objector status in wartime are religious. You can be a brilliant moral philosopher with a prizewinning doctoral thesis expounding the evils of war, and still be given a hard time by a draft board evaluating your claim to be a conscientious objector. Yet if you can say that one or both of your parents is a Quaker you sail through like a breeze, no matter how inarticulate and illiterate you may be on the theory of pacifism or, indeed, Quakerism itself. (pp. 20-21)

The above example is only a mild example of a privilege that may be acquired through religion to exempt someone from a social duty. However in most dramatic cases, religious leaders are less known as responsible for the atrocities their verdicts may bring about, while they enjoy a broader security margin, claiming that it is not their own verdicts; but they only speak on behalf of their religion. Hence some worn out and outdated religious texts, from long time ago, make the commentator of "God's words" rightful for sanctification of

brutality, and take any responsibilities from his shoulders. So they can utter their hostile intentions without having to be very cautious about the outcomes. The cues of a culture's approach or preparedness towards violence and peace, might be somewhat discovered in their religious beliefs. Such beliefs may be the heritages of violent or peaceful ancestors for their offspring. Here I will point out, in brief, to violent vs. nonviolent religious narratives:

3.2.1.1.1 Hinduism

There seems to be only a meager unanimity between western writers on their interpretation of Hinduism as a peaceful or warlike religion. This reciprocity is especially considered between earlier and later writers. For example, several decades ago, Hume (1916) gave a picture of Hinduism which was consistent with the idea of a warlike religion. He wrote that "Hinduism as a separate historical religion arose in a state of war" and indeed "it was on the basis of successful war that the essential religious-social organization of Hinduism was effected." (p. 33) According to Hume, "among the numerous sacred books of Hinduism those which have been the most available to, and the most influential upon, the masses of Hindus have been the two epics, which, in spite of some beautiful human touches, are in the main a glorification of war". (pp. 36-37) He adds: "The most authoritative code of law in Hinduism enjoins war-fare conducted with every available form of injury, as being not only the expedient self-interest, but also as the proper religious duty, of a Hindu ruler." (p. 43) He points out to the concept of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) only as a concept which is mentioned in Buddhism (while other writers find the same concept also in Hinduism-see below) and concludes that: "Except for Buddhism there has been no formal denunciation of war among the religions of India." (p. 44) In a more or less same track, Bonnerjea (1934) writes that a considerable part of the

Hindu mythology contained in the *Rig-Veda* makes the warlike spirit quite clear, and constant references are made to the wars with the aborigines, that is somehow a religious endorsement of violence on the side of the Aryan immigrants/invasers of India against the local inhabitants. One of the most important deities of the ancient Hindus, as he writes, was Indra, who was also the favorite national god of the Vedic period and the warrior god. He is primarily a thunder god, and his especial feat was to conquer the demons of drought and darkness; but frequent references are made in the *Rig-Veda* to the victories of Indra over the Dasyus, or the dark-skinned human foes of the Aryan invaders [whose descendants, Dravidians, mostly settle now in the south of India]. (p. 34) He also finds two of the great Hindu epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, full of the warlike deeds of their heroes. The former deals with the exploits of *Rāma*, and especially with his wars against *Rāvana*, the demon-king of Lanka, the modern Ceylon. And the latter is in the main a glorification of the wars of the five *Pandava* brothers. (p. 41)

Contrary to the above mentioned early writers, Gabriel (1999) finds some important elements of pacifism in Hindu beliefs. He refers to the concept of Ahimsa also in Hinduism, a more or less well-known concept according to which Hinduism propagates the idea of non-injury not only toward human beings but also toward any living creature. It has been considered as the most important *Dharma* (duty). The idea of *Karma* (deed) and also *Samsara* (reincarnation) that is the endless cycle of birth, death and rebirth is the cornerstone of the Hindus beliefs; though it can also be found for example in Jainism which historically stem from the so-called pre-Aryan Hinduism. This notion may be important especially because our Karma in one life can specify our existential rank in the next. That is our prosperity or adversity in the next

incarnation depends on our deeds or Karma in our present life. A second aspect of Hinduism which is related to nonviolence is *Advaita* (non-duality, monism). The basis of Advaita is the identity of *Atman* (self, or what specifies all separate beings) that is of all beings with *Brahman*, the transcendental soul or Supreme Being. The consequence of such an identity is that if you harm another being, man, woman, animal, or insect you are harming yourself. Or indeed any action returns to its doer; while the separate souls are all reflecting the universal soul. (See Gabriel 1999, pp. 715-16) Though the duality in construing a religion as pacifist or warlike, may stem from paradoxes in that religion, but with regard to Hinduism we can certainly say that it agrees with application of some form of violence at least in those conditions that people may interpret them as a defense, for example in *Manu Dharmashastra* (G. Buhler's translation) it is asserted that "One may slay without hesitation an assassin who approaches (with murderous intent), whether (he be one's) teacher, a child or an aged man, or a *Brahmana* deeply versed in the Vedas." (8.350)

3.2.1.1.2 Buddhism

Buddhism is well-known for the propagation of nonviolence. There is unanimity over peacefulness of Buddhist teachings. These teachings developed from Siddhartha Gautama's, called the Buddha (c. 563-483 B.C.) spiritual quest to understand and remove the origins of human suffering. His contemplations led to a series of precepts for a better life which in the first step would prohibit inflicting any harm on another living being (ahimsa). As Kraft (1992) excerpting from Nhat Hanh, a Buddhist teacher, writes, the five main precepts, the first of which is to refrain from harming any living being, are expanded in fourteen other precepts which invite the followers to live in a very tolerant way:

1. Do not idolize any doctrine or ideology, even a Buddhist one.
2. Do not think that your knowledge is a changeless absolute truth.
3. Do not force others to adopt your view, whether by authority, threat, money, propaganda, or even education.
4. Do not avoid contact with suffering or close your eyes to suffering
5. Do not accumulate wealth while millions remain hungry.
6. Do not maintain anger or hatred.
7. Do not lose yourself in distraction, inwardly or outwardly.
8. Do not say words which cause your community to split apart.
9. Do not say untruthful things for your personal advantage.
10. Do not use Buddhism for personal gain, or as a political party.
11. Do not take a job which is harmful to man and nature.
12. Do not kill and do not let others kill.
13. Take nothing that belongs to others.
14. Do not mistreat your body. (see Kraft, 1992, P. 21)

One of Buddha's sermons strongly exemplifies Buddhism's commitment to non-violence, even to the point of self-sacrifice (and makes it difficult to behave like a real Buddhist): 'Even if thieves carve you limb from limb with a double-handed saw, if you make your mind hostile you are not following my teaching.' (Austin, Cranock, & Oommen)

In *Dhammapada* (a scripture which has been ascribed to Buddha himself) ethical points for a better living have been introduced in a succinct way. For example, "Hatred is never appeased by hatred in this world; it is appeased by love." (I:5) and, "Whoever tries to seek happiness through hurting others, cannot find happiness." (10:131)

According to Gabriel (1999) in Buddha's teachings, evil originates from earthly desires, which in their turn such desires are "caused by the delusion of a permanent self". Buddha construed the human being as "an ever-changing aggregate of five elements"-the corpse, feeling, perception, impulse, and emotion- and acts of consciousness.

This conglomeration of ever-changing elements is in a state of flux, and after birth is reborn or reconstituted into another aggregate, and suffers the consequences of negative *karma* or misdeeds. The solution to worldly suffering is to realize the myth of self-hood and aim at *nirvana* (literally, blowing out), a state of permanence.[...] Thus the key concepts of Buddhism are those of *anatta* (no self) and *anicca* (impermanence). The Buddhist precepts regarding *ahimsa* and compassion has had a profound effect on ethics in India and wherever this religion has spread to. It is well known that Buddhism reformed to a considerable extent the warlike tendencies of the Central Asian Mongol and Tibetan populations." (p. 718)

So, in Buddhism in order to live in peace, one is advised to forget his self and the identity which demarcates boundaries between him and the rest of world; that is to change his experience. It invites people to an unconditional self-sacrifice and its pacifism seems to be somewhat synonymous to submission (or a magnanimous remission). One form of such a self-sacrifice can be found in the course of the American-Vietnamese war during which Some Buddhist monks burned themselves to death in protest against the war.

However in a caste society like India, in which structural violence (through negligence towards and deprivation of the lower castes from their human rights) has been widespread in the course of history, Buddhist teachings have most

probably played an important role in maintenance of peace. In Buddhist culture violent tendencies are counteracted through self-denial. And while in many other cultures some sort of honor and dignity are sought in retaliation and violent behavior, Buddhism finds no virtue in any forms of violence.

3.2.1.1.3-Jainism

Among the Indian religions, Jainism can be traced back to the pre Aryan era and then is the most ancient indigenous religion of India (Gabriel 1999). The idea of non-injury is practically observed very meticulously in daily lives of Jains. That is while others may avoid from any intended harm against people or other living beings, Jains make a lot of preparations lest they harm insects unintentionally. For example, monks have masks on their faces to take care of inhaling small insects, and they also use a long and soft broom to sweep small living beings in their sides so that they don't harm them while walking. Jainism has two sets of behavioral rules for the lay followers and the ascetics. *Mahavrata* refers to the five great vows which the ascetics should observe: Ahimsa (Non-violence), *Satya* (Truthfulness), *Asteya* (Non-stealing), *Brahmacharya* (Celibacy, chastity), *Aparigraha* (Non-greed, renunciation of all possessions); *Anuvrat* is comprised of nine ethical principles for the lay Jains: Sensitivity to the existence of others; Unity of mankind; Co-existence; Communal harmony; Non-violent resistance; Limited individual acquisition and consumption; Integrity in behavior; Belief in the purity of means; Fearlessness, objectivity and truthfulness. So the principle of non-injury and respect to the existence of others is the first vow which either monks or lay should observe.

3.2.1.1.4 Other Eastern ethical systems

The idea of nonviolence also might somehow be found in some other eastern ethical philosophies as Sikhism as well as the two famous Chinese ethical systems of Confucianism and Taoism. With regard to the Sikhs though they are looked sometimes as a martial community due to their considerable presence in the Indian army, however historically aggressiveness is not intrinsic to this ideology (Gabriel, 1999). Indeed Guru Nanak (1469-1534), the first guru and the founder of Sikhism is well-known for his peaceful teachings. He has a famous hymn: “No one is my enemy, no one is a foreigner. With all I am at peace, God within us renders us incapable of hate and prejudice.” However Sikhs had also challenges with the Indian rulers of their time, and some shifts have occurred in their attitudes toward nonviolence. This can be found in Guru Gobind Singh’s (the tenth guru) words who said, “When all other means have failed, it is permissible to draw the sword.” So the idea of “just war” is accepted by Sikhs under conditions, but the idea of “holy war” is not found in Sikhism. A central teaching of Sikhism is respect for people of all faiths.

Confucianism is a set of ethical precepts taught by Confucius, and these teachings are aimed to establish a harmony between man and nature. This harmony can be achieved through tolerance and moderation. Though, with regard to tolerance of heresy or of beliefs other than Confucian teachings, Jiang (2007) finds an ambiguity in it:

Confucianism proposes “All things exist together but never harm each other, all ways function together but never go against each other”, demonstrating tolerance to varied philosophies; on the other hand, Confucianism also proposes that gentlemen have the responsibility of “correcting people’s minds and banishing excessive views”, suppressing

all the philosophies Confucians consider wrong, in order to promote the sages' doctrines. (p. 21)

Though, in Confucian tradition there is not much direct words in praise of nonviolence (or at least I couldn't find them), but in the same way there seems to be no clues of glorification of violence and war. However some forms of violence have been approved: "Confucius sanctioned personal revenge, especially by sons of murdered parents, and throughout the Han period blood revenge for close relatives, although often performed by professional avengers, remained prevalent." (Spiereburg, 2006, p. 15)

In Taoism, as Wolfe (2007) writes, violence is considered as an internal psychological problem rather than something external. Indeed in this ethical philosophy, self-control is advised, while our anger seems to be more dangerous than the outer source of that anger. Tao Te Ching, the scripture of Taoist ethics, teaches modesty and peacefulness:

Whenever you advise a ruler in the way of Tao,
Counsel him not to use force to conquer the universe,

....

Achieve results, but never glory in them

Achieve results, but never boast

....

Achieve results, but not through violence

.... (30)

Or:

What others teach I also teach; that is

“A violent man will die a violent death!” (42)

Taoism explains life and the phenomena on the basis of a continuous cycle between Yin and Yang, two opposite and at the same time complementary parts depicted in the following diagram. In any universal phenomenon, when the dark Yin gets to its climax, then it recedes for the light Yang and vice versa, and this contraction-expansion defines the nature of events. Each of them has the seed of another in itself (the dots). This worldview shows why a Taoist believes that “... one gains by losing, and loses by gaining.” (Tao Te Ching, 42)



While most of the Eastern religions are ethical philosophies, Semitic religions are mostly revealed ones, in which a personified God is the creator and ruler of the universe. He (and not she) has a continuous attention to man’s behavior, and finally will reward or punish us for our good or evil deeds. Galtung (1990) makes a “basic distinction between a transcendental God outside us and an immanent god inside us”. He finds that the Semitic or as he calls them “Occidental” religions spread a “catastrophic idea” of transcendentalism which may result in many consequences; there is a God who is “outside” or “above” us, and it is likely that some people are seen closer than others to Him, and then they will have higher status or dignity. In his own words:

... in the general occidental tradition of not only dualism but Manichaeism, with sharp dichotomies between good and evil, there would also have to be something like an evil Satan corresponding to the

good God, for reasons of symmetry. Again transcendental and immanent representations are possible, with God and Satan possessing or at least choosing their own; or with God or Satan - not to mention God and Satan - being inside us. All combinations are found in all occidental religions. But the focus here is on the hard version, belief in a transcendental God and a transcendental Satan. (p. 296)

3.2.1.1.5 Judaism

Judaism has a personified anthropomorphic God, who sends messages to Earth, who gets angry or happy in reaction to the behavior of His servants, who sends angels to destroy the cities of evildoers. (Genesis 19:1-29), and who wrestles with Jacob (Genesis 32:24-29) face to face⁶.

The history of the Jewish is a history of war, violence, and discrimination. The expansion of David's kingdom was a result of military conquests, and afterwards the collapse of the Judah and the great Diaspora took place after two destructive attacks by Sennacherib from Assyria and then by Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon. So no wonder if we find so many plaintive and vengeful curses against the Babylonians in the Book of Jeremiah in which he wished and prophesized a bloody and painful annihilation of Babylon (which came true though not so bloody, after Cyrus the Great conquered the Babylonian Empire and rescued the Jewish captives).

⁶ Such a manlike understanding of God in the Old Testament might probably have led (at least partially) writers like Erich von Däniken to believe in the extraterrestrial origin of ancient civilizations and the wireless contact between Moses and the outer space men! (see *Chariots of Gods*, 1968).

Though Jews have been victims of violence in confrontation with other nations, and especially under the persecution of Christians as well as Moslems, however glorification of violence can be found in parts of the Old Testament. Both “just war” and “holy war” ideas are accepted in Judaism as in the two other Middle Eastern religions, Christianity and Islam. Though the rights of other people have been clearly considered in the Ten Commandments, however in Deuteronomy 20: 10-15 we read:

¹⁰ When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of peace. ¹¹ If they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to forced labor and shall work for you. ¹² If they refuse to make peace and they engage you in battle, lay siege to that city. ¹³ When the LORD your God delivers it into your hand, put to the sword all the men in it. ¹⁴ As for the women, the children, the livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as plunder for yourselves. And you may use the plunder the LORD your God gives you from your enemies. ¹⁵ This is how you are to treat all the cities that are at a distance from you and do not belong to the nations nearby.

In the Book of Esther there is a report of a massacre which the Jews call it Purim⁷ and celebrate it every year. This report victoriously explains how the

⁷ A group of Iranian historians who criticize the formal histories of the Middle East (written mostly by Western historians), and whose writings seem to have some anti-Semitic flavor, call Purim the genocide of Iranians by Jews. They offer a new narrative of the Middle Eastern history and contrary to the contents of history textbooks claim that the Achaemenids and their "accomplices", Jews, have totally destroyed several civilizations of Iran and Mesopotamia. In short, Esther the queen of King Xerxes (the 4th Achamenid king) became aware of a plot against the Jews by Haman (a minister of Xerxes) through her uncle Mordecai who had found a prominent status in king's court. She begged the King to let Jews annihilate their enemies, and following his permission, the Jews were allowed to attack their adversaries and kill a huge

Jewish inhabitants of the Persian Empire [in the course of what we may call a preemptive retaliation] murdered a great number of “their enemies”:

The Jews struck down all their enemies with the sword, killing and destroying them, and they did what they pleased to those who hated them. In the citadel of Susa, the Jews killed and destroyed five hundred men. They also killed Parshandatha, Dalphon, Aspatha, Poratha, Adalia, Aridatha, Parmashta, Arisai, Aridai and Vaizatha, the ten sons of Haman son of Hammedatha, the enemy of the Jews. But they did not lay their hands on the plunder. (Book of Esther 9:5-10)

And also:

Meanwhile, the remainder of the Jews who were in the king's provinces also assembled to protect themselves and get relief from their enemies. They killed seventy-five thousand of them but did not lay their hands on the plunder. This happened on the thirteenth day of the month of Adar, and on the fourteenth they rested and made it a day of feasting and joy. (ibid. 9:16-17)

Presence of the Jews as minorities in many countries, have resulted in formation of negative stereotypes towards them, and as a result in persecution as well as discriminations against them during a long time culminating in the Holocaust during the World War II.

number of people. Most of the casualty were apparently in Susa, capital of Elam which was now one of the three capitals of the Persian Empire (Ecbatana and Persepolis were the other two). However, among many questions, one is that why and how a king who (as the heir of Darius the Great) reigns over 33 nations, can leave the hands of a group of his subjects free to annihilate another group?

3.2.1.1.6-Christianity

Christianity, during the past two millennia has shown two different faces and opposing approaches toward violence. The rise of Christianity (regardless of its historical authenticity) had a message of peace, equality, hope, and fraternity. Teachings of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount (the New Testament, Matthew 5 - 7) are clearly messages for nonviolence; He said “blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God” (Matthew 5:9) and ‘love your enemies’ (Matthew 5:44). Christ’s Father was an endless source of compassion, forgiveness and unconditional love for mankind, especially for the suffering people. It seems that until Constantine, the Roman Emperor (274-337) converted to Christianity and made it the official religion of the Empire, it kept its genuine message, however after being an official religion in the hands of statesmen, it gradually turned into a conservative religion with the potentials for establishing Inquisition courts, persecution of heretics, and Crusades in the next centuries. Christianity can be a proper example of how man can transform an emancipating idea into a means of enslavement and repression. This can especially happen when an ideology is in the hands of ruling classes. Though within 2000 years not a single but several narratives of Christianity have been offered among which some denominations (for example, Quakers, Amish, Mennonites) are considered as “peace churches”. Conceiving the violence of the Christian church during the Middle Ages, the Christianity of our time, which has only a meager power in political arena, can be seen as a religion of pacifism, especially when it is compared to fundamentalist Islamic movements.

3.2.1.1.7 Islam

Since the beginning of its foundation (maybe except for a very short time, during which Moslems were a minority), Islam has been involved in violence. Two opposite narratives can be found in the ideas of the commentators. Moslems usually define the word “Islam” as submission or surrender to God. But with regard to the Arabic root of this word, it can be defined as “to make healthy” or “to make peace”. Mohammad, the prophet of Islam, introduced himself as the last of all prophets and the last messenger of Allah whose word was revealed to him. So the believing Moslems usually think that their religion is the most perfect one and it contains the absolute truth. Early Moslems were under persecution and within the first few years of the rise of Islam they underwent prejudices and attacks; however reciprocally they waged wars against their dissidents. Equipped with a firm faith, early Moslems after getting political power in Arabia, invaded other lands and invited people to convert into their religion, or to pay a constant tribute to the conquerors, and thereafter many disputes were settled through repressive means. So the issue here is that it is an onerous and futile effort to give a tolerant picture of the religion, in the presence of explicit vengeful verdicts and commandments, and in view of the many historical examples of invasion, plunder, and forced subjugation of the invaded nations. Those who in spite of such evidences do so, may give a picture of their own peaceful minds. In cases the inferences of some commentators of the religion are reflective of vindictive and punitive mentalities. In such conditions it is hard to expect ordinary people who are raised in a prejudicial atmosphere, and who receive such indoctrinations, to develop a tolerant way in their personal lives. There seems to be a relationship between social context and tolerance in

interpersonal relations. The general approach of Islam to violence is also reflected in the behaviors of believers as well as in its jurisprudential verdicts.

For example, in the Islamic doctrines, any Moslem, is obliged to do *Amr be Ma'ruf* (propagation of virtue) and *Nah'i az Monkar* (prohibition of vice); though this religious command can be construed as the Moslem's responsibility to stand against oppression, however (especially when there is a superficial understanding of such "general purpose" commands) the vice may include many behaviors which are performed within the individual rights limits, such as drinking alcoholic beverages, premarital love affair (though with mutual consent), gambling, and even eating in public places during the fasting month. So a believing devoted Moslem deems it not only as his right, but also as his religious task to prohibit drinkers, or unlawful lovers from "the evils" they are doing, and hence his understanding of the religious tasks leads him to meddle in other people's private affairs. Then religious fundamentalism, may indulge the followers in inquisition of others for what they do in the boundaries of their personal rights; something that may result in very harsh and bloody confrontations and interpersonal violence.⁸ In such cases that violent behavior receives justification from the ruling ideology (either the ideology is dictated by the Divine Will, or by the earthly man) and is equipped with a feeling of

⁸ Several cases of this kind of interpersonal violence which have led to death, have occurred in Iran. In one case for example, a family were celebrating Nowruz (the Iranian New Year) in front of their home like the majority of Iranians. The way they expressed their happiness was not liked by their neighbor a young zealot moslem who was also a member of a paramilitary organization. He urged the family to stop it, and the family refused, then he insisted until the conflict escalated into a full fledged fight during which the one who wanted to perform Nah'i az monkar was killed. After a few weeks the son of the family was sentenced to death by the court and then was executed for murder. Two deaths were the result of a religious meddling to show the right path!

rightfulness, it can be still more destructive; it leaves no hesitations or feelings of guilt for what the individual may do. Those creeds which are the claimants of absolute truth usually create a schism among people and divide them into opposite categories. Consequently, since their very early social contacts, people are somehow indoctrinated to put up a defensive barrier between themselves and others. They may appeal to religious texts to justify their own hostility and for example read in Quran that whoever does not believe in Allah and the message of prophet or questions his prophecy is recognized as *Kafir* and then has a more chance to be treated in a hostile manner:

Fight them and Allah will punish them by your hands and disgrace them and give you Victory over them and heal the hearts of a believing people.
(Quran 9:14)

The Islamic culture has been replete with distrust and antagonism towards the so-called non believers. The cornerstone of the Islamic culture was laid in an atmosphere of mutual hostility and hatred between the believers and non believers. Then, no surprise to find -several centuries later - the continuation of that mentality in legal and jurisprudential arenas. The legal system derived from such religious doctrines, not only does not decrease interpersonal (and of course group) violence, but also sometimes explicitly or implicitly propagates it. According to Saney (1991):

There is consensus among Moslem clergy that if a “natural” Moslem, meaning a person born of Moslem father and mother, renounces Islam and embraces another religion, his blood can be split. He is called *mortad* [apostate] and is no longer the master of his life, property, or social rights.
(p. 870, the bracket was added)

The Islamic jurisprudence apparently offers its followers the right to eliminate unbelievers, or at least it is very easy-going towards them in comparison to the cases in which a Moslem is killed. For example:

If a person, thinking that another person is *mahdoor ol dam* [that is an apostate whose blood in the Islamic penal law is of no value] gives him poisoned food and it turns out that he was not a “mahdoor ol dam”, such a killing is not intentional murder and *qisas* [retaliation] will not be applied to it. (Saney p. 871, Marashi p.12, *brackets were added*)

Also:

If a Moslem injures an “infidel” with intention to kill him, and the victim converts to Islam in the meantime and then dies, the killer will not be subjected to *qisas*.... If a Moslem cuts the hand of another Moslem and the latter becomes an apostate and dies of the wound, there will be no *qisas* or blood-money, because a Moslem cannot be punished for killing an “infidel” and there is no blood-money for an apostate. (ibid. p. 871, ibid. pp. 24-25)

This may leave people’s hands free to kill whoever they will and say they thought that their victim was an apostate, and this is indeed what has sometimes happened. In several murder cases the murderers have claimed that their victims were Bahai or “mahdoor ol dam”. (Such procedures have been in act for several years, though recently Iranian legislators have found it expedient to make some revisions in such laws; they have taken steps to partially moderate the discrimination. However the blood-money in cases the victims are women or members of officially recognized religious minorities, is half less than for Moslem men.)

The cultures of violence can be also demarcated by such discriminations and devaluation of those who do not fit into the prevailing social molds, and in cases they are also reinforced by religious justifications then they can provide effective pretexts for the application of most harsh ways of unbridled violence against the perceived trespassers, without any or with less remorse and pangs of conscience. For example in traditional Islamic cultures people are usually severely opposed to premarital sexual relations, and if they come across such cases, sometimes they feel free to persecute, arrest and punish adulterers; they may think that it is their religious task (and also a sign of their purity and piety!) to intervene and to clean the world from such “dirty”, “lewd”, “sinful” creatures! Stoning the adulterers gives them a feeling of satisfaction for enforcing the “Divine Law” on the earth! They seem to have a picture of an unforgiving God in their minds, who allows or even urges a group of His own creatures to mercilessly punish another, for what they cite from the religious texts as “corruption on earth”, though it may be a radical idiosyncratic understanding of the term “corruption”. The jurisprudential interpretation of some of the commentators in the Islamic world, are in odds with the modern understanding of human rights, and can be considered as an obvious and undoubted prescription of discrimination and violence against women, and other social groups. Such jurisprudential verdicts however seem to be a reproduction of the original version in new forms. They may advise application of force and violence in some occasions.

In one case for example Charles Dawkins (2006) points out to the cartoons published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten which apparently depicted the prophet of Islam, which soon led to a political crisis and inter-religious tension in some countries:

A bounty of \$ 1 million was placed on the head of 'the Danish cartoonist', by a Pakistani imam - who was apparently unaware that there were twelve different Danish cartoonists, and almost certainly unaware that the three most offensive pictures had never appeared in Denmark at all [...].In Nigeria, Moslem protesters against the Danish cartoons burned down several Christian churches, and used machetes to attack and kill (black Nigerian) Christians in the streets. One Christian was put inside a rubber tyre, doused with petrol and set alight. Demonstrators were photographed in Britain bearing banners saying 'Slay those who insult Islam', 'Butcher those who mock Islam', "Europe you will pay: Demolition is on its way" and apparently without irony, 'Behead those who say Islam is a violent religion'. (ibid. p. 25)

In another case before the above mentioned, Ayatollah Khomeini issued the *fatwa* (religious edict) ordering Moslems to murder Salman Rushdie, the author of *The Satanic Verses*, for insulting Islam. Apparently, he had not read the book, and his *fatwa* was only a reaction out of anger and rage that a very dedicated believer in Islam may show against someone who has written something against Islam. Shortly afterwards, a revolutionary foundation specified a considerable amount of money as an award for anybody who could put this command into action. Though Rushdie was blessed enough to be protected by the British guardians and he remained unharmed, but there have been others who were not as lucky as he was.

As a result of what has been discussed on religion in the above pages, we can see that a conspicuous feature of the fundamentalist religious people is the lack of tolerance towards any different voices. This is a characteristic of what I would like to call the religious/ideological narcissism, which is accompanied by

a severe rage in case of being criticized or questioned. It seems that high religiosity tends to increase the chance of struggle amongst people. This might be especially true when we are talking about the so-called revealed religions which are claimants of pure truth. If they could have produced many group conflicts in the course of history, then they can be suspected to have a negative role also in interpersonal conflicts.

3.2.1.2 Ideological extremism: ethno-nationalism

The world is made a hell usually by those who promise a paradise. This is not confined to religious extremism. Grimshaw (1999) identifies three varieties of ideologies which are closely associated with democide. One is undoubtedly religious. The other two are first *political* ideologies which

Often combine elements of idealism and self-interest as when it is anticipated that a new order of some sort will make [everybody's] life better [...]. "Manifest destiny", the "dictatorship of proletariat", death to the American imperialist infidels", and the "thousand year Reich" have all resonated, and have all been associated with democide. (pp. 58-9)

And then racism:

Racial ideologies about the superiority of one or another group and the inferiority of others seems always to accompany contact between groups. In some cases, as in Anti-Semitism, characterization of Jews as inferior has been comfortably accommodated with portrayals of them as successful schemers and exploiters. Slogans here include "final solution" and "only good Indians" and lead to colonial open seasons on wogs and kafirs, eliminationism in the Third Reich and the "ethnic cleansing" of 1990s Yugoslavia in dissolution. (p. 59)

Though he points out to three type of ideologies which may direct a society to violence, however in a general view ideologies have similar characteristics; that is though in their appearances they may seem very different and even contradictory, utopian ideologies (either pious religious or blasphemous atheist indoctrinations) exhibit similar performances: they claim for *pure truth* and promise “the right path”; they take the role of *saviors*; they look for *masses*, and devoted believers rather than individuals who have the strength of criticism, and through *deception of the realities* which seem to be contradictory to their propaganda, they mobilize people (usually against their adversaries) and urge them to participate ceremoniously in special group activities.

Ideologies go beyond the realities. Ideology is devotedness to a limited and selected part of reality with a tendency to ignore and overlook the rest. It allows the followers to think only in an approved way, which looks like selective blindness. Dogmatic ideologies may endanger peace in two ways: first through propagation of biased ideas, and instigation of the disciples against the infidels or the “perilous enemies”; second, through preventing people from expanding their knowledge and cognitive skills. Ideological governments (which are themselves products of specific historical and cultural conditions) encourage their people to watch, listen, read, learn, and behave in a strictly limited way. For years, the Chinese students had to study and pass courses on Marxism (of course the Chinese version!), and in some other communities, students should still pass compulsory religious courses (as the only way for a *forced* salvation!) since the early years of schooling till graduation from universities. So a considerable part of their energies, and talents, and learning opportunities is wasted for memorizing and thinking on outdated tales concocted by forgotten generations of long time ago, not from a mythological perspective, but as a sheer

truth. So ideologies usually obstruct the unbiased and logical way of thinking, which is a necessary precondition for mental development. Fundamentalist ideological social systems not only split the people in different identities with different labels, but also ruin the harmony and make a schism between soul and body; people should only select between two prisons. To emancipate their souls from the ideological deception, to think and talk freely, they may sometimes find their bodies in prison; to save their bodies from rods and chains, they may have to send their souls to captivity and consent to a deadly silence. So the freedom of soul and body together becomes the sweetest wish in such a society. However as a defense mechanism, sometimes people forget that they have souls. In Fromm's words (see Chapter One), they appeal to automaton conformity to release themselves from the predicaments of taking any responsibilities. Strict devotion to any fundamentalist ideology may lead to bias in the faculty of judgment, rigidity and inflexibility of thought, resistance against any change and any different or new way of thinking, and therefore to more conflicts. In such a social milieu the seeds of mistrust, xenophobia, intolerance, and prejudice are planted and the fruit to be harvested is nothing but hostile conflict.

Among the mentioned sources of conflict, *ethnic nationalism* has been a good predictor of group violence. Researchers have reported correlations between specific social attitudes and aggressiveness. Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) contemplate on a relation between nationalism and aggression. They describe two types of nationalism, individualistic-libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian. Membership in such national entities can be either "civic" (voluntary) or "ethnic" (predetermined). They distinguish three different factors, structural, cultural, and psychological, in the emergence of any nationalism. Regardless of the historical cases of nationalisms they count, they write on a

psychological negative experience that is *ressentiment*⁹ in the formation of ethnic nationalisms:

According to the characteristic psycho-logic of ethnic nationalisms, the evil other (whoever that may be) is always harboring malicious intentions, ready to strike against the innocent nation at an opportune moment. For this reason, resentment-based nations tend to feel threatened and to become aggressive - both to preempt perceived threats of aggression against them and because the evil nature of the adversary justifies aggression, even if no immediate threats are perceived, at the same time as it justifies brutality in relation to the enemy population. (Greenfeld & Chirot 1994, p. 88)

Searle-White (2001) notes that the ascription of evil characteristics to the enemy and outgroup devaluation through nationalistic sentiments justifies and facilitates the application of violence and aggression against them. Then it can be construed that the adoption of an ethnic nationalistic identity (which for example is based on similarity in blood, or the like) can be a reaction to an unexpressed envy and hostility which can get an outlet for expression after being allied in a nation.

3.2.1.3 Absolutist vs. relativist

As mentioned before, extremist ideologies either religious or non-religious usually believe in a sharp distinction between good and evil. For them the world is strictly divided into opposite sides, and into absolute truth and absolute falsity;

⁹ Deep-seated resentment, frustration and hostility accompanied by a sense of being powerless to express these feelings directly (Adopted from Merriam-Webster Dictionary)

and proportionately people may be divided to one of such bipolar categories, with the favorite ones being idolized as the spokesmen and the plenipotentiary representatives of the absolute truth on the earth!

They usually want to show the path to salvation. The degree of fanatic devotion to any dogma or ideology can be related to a cognitive orientation, which we may call absolutism vs. relativism. Absolutist way of thinking is usually found in the heart of all ideological systems; when people tend to accept something as the absolute truth they will at the same time energetically oppose against what they find incompatible with their approved beliefs.

This dualistic thinking may to a large extent stem from religion, as Russell (cited in Doty 1998) states, “the Christian conception of God as perfectly and exclusively good creates a need for an anti God” so that a splitting happens between an absolute good and an absolute evil. The very mentality that ascribes opposite antagonistic characteristics to things and people is intrinsically conflict-oriented.

The idea of relation between moral absolutism and aggression can also be traced in Talcot Parsons’ (1999) writings. Though while analyzing the issue of religion and modern society he deeply philosophizes the concepts of absolutism, eroticism and aggression, but he finds the relation between moral absolutism and aggression as serious, and more dangerous than regression into eroticism or into drug dependence. According to Parsons, the point with moral absolutism in relation with aggression is

the extent to which they serve as triggers to mobilize, not only legitimate opposition, in the sense of adherence to values somewhat different from those absolutized, or of defense of rights against violence or insult, but

they release the irrational affective factors which lie back of the tensions inherent in such conflict situations, factors which in general in relation to creative movements operate repressively. (Parsons, 1999 p. 71)

Borgeryd (1998) finds out that the good-evil dichotomization aggravates inter-collective conflicts; and Zafirovski (2007) writes that the US Puritan conservatives tend to intolerance and aggression and to impose their moral absolutism on society. He finds parts of the roots of aggression in American society in puritan religious beliefs which propagate moral absolutism and their political outcomes.

3.2.2 Prescriptive facilitators

Proportionate to the way members of a culture understand themselves and the world, they develop attitudes about how to deal with others. The basic cognitive orientations and belief systems which provide people with criteria for judgment and distinction between good and evil have some outcomes and connotations; they provide prescriptions or action-oriented directions to answer essential questions pertaining to such issues as extent and limits of individual rights and freedom, and choice. Then depending on the prevailing infrastructural value systems (which may stem from historical and socioeconomic experiences) specific attitudes and behavioral norms develop through which people regulate their social behaviors.

In the course of social interaction, everyone should inevitably have an idea about such beliefs as equality or inequality of people, power and obedience, dominance vs. compliance, self-fulfillment vs. self-sacrifice, and competition vs. cooperation. Attitudes toward these concepts define the ways people apply for

attainment to social rewards, and they can be reflected in the following four tightly interrelated orientations:

3.2.2.1 Power Distance

Unequal distribution of power across society is usually referred to as Power Distance and according to Arbuckle (2004) it can be defined as “the extent to which less powerful members of organizations accept that power is distributed unevenly.” (p. 23) It is related to the hierarchical social structures. In high power-distance societies there is a tendency to understand class cleavages and inequality in distribution of power and privileges among people, as something natural, unavoidable and more or less fair. So it is expected that few if any effective social policies are adopted by the ruling classes to disruptions. Indeed, Hofstede (2001) has found smaller power distance to be associated with “a certain consensus among the population that reduces the chance of disruptive conflicts”. He stipulates that in his previous three measures of domestic political violence on “37, 37, and 10 countries”, he has found highly significant correlations “(.39**, .71***, and .93***)” between power distance and violence. (p.111). In another study on 50 countries, Van de Vliert, Schwartz, Huisman, Hofstede, and Daan (1999, as cited in Hofstede, 2001) calculated an index for riots and political violence, and this index was highly correlated with power distance with $r=.51^{***}$ (ibid.) Hofstede also points out to three groups of countries: those with higher PDI having stable authoritarian governments, those in the middle of power distance scale being in revolutionary changes, and those with lower PDI enjoying a relatively stable pluralist systems. (ibid.) Hence, power distance index is also related to the authoritarian tendencies and values.

3.2.2.2 Authoritarianism

Authoritarian character has received a special attention in the studies of war and violence especially during the post war years in the middle of 20th Century after Adorno and his colleagues introduced this term as a pathological syndrome consisting of several cognitive and behavioral traits including conventionalism, submissiveness toward ingroup leaders, aggressiveness toward those who do not abide by conventional values, superstition and stereotypy and sort of fatalism, preoccupation with power and dominance, destructiveness and cynicism and a generalized hostility (see Bay 1970 pp. 194-5). Authoritarian character has been found to be involved in political and group violence (e.g. in Erich Fromm 1941). The early theorizations and especially the F-scale for the measurement of authoritarian personality, have been revised or refined (e.g. by Bob Altemeyer) and the term authoritarianism seems to have found its place in social studies.

According to Staub (1989) “A society’s strong respect for authority is *one* source of genocidal violence. A tendency to like and obey authority is *one* characteristic of perpetrators” (p. 30). On the basis of Staub’s (1999) argumentation, Bond (2006) finds out that in highly authoritarian cultures, people who suffer from difficult living conditions, when their authorities fail to provide them with security and an effective leadership, long for the more promising leaders, and at the same time accuse other groups for their problems. As they are leader-oriented they might be easier enticed or provoked to involve in violent behavior. The so-called “in-groupism” in collectivist cultural settings leads to a higher tendency to participate in collective violence.

In authoritarian families which apply punishment more than others, an unconditional respect and obedience seems to be more important than showing affection and love. So their relationships are usually formal and cold and strictly

organized. According to Koot et al. (2008) “harsh or punitive parenting, physical punishment and authoritarian parenting styles” may have a role in children’s disruptive behavior, and according to Lamers-Winkelmann (2008) a “cycle of violence” can be found in such relations in which authoritarian fathers may appeal to battering and physical violence and this way convey the message to their children that physical violence is permissible. Such punishments are applied especially when children are considered as “disobedient”. Authoritarian cultures, being based on a hierarchy of obedience rather than mutual consent, expect their members to unquestionably obey the rules. Parents take the role of commanders. In such families as Alice Miller (cited in Staub 1989) states, “children who grow up in punitive authoritarian families do not develop separate, independent identities. They cannot stand on their own but need guidance and leadership”. (p. 30) lack of spontaneity and warm social relations and thinking in a conventional and stereotyped manner makes them prone to show hard reactions against whatever is innovative or different from the status quo. Stenner (2005) gives a detailed account on the measures of Authoritarianism in east European societies and finds out that they can define part of intolerance to difference.

For the authoritarian character, authority is legitimate per se. So respect of figures of power and obedience seem to be salient features of this character. It can be marked by compliance to the powerful figures and at the same time devaluation of those who do not have a share in power. The authoritarian character perceives criticism as a threat and may be highly reactive to signs of disobedience and appeal to violence.

3.2.2.3 Fantasies of Omnipotence

Feelings or fantasies of unlimited self-agency, refer to a sense of hyper autonomy. Power Distance and Authoritarian tendencies within a society, may strengthen or, be accompanied by a sense or indeed an illusion of unbound freedom of action, an apparently extreme sense of self-confidence which is not confined or conditioned by custom or law. This condition can be labeled as feeling or fantasy of omnipotence, which might be seen especially amongst law-breakers who find their wills and wishes above legal limits, and their own rights prior to the rights of others. It can be expressed as an exaggeration in one's choice and control and then it may reflect a tendency to impose one's own will on others, or represent an ungrounded overestimation in one's self-determination. This positive bias in self-evaluation may reflect a fantasy of mastery which seems to be related with authoritarian tendencies. At the same time it can be reminiscent of a symptom of narcissistic personality disorder, a zest for manipulation and control. In the "threatened egotism model" Baumeister and colleagues (as cited in Yukawa 2004) argue that excessive self-confidence and self worth brings about a sensitivity to criticisms and evaluations by others, leading to a defensive denial of negative evaluations. Such a narcissistic vulnerability to negative evaluations can reactively trigger an aggressive retaliatory behavior. The fantasies of omnipotence seem to have more chance to be found in cultures of honor which emphasize on masculine values. Machismo or the will for more strength, virility and courage can be highly related to this thought style, which ultimately leads to serious competition with others.

3.2.2.4 Competitiveness

This orientation pertains to the way people may establish relations with others, that is to look at one another as rivals or as allies. Achievement to social

rewards and privileges through competition or cooperation seems to be a main and early decision through which people regulate their public relation strategies. Prescription of competition as a general principle in the course of social relations, reflects how one may consider others; that is, as obstacles against his achievements. Buck (1999) refers to the “conflict-competition-violence cycle”, and states that “[a] conflict view is derived from the conviction that variance is equivalent to opposition and struggle” (p. 589). Competition, as he mentions, is an orientation through which the conflict is converted in a win-lose contest, and finally, to avoid losing, competition fosters destructiveness. So, when variance which is unavoidable in any society is perceived as a sign of conflict and contention, then competitiveness inevitably happens, and it does not necessarily lead to fair play, especially when the competition is over scarce sources of welfare and dignity. Though Buck tends to understand competitiveness as a result of the way people interpret their differences (rather than something intrinsically-induced) and in the same line with Klama (ibid. p. 590) finds a “bias” pertaining to the concept of conflict “in many scientific spheres”, however he links competitiveness to violence. Daly and Wilson (1988) also refer to competitiveness as a source of interpersonal violence of young men. Therefore those cultures which emphasize on competition rather than cooperation may be more prone to struggle.

Then it seems that competitiveness is a logical outcome of the fantasy of omnipotence which in its turn stems from authoritarian relationship style, and finally this kind of relationship reflects or is produced by a deep-rooted attitude towards the legitimacy of inequality among people in their rights for attainment to power and social rewards. This package which has been shown in the following figure can also be a resultant of the way people learn to perceive and

understand the world around them, through beliefs and values, as mentioned in the previous sections.




Fig. 3.2 Interplay among the four prescriptive orientations.

As seen in the Fig. 3.2 four above-mentioned orientations, power distance, authoritarian tendencies, fantasies of omnipotence, and competitiveness can be considered as tightly interrelated and complementary sides of one phenomenon. These orientations as noted before might be embedded together in the so-called cultures of honor and in the underdeveloped world, where most cases of hostile conflicts take place.

3.2.2.5 Cultures of honor

Cultural values equip us with criteria to understand special situations as real or symbolic threats, and such symbolic threats are especially reflected in what is against ones honor or reputation. A culture also offers ways to cope with such

insults. According to Flynn (1977) “[i]n general, societies that prescribe violent retaliations for an affront from their individual members exhibit a value system which places a strong emphasis both on individual and group honor”. (p. 21) He finds examples of such honor-based violent behaviors not only in European feudal aristocracies but also in some little-known tribal communities, and describes such people as extremely “touchy”. Such touchy people may have a lower threshold of irritability and impulsive emotional outbursts in response to any behavior which may threaten their honor.

A same track of theorization may be found in Marongiu and Newman’s (1987) *Vengeance*. In their view honor vs. shame has the property to simply divide social beings into two categories: “those endowed with honor and those deprived of it” (p.95). So achievement to honor and avoidance of shame has a motivating force, which may sometimes in specific cultural contexts require application of violence. For example in some rural places in the Middle East it is normal for men to control or take special care of their sisters, wives and of course any female relatives in public arenas, so that no other man can look at them or talk to them. In such situations a quarrel is most probable to happen. In the cultures which are more preoccupied with issues pertaining to honor and disgrace, the role of females is very important. According to Hautzinger (2004) “female adultery supplies a critical key scenario, revealing the place where violence is most probable and most readily defensible.” (p. 50) According to the United Nations reports (e.g. in WomenWatch, UNFPA, and UNIFEM) though honor killing is a global phenomenon however it is more prevalent especially in the Middle Eastern nations, e.g. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen, in Morocco, and Mediterranean as well as the Persian Gulf region. Apparently most cases of honor murders happen in countries with

Islamic traditions who show extra vigilance towards females. On the basis of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2000) worldwide some 5000 women fall victim to honor killings every year. (also cited in Geneva Declaration Report 2008, p. 120) So the honor of a man or a family or even a community may be stained if a female relative is involved in a love intrigue. If a brother or father does nothing harsh against the “wrongdoer” female and her lover, the social pressure against him may be too devastating. Bloody honor-restoring violence is sometimes done only to keep the mouths shut. Such social pressures are obviously indicative of the dominance of patriarchal rules and norms in which females and still more other things are considered as men’s properties.

An interesting point is that the cultures which are mentioned as cultures of honor are more or less the same cultures which are labeled as collectivist; honor seems to be highly related to social hierarchical rankings. Nisbett and Cohen’s study on the Culture of Honor hypothesis gives some evidences. In an effort to explain the north-south significant difference in their violence rates, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) have compared these societies. They believe that in societies with herding (rather than farming) economies, for example in the southern parts of the States, people develop some characteristics that are especially suitable for protection of their moving property (herd), and therefore they become more aggressive than farmers whose property (land) may not be lost. In such societies male characteristics are more conspicuous and as the ruling sex, males involve more in violence. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show a considerable difference between the Northerners and Southerners in their attitudes towards the application of violence in different conditions:



Fig. 3.3 Percent of people agreeing different propositions about killing. (Cohen & Nisbett 1996)

The physiological responses of both groups of subjects were also significantly different in anger inducing conditions, as shown in the following figure:




Fig. 3.4 Change in Cortisol and Testosterone level after insult in Southern and Northern subjects. (Adopted from, Cohen and Nisbett, Culture of Honor, 1996)

With regard to Nisbet and Cohen's findings, Heine and Norenzayan (2006) make a distinction between distal and proximal explanations. Distal explanations include historical analyses which involve socio-economic as well as geographical factors of "culturally stable patterns of thought and behavior", and proximal explanations consist of "individual-level psychological processes" such as beliefs, knowledge and experiences, which are under the influence of these historical factors. Heine and Norenzayan consider Nisbett and Cohen's work which explains the present South US culture of honor with regard to the herding-based economic life style of the early immigrant settlers in that region, and state that distal explanations can not be well-examined psychologically. Instead, "evidence for distal explanations can be derived from investigation of proximal measures regarding how cultural patterns continue to persist even when the original ecological factors that gave rise to them are long gone". (p. 262, also in D. Cohen 2001). This seems to be true in historical etiology of a behavioral pattern. Sometimes a behavioral pattern goes on (as a habit) even in the absence of its causing factors. Such habits indicate stable behavioral patterns. For example, if we consider the temperature-aggression hypothesis and the *Heating Effect* (e.g. Anderson & Anderson 1998), we may argue that in hot areas in the world (including most parts of the underdeveloped regions and the South) because of the high temperature during summers people show less patience and the thresholds of their irritability are lower than those who reside in a moderate climate. So under the influence of a geographical factor they develop a stable pattern of action which reminds us of aggression. Such patterns partially take the role of behavioral habits and norms and may continue even if the new generations are equipped with good air conditioning facilities.

Though Van de Vliert et al. (cited in Triandis and Suh 2002) give another explanation for violence in such regions:

Climate can also influence culture. For example, Van de Vliert et al. (1999) argued that temperature is related to violence. Data from 136 countries show a curvilinear pattern, with violence very low in cold climates (e.g., Finland), very high in warm climates (e.g., Pakistan), and moderately high in extremely hot climates (e.g., Malaysia). In warm climates the survival of offspring is possible even without the significant investment of fathers. This frees men to sire children with multiple mates and leads to greater competition among the men, and ultimately to “masculine” cultures where men are more dominant, assertive, and tough. (Triandis and Suh p.138)

Years ago Porterfield (1965) while explaining the types of adjustment stated that aggressiveness is sometimes a pattern of adjustment. He writes: “this characteristically aggressive and destructive habit of slashing right and left in violation of persons and social values to get what one wants for himself, regardless, is criminal behavior”. (p. 146) however we may ask about the nature of a habit. Habits are the previously experienced ways for satisfaction of our needs. They are not only seen in behaviors like eating, clothing, working, and spending leisure time, but also in the way we may express our attitudes. This habitual thinking is what we call cognitive heuristics. All such habits seem to be under the influence of cultural norms and values.

Some historical evidence may be found for Nisbet and Cohen’s hypothesis: many of the most important invasions during the past centuries have been on the part of the people with nomadic origins. Herders have defeated farmers and

occupied their lands. Though “honor” seems to be an element of human aggression, however its relation to the moving property, as claimed in this hypothesis is not very clear. It may depend more on some other social variables. This simple hypothesis explains part of the social roots of aggression; however it can be included in a more elaborated model.

What we call *honor* in our daily language may be a symptom of a social psychological syndrome. This honor can take many diverse forms such as extreme patriotism, and or any other extremism. So honor seems to reflect something more than moving properties of a herding economy. It serves for a psychological function as well and reflects specific attitudes towards “others”. It requires dividing people in two categories, those who possess the honor and those who lack it. The in-groups usually have a share in the honor. So to have an honor in another words mean to be superior to another person or group of people, and it may somehow reflect in Adlerian terms an inferiority complex which shows itself through an over-compensation and a zest for superiority. It can be expected that the nations who are high in Chauvinistic attitudes show such tendencies not only in one area (for example nationalism) but also in a series of fields (anything that can be used to prove their superiority). Another aspect of cultures of honor may be related to the lower rates of social and industrial development. After all it seems that those societies which are labeled as cultures of honor belong to the developing regions of the world. Underdevelopment may bring about its psychological consequences. Honor and craving for superiority give a meaning and direction to aggressive potentials.

From a psychological standpoint an exaggerated emphasis on reputation and honor can be a sign of a deeper gap between the self and the outer world. The cultures of honor may make the individual more involved in a self-centered

identity seeking self image. Needs, necessities, and deprivations which are related to the most important aspects of human life that is, to survival, lead individuals to more engagement with themselves. Such cultures may exert some strengthening effects on the development of narcissistic personality disorder. Three decades ago Christopher Lasch's (1979) best seller, *The Culture of Narcissism*, also argued about the influence of the American life style and social institutions on the higher incidence or prevalence of narcissistic tendencies in the American society. The first important point in this work is that it links a psychopathological condition to society and traces the roots of such a psychological problem in social relations and institutions. Lasch's argumentation goes beyond a mere understanding of narcissism as only an inflated self-regard, exaggerated focus on self, and the resulting inconsideration of the feelings and violation of the rights of others. Rather, in a deeper understanding he considers narcissism as a sublimated expression of hostile and aggressive impulses; it originates from fixation of aggressive impulses very early in life. And "instead of being connected with a relaxation of superego controls over self, it is associated with superego's unconscious defensive struggle against raging aggressive impulse. The point of fixation in narcissistic impairment is pre-Oedipal and therefore is tied to hostility toward parents rather than to post-Oedipal acceptance of parental imperfection in the more adjusted and flexible personality" (Shepherd, 1980, p. 311).

In Lasch's view the new status of family and the changes in family relations, the "Absent Father" families, and the "decline of parental authority" which is reflective of the "decline of superego", and an inefficient pattern of parenting in America which leads to the lack of a "disciplined self-restraint", does not make the child to grow up without a superego, but rather it "encourages

the development of a harsh and punitive superego based largely on archaic images of parents, fused with grandiose self- images” (Lasch *ibid.*, p. 178) it is noteworthy to remind that:

The conventional oversimplification which equates superego and id with “self restraint” and “self-indulgence”, treating them as if they were radically opposed, ignores the irrational features of the superego and the alliance between aggression and a punishing conscience. The decline of parental authority and of external sanctions in general, while in many ways it weakens the superego, paradoxically reinforces the aggressive, dictatorial elements in the superego and thus makes it more difficult than ever for instinctual desires to find acceptable outlets. The “decline of the superego” in a permissive society is better understood as the creation of a new kind of superego in which archaic elements predominate. The social changes that have made it difficult for children to internalize parental authority have not abolished the superego but have merely strengthened the alliance of superego and Thanatos – that “pure culture of the death instinct”, as Freud called it, which directs against the ego a torrent of fierce, unrelenting criticism. (*ibid.* pp. 178-9)

Here we may ask about how the ego inflation and other manifestations of a pathological narcissist might be explained? Superego, equipped with the aggressive force of id, attacks to the ego. So the ego is under the constant pressure and hence defends itself and in an exaggerated way makes a constant effort to preserve itself and to prove its perfection. It deflects the attacks of superego outwards and constantly fights against the feelings of guilt and self-deprecation. To counteract the feelings of self-devaluation and failure, in an extremely defensive way, he acts out the negative feelings and ascribes them to

others. This is why a narcissist can hardly bear a criticism, and is reciprocally very sharp-minded in inflicting sarcastic criticisms on others. He may feel insecure in the presence of another person who may be conceived as a successful person with valuable characteristics. That's why he seems to be fragile in conditions in which his capacities are evaluated and compared to others. He wants to be the best. But in addition to what Lasch has found in the American society, the diagonally different strict cultures with high parental or social dominance do not necessarily bring about healthier characters. According to Battan (1983):

For Lasch, the emergence of a culture of narcissism out of the ruins of American Victorianism has been caused by the transition from competitive to corporate capitalism along with the socialization of production and reproduction. These changes have undermined the authority of the father, and have replaced it with more diffuse yet pervasive sources of control - the paternalism of the modern state, corporation and bureaucracy[...] The creation of a "fatherless society" has made impossible the rebellion against patriarchal authority, and the subsequent creation of a strong superego. The result has been, according to Lasch, "an underlying change in the organization of personality, from what has been called inner-direction to narcissism." (p. 201)

Battan points out to Lasch's argumentation for the Victorian family structure which would bring forth independent self-determining individuals through the establishment of a healthy and strong superego and internalization of the middle-class Victorian values. This would lead to the successful resolution of oedipal conflicts via rearing individuals who used to identify with an aloof and strong father.

Lasch posits that every age [that is every cultural formation] can be distinguished from others by its own peculiar pathological conditions, which in their extreme manifestations indicate its underlying character structure, and indeed the prevalent psychological disorders of any age reflect the dominant characters of that time, so that cultural changes can also be construed from the change in forms of pathologies. One such transition can be considered in the fall of the obsessive and hysterical neuroses which had afflicted the 19th Century middle classes whose characters have been described as modest, puritanical, conscientious, and parsimonious, and the rise of narcissistic disorders which fit to the social demands of the next age in the industrial and consumer culture of the north America, and which demarcate an increasing number of the people who suffer from chronic boredom, fear of being compared and evaluated, and impatience for immediate gratification. So the dominant psychopathological condition of the contemporary (American) society is narcissism (Lasch 1979; Battan 1983).

Though Lasch criticizes Erich Fromm's view on narcissism and accuses him of losing his sight on some obvious clinical aspects and pathological symptoms of narcissism, and also for what he thinks is a loose and arbitrary use of the term narcissism for a wide range of clinical forms which may go beyond narcissism, but at the same time the similarity between Fromm and Lasch can be found on the basis of their efforts to trace back the roots of narcissism in social change. Furthermore, interestingly Sam Vaknin (2001) levels similar criticisms at Lasch, and indeed reflects Lasch's critique of Fromm back to himself. Vaknin writes that the Narcissistic Personality Disorder as the acute form of pathological Narcissism, according to the DSM-4 is the label under which a group of 9 symptoms have been taken into account. They include: a grandiose Self

(illusions of grandeur coupled with an inflated, unrealistic sense of the Self), inability to empathize with the other, the tendency to exploit and manipulate others, idealization of other people (in cycles of idealization and devaluation), rage attacks and so on. Narcissism, therefore, has a clear clinical definition, etiology and prognosis. However the way Lasch has used this term has nothing to do with its usage in psychopathology. (Vaknin 2001)

There may be a tendency to ascribe narcissism to individualist cultures. Adamopoulos (1999) while distinguishing between the functions of prejudice and discrimination in collectivist and individualist cultures, states that in the collectivist cultures the group identification of the target is a main determinant of prejudice, while in the individualist cultures, it is the dissimilarity of the target to the individual (rather than his group affiliation) that matters. “In individualist cultures, the essentially narcissistic patterns of interpersonal relations associated with egocentric individualism are encouraged by the affirmation of the self provided by similar others” (p. 69). However, such differences between the individualist and collectivist cultures may be two sides of one coin. Repressing and stressful cultures in spite of their emphasis on non-individuality strengthen a gigantic shadow of individuality in their members. In a collectivistic hierarchical social system, subordinates are supposed to obey unquestionably. Here we may ask, what are the cultural processes through which strong narcissistic tendencies may develop?

If we agree that our experiences in specific social contexts may lead us at least partially to specific psychological orientations, then we have to define the mechanisms through which such social experiences are translated into psychological impressions, and in their turn these psychological impressions define the long-term living strategies, or the more or less fix patterns of

interpretation of and reaction to the reality, or what we call personality. The precondition for such an analysis is to accept that in different social and cultural atmospheres, different personality types may emerge, each of which, to a large extent is proportionate to its cultural background. In some social milieus, that is, in hierarchical authoritarian cultures in which individual rights and freedom are ignored or violated, people's self-images are threatened. When a child is under inquisition and reprimand, his ego may tend to project all the "bad" things ascribed to him outwards. Sometimes this becomes his main strategy in coping with the outer world. Defending ego through denial and projection of whatever is disagreeable can bring about a personality which is usually described with the word "stubborn". When an individual's self-image and self-esteem are under continuous assault, regardless of the creative ways through which he may develop a healthy life style, two other reactions also have a high chance to emerge:

- 1) Passive surrender: admitting his inferiority and worthlessness and being inclined to either depression and self-destructive behavior or a strict and blind obedience of the figures of power. The latter has a great aptitude for being an ardent disciple and a follower of dictators. The second group also has a need and greed for superiority but only through attachment to a still more superior powerful figure. This so-called authoritarian personality (in Adorno's term) enhances his feelings of security and self-worth through identification with the ruling power. His source of worthiness is external, and via alliance with figures of power the feelings of inferiority are suppressed and reversed to a zest for superiority. This is description of what Erich Fromm (1984) refers to as "group narcissism", which can be recognizable in zealot nationalists or racists, and the ardent

fans of charismatic leaders, who claim to be ready to give and shed blood for them.

- 2) An exaggerated self-approving behavior, through formation of a protective fence around his ego, and an extreme resistance against any real or symbolic threats against his self-esteem. This may be labeled as individual narcissism, which may happen in more self-relying and intelligent individuals. A narcissist is persistently proving his worthiness and flaunting his capabilities, and he usually construes any criticism, though a benign one, as a sign of hostility and mischievous intentions, and may in a defensive manner take retaliatory measures and respond furiously. So he may try to get rid of his critic to keep his self-image sound. Such a narcissist is enthusiastic to receive encouraging and promising feedbacks of himself, to be endeared and fully respected by everybody. As this is not easily achieved in his daily life, he is usually frustrated and shows rage and pessimism. He is ready to take the role of a dictator, in case the occasion arises.

The two above-mentioned reactions are somehow complementary. After all dictators need disciples and vice versa. No wonder why charismatic leaders show up in a place where masses are impatiently waiting for their saviors! Authoritarian societies suggest a feeling of worthlessness to their subordinates, and send them to the margins. This can lead to an emotional opponent process in the people to reject and stand against the feeling of worthlessness, and therefore in such societies a zest for power can be noticed in different forms and degrees in the social classes. Then narcissism, at least partly, can be considered as a defense against feelings of unworthiness, in a society with tough social relations. In such societies people understand the laws as something imposed by the upper

classes, and sometimes breaking the rules and regulations is considered as a heroic action. The tendency for unlawfulness is high. Laws have been enacted only for “others”. Despite the tendency to identify narcissism with individualism, the narcissistic wishes may show themselves in different ways through different identity levels:




Fig. 3.5 Levels of expectation for honor and reverence

Narcissism may emerge from two sources: over-gratification of needs, and immediate fulfillment of wishes (as in aristocratic classes), or due to ungratified needs and extreme deprivations. “Narcissism is more common when resources are abundant...or extraordinarily limited...” (Triandis 1995, p. 180, Scheper-Hughes, 1985). In order to be recognized and revered, and to feel worthy, a narcissist *needs* a group; either a religious community, or another group which may be formed on the basis of any other shared interests. Then he does not turn away from the society to live in solitude; instead, he prefers to be with others but above them. Being superior to others is a main and sustained motive of him. The tendency to simply equate narcissism with individualism seems to be simplistic. Foster, Campbell, and Twenge (2003), while reporting a decline in narcissism in old age, higher incidence of narcissism in males, and reconfirmation of a positive correlation between narcissism and self-esteem, also conclude that

participants from individualistic societies, due to their culture, show more narcissism. Their findings, especially the latter one are in the same line of Lasch's argumentation on the increased individualism and self-focus in America, resulting in a higher tendency to narcissism.

It can be said that, within an individualist culture, such as a western liberal democracy, people are more prepared to believe in their liberty, spontaneity and independence from others. However, at the same time they may tend to ascribe the same characteristics to others as well. They *know* that others, their neighbors, colleagues, classmates, and relatives, are also more or less separate worlds and live with the same and equal rights. Hence, they usually do not have great expectations from others to behave according to their own criteria. Everyone has his or her own individuality, and therefore is not supposed to sacrifice his or her own individual rights for the family or society. On the contrary in a collectivist society where people may sometimes share a common identity, they sometimes consider others as their own appendages. They have many expectations from others, and people should most of the time behave as they like. In such cultures such words as "treason", "infidelity", and "perfidy" may have a more usage! Men may feel more righteous to retaliate against their partners' disloyalty. In such societies it takes sometimes the form of a norm to revenge an infidelity in the worst violent way, as if the life of another human being, in their view, has less value than their own honor or reputation. And this seems to reflect a culturally induced psychopathology. Such social conditions may pave the way for feelings of insecurity. In its turn, the feeling of insecurity may lead to pathological reactions which also have been explained by Erich Fromm in *Escape from Freedom*. One of such pathological reactions can take the form of a zest for controlling others. The will to power has a hidden side: being insecure

and feeling vulnerable. Then sometimes to have power for the sake of power is the main purpose of the members of such societies. In the security systems of these strictly controlling societies, officials scrutinize almost over most personal and private aspects of others without any convincing reason for doing so, and hence they may appeal to fictitious explanations for dangerous plots or the menace of foreign spies, to justify their will to control and power.

3.2.3 Structural facilitators: socioeconomic development

In the realm of cross-national studies of criminal violence, Messner (2003) counts three macro-sociological theories: Modernization theory which puts forward an evolutionary model, according to which during the industrial development and especially rapid urbanization, traditional social structures and their concomitant values are subject to collapse and they will gradually be substituted by modern ones. This process results in social disorganization, breakdown of norms or in Durkheimian term anomie, which leads to criminal behavior. Modernization *side effects* may explain part of differential rates of violence in societies. At the same time this theory indicates a clash between pre-modern and modern values and a cultural change that is a transformation from a traditional social formation to a modern one. The second theory noted by Messner, pertains to Norbert Elias's thesis on civilizing process, in which in the course of social development, significant changes both in micro- and macro-levels happen (cited in, Eisner 1995; Heiland & Shelley 1991). These changes include, in the micro-level, transformation in personality structures and refinement of customs and manners, and in the macro-level, the institutionalization of capitalist economy (which essentially requires mutual trust in market and hence is incompatible with interpersonal violence), as well as the monopoly of power in the modern nation-state (also cited in Neapolitan 1997)

which reduce the probability of criminal violence. And finally the third approach is to be found in dependency/world systems theory which pays more attention to violence in the less developed countries, and construes the higher incidence of criminal violence in these countries as something stemmed from their economic dependency and its consequences such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, as well as political oppression. Therefore, higher rates of violence of such nations may be a reaction to the “frustration and misdirected anger created by deprivation and demoralizing living conditions” (p. 704, also cited in Neapolitan 1997 p. 76).

As noted before, some writers have found lower socioeconomic status and economic inequality as the major predictor of violence (see Heimer 1997). Also in Embers’ (2005) study one of the predictors of physical punishment of children as mentioned before, was “the use of an alien currency” which directly pertains to the colonized societies. This notion also seems to be consistent with the history of slavery and the geographies of violence. It is interesting that most highly violent societies, which are located in South America, as well as West and South of Africa, have been long under colonialism. These cultures of violence in the world are mostly remnants of the colonial era. In the previously colonized parts of the world whose people were under oppression, violence has been institutionalized. Colonialists felt free to behave in a different way in the colonies; they expressed their exploitative and aggressive characters in a more free way than they were permitted to do in their own countries. For example the French who recognize themselves as the heirs of the Great French Revolution, which introduced itself as an emancipative movement, or the harbinger of equality, fraternity and freedom, indulged their Legions in Africa and other parts of the world to repress people who sought after their own emancipation. This is

also true for other colonialists. The Spaniard and Portuguese slave-drivers in South America imposed many burdens against their slaves who were great in number. The South American hybrids are partly the offspring of an abusive sexual relation between the slavers, and the slave maidens who were considered as part of the slaveholder's properties and therefore had no human rights. A slaver-slave relation is characterized by exploitation, humiliation, discrimination, and coercion. The future of such a relation has nothing to do with the Hegelian master-slave paradigm in which the slave would eventually find his autonomy and would overcome the master through his work. Nay! In the earthly life, and within the boundaries of the ongoing stream of history, the slaver and slave give something to each other: the slave gives his pride and esteem to the master to build up his splendid world, and receives the slaver's hatred and humiliation, internalizes it and projects it onto others.

A main aspect of social development may be related to the patterns of social relations, or the way people interact with one another. The less developed societies with rural economies traditional cultural structures tend to be more collectivist, and by contrast the modern industrialized cultures are sooner or later compelled to adopt individualistic values and relation patterns. A main reason of appealing to violent solutions seems to be laid in disequilibrium between the traditional supplies and the modern demands. Transition from traditional to modern is usually accompanied by challenge. It shows the inefficacy of the traditional methods and values. Transitions have usually a faith-based to secular direction and hence they may lead to some sort of disenchantment and moving away from the ruling beliefs. The traditional collectivist societies may be by nature pre-democratic, and therefore, in addition to the conflicts which arise in the course of social transitions, there might be some intrinsic capacities for the

incidence of violence in collectivism-individualism dimension. There are theorizations which consider violence as related with collectivism. For example Bond (2006) states that some cultures may socialize their members in a way that they comply in applying violence against other groups. According to cross cultural studies on conformity, for example variations in Asch's line judgment paradigm (Bond & Smith 1996) as well as cross-national differences in acquiescent response bias (smith 2004), he puts that the so-called collectivist cultures, having higher degrees of hierarchy and power distance, are more prone to compliance, and hence they are more "mobilizable for perpetrating collective violence" (also Oyserman & Lauffer 2002). However with regard to perception of violence Segall (1988) argues that similar coercive behaviors, depending on the cultural context, maybe construed as aggressive or non-aggressive; that is in the so-called collectivist cultures, if such a behavior is elicited from a superior figure against a subordinate, people may tend to perceive or judge it only as a legitimate exercise of authority.

In the previous chapter the interconnections and overlaps between culture and personality were discussed. Regardless of which one has more influence on the other, they seem to be interrelated and some personality types are more probable to be found in specific cultural contexts. For example the authoritarian personality may have a more chance to develop in a highly collectivist hierarchical social structure in which discipline and obedience are emphasized. This may come true via authoritarian parenting which is correlated by collectivism (e.g. Rudy and Grusec 2001). Through complying with a powerful figure in family or in the larger society, one may not only reduce the probability of his potential threat against oneself, but also transform this source of threat into a source of support and security.

In a very recent study Forbes, Zhang, Doroszewicz, and Haas (2009) also have found a relation between individualism-collectivism and direct and indirect aggression; however they report results which are contradictory to the above-mentioned findings. Their study indicates that in a highly individualistic culture that is United States aggression is higher than the same variable in Poland which has a moderate place in the individualism-collectivism dimension, and yet aggression in the both mentioned societies is higher than in China which has been considered as a highly collectivist culture. This study apparently shows that there might be a positive correlation between individualism and aggression. However a main problem of this study is that such a conclusion has been made only according to the data of three countries. This number is too small for being a base to make such a conclusion. The three societies might also be different in so many other ways, and the degree of collectivism or individualism seems to be what they have arbitrarily selected from among a great number of other potentially plausible variables. For example, the three societies could be considered as different in their violence rates according to their religious tendencies (mostly protestant USA, Catholic Poland, and Irreligious China), or by means of any other social or cultural factor. The only way we can give a clearer analysis of such a relationship across nations is to study a large number of samples so that we can make sure that those countries are mainly classified on the basis of their place in a spectrum of individualism-collectivism. Other studies including the present one indicate results which are contrary to Forbes et al.: The so-called collectivist societies indicate higher rates of homicide. However another point also should be added here: though according to Hofstede's data on individualism Poland occupies a place between USA and China, but contrary to their findings Poland is less violent than China; WHO data on the homicide rates across the world (2002) indicates 1.8 cases per

100,000 population in Poland and about 3 cases for the same population in China. Then the result of this study seems very dubious. If individualism was a reason of higher incidence of homicide in the United States, then it could also lead to a high incidence of a similar problem in Western Europe. But we already know that the Western Europe is both high in individualism and low in homicide rate.

So according to the aforementioned studies, two more variables, socioeconomic underdevelopment and its cultural concomitant that is collectivism are supposed to be significantly related to violence.

3.3 Homicide across nations

WHO World Report on Violence and Health (2002), counts three main categories of violence, including, collective, interpersonal, and self-directed, each of which may be divided in some subcategories and at the same time may be expressed in four different forms, that is, physical, sexual, psychological, and deprivation or neglect, as shown in the following diagram:




Fig. 3.6 Classification of Violence- Source: WHO, World report on violence and health, Chapter 1, p. 7.

In the above diagram, homicide lies in physical interpersonal category. The same phenomenon when occurred in collective violence can be labeled as democide (a term by R. J. Rummel for naming governmentally directed murders), genocide, or mass murder. The report has also given an estimation of global violence-related deaths during the year 2000 (citing from WHO Global Burden of Disease project for 2000), according to which some 520,000 cases of homicide have happened across the world in 2000. Homicide rate has been reported 8.8 cases per 100,000 population of the world (p. 10), which of course is not distributed equally in the world countries. Latin America and a great part of the sub-Saharan Africa, followed by some post-Soviet nations have considerable homicide rates.

To answer the question that what makes different nations to have significantly different violence rates we may appeal to some theories. Considering the general discussions pertaining to the correspondence between cultural type and personality and behavior discussed in the previous chapter, now we may have the expectation to explain the violent behavior on the basis of cultural forms. To take practical steps for such an explanation, we should first specify the type of violent behavior as well as specific cultural orientations. It seems that homicide is the most important form of violence all around the world. In addition, there is a good access to homicide rates statistics, at least as far as they are related to interpersonal (rather than political) crimes, and therefore a comparative study through using these data can be performed cross-nationally. Also according to Messner (2003) “Researchers generally agree that the comparability of definitions and the quality of official data are greater for homicide than for other offenses” (p. 705).

According to Daly and Wilson (1988) the cross-national and yearly variations in homicide rates indicate considerable differences in the aggregate behavior of human groups; we tend to appropriately attribute such cross-national variations in homicide (e.g. considering Americans, who as they write, kill thirty times more than Icelanders), to *culture*. By doing so, however, we only relabel the phenomenon to be explained (p. 279). To avoid confining our analysis to a relabeling, it is obvious that we should move from a merely description of culture as an abstract concept, toward an analytic approach to culture. Daly and Wilson, who define culture as a manifestation of the relative homogeneity of behavior within societies, propose that for understanding cultural differences, it should first be understood that “how and why people are influenced by their fellows to behave like them.” But they also add that theories are underdeveloped in this field, while “most social scientists treat culture as an irreducible ‘independent variable’ – as an explanation rather than an entity to be explained” (ibid. p. 280).

With regard to the homicide rates in the world cultures we may compare world nations on the basis of their wealth and economic standards, their socio-political life styles, demographics, and other measures. Regardless of the obvious differences in statistics of north-south and developed-underdeveloped regions however we may sometimes find considerable differences in homicide rates within one category. For example how could we explain the very high homicide rate in USA in comparison to other western countries with more or less same economic standards and political similarities? Cross-national comparisons of rates of homicide, rape, and criminal assault indicate that the United States is relatively high compared to other industrialized nations, and especially highest in homicide rates. According to Archer and Gartner (1984) the

higher incidence of homicide in the U.S. might be partially due to the easy availability of firearms, although questionnaire studies indicate that U.S. respondents are also more likely than respondents of other nations to suggest aggressive solutions to interpersonal conflicts. Archer and Gartner find that higher rates of violent crime are associated with waging and winning wars that is, nations participating in the two world wars, especially nations on the winning side in these wars, show increases in homicide after the war is over. Among other models, they also point out to this Legitimation of Violence Model, which is essentially based on the explanation that civilian nonmilitant members of a society in war are also influenced by the official approbation of killing and destroying others (though they are enemies). In wartime the previous prohibitions against fatal violence are forgotten or loosened, and by reverse violence is rewarded, and then the wartime violence may have a lasting releasing effect on homicidal violence. Of course it should be mentioned that their data covers the beginning of 20th Century till the early 1970s. This explanation reminds us of the Cultural Spillover Theory (Baron and Straus 1987, 1989, cited in Straus & Donnelly 2001, pp. 90, 111) according to which part of differences of societies in the rates of criminal violence may be explained by the use of legally or socially admitted forms of violence which have an increasing effect in other areas. That is the greater a society applies violent ways for legitimate purposes (such as executions, corporal punishment), “the greater is the tendency for those engaged in illegitimate behavior to also use force for their own purposes” (ibid. p. 112)

In addition to the above-mentioned viewpoints for explanation of higher incidence of homicide in USA, other assumptions can also be considered. USA is a western democracy based on the philosophy of individual freedom. GNI per

capita, as well as many other measures of economic welfare are comparable to the Western Europe. However the homicide rate in USA is usually about ten times more than such countries as Germany and France. I believe that we may trace part of the reasons of such a difference back in the American history. Since being (re)discovered and settled by Europeans, America was for a long time a colony. But during centuries many people, mostly from Europe, immigrated and settled in the new continent. Who were these immigrants? A little imagination is of no harm in our analysis! Emigrants who leave their homelands to settle in a new world may have some similar characteristics: first, they are not satisfied with their existing life conditions and not fit in their own societies. Second, they are action oriented and risk taking; they are prepared to abandon their current positions and to go on a way which might be stressful, and at least they should be risk-taking enough to board on the 18th Century galleons for several weeks or months. Third, they might be competitive and achievement seeking; they immigrate to gain something more than what they have. Hence within the recent centuries many adventure seeking people from different countries packed their memories and genes to share them in the establishment of a new culture: the American. The link between personality and culture in American life style may be best explained by McCrae's model (see the previous chapter); that is more or less similar personalities gathered to form a culture.

Considering homicide as a universally recognized index of violent behavior which shows a significant variation across nations, cultural forms may provide convincing explanations. Indeed there are considerable variations both in frequency and direction of violence across nations. In some regions it is more inwardly directed and in others more outwardly, as the Fig. 3.7 implies.




Fig. 3.7 Homicide and suicide rates per 100'000 population in world regions. (WHO, 2000)

As depicted in the above diagram, there is a great variation in homicide rates across nations. An interesting point in these data is that homicide and suicide have a strong negative correlation. Also according to WHO's statistics on Global Burdens of Disease (2004) among the intentional causes of fatal injuries, violence is the most important cause in South America, and in Africa. In Eastern Mediterranean, the collective violence, war, inflicts more injuries on people. And in other parts of the world self inflicted injuries (suicide) take more casualties than interpersonal and collective violence. It seems that the less (economically, politically, culturally) developed nations in general show a greater tendency to homicide, and of course this is not far from expectation.

“Research suggests an inverse relationship between a nation's development level and its homicide rates. In other words, homicide rates tend to be higher in developing nations, and lower in developed nations.” (Rennison 2008, p. 221) Among the developed nations however, as mentioned earlier, USA occupies the

first rank, and according to Rennison, it is comparable to homicide rates of Eastern European countries. She also writes that being a male and young increases the likelihood of being a victim of homicide and this is not related to nationality.

Finally, in order to understand the cultural factors involved in homicide, it will be practical to look at culture as an entity comprised of different measurable constituents, and to consider both these measures and homicide rates in a cross-cultural level. Up to now, different characteristics of culture as related to human behavior in general (in chapter two) and as specifically related to violent behavior (in the present chapter) have been discussed. Three main cultural facilitators of violence were proposed in this chapter. These facilitators may involve many potential variables, of which the following nine variables have been discussed and identified for further analysis in this study:




Fig. 3.8 Nine variable which are supposed to be involved in high rates of homicide

3.4 Hypotheses:

Some group identity ideologies such as nationalism have proved to be related to intergroup conflicts. As noted before, Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) suggest a relation between ethnic nationalism and aggression in which the image of an evil other is drawn. Highly nationalistic tendencies have had an undeniable role in many wars. In the age of nation-states ethnocentric nationalism has led to several major group violence and genocides. Ethno-national self-definitions create a group identity to establish strict boundaries with others who have nothing to share with them. Emphasis on national pride and prestige can be used as to despise and degrade others and then to apply prejudice and violence against them, a biased social perception through which weaknesses, deficiencies and evils are attributed to outsiders. Group affiliation here may provide a more justified outlet for hostile expressions. So, such extreme ideologies may reflect a personality trait which fulfills the need for superiority and dominance through prescription of violence, and therefore might be a predictor of interpersonal violence (in addition to group struggle). Nationalism may be reflective of a culture of honor; it can provide justifications for intolerance towards others. Then:

Hypothesis 1: Nationalism is positively correlated with homicide.

The way people judge others' intentions and actions, has certainly an effect on their treatment with them. In ascription of one or another meaning to a behavior, one may think to a wide range of possible probabilities, or simply cling to rudimentary descriptions like "good" or "evil". This elaborateness versus simplicity of judgments may depend on a series of factors such as personal experience, education, etc. So people may fall on a spectrum at one end

of which lies what people label “broad-mindedness”, and at the other what people call “narrow-mindedness” or “fanaticism”. We may call them relativism versus absolutism. This schismatic way of thinking between extremes reminds of *splitting* as a primitive defense mechanism (as explained by Melanie Klein, and Otto Kernberg); a mechanism which is central to narcissistic and borderline personality disorders. The absolutist way of judgment in its excessive form conceives things either as good or as evil, and then involves a more tendency to accusation and condemnation of others accompanied by punitive expectations. This strict dualistic way of thinking is suitable for creation of an enemy, which has also been discussed by Harle (2000). Therefore:

Hypothesis 2: Absolutism is positively correlated with homicide.

Considering the role of religious fundamentalism in intergroup conflicts and wars (which has been a well-known phenomenon throughout history), it can be also argued that in societies with dogmatic religious beliefs, people may (due to religious doctrines and indoctrinations) be more inclined to engage in hostile behavior.

Apart from the content and message of religions which usually preach non-violence, an unconditional devotedness toward them as something deeply sacred and as the only way of the last-day salvation (as the word of God which is above any human law) may make their followers intolerant of criticism, and this intolerance can be practiced and applied as a dominant way of interaction in daily life, especially when there exists only a superficial and dogmatic understanding of religion. In such cases they may find themselves as obliged to carry out what they understand as the commands of the religion they follow, or

even they may only need publicly acceptable justifications for acting out their hostility.

Hypothesis 3: Highly religious societies have higher rates of homicide.

To commit a serious violent behavior like murder, usually some justifications are needed to empower the perpetrator in actualization of his intention. Such justifications are usually easy to find, especially by those who make a clear-cut distinction between “good ones” and “evil ones” as noted before, and this may provide them with enough courage and an exaggerated feeling of personal agency which can be associated with preparedness to intervene and personally enter into action. So this exaggeration in perceiving oneself (as not being bound to any limitations) or what we may label the feeling of *omnipotence*, something that Malmquist (2006), calls a cognitive distortion, again can be related to defense mechanisms mostly used in narcissistic as well as borderline personality disorders, which as Cartwright (2002) concludes from Kernberg’s theorization, have a role in rage-type murders. The fantasy of omnipotence may reflect despotic tendencies which are equivalent to underestimation of the values and rights of others, and may have more chance to arise in cultures of honor. Cultural variation in this variable may entail significant connotations. Hence:

Hypothesis 4: Omnipotence is positively correlated with homicide.

As discussed previously, some differences amongst cultures may lead to differential prevalence of specific character types. Erich Fromm’s work (chapter one) and Lasch’s theory (chapter three) both correspond to this notion. The

works of thinkers like Adorno and Fromm imply the importance of social conditions in the development of the *authoritarian character*. In such theorizations, a link between this character type and violence can be construed. This character perceives power and authority legitimate per se, and therefore tends to disdain powerless people and expect them to show an unconditional submission to authority. The people with authoritarian tendencies admire the figures of power, and at the same time are talented for becoming dictators in case the occasion arises. As parents, they can be punitive and strict, and in larger society regardless of compliance to powerful figures they may have higher expectation for obedience from subordinates and peers. Authoritarian character has received much attention for explanation of group violence, but it is logical to assume it to be involved also in interpersonal conflicts. Then:

Hypothesis 5: Cultures with higher authoritarian tendencies have higher homicide rates.

Cultures can be different also on the basis of their attitudes towards cooperation and competition. In highly competitive societies people may look at others as potential or actual rivals. High competition may at the same time reflect an imbalance between supply and demand, and a shortage of vital resources and social rewards. It can increase interpersonal conflicts and as a result activate emotional distress, and feelings of jealousy, injustice, discrimination, and retaliation. People having competitive attitudes may tend to interpret any social arena as a scene for taking advantage of others, and this way give more chance to conflicts. Then it seems logical to suppose a relation between competitiveness and violence.

Hypothesis 6: The cultures that tend to competition suffer from higher homicide rates.

Attitudes toward power distribution, and the way a culture allocates social positions to the members (e.g. via traditional customs, inheritance, or mutual consent), and especially the way people perceive and judge inequality in allocation of social rewards as fair or unfair, may to some extent predict justifiability of violent behavior in that culture; power distance pertains to an attitude that recognizes such inequalities as fair, and especially when power and privileges are transferred through nondemocratic ways, it can convey the idea that one should not wait for opportunities which might be offered to him, rather considering the rules of game in that culture, he should sometimes go into water and fire in order to attain to the privileges. As noted before Hofstede and others propose a relationship between higher levels of power distance and political violence and riots, as well as authoritarianism. In case of riots, for example, it seems sensible to find every now and then unrest within societies which due to the very acceptance of inequality do not systemically take measures to prevent such upheavals. Regardless of group violence, here power distance is thought to be correlated with interpersonal homicide:

Hypothesis 7: Power Distance is positively correlated with homicide rate.

As discussed before cultural determinants of violence can be rooted in specific socioeconomic structures; economic underdevelopment and poverty can lead to a prolonged frustration, continuous pressure and hardship which in its turn brings about cultural underdevelopment or what may be called culture of

poverty. Indeed an important aspect of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in a macro societal level refers to less satisfactory life conditions in the underdeveloped world which stem largely from a chronic poverty, and it may consider higher rates of crime and conflict in specific regions as the aftermath or side effect of a long dissatisfaction, and lower quality of life which result in the fixation and establishment of patterns of violence, like what we may observe in the postcolonial societies which suffer from socioeconomic problems and their cultural concomitants. The psychological consequences of the cultures of poverty may have been well described by Oscar Lewis (1981) as “a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependency, of not belonging”...“a widespread feeling of inferiority [and] of worthlessness” (p. 316-7). This description reminds us of the concept of frustration. Though poverty is something more than a solely economic disorder and is highly intertwined with cultural and psychological factors, however it is considered as a structural determinant of cross national differences in the rates of homicide. A main index of poverty is Gross National Income per capita. Then we can suppose that:

Hypothesis 8: Poor nations suffer from higher homicide rates.

In some studies (as mentioned before) the collectivism-individualism dimension has been related to many cognitive and behavioral differences among the so-called collectivist and individualist cultures, also including rates of aggressive behavior. As mentioned in the previous pages, the individualism-collectivism dimension has been found to be related with violence; due to specific group dynamisms collectivist societies might be more apt for group struggle, and at the same time some researchers (Forbes et al. 2009) conclude the reverse, though on the basis of a very scant sample size. It is supposed that

highly collectivist societies have stricter norms and regulations, inobservance of which may sometimes be construed as a severe violation of something “sacred”. Then because of such strict rules, a greater number of behaviors may exist in their repertoire of forbidden behaviors, and therefore a stronger punitive attitude and more punishments exist for deviations from rules. Therefore it can be hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 9: Collectivist cultures have higher rates of homicide than individualist cultures.

Up to now, several variables which can possibly explain cross national differences in violence on the basis of cultural psychological findings, have been discussed theoretically. To take one step more in order to operationalize the above theoretical constructs and evaluate their explanatory power, statistical analysis and measurements of cross national data on homicide and other proposed variables are needed. This will be done in the next chapter.

Chapter Four

Methodology and Results

Among the various forms of violence, homicide (interpersonal rather than intergroup) as the dependent variable, and a series of psychological and cultural independent variables, will be considered in this chapter. As homicide is conceived pan-culturally to be the most serious form of violence (in comparison to some other criminal behaviors such as battering which sometimes there may exist less consensus on it as a criminal behavior, and some traditional cultures may perceive it as a legal way of disciplining), then from a statistical point of view there is more certainty for the comparability of homicide across different world nations. The very comparability can enhance the reliability and validity of measurements.

Theoretical speculations as partly discussed in the previous chapters may imply that people, at least partly due to the cultural contexts they live in, and because of the dominant values and behavioral norms and other factors, tend to solve their issues violently or non-violently. Here, some of the variables by which cultures can be distinguished and compared, are introduced. A few of these variables have been considered in group violence studies, but in this study

they are used for clarification of cross-national variation of an interpersonal form of violence that is homicide. In the previous chapter 9 hypotheses were proposed. Here, I am going to test the hypotheses in a cross national level.

Then this study in a correlational paradigm takes one dependent and nine independent variables into account and the units of analysis are nations.




Fig. 4.1 Dependent and independent variables

4.1 Data gathering:

To operationalize the hypotheses, it is clear that the variables which would be measured quantitatively within a data matrix, should as much as possible, represent the same hypothesized concepts; otherwise the construct validity of our inferences would be dubious. This issue is especially important here because the data pertaining to both dependent and independent variables have been collected from other studies and independent data banks, then selection of parts of the data reported in these separate databases and integration of them in a new analysis, should take the issue of representativeness into account. Fortunately, there are variables in these studies which signify a correspondence to the variables mentioned in the present study. Sources of the statistical data used in this study are as follows:

For the dependent variable, homicide rate, the World Health Organization (WHO) has provided a detailed report on violence across the world, as well as a statistical database which can be used online. Part of this report refers to the causes of death, and in this part, death resulting from violence has been separated from self-inflicted and war casualties and other causes of death. Homicide rates of more than 190 countries have been extracted from this database, which has been released in 2004.

World Values Survey (WVS) has been one of the important sources of statistical information for psychological and social variables, used in this study. It provides a good deal of information for more than 80 countries.

- For the variable of nationalism, the data was collected from answering to the question “how proud of your nationality” in WVS. This question has four options for answering ranging from “very proud” to “not at all”. The option “very proud” was taken as the measure of nationalism. The percentage of people ticking this option can be construed as the strength of nationalistic tendency in any given country.

- For measuring the absolutism, there is a question in WVS with three answering choices, amongst which the percentage of agreeing with the statement that there is “clear guidelines about what is good and evil”, is construed as a measure of absolutism.

- The percentage of people in each nation who agreed over having an excessive “freedom of choice and control” (the highest option from a Lickert scale of 10 possible ratings) was taken as the measure for tending to omnipotence.

- To compare devotion to religion in different nations, the answers to a question about the importance of religion mentioned in WVS were used. The percentage of people, who have chosen “very important” from four possible options, has been used as the indicator of religiosity.

- Answers to the question about the value of competition were used as the measure for cross-cultural difference in attitude toward competitiveness. There are 10 possible values ranging from “competition is good”, to “competition is harmful”. The percentage of those voted to the highest value for competition has been used in this study.

- For a cross-national comparison of authoritarian tendencies, two data sets were used: respect for authorities, and expectation of obedience as a child rearing value. The percentage of those who check marked for “greater respect for authorities”, as well as those who checked the obedience of children as important, were together taken as the measure of tendency to authoritarianism. The mean of these two measures were used in the data matrix.

Considering that the independent variables which were conceptually derived from these value surveys are usually based on single items (rather than a combination of questions as seen in psychological tests), it can be conjectured that the reliability of such items may not be very high and there might be variability in the sample taken from a same nation. So the reliability of these data was out of my control. Of course it is obvious that the data in WVS are only crude figures. However in cases where there were more than one set of data for an item the means of their scores for each nation were used. It should also be noted that in these variables there were high correlations between old and new

data sets. For example in two variables that I measured, namely in the variables being referred as Nationalism and Omnipotence the correlations between the older and newer polls (percentages of pros and cons of a value) were $r=.9$ and $r=.8$ respectively.

Parts of the data also were collected from Hofstede's study. His measures of power distance and collectivism were used for the same variables in this study. Of course as collectivism and individualism are two ends of one bipolar dimension, the measures of "individualism" in Hofstede's data were subtracted from a given number (100), in order to be reversed and used as measures of collectivism.

Finally for the variable material welfare, Gross National Income per capita released by the World Bank (2006) was used. Though GNI per capita is only one measure of welfare, but as the units of analysis are countries, it seems to be the most important indicator. Regardless of the distribution of wealth the national annual income gives an overall picture of the economic welfare of each country.

4.2 Sample size and missing data

Data retrieved from the four above mentioned sources were incorporated in a data matrix for the relevant analyses. The resulting table of data was consisted of homicide rates (DV) of 190 countries, and measures of nine independent variables for some 80 countries. However, as the list of countries in one study would not always include the same countries in other studies, and there were missing values for some nations, an early sample size of 53 nations could be selected that had no missing values in any variables. Contentment with this sample size would result in exclusion of part of the useful data from the analysis

process. Indeed selection of sample size was a matter of gain and loss. The arrangement of data in the data matrix would imply that an estimation of part of the missing values was much more beneficial than harmful, because by doing so, a larger amount of observed data (which otherwise would be omitted) could be saved. To increase the sample size and maintain part of informative data, and to avoid problems with listwise deletion (primarily sample size reduction and losing part of the useful data) and with pairwise deletion (less internal consistency in the correlation matrix, and also distorted parameter estimates if the data are not Missing Completely At Random), estimation of the missing values through Multiple Imputation was performed. Before that, however, a question was how many cases with missing values should be listed in the table of data, so that with the least number of estimations the most observed data can be saved from being dropped from the analysis. My choice was to maintain cases with 60% and more observed data (at least 6 of 10 variables) and discard the rest. So nations with more missing values were excluded and the data matrix was finally comprised of 81 nations (having only 7% missing values) as shown in the following table:

Table 4.1 Data matrix of 10 variables and 81 cases (nations). Missing values are coded with -9, to prepare the table of data for the multiple imputation.

	Country	Homicide per 100,000 pop.	Nationalism	Omnipotence	Absolutism	Religiosity	Power Distance	Collectivism	Authoritarian.	Competitive.	GNI per capita
1	Albania	6.00	68.20	3.55	43.20	27.50	59.00	62.00	44.05	30.10	5420
2	Algeria	12.00	73.55	16.05	-9	90.60	-9	-9	56.15	-9	6770
3	Argentina	8.80	62.05	28.75	35.80	41.40	49.00	54.00	53.95	31.90	13920
4	Armenia	3.70	42.95	10.60	38.20	25.00	-9	-9	38.35	20.20	5060
5	Australia	1.50	71.35	19.75	40.80	23.10	36.00	10.00	50.95	26.40	30610

6	Austria	.90	50.95	23.50	19.30	20.00	11.00	45.00	26.85	22.60	33140
7	Azerbaijan	2.90	63.35	15.60	52.30	29.50	-9	-9	41.45	31.50	4890
8	Bangladesh	7.40	74.05	11.65	39.10	87.50	80.00	80.00	55.10	49.60	2090
9	Belarus	13.00	27.70	5.98	27.30	11.60	-9	-9	50.20	22.60	7890
10	Belgium	1.70	23.50	8.05	29.70	17.80	65.00	25.00	51.60	10.30	32640
11	Bosnia & H.	2.00	41.25	8.90	29.41	34.00	-9	-9	34.90	35.90	7790
12	Brazil	32.60	51.75	32.55	48.30	64.50	69.00	62.00	70.95	41.60	8230
13	Bulgaria	3.00	42.30	6.55	30.00	16.00	70.00	70.00	37.75	28.40	8630
14	Canada	1.50	66.80	16.95	41.70	30.10	39.00	20.00	48.00	23.60	32220
15	Chile	5.50	59.40	21.05	49.00	46.30	63.00	77.00	54.20	18.90	11470
16	China	3.00	29.10	20.65	29.60	2.50	80.00	80.00	34.00	33.30	6600
17	Colombia	72.40	87.55	30.40	37.50	54.30	67.00	87.00	69.05	-9	7420
18	Croatia	1.90	42.20	11.65	33.40	25.30	-9	-9	-9	45.10	12750
19	Czech Rep.	1.30	26.95	8.55	22.80	7.20	57.00	42.00	32.45	25.30	20140
20	Denmark	1.00	44.95	11.50	10.10	7.80	18.00	26.00	24.15	13.30	33570
21	Dominican	10.20	74.90	22.15	34.80	49.60	-9	64.50	51.05	46.00	7150
22	Egypt	1.20	77.70	7.00	-9	97.30	80.00	62.00	69.35	-9	4440
23	El Salvador	38.40	85.15	28.50	41.30	86.50	66.00	81.00	73.95	38.50	5120
24	Estonia	15.40	21.65	5.40	30.00	5.30	40.00	40.00	33.15	13.60	15420
25	Finland	3.20	52.30	9.95	28.60	13.70	33.00	37.00	33.70	10.60	31170
26	France	.70	33.75	9.90	24.60	10.90	68.00	29.00	50.85	15.80	30540
27	Georgia	3.80	70.35	15.75	39.10	49.30	-9	-9	47.35	37.20	3270
28	Germany	.70	21.40	11.65	34.30	8.60	35.00	33.00	28.35	15.20	29210
29	Greece	1.20	54.10	6.85	15.80	32.40	60.00	65.00	13.70	15.00	23620
30	Hungary	2.40	48.15	13.40	14.50	19.70	46.00	20.00	48.35	26.50	16940
31	Iceland	.60	63.30	10.00	8.80	19.10	-9	-9	30.70	33.70	34760
32	India	5.50	72.85	21.85	23.90	55.80	77.00	52.00	49.45	40.70	3460
33	Indonesia	9.40	47.25	20.35	40.88	97.70	78.00	86.00	42.75	-9	3720
34	Iran	3.80	77.60	13.35	-9	78.90	58.00	59.00	51.85	-9	8050
35	Iraq	2.90	80.25	9.65	-9	93.50	80.00	62.00	-9	-9	2170
36	Ireland	1.00	72.80	16.25	38.90	32.80	28.00	30.00	61.55	19.70	34720
37	Israel	.70	54.00	-9	-9	-9	13.00	46.00	37.35	-9	25280
38	Italy	1.10	41.15	7.50	34.90	32.60	50.00	24.00	38.05	17.80	28840
39	Japan	.60	23.25	2.50	17.00	6.40	54.00	54.00	4.15	10.60	31410
40	Jordan	2.90	69.05	31.75	-9	95.90	82.50	62.00	67.25	-9	5280
41	Kyrgyzstan	8.90	42.85	22.25	55.20	31.60	-9	-9	44.05	38.30	1870
42	Latvia	12.60	32.85	5.85	35.20	10.60	-9	-9	30.75	25.10	13480
43	Lithuania	10.70	23.45	9.35	33.40	13.40	-9	-9	28.00	21.80	14220
44	Luxembourg	1.70	39.95	15.20	21.80	15.30	40.00	40.00	37.25	14.80	65340
45	Macedonia	3.00	61.25	11.10	52.80	47.00	-9	-9	29.90	46.80	7080
46	Malta	1.50	74.85	16.35	47.40	65.60	56.00	41.00	66.45	25.50	18960
47	Mexico	10.20	75.90	33.35	36.80	67.70	81.00	70.00	63.65	38.30	10030
48	Moldova	12.30	24.10	10.70	35.80	33.90	-9	-9	44.65	20.30	2150
49	Morocco	1.10	88.90	15.60	71.70	94.20	70.00	54.00	69.60	60.30	4360
50	Netherlands	1.10	24.55	3.90	26.50	16.70	38.00	20.00	45.85	4.80	32480
51	New Zealand	1.20	68.15	24.30	39.50	19.00	22.00	21.00	35.80	24.10	23030
52	Nigeria	23.10	69.80	17.45	55.80	92.80	77.00	80.00	76.95	-9	1040

53	Norway	1.10	50.55	12.95	28.90	12.10	31.00	31.00	28.50	17.50	40420
54	Pakistan	3.70	81.95	.20	-9	81.80	55.00	86.00	51.30	-9	2350
55	Peru	3.60	77.25	21.75	45.30	52.50	64.00	84.00	70.05	39.60	5830
56	Philippines	21.10	83.85	19.65	56.10	86.80	94.00	68.00	57.05	23.00	5300
57	Poland	1.80	65.75	9.55	39.90	44.30	68.00	40.00	40.50	23.80	13490
58	Portugal	1.40	67.45	11.75	35.60	27.00	63.00	73.00	57.25	17.50	19730
59	Puerto Rico	20.00	90.90	41.40	41.10	75.40	-9	-9	74.60	52.80	12239
60	Romania	3.60	42.55	20.30	35.10	51.00	90.00	70.00	46.25	39.20	8940
61	Russian Fed.	32.90	37.60	16.80	35.80	11.60	93.00	61.00	41.30	22.50	10640
62	Saudi Arabia	3.00	74.20	10.70	-9	88.70	80.00	62.00	66.70	-9	14740
63	Serbia & M.	1.80	44.05	8.50	40.00	23.80	79.00	72.00	42.60	27.80	3910
64	Singapore	.80	43.55	7.50	36.90	35.90	74.00	80.00	49.50	21.10	29780
65	Slovakia	2.20	28.00	8.90	29.40	26.70	104.00	48.00	43.50	19.20	15760
66	Slovenia	.80	57.75	19.00	25.10	12.20	-9	-9	32.75	28.80	22160
67	South Africa	43.20	76.30	23.05	59.40	69.70	49.00	35.00	62.30	29.30	12120
68	South Korea	1.80	25.35	17.00	37.00	23.20	60.00	82.00	16.25	15.10	21850
69	Spain	1.00	55.55	9.65	34.90	18.40	57.00	49.00	52.30	14.40	25820
70	Sweden	1.00	42.65	15.25	19.70	10.60	31.00	29.00	16.65	17.70	31420
71	Switzerland	.90	33.75	18.65	27.40	14.30	34.00	32.00	26.55	26.30	37080
72	Tanzania	24.00	81.20	33.10	63.90	77.80	64.00	73.00	77.15	55.40	730
73	Turkey	3.40	75.05	21.15	30.40	81.00	66.00	63.00	53.83	33.30	8420
74	Uganda	20.80	66.30	22.90	57.00	73.50	80.00	73.00	72.50	53.30	1500
75	Ukraine	15.50	28.85	6.50	42.30	19.30	-9	-9	43.15	23.60	6720
76	UK	1.10	53.30	13.50	38.00	12.30	35.00	11.00	58.50	11.60	32690
77	Uruguay	5.60	75.15	24.85	31.90	22.80	61.00	64.00	41.60	20.50	9810
78	USA	5.40	70.50	18.60	47.60	56.90	40.00	9.00	51.00	28.90	41950
79	Venezuela	35.20	91.85	42.40	39.70	63.80	81.00	88.00	70.85	33.60	6440
80	Viet Nam	4.20	79.55	21.35	40.71	9.70	68.91	80.00	68.20	29.30	3010
81	Zimbabwe	11.30	77.90	19.25	54.90	-9	-9	-9	78.90	61.70	1940

4.2.1 Missing value estimation by Multiple Imputation

As seen in the table 4.1 about 7% of the values are missing (those coded with -9). The missingness follows at least a “missing at random” model; that is, the process through which cells have been determined to be or not to be missing does not depend on the values of those cells, or in other words the probability of the missingness pattern, does not depend on the values of the unobserved data; each variable has been surveyed in a group of countries which do not totally overlap, and also because they come from different databases. Depending on the

percentage of missing values it is common among researchers (according to Wayman 2003) to run between 3-10 imputations. (The more missing the more imputations, because several estimations provide us with overall results which are less biased than a single estimation). With about 7% missing values, 6 imputations provide an unbiased estimation of the missing values. This process was done by use of NORM 2.03, a program developed by Schafer (1999) for this exclusive purpose. The intention was to produce 6 different imputed data matrices (which were obviously similar in the observed values and probably different in their estimations of the missing values) for further analyses:

First, the preliminary file, comprising both observed and missing data, was converted from *.sav format to *.dat format, and the empty cells, as shown in the Table 4.1, were coded with -9 which is a default code for missing values in NORM. Then the file was opened in the NORM as shown in the Fig. 4.2, and then the data were ready for running the relevant procedure:




Fig. 4.2 The 10 variables which were imported in NORM for multiple imputation

After such preparations the next step was to perform Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation through Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. EM deals with the observed data and provides estimates of means, variances, and covariances, and on the basis of these measures it estimates missing values, and after including those new estimates in the whole data it gets to new estimates and repeats the process until it converges. In the case of my data EM converged within 20 iterations. The high speed of EM convergence can be affected by the number of variables as well as the amount of missing data which was not much. (with more variables and more missing information EM converges at more iterations). The program saves this automatically in two files named em.out and em.prm:

```

em - Editor
Datei Bearbeiten Format Ansicht ?
Method: maximum likelihood

ITERATION HISTORY

ITERATION #      OBSERVED-DATA LOGLIKELIHOOD
1              -371.5000000
2              -134.6146344
3              -119.0924048
4              -115.6392420
5              -114.6848607
6              -114.3937875
7              -114.2990715
8              -114.2665521
9              -114.2548813
10             -114.2505446
11             -114.2488908
12             -114.2482482
13             -114.2479953
14             -114.2478948
15             -114.2478547
16             -114.2478385
17             -114.2478320
18             -114.2478294
19             -114.2478284
20             -114.2478279

EM CONVERGED AT ITERATION 20
*****

```

Fig. 4.3 EM convergence

Following the ML, Data Augmentation (DA) was performed. It gives those estimates for the population. DA first estimates missing values on the basis of means, variances, and covariances (sample statistics). Then through a Bayesian probability model, it creates a likely distribution of parameter values which fall

within the confidence limits of those values and in any estimation of parameters it represents one of those likely values. Parameter is logically, in large-enough samples, near to the sample statistic, but DA each time gives an estimate from the likely distribution of that parameter. Using NORM the DA was run under 2400 iterations, and “impute at every k th iteration”; a value of 100 was given to k so that 24 series of imputed data files can be prepared. Of course it could be set up in a way that only 6 imputed data files can be produced (for example with an iteration of 900 and $k=150$). However I preferred to draw the 6 imputations randomly from a larger number of data tables.




Fig. 4.4 Data Augmentation settings

To assess the convergence of Data Augmentation, by clicking on the “series” button, I chose the *save only worst linear function of parameters*. The relevant plot is automatically saved during the DA process in a file labeled with

*.prs suffix. Running the program under the above settings created 24 imputations. The following plot indicates that DA has converged very rapidly in the first few iterations:




Fig. 4.5 the “series” checkbox (left) and the plot of the worst linear function of parameters (right)

Running impute from parameters tab produces tables of data like what can be seen in the Fig. 4.6. DA actually provided 24 different tables of data.




Fig. 4.6 An imputed data matrix, containing estimations for the missing data

From the above mentioned 24 imputed data files, 6 were randomly selected, and then imported in 6 separate SPSS files for further analysis. The 6 data sets were comprised of same observed data and different estimated values. An example has been shown in the Fig. 4.7:

3.55	43.20	27.5	59.00	62.00	44.05
16.05	49.52	90.6	56.23	52.82	56.15
28.75	35.80	41.4	49.00	54.00	53.95
10.60	38.20	25.0	73.54	69.96	38.35
19.75	40.80	23.1	36.00	10.00	50.95
23.50	19.30	20.0	11.00	45.00	26.85
15.60	52.30	29.5	53.19	76.42	41.45
11.65	39.10	87.5	80.00	80.00	55.10
5.98	27.30	11.6	74.83	83.78	50.20
8.05	29.70	17.8	65.00	25.00	51.60
8.90	29.41	34.0	52.86	81.10	34.90
32.55	48.30	64.5	69.00	62.00	70.95
6.55	30.00	16.0	70.00	70.00	37.75
16.95	41.70	30.1	39.00	20.00	48.00

m 1

3.55	43.20	27.5	59.00	62.00	44.05
16.05	52.86	90.6	68.51	82.27	56.15
28.75	35.80	41.4	49.00	54.00	53.95
10.60	38.20	25.0	68.09	92.52	38.35
19.75	40.80	23.1	36.00	10.00	50.95
23.50	19.30	20.0	11.00	45.00	26.85
15.60	52.30	29.5	66.49	91.85	41.45
11.65	39.10	87.5	80.00	80.00	55.10
5.98	27.30	11.6	62.61	53.97	50.20
8.05	29.70	17.8	65.00	25.00	51.60
8.90	29.41	34.0	53.78	48.80	34.90
32.55	48.30	64.5	69.00	62.00	70.95
6.55	30.00	16.0	70.00	70.00	37.75
16.95	41.70	30.1	39.00	20.00	48.00

m 2

Fig. 4.7 Selected parts of two imputed data sets for the data matrix; *m1* and *m2* are equal in all cells excepting the highlighted ones which are estimates for the missing values.

A completed final data matrix can be found in the Table 4.2, and compared to the Table 4.1. Table 4.2 is the mean of all six imputations (see subchapter 4.3)

Table 4.2 Data including both observed and estimated values for 81 nations

	Country	Homicide per 100,000 pop.	Nationalism	Omnipotence	Absolutism	Religiosity	Power Distance	Collectivism	Authoritarian.	Competitive.	GNI per capita
1	Albania	6.00	68.20	3.55	43.20	27.50	59.00	62.00	44.05	30.10	5420
2	Algeria	12.00	73.55	16.05	46.19	90.60	75.00	68.59	56.15	38.99	6770
3	Argentina	8.80	62.05	28.75	35.80	41.40	49.00	54.00	53.95	31.90	13920
4	Armenia	3.70	42.95	10.60	38.20	25.00	83.57	70.74	38.35	20.20	5060
5	Australia	1.50	71.35	19.75	40.80	23.10	36.00	10.00	50.95	26.40	30610
6	Austria	.90	50.95	23.50	19.30	20.00	11.00	45.00	26.85	22.60	33140
7	Azerbaijan	2.90	63.35	15.60	52.30	29.50	53.10	55.58	41.45	31.50	4890
8	Bangladesh	7.40	74.05	11.65	39.10	87.50	80.00	80.00	55.10	49.60	2090
9	Belarus	13.00	27.70	5.98	27.30	11.60	83.34	59.78	50.20	22.60	7890

10	Belgium	1.70	23.50	8.05	29.70	17.80	65.00	25.00	51.60	10.30	32640
11	Bosnia & H.	2.00	41.25	8.90	29.41	34.00	61.47	53.97	34.90	35.90	7790
12	Brazil	32.60	51.75	32.55	48.30	64.50	69.00	62.00	70.95	41.60	8230
13	Bulgaria	3.00	42.30	6.55	30.00	16.00	70.00	70.00	37.75	28.40	8630
14	Canada	1.50	66.80	16.95	41.70	30.10	39.00	20.00	48.00	23.60	32220
15	Chile	5.50	59.40	21.05	49.00	46.30	63.00	77.00	54.20	18.90	11470
16	China	3.00	29.10	20.65	29.60	2.50	80.00	80.00	34.00	33.30	6600
17	Colombia	72.40	87.55	30.40	37.50	54.30	67.00	87.00	69.05	33.50	7420
18	Croatia	1.90	42.20	11.65	33.40	25.30	48.40	39.52	36.20	45.10	12750
19	Czech Rep.	1.30	26.95	8.55	22.80	7.20	57.00	42.00	32.45	25.30	20140
20	Denmark	1.00	44.95	11.50	10.10	7.80	18.00	26.00	24.15	13.30	33570
21	Dominican	10.20	74.90	22.15	34.80	49.60	51.17	64.50	51.05	46.00	7150
22	Egypt	1.20	77.70	7.00	51.07	97.30	80.00	62.00	69.35	38.47	4440
23	El Salvador	38.40	85.15	28.50	41.30	86.50	66.00	81.00	73.95	38.50	5120
24	Estonia	15.40	21.65	5.40	30.00	5.30	40.00	40.00	33.15	13.60	15420
25	Finland	3.20	52.30	9.95	28.60	13.70	33.00	37.00	33.70	10.60	31170
26	France	.70	33.75	9.90	24.60	10.90	68.00	29.00	50.85	15.80	30540
27	Georgia	3.80	70.35	15.75	39.10	49.30	85.55	69.64	47.35	37.20	3270
28	Germany	.70	21.40	11.65	34.30	8.60	35.00	33.00	28.35	15.20	29210
29	Greece	1.20	54.10	6.85	15.80	32.40	60.00	65.00	13.70	15.00	23620
30	Hungary	2.40	48.15	13.40	14.50	19.70	46.00	20.00	48.35	26.50	16940
31	Iceland	.60	63.30	10.00	8.80	19.10	33.57	30.42	30.70	33.70	34760
32	India	5.50	72.85	21.85	23.90	55.80	77.00	52.00	49.45	40.70	3460
33	Indonesia	9.40	47.25	20.35	40.88	97.70	78.00	86.00	42.75	46.14	3720
34	Iran	3.80	77.60	13.35	40.63	78.90	58.00	59.00	51.85	34.42	8050
35	Iraq	2.90	80.25	9.65	56.48	93.50	80.00	62.00	68.50	48.22	2170
36	Ireland	1.00	72.80	16.25	38.90	32.80	28.00	30.00	61.55	19.70	34720
37	Israel	.70	54.00	16.47	31.64	21.75	13.00	46.00	37.35	24.61	25280
38	Italy	1.10	41.15	7.50	34.90	32.60	50.00	24.00	38.05	17.80	28840
39	Japan	.60	23.25	2.50	17.00	6.40	54.00	54.00	4.15	10.60	31410
40	Jordan	2.90	69.05	31.75	49.72	95.90	82.50	62.00	67.25	45.46	5280
41	Kyrgyzstan	8.90	42.85	22.25	55.20	31.60	82.26	84.55	44.05	38.30	1870
42	Latvia	12.60	32.85	5.85	35.20	10.60	82.23	55.49	30.75	25.10	13480
43	Lithuania	10.70	23.45	9.35	33.40	13.40	72.18	52.40	28.00	21.80	14220
44	Luxembourg	1.70	39.95	15.20	21.80	15.30	40.00	40.00	37.25	14.80	65340
45	Macedonia	3.00	61.25	11.10	52.80	47.00	54.74	42.17	29.90	46.80	7080
46	Malta	1.50	74.85	16.35	47.40	65.60	56.00	41.00	66.45	25.50	18960
47	Mexico	10.20	75.90	33.35	36.80	67.70	81.00	70.00	63.65	38.30	10030
48	Moldova	12.30	24.10	10.70	35.80	33.90	99.47	86.99	44.65	20.30	2150
49	Morocco	1.10	88.90	15.60	71.70	94.20	70.00	54.00	69.60	60.30	4360
50	Netherlands	1.10	24.55	3.90	26.50	16.70	38.00	20.00	45.85	4.80	32480
51	New Zealand	1.20	68.15	24.30	39.50	19.00	22.00	21.00	35.80	24.10	23030
52	Nigeria	23.10	69.80	17.45	55.80	92.80	77.00	80.00	76.95	53.25	1040
53	Norway	1.10	50.55	12.95	28.90	12.10	31.00	31.00	28.50	17.50	40420
54	Pakistan	3.70	81.95	.20	43.02	81.80	55.00	86.00	51.30	43.77	2350
55	Peru	3.60	77.25	21.75	45.30	52.50	64.00	84.00	70.05	39.60	5830
56	Philippines	21.10	83.85	19.65	56.10	86.80	94.00	68.00	57.05	23.00	5300

57	Poland	1.80	65.75	9.55	39.90	44.30	68.00	40.00	40.50	23.80	13490
58	Portugal	1.40	67.45	11.75	35.60	27.00	63.00	73.00	57.25	17.50	19730
59	Puerto Rico	20.00	90.90	41.40	41.10	75.40	58.27	59.55	74.60	52.80	12239
60	Romania	3.60	42.55	20.30	35.10	51.00	90.00	70.00	46.25	39.20	8940
61	Russian Fed.	32.90	37.60	16.80	35.80	11.60	93.00	61.00	41.30	22.50	10640
62	Saudi Arabia	3.00	74.20	10.70	44.03	88.70	80.00	62.00	66.70	26.62	14740
63	Serbia & M.	1.80	44.05	8.50	40.00	23.80	79.00	72.00	42.60	27.80	3910
64	Singapore	.80	43.55	7.50	36.90	35.90	74.00	80.00	49.50	21.10	29780
65	Slovakia	2.20	28.00	8.90	29.40	26.70	104.00	48.00	43.50	19.20	15760
66	Slovenia	.80	57.75	19.00	25.10	12.20	41.12	45.20	32.75	28.80	22160
67	South Africa	43.20	76.30	23.05	59.40	69.70	49.00	35.00	62.30	29.30	12120
68	South Korea	1.80	25.35	17.00	37.00	23.20	60.00	82.00	16.25	15.10	21850
69	Spain	1.00	55.55	9.65	34.90	18.40	57.00	49.00	52.30	14.40	25820
70	Sweden	1.00	42.65	15.25	19.70	10.60	31.00	29.00	16.65	17.70	31420
71	Switzerland	.90	33.75	18.65	27.40	14.30	34.00	32.00	26.55	26.30	37080
72	Tanzania	24.00	81.20	33.10	63.90	77.80	64.00	73.00	77.15	55.40	730
73	Turkey	3.40	75.05	21.15	30.40	81.00	66.00	63.00	53.83	33.30	8420
74	Uganda	20.80	66.30	22.90	57.00	73.50	80.00	73.00	72.50	53.30	1500
75	Ukraine	15.50	28.85	6.50	42.30	19.30	79.22	56.00	43.15	23.60	6720
76	UK	1.10	53.30	13.50	38.00	12.30	35.00	11.00	58.50	11.60	32690
77	Uruguay	5.60	75.15	24.85	31.90	22.80	61.00	64.00	41.60	20.50	9810
78	USA	5.40	70.50	18.60	47.60	56.90	40.00	9.00	51.00	28.90	41950
79	Venezuela	35.20	91.85	42.40	39.70	63.80	81.00	88.00	70.85	33.60	6440
80	Viet Nam	4.20	79.55	21.35	40.71	9.70	68.91	80.00	68.20	29.30	3010
81	Zimbabwe	11.30	77.90	19.25	54.90	98.25	78.84	68.07	78.90	61.70	1940

After substitution of missing values with estimated values, and on the basis of the Table 4.2 which is a result of this procedure, the 81 nations are ranked in descending order in the Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Nations' rankings in 10 variables: (The rankings are aggregates obtained after exploring the effects of imputations on parameter estimates.)

	HOMICIDE	Nationalism	Omnipotence	Absolutism	Religiosity
1	Colombia	Venezuela	Venezuela	Morocco	Zimbabwe
2	South Africa	Puerto Rico	Puerto Rico	Tanzania	Indonesia
3	El Salvador	Morocco	Mexico	South Africa	Egypt
4	Venezuela	Colombia	Tanzania	Uganda	Jordan
5	Russian Fed.	El Salvador	Brazil	Iraq	Morocco
6	Brazil	Philippines	Jordan	Philippines	Iraq
7	Tanzania	Pakistan	Colombia	Nigeria	Nigeria
8	Nigeria	Tanzania	Argentina	Kyrgyzstan	Algeria
9	Philippines	Iraq	El Salvador	Zimbabwe	Saudi Arabia

10	Uganda	Viet Nam	Uruguay	Macedonia	Bangladesh
11	Puerto Rico	Zimbabwe	New Zealand	Azerbaijan	Philippines
12	Ukraine	Egypt	Austria	Egypt	El Salvador
13	Estonia	Iran	South Africa	Jordan	Pakistan
14	Belarus	Peru	Uganda	Chile	Turkey
15	Latvia	South Africa	Kyrgyzstan	Brazil	Iran
16	Moldova	Mexico	Dominican	USA	Tanzania
17	Algeria	Uruguay	India	Malta	Puerto Rico
18	Zimbabwe	Turkey	Peru	Algeria	Uganda
19	Lithuania	Dominican	Viet Nam	Peru	South Africa
20	Dominican	Malta	Turkey	Saudi Arabia	Mexico
21	Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Chile	Albania	Malta
22	Indonesia	Bangladesh	China	Pakistan	Brazil
23	Kyrgyzstan	Algeria	Indonesia	Ukraine	Venezuela
24	Argentina	India	Romania	Canada	USA
25	Bangladesh	Ireland	Australia	El Salvador	India
26	Albania	Australia	Philippines	Puerto Rico	Colombia
27	Uruguay	USA	Zimbabwe	Indonesia	Peru
28	Chile	Georgia	Slovenia	Australia	Romania
29	India	Nigeria	Switzerland	Viet Nam	Dominican
30	USA	Jordan	USA	Iran	Georgia
31	Viet Nam	Albania	Nigeria	Serbia & M.	Macedonia
32	Georgia	New Zealand	South Korea	Poland	Chile
33	Iran	Portugal	Canada	Venezuela	Poland
34	Armenia	Canada	Russian Fed.	New Zealand	Argentina
35	Pakistan	Uganda	Israel	Georgia	Singapore
36	Peru	Poland	Malta	Bangladesh	Bosnia
37	Romania	Azerbaijan	Ireland	Ireland	Moldova
38	Turkey	Iceland	Algeria	Armenia	Ireland
39	Finland	Argentina	Georgia	United Kingdom	Italy
40	Bulgaria	Macedonia	Morocco	Colombia	Greece
41	China	Chile	Azerbaijan	South Korea	Kyrgyzstan
42	Macedonia	Slovenia	Sweden	Singapore	Canada
43	Saudi Arabia	Spain	Luxembourg	Mexico	Azerbaijan
44	Azerbaijan	Greece	United Kingdom	Argentina	Albania
45	Iraq	Israel	Hungary	Russian Fed.	Portugal
46	Jordan	United Kingdom	Iran	Moldova	Slovakia
47	Hungary	Finland	Norway	Portugal	Croatia
48	Slovakia	Brazil	Portugal	Latvia	Armenia
49	Bosnia	Austria	Bangladesh	Romania	Serbia & M.
50	Croatia	Norway	Croatia	Spain	South Korea
51	Poland	Hungary	Germany	Italy	Australia
52	Serbia & M.	Indonesia	Denmark	Dominican	Uruguay
53	South Korea	Denmark	Macedonia	Germany	Israel
54	Belgium	Serbia & M.	Saudi Arabia	Croatia	Austria
55	Luxembourg	Singapore	Moldova	Lithuania	Hungary
56	Australia	Armenia	Armenia	Uruguay	Ukraine
57	Canada	Kyrgyzstan	Iceland	Israel	Iceland
58	Malta	Sweden	Finland	Turkey	New Zealand

59	Portugal	Romania	France	Bulgaria	Spain
60	Czech Rep.	Bulgaria	Iraq	Estonia	Belgium
61	Egypt	Croatia	Spain	Belgium	Netherlands
62	Greece	Bosnia	Poland	China	Bulgaria
63	New	Italy	Lithuania	Bosnia	Luxembourg
64	Italy	Luxembourg	Bosnia	Slovakia	Switzerland
65	Morocco	Russian Fed.	Slovakia	Norway	Finland
66	Netherlands	Switzerland	Czech	Finland	Lithuania
67	Norway	France	Serbia & M.	Switzerland	UK
68	United Kingdom	Latvia	Belgium	Belarus	Slovenia
69	Denmark	China	Singapore	Netherlands	Norway
70	Ireland	Ukraine	Italy	Slovenia	Russian Fed.
71	Spain	Slovakia	Egypt	France	Belarus
72	Sweden	Belarus	Greece	India	France
73	Austria	Czech Rep.	Bulgaria	Czech	Sweden
74	Switzerland	South Korea	Ukraine	Luxembourg	Latvia
75	Singapore	Netherlands	Belarus	Sweden	Viet Nam
76	Slovenia	Moldova	Latvia	Austria	Germany
77	France	Belgium	Estonia	Japan	Denmark
78	Germany	Lithuania	Netherlands	Greece	Czech Rep.
79	Israel	Japan	Albania	Hungary	Japan
80	Iceland	Estonia	Japan	Denmark	Estonia
81	Japan	Germany	Pakistan	Iceland	China

	Authoritarian	Power Distance	Collectivism	Competitive	GNI per capita
1	Zimbabwe	Slovakia	Venezuela	Zimbabwe	Luxembourg
2	Tanzania	Moldova	Colombia	Morocco	USA
3	Nigeria	Philippines	Moldova	Tanzania	Norway
4	Puerto Rico	Russian Fed.	Indonesia	Uganda	Switzerland
5	El Salvador	Romania	Pakistan	Nigeria	Iceland
6	Uganda	Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	Puerto Rico	Ireland
7	Brazil	Armenia	Peru	Bangladesh	Denmark
8	Venezuela	Belarus	South Korea	Iraq	Austria
9	Peru	Jordan	El Salvador	Macedonia	United Kingdom
10	Morocco	Kyrgyzstan	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Belgium
11	Egypt	Latvia	China	Dominican	Netherlands
12	Colombia	Mexico	Nigeria	Jordan	Canada
13	Iraq	Venezuela	Singapore	Croatia	Sweden
14	Viet Nam	Bangladesh	Viet Nam	Pakistan	Japan
15	Jordan	China	Chile	Brazil	Finland
16	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Uganda	India	Australia
17	Malta	Iraq	Tanzania	Peru	France
18	Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Portugal	Romania	Singapore
19	South Africa	Uganda	Serbia & M.	Algeria	Germany
20	Ireland	Ukraine	Armenia	El Salvador	Italy
21	United Kingdom	Serbia & M.	Romania	Egypt	Spain

22	Portugal	Zimbabwe	Mexico	Kyrgyzstan	Israel
23	Philippines	Indonesia	Bulgaria	Mexico	Greece
24	Algeria	India	Georgia	Georgia	New Zealand
25	Bangladesh	Nigeria	Algeria	Bosnia & H.	Slovenia
26	Chile	Algeria	Zimbabwe	Iran	South Korea
27	Argentina	Singapore	Philippines	Iceland	Czech Rep.
28	Turkey	Lithuania	Greece	Venezuela	Portugal
29	Spain	Bulgaria	Dominican	Colombia	Malta
30	Iran	Morocco	Uruguay	China	Hungary
31	Belgium	Brazil	Turkey	Turkey	Slovakia
32	Pakistan	Viet Nam	Jordan	Argentina	Estonia
33	Dominican	France	Egypt	Azerbaijan	Saudi Arabia
34	USA	Poland	Iraq	Albania	Lithuania
35	Australia	Colombia	Saudi Arabia	Viet Nam	Argentina
36	France	El Salvador	Brazil	South Africa	Poland
37	Belarus	Turkey	Albania	USA	Latvia
38	Singapore	Belgium	Russian Fed.	Slovenia	Croatia
39	India	Peru	Belarus	Bulgaria	Puerto Rico
40	Hungary	Tanzania	Puerto Rico	Serbia & M.	South Africa
41	Canada	Chile	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Chile
42	Georgia	Portugal	Ukraine	Hungary	Russian Fed.
43	Romania	Bosnia & H.	Azerbaijan	Australia	Mexico
44	Netherlands	Uruguay	Latvia	Switzerland	Uruguay
45	Moldova	Greece	Morocco	Malta	Romania
46	Kyrgyzstan	South Korea	Japan	Czech Rep.	Bulgaria
47	Albania	Albania	Argentina	Latvia	Turkey
48	Slovakia	Puerto Rico	Bosnia	Israel	Brazil
49	Ukraine	Iran	Lithuania	New Zealand	Iran
50	Indonesia	Czech Rep.	India	Poland	Belarus
51	Serbia & M.	Spain	Spain	Ukraine	Bosnia & H.
52	Uruguay	Malta	Slovakia	Canada	Colombia
53	Azerbaijan	Pakistan	Israel	Philippines	Dominican
54	Russian Fed.	Macedonia	Slovenia	Belarus	Macedonia
55	Poland	Japan	Austria	Austria	Algeria
56	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Macedonia	Russian Fed.	Ukraine
57	Italy	Dominican	Czech Rep.	Lithuania	China
58	Bulgaria	Italy	Malta	Singapore	Venezuela
59	Israel	Argentina	Poland	Uruguay	Peru
60	Luxembourg	South Africa	Estonia	Moldova	Albania
61	Croatia	Croatia	Luxembourg	Armenia	Philippines
62	New Zealand	Hungary	Croatia	Ireland	Jordan
63	Bosnia	Slovenia	Finland	Slovakia	El Salvador
64	China	Estonia	South Africa	Chile	Armenia
65	Finland	Luxembourg	Germany	Italy	Azerbaijan
66	Estonia	USA	Switzerland	Sweden	Egypt
67	Slovenia	Canada	Norway	Portugal	Morocco
68	Czech Rep.	Netherlands	Iceland	Norway	Serbia & M.
69	Latvia	Australia	Ireland	France	Indonesia
70	Iceland	Germany	France	Germany	India

71	Macedonia	United Kingdom	Sweden	South Korea	Georgia
72	Norway	Switzerland	Denmark	Greece	Viet Nam
73	Germany	Iceland	Belgium	Luxembourg	Pakistan
74	Lithuania	Finland	Italy	Spain	Iraq
75	Austria	Norway	New Zealand	Estonia	Moldova
76	Switzerland	Sweden	Hungary	Denmark	Bangladesh
77	Denmark	Ireland	Canada	United Kingdom	Zimbabwe
78	Sweden	New Zealand	Netherlands	Japan	Kyrgyzstan
79	South Korea	Denmark	United Kingdom	Finland	Uganda
80	Greece	Israel	Australia	Belgium	Nigeria
81	Japan	Austria	USA	Netherlands	Tanzania

4.3 Statistical analyses and results

Having six imputed data matrices with no missing cells and comprising a sample of 81 nations, statistical analyses were performed to find the relation between 9 independent variables and homicide as the dependent variable. The imputed data tables were similar in about 93% of their data, and dissimilar in about 7% of cells. However the 7% estimated values were not distributed equally in all variables:

Table 4.4 Amount of estimated values for each variable

Variable	No. Estimated values	% Estimated values
Homicide	0	0.00
Nationalism	0	0.00
Omnipotence	1	1.23
Absolutism	8	9.88
Religiosity	2	2.47
Power Distance	17	20.99
Collectivism	16	19.75
Authoritarianism	2	2.47
Competitiveness	11	13.58
GNI per capita	0	0.00

The statistical measurements also indicate more variability in variables with more estimated values. The following table indicates the correlation coefficients between homicide and the 9 IVs in six measurements:

Table 4.5 Correlations between 9 IVs and Homicide in 6 imputations

	Imputation No.	Statistics	Nationalism	Omnipotence	Absolutism	Authoritarianism	Collectivism	Power Distance	Religiosity	Competitiveness	GNI per capita
HOMICIDE	1	<i>r</i>	.295	.498	.306	.449	.347	.292	.307	.272	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.006	.000	.001	.008	.005	.014	.001
	2	<i>r</i>	.295	.5	.299	.434	.364	.259	.312	.279	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.007	.000	.001	.020	.005	.012	.001
	3	<i>r</i>	.295	.499	.282	.440	.352	.273	.318	.220	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.011	.000	.001	.014	.004	.049	.001
	4	<i>r</i>	.295	.482	.344	.436	.356	.280	.324	.253	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.002	.000	.001	.011	.003	.023	.001
	5	<i>r</i>	.295	.496	.289	.439	.346	.289	.316	.327	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.009	.000	.002	.009	.004	.003	.001
	6	<i>r</i>	.295	.498	.305	.436	.367	.286	.307	.224	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.006	.000	.001	.010	.005	.045	.001
	Mean	<i>r</i>	.295	.497	.31	.439	.355	.28	.315	.268	-.365
		<i>p</i>	.007	.000	.005	.000	.001	.014	.004	.016	.001

As indicated in the above table variables *nationalism* and *GNI per capita* have no estimated values and then they are similar in all six measurements. The variable *omnipotence* had only one missing value, and hence estimations of this value had a very trivial effect on the aggregate value of this variable. In other variables there were a few more missing data, and several estimations of such data led to more variation in measures, but they still indicate a similar pattern.

Table 4.6 Correlations among all 10 variables

HOMICIDE										
Nationalism	.295** .007 81	Nationalism								
Omnipotence	.5** .000 81	.527** .000 81	Omnipotence							
Absolutism	.31** .005 81	.524** .000 81	.300** .007 81	Absolutism						
Religiosity	.315** .004 81	.708** .000 81	.380** .000 81	.668** .000 81	Religiosity					
Power Distance	.282* .011 81	.051 .651 81	.049 .666 81	.383** .000 81	.414** .000 81	Power Distance				
Collectivism	.367** .001 81	.247* .026 81	.250* .024 81	.343** .000 81	.440** .000 81	.679** .000 81	Collectivism			
Authoritarianism	.44** .000 81	.686** .000 81	.496** .000 81	.668** .000 81	.710** .000 81	.377** .001 81	.326** .003 81	Authoritarianism		
Competitiveness	.268* .016	.584** .000 81	.436** .000 81	.589** .000 81	.738** .000 81	.354** .001 81	.450** .000 81	.576** .000 81	Competitiveness	
GNI	-.365** .001 81	-.358** .001 81	-.220* .048 81	-.549** .000 81	-.544** .000 81	-.694** .000 81	-.719** .000 81	-.462** .000 81	-.656** .000 81	GNI

4.3.1 Regression Analysis

Multiple regression analysis of the variables was performed for each of the six data tables. A stepwise RA in all data sets led to same results, so that it made actually no difference if only one data set (no matter which one) could be used in the analysis. Parts of these results have been indicated in the Tables 4.7 – 4.9:

Table 4.7 Model summaries for RAs with 3 (of 6) data matrices

Model Summary(c)					
RA 1	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
	1	.499(a)	.249	.240	10.42443
	2	.563(b)	.317	.299	10.00719
RA 2	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
	1	.497(a)	.247	.238	10.43833
	2	.562(b)	.316	.298	10.01558
RA 3	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
	1	.500(a)	.250	.241	10.41605
	2	.563(b)	.317	.300	10.00274

a. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence
b. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence, GNI
c. Dependent Variable: HOMICIDE

Table 4.8 ANOVA tables related to RA with 3 (of 6) data matrices

ANOVA(c)							
RA 1	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	1	Regression	2826.012	1	2826.012	25.937	.000(a)
		Residual	8607.743	79	108.959		
		Total	11433.756	80			
	2	Regression	3609.440	2	1804.720	17.991	.000(b)
		Residual	7824.316	78	100.312		
	Total	11433.756	80				
RA 2	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	1	Regression	2862.728	1	2862.728	26.386	.000(a)
		Residual	8571.028	79	108.494		
		Total	11433.756	80			
	2	Regression	3629.487	2	1814.743	18.138	.000(b)
		Residual	7804.269	78	100.055		
	Total	11433.756	80				
RA 3	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	1	Regression	2862.728	1	2862.728	26.386	.000(a)
		Residual	8571.028	79	108.494		
		Total	11433.756	80			
	2	Regression	3629.487	2	1814.743	18.138	.000(b)
		Residual	7804.269	78	100.055		
	Total	11433.756	80				

a. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence
b. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence, GNI
c. Dependent Variable: HOMICIDE

Table 4.9 Coefficients of the 3 RAs (from the 6 imputed data matrices):

Coefficients (a)							
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
RA 1	1	(Constant)	-3.020	2.443		-1.236	.220
		Omnipotence	.691	.135	.499	5.120	.000
	2	(Constant)	2.170	2.998		.724	.471
		Omnipotence	.608	.133	.440	4.578	.000
		GNI	.000	.000	-.267	-2.779	.007
RA 2	1	(Constant)	-3.004	2.451		-1.226	.224
		Omnipotence	.689	.135	.497	5.093	.000
	2	(Constant)	2.203	3.000		.734	.465
		Omnipotence	.607	.133	.438	4.560	.000
		GNI	.000	.000	-.268	-2.795	.007
RA 3	1	(Constant)	-3.014	2.435		-1.238	.219
		Omnipotence	.692	.135	.500	5.137	.000
	2	(Constant)	2.162	2.994		.722	.472
		Omnipotence	.609	.133	.440	4.588	.000
		GNI	.000	.000	-.266	-2.768	.007

a. Dependent Variable: HOMICIDE

There is a possibility in NORM to infer the overall results of several lists of imputations. To do this one should get coefficients of different analyses on each of data tables in one single file labeled with a suffix .dat and through MI inference tab can combine the results. However it seems to be useful especially when data files do not give similar patterns of results. In the case of my data all the imputations showed similar results in analyses, so that the estimated values had only trivial and insignificant effects on the coefficients. Then I found it redundant to go on with MI inference and instead I decided to work only with one set of data that is the mean of all six data matrices. Among the nine independent variables *Omnipotence* followed by *GNI* were found to be the first and second significant predictors of homicide. This happened also in each of the

six regression analyses. The results of six RAs can therefore be summarized in the following tables 4.10 and 4.11 and also in Fig. 4.8:

Table 4.10 Model Summary- mean of 6 RAs

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.497(a)	.247	.237	10.44188
2	.562(b)	.315	.298	10.01783

a. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence

b. Predictors: (Constant), Omnipotence, GNI per capita

Table 4.11 Coefficients- mean of 6 RAs

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-2.997	2.453		-1.222	.225
	Omnipotence	.688	.135	.497	5.086	.000
2	(Constant)	2.214	3.001		.738	.463
	Omnipotence	.606	.133	.437	4.555	.000
	GNI per capita	.000	.000	-.269	-2.798	.006

Dependent Variable: Homicide rate per 100,000 pop.




Fig. 4.8 Omnipotence and GNI as the two main predictors of homicide

Beta weights of Omnipotence (.44) and GNI (.27) which are significant in .000 and .006 levels respectively, represent them as two significant predictors of homicide. But with regard to other predictors which are significantly correlated with homicide, but do not predict it in regression analysis, factor analysis may provide us with a better picture of the predictors' relations.

4.3.2 Factor Analysis:

In the multiple regression analysis several predictors were insignificant; this seems to be due to the high correlations among the predictors. At the same time these high correlations may reveal an underlying factorial relationship among the independent variables, and a factor analysis can deal with this issue by reducing the nine correlated predictors in a less number of common factors. So the method of principle axis factoring, conditioned by Eigenvalues more than 1, with direct oblique rotation, was performed. The results indicate that the 9 IVs fall in a two-factor model. The following tables give an indication of all measures.

Table 4.12 KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.804
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	473.685
	df	36
	Sig.	.000

As seen in the above table the KMO value is much greater than the critical value (.5) and is large enough to be considered as “meritorious”, and also the Bartlett’s test is highly significant, implying the suitability of the correlation patterns and the factor analysis.

Table 4.13 Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Nationalism	.702	.771
Omnipotence	.394	.315
Absolutism	.569	.540
High Religious Devotion	.757	.756
Power Distance	.692	.745
Collectivism	.622	.604
Authoritarian Tendency	.691	.682
Competitiveness	.685	.640
GNI per capita	.748	.793

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

The two extracted factors, as indicated below, explain almost 65% of total variance.

Table 4.14 Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings(a)
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative	Total
1	4.904	54.493	54.493	4.577	50.861	50.861	4.020
2	1.584	17.601	72.094	1.268	14.088	64.949	3.159
3	.740	8.223	80.318				
4	.503	5.593	85.911				
5	.398	4.423	90.334				
6	.317	3.521	93.855				
7	.254	2.823	96.678				
8	.179	1.991	98.669				
9	.120	1.331	100.000				

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.

The two factor model is also indicated in the following diagram:




Fig. 4.9 Scree plot of the factor Eigenvalues

Six of the IVs belong to one factor and the rest three forms the second factor:

Table 4.15 Pattern Matrix(a)

	Factor	
	1	2
Nationalism	.943	.199
Authoritarian Tendency	.781	-.096
High Religious Devotion	.759	-.211
Competitiveness	.644	-.276
Absolutism	.601	-.240
Omnipotence	.594	.093
Power Distance	-.109	-.903
GNI per capita	-.210	.781
Collectivism	.070	-.746

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

The first factor, as I understand it, represents mostly those variables which are formed in the course of psycho-cultural development, and the other reflects mostly the socio-economic variables, because in addition to GNI as an important indicator of development, collectivism may be directly dependent on social and economic structure and production relations; then I call the first factor as Psy-Cul and the second as SED (abbreviated from socio economic development):




Fig. 4.10 Reduction of variables in two factors

According to the factor analysis results, something binds 6 variables in one factor and 3 variables in another (Fig. 4.10). The variables in Psy-Cul factor reflect psychological reactions that emerge and take special forms in cultural settings; for example in a specific cultural context, people may learn to be more competitive, or nationalistic, etc. I assume that these psychological orientations are heavily culture-bound. The 3 variables in SED factor, seem to be more related to the objective conditions of social and economic relationships. I will discuss the topic in more detail in the next chapter.

Correlations between homicide and the two factors are shown in the following table:

Table 4.16 Correlation between factors and homicide

N (81)	Psy-Cul	SED
Homicide	.401**	-.363**
	.000	.001
Psy-Cul		-.471**
		.000

This has been shown in the following diagrams in which both factors indicate a significant relation (but in opposite directions) to homicide:




Fig. 4.11 Regression curve estimations for the two factors

The two sets of factor scores are negatively correlated, suggesting that they are not independent from one another. This negative correlation between factors may imply that the lower socio-economic development intensifies those psycho-cultural problems which are involved in aggression, more specifically in homicide. This relationship can be seen in the following diagram:




Fig. 4.12 Negative correlation between the two factors

4.3.2.1 Regression analysis with factors

A regression analysis with the two factors as the predictors indicates a more predictive value of the Psy-Cul factor. As seen in the following table R-square is .20, indicating that the two factors explain 20 percent of the variance of homicide. In other words the two factors (from among all possible cultural and non-cultural factors) define 20 percent of variation in cross national homicide rates.

Table 4.17 Model Summary RA with factors

Mode	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.447(a)	.200	.179	10.83185

a. Predictors: (Constant), Socio Economic Development Factor, Psycho-Cultural Factor

Table 4.18 ANOVA- RA with factors

Mode 1		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2282.103	2	1141.051	9.725	.000(a)
	Residual	9151.653	78	117.329		
	Total	11433.756	80			

a. Predictors: (Constant), Socio Economic Development Factor, Psycho-Cultural Factor
Dependent Variable: Homicide rate per 100,000 pop.

Table 4.19 Coefficients RA with factors

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	7.993	1.204		6.641	.000
	Psycho-Cultural Factor	3.690	1.433	.296	2.574	.012
	Socio Economic Development Factor	-2.819	1.448	-.224	-1.947	.055

Dependent Variable: Homicide rate per 100,000 pop.

Beta weights of the two factors (.3 and .22) indicate that Psy-Cul factor in the presence of SED can better predict homicide ($p = .012$). But SED also seems not to be far from the level of significance ($p = .055$).

4.3.3 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis

One of the main goals of this analysis is to distinguish different cultures by means of their social and psychological characteristics. If the independent variables (being grouped in factors) can give a sensible classification of the cases, it can be also a sign of discriminating strength and as a result the predictive power of these factors. Cluster analysis gives a clear picture of a plausible grouping pattern among the 81 nations. The clustering was performed on the basis of the two factor scores. The cluster method was *between group linkage* with the *squared Euclidean distance* measure. The following

dendrogram (using average linkage between groups) indicates a considerable proximity among nations with common historical backgrounds. That is, the variables can not only to a good extent predict homicide, but also they can effectively classify nations on the basis of their cultural values.






Fig. 4.13 Dendrogram of three main clusters of nations

C A S E
Label

Num 0 5 10 15 20 25
+-----+-----+-----+-----+



C A S E 0 5 10 15 20 25
 Label Num +-----+-----+-----+-----+



The grouping of nations can be better seen in the following interactive chart, in which the three groups of the developing, Western, and formerly socialist countries are distinguished:




Fig. 4.14 location of nations on the basis of their factor scores

As the above chart indicates, the two factors can to a great extent distinguish three major groups of nations. Interestingly they even make a distinction between English speaking and other Western nations. The post-

Soviet as well as other nations with a history of socialism can be easily distinguished from both developing countries and the Western ones. The developing nations from three continents, regardless to their far geographical distances show some similarities on the basis of these two factors. To give a numerical picture of the three groups of nations, descriptive statistics of the clusters in variables and factors have been summarized in the following table:

Table 4.20 Means and SDs of three clusters of nations in 10 variables and 2 factors

Variables and factors	Cluster 1 Developing Nations		Cluster 2 Post Communist Nations		Cluster 3 Western Nations	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
HOMICIDE	15.5074	16.92138	6.5889	6.75940	1.8815	2.87483
Nationalism	77.4130	8.23597	45.8852	16.10765	46.9278	16.50126
Omnipotence	21.6500	10.13003	13.3435	6.64275	12.9323	5.67589
Absolutism	46.5281	10.60724	37.9443	7.38510	27.8829	10.03141
Religiosity	75.3204	19.69398	30.6741	18.55140	18.4093	11.08740
Power Distance	70.6921	11.22463	73.2050	14.97832	39.0997	14.64931
Collectivism	67.5819	13.34647	64.6595	14.14728	31.9860	13.63935
Authoritarianism	65.2863	8.91093	41.2741	8.80286	37.0019	13.99206
Competitiveness	41.2775	10.57992	28.2905	9.23129	19.0187	7.14112
GNI	6266.2593	4424.26388	10031.1111	6478.78807	30985.9259	9396.94847
<i>Psy-Cul</i>	1.1305	.39190	-.4052	.54208	-.7252	.57550
<i>SED</i>	-.6430	.39238	-.5203	.48514	1.1633	.50999

The findings resulted from the cluster analysis were compared by means of analysis of variance. This analysis indicated that the three groups of nations (developing, post-communist, and western) are significantly different in homicide rates and at the same time in their scores in all 9 independent variables and consequently in both factors. Results of the ANOVA are shown below in Table 4.21:

Table 4.21 One-way ANOVA: comparison of three groups of nations in 10 variables and 2 factors

		Sum of Squares	d.f	Mean Square	F	Sig.
HOMICIDE	Between Groups	2586.290	2	1293.145	11.400	.000
	Within Groups	8847.466	78	113.429		
	Total	11433.756	80			
Nationalism	Between Groups	17319.909	2	8659.954	43.330	.000
	Within Groups	15589.064	78	199.860		
	Total	32908.972	80			
Omnipotence	Between Groups	1306.478	2	653.239	10.951	.000
	Within Groups	4652.945	78	59.653		
	Total	5959.423	80			
Absolutism	Between Groups	4703.020	2	2351.510	26.354	.000
	Within Groups	6959.743	78	89.227		
	Total	11662.763	80			
Religiosity	Between Groups	48443.328	2	24221.664	84.995	.000
	Within Groups	22228.373	78	284.979		
	Total	70671.702	80			
Power Distance	Between Groups	19508.076	2	9754.038	51.796	.000
	Within Groups	14688.559	78	188.315		
	Total	34196.635	80			
Collectivism	Between Groups	21088.553	2	10544.276	56.056	.000
	Within Groups	14671.942	78	188.102		
	Total	35760.495	80			
Authoritarianism	Between Groups	12553.607	2	6276.803	53.393	.000
	Within Groups	9169.490	78	117.558		
	Total	21723.096	80			
Competitiveness	Between Groups	6750.755	2	3375.378	40.807	.000
	Within Groups	6451.827	78	82.716		
	Total	13202.582	80			
GNI	Between Groups	9579062641.507	2	4789531320.754	95.886	.000
	Within Groups	3896137601.704	78	49950482.073		
	Total	13475200243.210	80			
Psy-Cul	Between Groups	53.138	2	26.569	102.367	.000
	Within Groups	20.245	78	.260		
	Total	73.383	80			
SED	Between Groups	55.014	2	27.507	127.070	.000
	Within Groups	16.885	78	.216		
	Total	71.899	80			

The *F*-ratios indicate that the three groups of nations are significantly different in all variables and factors ($p < .001$), and therefore the factors have distinguishing power and the clustering is robust. Though the *F* scores show significant differences amongst the three clusters, however the Scheffé test reveals that the mean distances among clusters are not similar in all variables.

Table 4.22 represents between-group comparisons and Fig. 4.15 gives a graphical illustration of the mean differences:

Table 4.22 Multiple comparisons of mean differences

<i>Scheffé</i>	(I) Nations	(J) Nations	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
HOMICIDE	1	2	8.91852(*)	2.89865	.011	1.6849	16.1521
		3	13.62593(*)	2.89865	.000	6.3923	20.8595
	2	1	-8.91852(*)	2.89865	.011	-16.1521	-1.6849
		3	4.70741	2.89865	.273	-2.5262	11.9410
	3	1	-13.62593(*)	2.89865	.000	-20.8595	-6.3923
		2	-4.70741	2.89865	.273	-11.9410	2.5262
Nationalism	1	2	31.52778(*)	3.84765	.000	21.9259	41.1296
		3	30.48519(*)	3.84765	.000	20.8833	40.0871
	2	1	-31.52778(*)	3.84765	.000	-41.1296	-21.9259
		3	-1.04259	3.84765	.964	-10.6445	8.5593
	3	1	-30.48519(*)	3.84765	.000	-40.0871	-20.8833
		2	1.04259	3.84765	.964	-8.5593	10.6445
Omnipotence	1	2	8.30648(*)	2.10208	.001	3.0607	13.5523
		3	8.71765(*)	2.10208	.000	3.4719	13.9634
	2	1	-8.30648(*)	2.10208	.001	-13.5523	-3.0607
		3	.41117	2.10208	.981	-4.8346	5.6569
	3	1	-8.71765(*)	2.10208	.000	-13.9634	-3.4719
		2	-.41117	2.10208	.981	-5.6569	4.8346
Absolutism	1	2	8.58376(*)	2.57088	.005	2.1681	14.9994
		3	18.64521(*)	2.57088	.000	12.2295	25.0609
	2	1	-8.58376(*)	2.57088	.005	-14.9994	-2.1681
		3	10.06145(*)	2.57088	.001	3.6458	16.4771
	3	1	-18.64521(*)	2.57088	.000	-25.0609	-12.2295
		2	-10.06145(*)	2.57088	.001	-16.4771	-3.6458
Religiosity	1	2	44.64630(*)	4.59451	.000	33.1806	56.1120
		3	56.91111(*)	4.59451	.000	45.4454	68.3768
	2	1	-44.64630(*)	4.59451	.000	-56.1120	-33.1806
		3	12.26481(*)	4.59451	.033	.7991	23.7305
	3	1	-56.91111(*)	4.59451	.000	-68.3768	-45.4454
		2	-12.26481(*)	4.59451	.033	-23.7305	-.7991
Power Distance	1	2	-2.51286	3.73487	.798	-11.8333	6.8076
		3	31.59241(*)	3.73487	.000	22.2720	40.9128
	2	1	2.51286	3.73487	.798	-6.8076	11.8333
		3	34.10527(*)	3.73487	.000	24.7849	43.4257
	3	1	-31.59241(*)	3.73487	.000	-40.9128	-22.2720
		2	-34.10527(*)	3.73487	.000	-43.4257	-24.7849
Collectivism	1	2	2.92241	3.73276	.737	-6.3927	12.2376
		3	35.59595(*)	3.73276	.000	26.2808	44.9111
	2	1	-2.92241	3.73276	.737	-12.2376	6.3927
		3	32.67354(*)	3.73276	.000	23.3584	41.9887
	3	1	-35.59595(*)	3.73276	.000	-44.9111	-26.2808
		2	-32.67354(*)	3.73276	.000	-41.9887	-23.3584
Authoritarianism	1	2	24.01219(*)	2.95093	.000	16.6481	31.3763
		3	28.28441(*)	2.95093	.000	20.9203	35.6485
	2	1	-24.01219(*)	2.95093	.000	-31.3763	-16.6481
		3	4.27222	2.95093	.356	-3.0919	11.6363
	3	1	-28.28441(*)	2.95093	.000	-35.6485	-20.9203
		2	-4.27222	2.95093	.356	-11.6363	3.0919

Competitiveness	1	2	12.98707(*)	2.47530	.000	6.8099	19.1642
		3	22.25881(*)	2.47530	.000	16.0817	28.4359
	2	1	-12.98707(*)	2.47530	.000	-19.1642	-6.8099
		3	9.27175(*)	2.47530	.002	3.0946	15.4489
	3	1	-22.25881(*)	2.47530	.000	-28.4359	-16.0817
		2	-9.27175(*)	2.47530	.002	-15.4489	-3.0946
GNI	1	2	-3764.85185	1923.54769	.154	-8565.0899	1035.3862
		3	-24719.66667(*)	1923.54769	.000	-29519.9047	-19919.4286
	2	1	3764.85185	1923.54769	.154	-1035.3862	8565.0899
		3	-20954.81481(*)	1923.54769	.000	-25755.0528	-16154.5768
	3	1	24719.66667(*)	1923.54769	.000	19919.4286	29519.9047
		2	20954.81481(*)	1923.54769	.000	16154.5768	25755.0528
Psy-Cul	1	2	1.53568(*)	.13866	.000	1.1897	1.8817
		3	1.85568(*)	.13866	.000	1.5097	2.2017
	2	1	-1.53568(*)	.13866	.000	-1.8817	-1.1897
		3	.32000	.13866	.076	-.0260	.6660
	3	1	-1.85568(*)	.13866	.000	-2.2017	-1.5097
		2	-.32000	.13866	.076	-.6660	.0260
SED	1	2	-.12274	.12663	.627	-.4387	.1933
		3	-1.80638(*)	.12663	.000	-2.1224	-1.4904
	2	1	.12274	.12663	.627	-.1933	.4387
		3	-1.68364(*)	.12663	.000	-1.9996	-1.3676
	3	1	1.80638(*)	.12663	.000	1.4904	2.1224
		2	1.68364(*)	.12663	.000	1.3676	1.9996




Fig. 4.15 Location of the three clusters of nations in 10 variables and 2 factors

The above data and the diagram indicate that the three groups of nations are not *equally* different in all measures. In Homicide, the cluster of Developing nations (C1) is significantly different from the other two clusters, Post-Communist (C2) and Western (C3) with a significance of .011 and .000 respectively. But the C2 and C3 are not significantly different. In Nationalism the same pattern happens: C1 differs from C2 and C3 (sig. = .000); while C2 and C3 are not very different. Again C1 is highly different from the other two in Omnipotence (.001 and .000) but the other two are not different from one another. In Absolutism however, they are all reciprocally different: C1 and C2 (.005), C1 and C3 (.000), C2 and C3 (.001). This is repeated also for Religiosity: C1 and C2 (.000), C1 and C3 (.000), C2 and C3 (.033). In Power Distance C1 and C2 are not significantly different, but they are both different from C3 (.000). It is the same also for Collectivism. In Authoritarianism C1 is significantly different from the other two (.000), but the others are not different from one another. However they differ reciprocally in Competitiveness: C1 and C2, C1 and C3 (both .000) and C2 and C3 (.002). The mean difference between C1 and C2 is not significant, but they both differ significantly from C3 (.000). The two factors also indicate a proportionate pattern with the variables: C1 is highly different from both other clusters (.000) in Psy-Cul but the difference between C2 and C3 is slightly less than significant (.076). In SED however, significant difference can be seen only between means of C1 and C2 on one hand and C3 on the other. So it seems that the Post-Communist nations are more inclined to the Developing nations in economic conditions and possibly social structures; both these clusters seem to be hierarchical and collectivistic. However, in some other variables and the Psy-Cul factor as mentioned before, they take distance from Developing nations, and incline to the Western ones.

Then as the above results indicate that, the Developing and Western nations are diagonally different in all variables. But the Post-Communist nations more or less tend to the Developing nations in variables related with SED factor, and in variables Nationalism, Omnipotence, Authoritarianism, and the Psy-Cul factor get closer to the Western nations. Neither their homicide rates differ significantly from the westerners. The convergences of Post-Communist nations to the other two clusters in specific variables are interesting; socio-economically they may look similar to the developing countries, probably because the majority of them were pre-industrial peasant societies in the middle of the 20th Century, when they started to be ruled by communist parties. So for example, collectivism was not only something intrinsic to their societies, but also something propagated through state policies as a sign of dedication to the socialist ethics (priority of society over the individual), and they are highly collectivistic like the developing regions. However, after the collapse of the Soviet they are rapidly changing and these new alterations may have a considerable effect on their values and cultural attitudes; a tendency to westernization of social institutes may proportionately have led them to digress from some of their previous attitudes and tend to new ones. For example, after a long history of authoritarian political systems now they show their preference for more freedom rather than being overwhelmed by strong figures of power and then they tend to the Western cluster in variable Authoritarianism. A great emphasis on internationalism for decades in the ex-communist countries may partly explain their less nationalistic tendencies. And their lower scores in Omnipotence (in comparison to the developing countries) might to some extent be explained by a long experience of systematic state-controlled economy and society, which might have reduced their feelings of self-agency.

In the next chapter, theoretical aspects pertaining to the statistical analyses will be discussed.

Chapter Five

Discussion

According to the statistical results in the previous chapter, the nine independent variables had significant correlations with homicide. These variables indicated correlations also with one another, and were loaded on two factors. Though measures of correlation by themselves may not be enough to draw a certain conclusion about the relation between two or more phenomena, however in this study a speculation on the correlations amongst the independent variables seems to be instructive and informative.

First, let's have a glance over the two factors. The factor I refer to as Socio Economic Development (SED) is consisted of three variables which are highly correlated with one another. One of the variables (GNI) in this factor pertains to the national income and indeed is an important index of economic development. The second variable, Collectivism, seems to be reflective of traditional less developed societies, which usually have local pre-industrial relations, such as pastoral, and rural agricultural economies. Hence, because of the nature of economic relations they tend to a collective way of interaction. The very high negative correlation between these two variables (-.72) also implies this notion.

The third one, Power Distance also is correlated positively with Collectivism (.68) and negatively with GNI (-.69).

The other factor (Psy-Cul) is composed of 6 variables, which are moderately to highly correlated with one another. However the way some of these variables are incorporated with others in one factor may give additional information. For example, this question comes to mind that why there is such a strong positive correlation (.71) between Nationalism and Religiosity? This question seems to be substantial, especially because there is apparently incongruence between religion and nationalistic tendencies. Apart from Judaism which is to some extent an ethnic religion, other great religions claim to belong to whole human race. Clerics in both Christian and Islamic societies, who are sometimes engaged in an intensive rivalry upon a guaranteed salvation of mankind, find nationalism an obstacle to the religious fraternity of their followers. They spend lots of time and energy to welcome the fresh proselytes who get in their communities, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. Yet, those nations who have acknowledged the high importance of religion in their lives, in comparison to less religious nations, have stated that they are highly proud of their nationalities. So it seems that religion and nationalism have something in common and serve for the fulfillment of similar motivations, and may have an underlying psychological function.

Strong correlations can be also found between Religiosity and Absolutism (.67) and Authoritarianism and Religiosity (.71) which may not be unexpected; religions are usually based on a clear-cut distinction between “good” and “evil”, and they may intrinsically be more susceptible to ascribe such adjectives to others. The so-called authoritarian characters cannot believe in diversity and relativity of values and at the same time defend the “absolute truth”. However

the high positive correlation between Competitiveness and Religiosity (.74) is not usually expected. After all religions encourage their followers to have cooperation rather than competition, and it is interesting that according to the statistics, Zimbabwean, Moroccan, and Tanzanian samples are highly agree with competition, and the majority of Dutch, Finnish, and English samples find it harmful.

So in addition to the strength of the correlations among variables, the way each independent variable is construed as serving for a special function may give us hints about the intervening variable which incorporates them in one factor. Contemplation over the six variables of this factor may reveal two fundamental elements which assemble them together. We may call them *dichotomization* and *domination*. Through dichotomization, the world is divided in two opposite parts or extremes. These opposites can take labels such as friend and enemy, we and others, good and evil, and the like. Nationalism, Religiosity, and Absolutism (in the form of any extreme belief or ideology) have the function of dichotomization, through which people affiliate themselves to one of the two extremes, normally to the favorable and justified one. This subjective affiliation to one extreme entails justifications and adoption of attitudes to behave in a certain way that is, to dominate over the other supposed extreme. Authoritarianism, Omnipotence, and Competitiveness reflect a zest for domination. They reflect the contingent pattern of action which can be activated in specific times, for example when in a process of social judgment they categorize someone or some groups in their unfavorable category and send them into their blacklist. Then dichotomization and domination are somehow complementary, or the two sides of one coin. Indeed, things are dichotomized to be dominated. That is to fulfill the need for domination, one should obviously

confront with a real or imaginary rival, imaginary because if there is no real rival, one may create it. He needs to cast out his hatred and direct it toward the “other”, and in a similar way to a paranoid patient who projects his own suppressed desire to another person, he also externalizes this unbearable emotional state and ascribes all the vice to this “enemy”, and consequently gets ready to eliminate it. This early unspecified free-floating hatred may stem from a prolonged or recurrent accumulation of negative emotions resulting from perception of deprivation or discrimination.




Fig. 5.1 Two complementary processes in Psy-Cul Factor

Whatever is dichotomized, that is sharply split in two opposite sides, may then proportionally receive extremely opposite emotions: reverence and sanctity

for one side and despise and contempt for the other; one is conceived as the source of virtue and rectitude, and the other as the epitome of vice and falsehood. Such swinging between the opposite poles of glorification and disdain is typical to the authoritarian character. So the *dichotomization-dominance* process gives him justifications to outcries his hatred, when the occasion arises. Being dressed in one or another “sacred” ideological guise, the expression of hostility in word and action is accompanied by more self-confidence and courage. In violent societies, people may have more access to ready-made negative labels to use against their “enemies”. These labels usually are taken from group norms and are used against those who are apparently lacking commonly acknowledged virtues. Hence, there seems to be more such labels in collectivist societies, in which the group norms are taken more seriously, and individual diversities and innovations as well as breaking the norms are less tolerated than in individualist societies. While the latter societies, in comparison to the former ones, seem to leave their members free, and acknowledge their individual differences.

Then expression of hatred sometimes gradually turns to a cultural habit, and is frequently practiced or even prescribed. This prescription of violence is a prominent feature of the “cultures of honor” (as discussed in Chapter Three). The term *honor* refers to violence as something heroic and necessary rather than a human catastrophe, without which man’s reputation can be endangered. The six variables of the Psy-Cul Factor are also somehow related to this aspect. That is dominance over those who are perceived as rivals or enemies, satisfies competitive motives, enhances self-esteem and a sense of empowerment, and brings about a feeling of honor for one’s personal, national or religious “superiority”.

When zest for honor and supremacy becomes a salient feature of one's personality and behavior, and indeed as a powerful socially-induced motive should be satisfied, it signifies a more probability for interpersonal confrontations and as a result more interpersonal violence. This may happen more in people who have a group-oriented mentality that is, they may prefer to be *with* others and *above* them than to be separated and equal; so, contrary to our expectations of the collectivist societies to be cooperative they may behave, in general, more competitively than the so-called individualist societies. This is also what our data indicate ($r=.45$ for competitiveness and collectivism).

The dichotomization and domination, being linked to feelings like honor and mastery over others, are remindful of the signs and symptoms which are recognized in narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). A review of the criteria or the nine symptoms which the DSM-IV counts for NPD may give a better picture. These symptoms are:

1. An inflated or grandiose sense of self-importance (exaggeration in achievements and talents, expectation for being recognized as superior)
2. Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance and beauty
3. Belief in being "special" and unique
4. Need for excessive admiration
5. A sense of entitlement, that is unreasonable expectation of being favorably treated; expecting an automatic compliance with one's wishes
6. Interpersonal exploitation and taking advantage of others to achieve one's ends
7. Lack of empathy; unwillingness to acknowledge feelings and needs of others

8. Being envious or believing in being envied

9. Showing arrogance and haughty behavior and attitudes

When a narcissistic wish is not satisfied a rage ensues which may lead to retaliatory behavior. Looking at the criteria of narcissism, we may both by means of symptomatology and etiological process find a congruence between the Psy-Cul Factor and the narcissistic tendencies. Omnipotence may reflect feelings of grandiosity and tending to arrogance. Being highly proud of nationality and religiosity gives a feeling of uniqueness and again provides reasons for one's superiority over others. Authoritarian tendency is associated with the need for admiration, exertion of an unconditional control, and negligence toward the values and rights of the people who lack power. Competitiveness also can be related to a zest for superiority and achievement, as well as to exploitation and envy.

Up to now, I pointed out to the symptomatic similarities, but with regard to the etiology, a common defense mechanism involved in narcissism is *splitting*, in which "the object is divided into all good and all bad aspects" (Alper 2003, p. 34). Absolutism or the sharp distinction between good and evil (which has been found to be significantly different across nations, and strongly correlated with other mentioned variables) can be reflective of a mode of dichotomous categorization which has been established since the early age. The term dichotomization corresponds to this notion. Splitting is a determining defense mechanism in the development of borderline and narcissistic personality disorders (Kernberg 1975, as cited in Tangney and Dearing 2002); it is characterized by polarized shifts in evaluation of the self and others, and though at early stages of development, splitting can somewhat be normative, however in adults it takes the pathological form (ibid.). Regardless of diversities in

theoretical explanations of the secondary or pathological narcissism, the poor parent-child relation, especially as related to an empathic care, has been frequently considered as a common feature of the etiology of this disorder (e.g. see Adams 2007, pp. 108,116). Heinz Kohut (in Popper 2001) for example, refers to a “deprivation” which may stem from a callous maternal neglect and absence of a warm motherhood, that damages the mirroring process, a central part of identity formation, through which children get praises and acceptance usually on the side of their parents, for their accomplishments. This process is important for the establishment of self-esteem in children, and in addition if they feel that they are loved by parents only for their achievements not for what they are, then they are apt to develop a false self by which they make effort to get admiration and approval for their real or pretended accomplishments. Those children who do not get encouraging feedbacks and admirations (mirroring) may develop a narcissistic personality. That is the pathological narcissism ensues when there are barriers against personal development; in such cases the narcissist mirrors himself against others: he persistently emphasizes over the self-worth which has previously been withheld from him.

So in social and cultural milieus, which due to their crises and problems, can hardly provide their people with proper and optimal life conditions, may directly or indirectly decrease attention to children’s psychological needs, and increase the risk of impelling them to unhealthy personality development including narcissistic disorders. An implication of this statement is that hard life conditions may restrict child-rearing process at most to attention only to a minimum of children’s physical needs, and then has a detrimental effect on development of a healthy personality. Whatever can put people under pressure, which we may call as sources of anxiety (either real or perceived) may lead to a

shallow attention to the emotional needs of children, and overshadow them by other urgent necessities. Of course the perceived sources of anxiety may not be totally collinear with the external sources (such as poverty), however we may duly expect to find a higher tendency to a shortage in child-rearing and educational facilities.

Also if the Psy-Cul Factor as explained before may be an indicator of narcissistic tendencies, then we may probably infer that some nations, namely those which are high in this factor may in general provide more pathological conditions for the development of higher narcissistic tendencies in comparison to other nations. The significant negative correlations between the two factors found in this study ($r = -.47$) and between Psy-Cul Factor and GNI per capita ($r = -.56$) indicate that the developing nations are apparently more prone to this predicament. This inference, however, is at odds with Millon et al.'s (2000) conclusion, who have found the pathological narcissism associated with higher levels of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and then confirm Vaknin's (2001) objection to their view. Millon et al. link narcissism to over satisfaction of needs and with such a premise then it can be concluded that wealthy nations are more afflicted by narcissism. Vaknin has criticized them (and also Lasch) for looking for narcissism only in wealthy and individualist cultures and suggested that the presence of malignant narcissists all around the world indicates that "malignant narcissism is all-pervasive and independent of culture and society" (p. 402). He writes that the healthy narcissism in early age may develop in pathological narcissism through abusive behaviors which can be found everywhere. In addition to this critique, as pointed out in the Chapter Three, Triandis (1995) suggests two sources for narcissism: abundance, and extraordinary shortage of resources. The findings in this study may especially be

congruent with the latter possibility. If we take the Psy-Cul Factor as an indicator of narcissistic tendencies, then according to the national differences measured by this factor, it can be construed that the less economically and socially developed nations, including collectivist societies, are more susceptible to pathological narcissism. (The Psy-Cul and Collectivism showed a correlation of .4). So if the developing nations, which in general have a higher incidence of homicide than the developed world, show at the same time a more proneness to pathological narcissism, an explanation should be suggested for this relationship. So we have to ask what special conditions may lead a group of people both to collectivism (as the prevalent form of social relationship) and at the same time to a higher incidence of pathological narcissism?

A possible answer to this question might be that people in the underdeveloped world have experienced a longer history of hardship and anxiety inducing conditions, e.g. shortage of vital resources and famine, natural or human made disasters such as wars and invasions that can potentially unite people of a same geography. Under specific conditions, for example the chronicity or recurrence of such aversive conditions (or the resulting psychological reactions) this unity may take an exaggerated and negative form which is contradictory to the individual rights and freedoms, in a way that community and its goals get an unequivocal precedence over the individual wishes, leading to excessive collectivistic life styles. Negligence toward individual independence and freedom may to some extent have an inhibitory effect on emotional development and on actualization of individual potentialities. Narcissism in an underdeveloped collectivist culture can be described as the rebellion of individuality, a maladaptive exaggerated effort to get rid of being a shadow among other shadows and to move into the limelight.

In contrast, in an individualist culture more emphasis is laid on the worthiness and importance of individuals, through which in the process of social and interpersonal interactions, individuals may get more personal attention and encouragement and as a result achieve to a more self-esteem, and emotional stability.

Hence, pathological narcissism may take different manifestations in both so-called collectivist and individualist cultures. That is, pathological narcissism in an individualist may be better labeled with egotism in which the afflicted person finds himself in a separate and secluded world and doesn't care about others and their needs, while in the collectivist culture the narcissist may actively use and exploit others in order to enhance his self worth; he is more socially oriented and seems to be hungry of respect and admiration by others, and others have a place in his mind so far as they can satisfy his needs for mastery and superiority. He is interested in getting control over others and gaining an ever-increasing honor. So I may call the first type as *phlegmatic* narcissist and the second as *choleric* narcissist. But how may this cultural difference lead to a difference in violence rate? It can be postulated that sort of a possessive attitude, a mutual belongingness, may exist amongst people in the collectivist cultures, which can bring about higher interpersonal expectations and as a result lead to a higher probability of being subject to emotional vulnerability and negative feelings of rejection and unworthiness. They may (and this can be a theme for a separate study) exaggerate in their interpretation of a situation as contemptuous or rejecting, and may be apt to construe lack of enough respect on the side of others as a sign of hostility. The choleric narcissists in comparison to the phlegmatic ones may be touchier and their feelings may become wounded much easier. The higher expectations in social interaction, pave the way for more

conflictive conditions that in their turn may lead to violence. The possessive attitude, the emotional ties, higher expectation of honor and respect, can give rise to the establishment of an authoritarian character and power structure in a collectivist culture. This process can be shown in the following picture:





Fig. 5.2 Psychological responses to structural conditions

The above explanation is consistent with the findings of this study. Lower levels of socio-economic development are associated with higher tendency in a factor which has been explained as an indicator of narcissistic tendencies. Both factors as discussed above are significantly correlated with homicide. The interactive model of socio-economic - psycho-cultural is suggestive of a mediation effect, Psy-Cul as a mediator between SED Factor and homicide:



Factor scores of both factors were used in two regression analyses. Sobel's test ($z = -2.26, p = .02$) confirmed a unidirectional mediation in correspondence with the above model, suggesting that the Psy-Cul Factor (narcissism) can be a by-product of human interaction in specific social conditions, which in its turn can significantly predict homicide in those societies.

Concluding remarks

Homicide was found to be significantly associated with the aforementioned variables, and the two resulting factors. Feeling of omnipotence which was the strongest predictor of homicide is in its essence a sign of law-breaking behavior and is in contrast with a tolerant democratic thought style. So are also the other variables e.g. Absolutism, Authoritarianism, and Collectivism in its vertical form (which tends to sacrifice individual freedom and rights for the sake of figures of power). The two factors, as discussed before, reflect two groups of variables which are involved in the dynamics of homicide: levels of the socio economic development, and vulnerability to pathological narcissism. The connotation of this statement is that we may expect for a more chance for emergence of pathological narcissism in less socio economically developed areas. This is what can be concluded on the basis of a combination of the statistical findings and the theoretical assumptions in this study. Narcissism is intrinsically antagonistic to a tolerant way of social relation, and therefore contradictory to democratic thought style. Then there is no wonder if we trace higher incidences of such psychological reactions in those societies which are stuck in lots of economic problems and nondemocratic social systems. In one general view and from a pathological standpoint we may make a distinction between two groups of pathogenic and nonpathogenic cultures. Psychopathology

traces the root and the core of neuroses and many personality disorders in a prolonged or unbearable anxiety, and alas anxiety is not uncommon in many areas of the underdeveloped (and maldeveloped) world. Our anxieties usually come from our life conditions and wherever life is under pressure, and people are under inhumane conditions, prejudiced and discriminated, the probability of formation of pathological behavior is increased. The variables already discussed in this study can be to some extent symptoms of pathogenic cultures. Narcissistic vulnerabilities reflect one's preoccupation with his self-esteem, something that is injured especially in those milieus which endanger human personal development. Threats against individual freedom, and imposing stereotyped patterns of thought and action on people, may obstruct their natural way of psychological development and eventually bring about pathological behavior. Nondemocratic social formations may also lead to some emotional immaturity; emotional intelligence which has an essential role in conflict resolution may be achieved in the course of free social contacts and experiences, and the suppressing cultures can also damage the normal emotional maturity and learning the necessary ways for controlling the aggressive impulses. So it seems that a continuous and serious endeavor for the institutionalization of democracy accompanied by amelioration of life standards in the underdeveloped world in the long run can decrease homicide rates and probably other forms of harsh violence.



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Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit mit dem Titel “Culture and Violence: Psycho-cultural Variables Involved in Homicide across Nations“ selbständig verfasst habe. Es wurde keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt. Alle wörtlichen und sinngemäßen Entlehnungen sind als solche gekennzeichnet. Die Dissertation oder Teile daraus sind vorher nicht als Prüfungsarbeit für eine staatliche oder andere wissenschaftliche Prüfung eingereicht worden. Weder die gleiche noch eine andere Abhandlung sind vorher bei einer anderen Hochschule als Dissertation eingereicht worden.

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